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 Writing a doctoral dissertation is a great privilege and a rare opportunity for which I am 
very grateful. In addition to the specific social, economic and historical conditions that allowed 
me to carry out my research and write the dissertation, I could not have done it without the 
support of many people over the years. I conducted most of the research in the Central Highlands 
of Peru and wrote the dissertation in Lima, Ann Arbor and Johnson City, Tennessee; along this 
journey I have accumulated many debts of gratitude. 
 I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee at the University of 
Michigan, who guided my graduate education and oversaw this project. Fernando Coronil was an 
inspiring mentor and thinker who combined intellectual boundary-crossing with rigor grounded 
in research and in theory. He was always pushing his students to go beyond surfaces and 
appearances and to search for connections among seemingly separate objects of study. His 
passing in 2011 was a great intellectual and personal loss but has in no way diminished his 
legacy. Bruce Mannheim had a strong impact on this dissertation and on my graduate education, 
through his profound knowledge of and engagement with Peru, which was important for me as I 
became reacquainted with the country I had left at the age of eleven. Bruce always held his 
students to a high and often critical standard when it came to formulating statements about Peru, 
and for that I am very grateful. Stuart Kirsch kept me connected to world anthropology and to 
broader literatures with which I needed to engage. He was an encouraging and thoughtful mentor 
who brought a critical eye to my work and provided detailed feedback on my writing, in addition 
to sharing his broad knowledge of the global mining industry. Julie Skurski had an impact on the 
whole of my graduate career through her commitment to an Anthro-History perspective and 
ethic. She never allowed her students to get too comfortable with conventional categories but 
rather always pushed them to be critical. Sueann Caulfield provided me with grounding in 
historical methodology and Latin Americanist historiography; her seminar on Gender, Ethnicity 
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and the Family in Latin American History in particular provided me with a solid immersion in 
contemporary methods and frameworks. 
 While conducting ethnographic, oral history and archival research in the highlands of 
Pasco Department, I received the help of many people. Doing field research is not always an 
easy experience. Yet I was impressed with the hospitality and generosity shown by so many 
people who received me in their homes, helped me find contacts and allowed me to accompany 
them on a number of everyday activities. In Huayllay, I am particularly grateful to Dalia Roque, 
the late Máximo Roque, the Calderón family, Armando López, Desiderio Roque, Gaudencio 
Machacuay, as well as the different communal authorities who gave me permission to conduct 
research in the community. The Huayllay Communal Cooperative and the Communal Company 
EMICONSATH were also generous and helpful. In Rancas, I want to thank my friends Jhames 
Gora Romero, Jhoel Rivera Santiago, Carlos Gora Oscátegui and the rest of the Rivera and Gora 
families, whom I had the good fortune of meeting through Elizabeth Lino Cornejo. They 
impressed me with their warm hospitality and their sense of pride in their community and its 
history, not to mention their sense of humor.  
In Cerro de Pasco, I am grateful to Juan Santiago Atencio, Zenón Aira Díaz, Pío 
Mendoza Villanueva, Atilio Córdova, Gustavo Córdova Guadalupe, Domingo Soto, Huber 
Rosales Huamán, Víctor Raúl Maldonado Tomás, as well as Aquilina Robles and her family, and 
the late Pablo Vargas Yacolca from Yarusyacán. Flaviano Bianchini and Javier Arellano-
Yanguas were in Cerro at different moments during my research, and I benefitted from my 
conversations with them. The staff at Centro de Cultura Popular Labor was always kind, friendly 
and helpful in facilitating contacts and giving me access to their collection of written materials. 
In Huayllay, Rancas and Cerro de Pasco there are also several individuals whom I would like to 
thank but to whom, for a number of different reasons, I would rather not draw undue attention. 
They should know that my gratitude extends to them as well. If I were to truly thank every 
person who was generous during my research, this acknowledgements section would have to 
extend for many more pages. 
 In the city of Huancayo, I owe thanks to Raúl Rivadeneyra and Alina Véliz; in Lima, I 
am grateful to Denis Sulmont, Silvana Vargas Winstanley, Carlos Alarcón Aliaga, Jorge 
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Quezada Liñán, Víctor Falconí, Mariella Estrada and María Fe Celi Reyna, as well as Ricardo 
Caro Cárdenas, Pablo Sandoval López, Carolina Garay Doig and the rest of the Study Group on 
the History of the Peruvian Left at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. The staff at the Biblioteca 
Nacional del Perú as well as Ana María Arróspide at the Centro de Documentación Social of the 
Universidad Católica helped me to find important print and archival materials.  
 My ability to write this dissertation depended on my academic and intellectual formation 
over the years. I owe a big thanks to my undergraduate advisor, Peter Rachleff, who introduced 
me to labor history as well as to politically committed scholarship (and to my first Marx reading 
group). I am also grateful to Arjun Guneratne, who drew me to anthropology, and to Teresita 
Martínez-Vergne, who introduced me to Latin American history. Going further back in time, I 
cannot fail to mention those Junior High and High School teachers who were most inspiring in 
encouraging me to pursue my goals, particularly Susan Peel, Linda Eason and Carol Kirkwood in 
Laramie, Wyoming. 
 The research for this dissertation was completed with funding from both the Fulbright-
Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program, and the Rackham Graduate School at the 
University of Michigan. At the University of Michigan, I am most grateful to the Doctoral 
Program in Anthropology and History, which had faith in me and provided a supportive learning 
environment in which unconventional thinking and student participation were encouraged. David 
Cohen, Fernando Coronil, Julie Skurski and Paul Johnson imparted their critical spirit to the 
Program, at workshops, seminars and gatherings. Diana Denney was generous with her time and 
expertise in helping me get through numerous deadlines and requirements. I also want to thank 
the Rackham Graduate School as well as the staff at Hatcher Library, especially Interlibrary 
Loan, whose assistance was essential during the writing stage. Besides the faculty already 
mentioned, I am indebted to Margaret Somers, Rebecca Scott, Gillian Feeley-Harnik and Leslie 
Pincus. Beyond Michigan, David Pedersen, Liisa North and Marisol de la Cadena provided 
helpful advice, ideas and encouragement at different moments.   
 At Michigan, I benefitted most from my conversations with my fellow graduate students. 
For generously sharing their friendship, advice and feedback over years of study, I want to thank 
Danna Agmon, Daniel Birchok, Esteban Rozo, Stephen Sparks, Nafisa Essop Sheik, Anneeth 
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Kaur Hundle, Purvi Mehta, Afia Ofori-Mensa, Angela Parker, Lori Roddy, Rebecca Carter, 
Joshua Coene, as well as Guillermo Salas, who contributed many ideas that helped to frame my 
research. Janam Mukherjee, Colleen Woods, Brady G’Sell, Angélica Serna, Joshua Shapero, 
Bridget Guarasci, Jessica Smith-Rolston, Robert Chidester, Jennifer Bowles, Federico Pous, 
Margarita Huayhua, Nathalie Koc-Menard, Anna MacCourt and Karla Peña provided useful 
critical feedback and/or encouragement either on chapters of this dissertation or on my research 
questions at crucial stages in my graduate career. I also learned a great deal from the officers, 
stewards and fellow teaching assistants in the Graduate Employees Organization, who gave 
freely of their time and effort to ensure a more equitable working and living environment for all 
TAs at the University of Michigan, and to work for a more democratic labor movement beyond 
the confines of the university. 
I am deeply thankful to my friend Karl Dahlquist for his loyal support over the years, as 
well as his sense of humor. In Lima I owe thanks to many friends and relatives who supported 
me in various ways during my years of doing the research and writing for this dissertation, in 
particular Salomón Helfgott Lerner, Erla Zúñiga Vinces, my aunts Elba, Magda and María 
Cristina and the rest of the Zúñiga, Helfgott and Seier families, as well as Anacé Bedón Huiza, 
Edgar Vera, Jean Anfossi and Luis Huamán Ramírez.  
 My siblings, Harald and Gabriela, provided a model and example for me through their 
hard work and achievements. The joy that my niece Adela and my nephews Santiago and 
Joaquín have brought to my family has helped to encourage and cheer me up during the last few 
years. I owe a big thanks to my grandmother, the late María Zúñiga Cerdán (Abuelita María), 
who helped raise me and who awakened my imagination with her stories about her childhood in 
a small town in northern Peru. My other grandparents, Gustavo, Moisés, Berta and Leah, 
whether they lived long enough to know me or not, have nevertheless had a lasting influence on 
my life through their deeds and their journeys. 
 My partner, Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, has left her imprint in much of my work, by 
accompanying me on several occasions during research and by exchanging ideas and analyses. 
She believed in my abilities even when I doubted them, and convinced me that I could complete 
this dissertation; her encouragement was incredibly important for me. 
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 Most of all, I want to thank my parents, Michel Helfgott Lerner and Edith Seier Zúñiga, 
who raised me with much love and who inspired me with their deep respect for learning as well 
as their belief in social justice. For those reasons, and many others, this dissertation is dedicated 
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 This dissertation is a historical ethnography of a mining region in central Peru, as well as 
an attempt to reflect on how social formations and antagonisms within capitalism shift over time. 
The starting point for this investigation is the decline in class-based politics that took place in 
parts of the world at the end of the 20th century, and the simultaneous rise of new social 
movements. In the Peruvian mining industry, the 1980s and 90s saw a shift from the 
predominance of labor conflicts to that of mine-community struggles over land, environmental 
and distribution issues. Through research in an area where both the labor and the land relation 
involve many of the same populations, I interrogate these late-20th century transformations and 
place them in the context of longer-term dynamics, in particular the century-long transition from 
labor shortage to labor surplus. I also re-examine the social history of the mining camps, 
focusing especially on topics such as everyday life, the household and the environment. This 
world ended in the 1980s and early 90s, during a period of decline precipitated by the global 
crisis of capitalist accumulation, and in a context of political violence. Yet as a new mining 
boom has taken hold since the mid-1990s and especially since 2003 (prompted by the 
industrialization of China), capital has encountered new challenges. Open-pit mines, which 
require little labor, have encountered widespread opposition, due to their invasive encroachment 
on local space as well as the sense of exclusion they foster. Underground mines, such as those in 
my region of focus, continue to require significant amounts of labor, even if a labor surplus is 
also present here. As the voice and power of labor have declined, however, the land/local 
community relation has taken over many of its functions, becoming socially “thick” as a 
repository for people´s expectations of progress and for the defense of local agency against 
powerful outside entities such as mining companies. I thus conclude by arguing that there is a 
surplus of the social that overflows the forms set by struggles over value, and that then expresses 





This dissertation is a historical ethnography of a traditional mining region in Peru. At a 
broader level, however, it is concerned with social transformations under capitalism, particularly 
with how social groups cohere and shift over time, and how categories and identities rise and 
fall. In particular, my research began with an interest in the global decline in class-based politics 
that took place towards the end of the 20th century, and the simultaneous rise of new identities 
and social movements. These interrelated processes took place both at the level of social reality 
(most markedly with the collapse of “really existing socialism” and the decline of labor unions in 
much of the world) and of academic analysis. On the latter plane, an important shift in the 
perspective of the intellectual Left was articulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in 
1985, when they wrote that “from the point of view of the determining of the fundamental 
antagonisms, the basic obstacle, as we have seen, has been classism: that is to say, the idea that 
the working class represents the privileged agent in which the fundamental impulse of social 
change resides” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 177; emphasis in original). It would be incorrect to 
assume that intellectual Marxism had previously been solely focused on the working class; 
nevertheless, statements like this served to articulate and acknowledge a greater willingness to 
decenter categories that had previously been central and to open up analysis towards other social 
and political relations and identities. 
  At the level of social and political change, these late 20th-century shifts have been highly 
uneven, with great variation depending on the region and sector involved. In the particular case 
of the global mining industry, many mining worker communities were displaced during these 
decades, and their formerly strong unions weakened (with important exceptions such as South 
Africa). At the same time, as Ballard and Banks (2003) have written, an important new category 
arose in the 1980s: “local communities,” which “swiftly assumed a pivotal position in the 
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politics and analyses of the wider global mining community” (288). This shift was reflected in 
the contrast between Godoy’s earlier (1985) review of the anthropology of mining, which 
devoted significant attention to mining workers, and Ballard and Banks’ own greater focus on 
the “resource wars” involving local communities, transnational advocates, corporations and the 
state.  
 In Peru, this transition has been even sharper than in other mining countries. Although 
mining workers there were never quite as central to national politics as their Bolivian 
counterparts (Damonte 2005, 63), they were nevertheless an important actor within the broader 
Peruvian labor movement up until the late 1980s. Moreover, for the national mining industry 
labor issues were certainly the biggest source of social conflict in the 1970s and 80s, the decades 
of greatest strike activity. By contrast, since the 1990s, and most of all in the last decade, the 
renewed expansion of mining activity has generated widespread social conflict, but this time 
between companies and local communities. In the last few years, some of these conflicts have 
become significant enough to affect national politics, even leading to the resignation of an entire 
government cabinet in late 2011 (as a result of the protests over the Conga gold mining project). 
Although the mining labor movement has recovered slightly from its nadir in the mid-to-late 
1990s, labor conflicts today are on the whole much less politically visible than the company-
local community disputes.  
This change has been accompanied by a corresponding shift in the academic scholarship 
on mining in Peru. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, a group of sociologists, 
historians and anthropologists conducted research on the formation of a working class in the 
mines, and the social dynamics, political struggles and cultural formations that this entailed 
(Bonilla 1974, Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, Laite 1981, DeWind 1987, Flores Galindo 1993 [1974], 
and Salazar-Soler 2002 and 2006). By contrast, in recent years the attention of scholars and 
analysts has turned to mining again, but this time to the relationships and conflicts that have 
emerged between corporations and local communities (Barrantes et al. 2005, Bebbington et al. 
2007, Scurrah et al. 2008, Salas 2008, Damonte 2009, Gil 2009, De Echave et al. 2009).  This 
new scholarship has yielded many important insights into contemporary mine-community 
conflicts in Peru. However, for the most part, it has not directly examined the change in the 
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nature of social conflicts around mining, from labor to the “local community” (with the 
important exception of an essay by Anahí Durand (2011) which discusses the transition “from 
miners to indigenous people” (de mineros a indígenas) in the region of Angaraes, Huancavelica, 
as well as the reflections in Chapter 2 of Damonte 2009).  Moreover, the earlier literature left off 
around the year 1980, and could not have predicted either the demise of the old mining camp 
model nor the decline of the mining unions. This process has thus been left largely unexamined 
as a historical event. Although this neglect is certainly understandable from the perspective of 
the contemporary literature, given its aims and purposes, it does mean that the “decline of labor” 
is assumed rather than examined, and that potential continuities and transformations are missed 
in the face of what seems like a total, radical break.1 
This shift or break in the literature on mining in Peru is a particularly sharp instance of 
the broader change in intellectual analysis in much of the world that was theorized by Laclau and 
Mouffe: the move away from the emphasis on class and towards a focus on the “plurality of 
democratic struggles which are decided in good part outside the class itself” (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985, 177). While I certainly believe this has been a productive intellectual shift, there is a risk 
of ignoring the potential for articulation and connection between the old class-based analysis and 
politics (and the social formations on which it focused), on the one hand, and the intellectual and 
political currents and identities that are most pominent today, on the other. As Greg Grandin 
writes, 
Over the last decade, scholars have heralded such ‘new social movements’ for mobilizing 
around culture, community, sexual, and gender identities and interests and for moving 
away from class analysis and an obsessive focus on the state and economic development. 
Yet notwithstanding its reputation, in many countries the old, class-based left was, on the 
ground, more varied and vibrant than its rhetoric often suggested. Despite their inability 
to incorporate culture and race into their analyses and visions of progress, left political 
parties and labor organizations in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile and Peru, for 
some examples, drew significant support from rural, often indigenous communities.... 
Just as recent work in U.S. history has revealed important bridges between the activism 
of the 1930s and subsequent civil, gay, and women’s rights movements, there often exists 
                                                          
1 Again, the shift in the mining literature is sharper in the scholarship on Peru than on that concerning other mining 
countries. For example, Ferry (2005) and Rajak (2011) do examine issues of mining labor ethnographically, for 
Mexico and South Africa, respectively. Similarly, Finn (1998) and Klubock (1998) have published works on the 
history of mining workers in Chile (and the United States in the case of Finn).  
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in Latin America a direct link between the older left and new social movements (Grandin 
2004, 192-193).   
In the specific case of conflicts around mining, the links between the “old” and the “new” 
at the level of politics have certainly been disrupted by structural transformations and 
restructuring in the global mining industry, and the corresponding changes in local social 
formations, as will be examined in this dissertation. Yet if nothing else, in a country like Peru – 
where, unlike in the U.S., the highland indigenous population has historically comprised the 
main labor force for the mines – there is a significant continuity at the level of the people 
involved in the old labor struggles and the new company-community conflicts. This is especially 
true in the Central Highlands, Peru’s traditional mining region.   
Thus, on one level my dissertation seeks to inquire into the historical transition that leads 
up into the present day – i.e. the “decline of labor” and the “rise of the local community.” To 
what degree is this only a surface appearance and to what degree does it represent an underlying 
reality? Has labor disappeared from the social landscape of mining regions the way it has 
vanished from academic analysis (in Peru) and from the concerns of most NGOs? If still present, 
what transformations has it undergone? What are the consequences and implications of these 
changes? Are there any continuities or commonalities between what we could call the old 
“communities of labor” and the new “local communities”? Although the mining industry 
certainly has its own economic, technological and social dynamics, these are questions that I 
believe resonate more broadly with issues of social articulation and transformation in global 
capitalism. I thus set out to examine these questions empirically, through a concrete study in one 
particular mining area of Peru – a country situated not at the center but rather on the periphery of 
global capitalism, where the “formation of the working class” had always been a more tenuous 
process to begin with. 
However, as I began, I realized that I could not adequately grasp these late-20th century 
shifts without a proper understanding of the longer trajectory of the labor-centered paradigm in 
the Peruvian mining industry since the early 1900s, and of local society more broadly. While on 
paper historical transformations may appear swift, sudden and all-encompassing, in the actual 
social world they often turn out to mask longer-term continuities and gradual, slowly evolving 
changes. While the restructuring of the 1980s and 90s had formed my initial object of inquiry, I 
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soon realized that the years leading up to that moment had not been one long, homogenous 
period of stable mining camp life, as I had assumed at first, but rather had been punctuated by 
several shifts that were almost as significant as what occurred at the end of the century. In 
general, I found I could not adequately analyze the transition of the 1980s and 90s without 
understanding what had come before.  
Thus, the project became not only an inquiry into the late-20th century shift but also a 
reexamination of the social history of mining in the Central Highlands of Peru since the early 
1900s. In this aim I was greatly helped by the historical, sociological and anthropological studies 
cited earlier. However, it has not been my purpose to simply summarize their findings or use 
them as background to my own work. Rather, I have conducted my own primary research into 
these earlier decades, as part of my overall investigation. While the earlier works contained many 
useful insights and analyses, scholarly perspectives have also changed since the 1970s and early 
80s, and my aim has been also to incorporate some of these analytical shifts. For example, I have 
tried to pay more attention to issues of everyday life and practice, as well as environmental 
history, and also to rethink the narratives of “proletarianization” and “working-class formation” 
that – understandably – were present in many of the earlier works. These narratives inevitably 
look different now after the dislocation and “flexibilization” of labor at the end of the 20th 
century. In this sense, my work seeks to make a modest contribution to the new social history of 
20th-Peru, along the lines of recent works such as Drinot (2011), Parker (1998), Drinot and 
Garofalo (2005), and, from the perspective of historical ethnography, De la Cadena (2000) and 
Mayer (2009). One particular feature of my research as social history is the fact that it focuses on 
the crossroads between the world of industrial labor and capitalism – usually associated more 
with urban spaces – and the rural world, i.e. between labor history and agrarian history.  
This “crossroads” aspect has to do with the fact that my research examines the world of 
mines and mining camps in highland Peru. Specifically, I focus on the Central Highlands, and on 
Pasco Department, where I conducted most of my research, in particular. While the new mining 
investments since the 1990s have been located all across northern, central and southern Peru, for 
much of the 20th century it was the mining centers of the central and south-central highlands, 
especially in the departments of Junín, Pasco and Huancavelica, as well as the highlands of 
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Lima, that were the most important. In particular, Pasco Department contains the historic mine of 
Cerro de Pasco – the most important silver mining center in the Andes after Potosí during the 
late-colonial and 19th-century periods, and an important polymetallic producer still today -  as 
well as several important medium-scale Peruvian mines, such as Brocal (Colquijirca), Milpo, 
Atacocha and Huarón. While many of the workers at these mines have historically come from 
valley agricultural regions such as the Mantaro Valley (Junín Department) and Huánuco, there is 
also a rural population in Pasco itself, and the comunidades there played an important role during 
the land recuperation movement of the early 1960s, accelerating the decline of the haciendas 
(large estates) across Peru. Thus, it seemed like an appropriate place to study the intersections 
between issues of labor, land and “local community” in relation to mining.  
Specifically, I focused primarily on two mining centers: Cerro de Pasco itself, which is a 
small city, and one of the medium-scale mines in the department, Huarón (and its more recently 
developed neighbor, the Animón/Chungar mine), situated next to the small town and comunidad 
campesina (peasant community) of Huayllay. I conducted ethnographic and oral history research 
in Cerro de Pasco, in the adjacent comunidad of Rancas, and in the comunidad of Huayllay, 
spending several months in each of these three locations. Since they are all reasonably close to 
one another, my dissertation is thus in a sense a historical ethnography of a region rather than of 
discrete villages or communities – although the focus shifts over the course of the chapters, with 
the social history component centered more squarely on Huayllay and the Huarón mine, and only 
secondarily on Cerro de Pasco. Altogether, I spent around 16 months in this area, and have 
continued to visit periodically since. I also conducted significant archival research, as well as a 
few interviews, in Lima, to complement the archival material I also gathered in Pasco itself. 
Some of the archives I have used for this research are those of the state mining company 
Centromín, the National Federation of Mining, Metal and Steel Workers of Peru (housed at the 
National Library), the Denis Sulmont Labor Archive at the Catholic University of Peru, the 
collection of engineers´ theses at the National Engineering University (UNI), and local archives 
such as the one I examine in Chapter 3. I also visited the city of Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley 
twice in order to interview former mining workers and company employees living there.  
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The choice of area focus within Peru thus leads to certain particular features in my 
research, which I discuss at greater length in the body of the dissertation. First of all, due to the 
altitude, at around 4,300 meters above sea level, this is a livestock-raising (sheep, alpacas and to 
a lesser degree bovine cattle) rather than agricultural area. Nevertheless, the region´s historical 
association with mining and with capitalist development in the 20th century has meant that 
population density is higher than would otherwise be expected given the altitude. Second, it is 
today a primarily Spanish-speaking region, although a variety of Central Peruvian Quechua is 
spoken by many elderly residents and is generally considered to be part of recent history and 
local identity. Third, as is clear from the subject matter of this dissertation, this is an area that 
saw a significant influx of foreign and also national capital during the course of the 20th century. 
It thus underwent certain processes of capitalist development and modernization to a greater 
degree than many other parts of Peru; this development furthermore took place in particular ways 
given that it had to do with mining rather than, say, industry or commercial agriculture. That 
said, it is not an area that is considered to be at the forefront of modernization in Peru anymore; 
rather, it tends to be associated with old-style, rather than what is today labeled “modern” (i.e. 
post-1990s) mining, as well as with environmental pollution. While certainly not an isolated 
region, it is regarded as distant from the perspective of the national capital, Lima, due to the 
difference in altitude, and is entirely outside the tourist circuits being avidly promoted in Peru 
today.  
Lastly, although this dissertation traces the decline of labor conflicts and the rise of 
company-community conflicts, in Pasco the latter generally do not take the form that they have 
at times had in recent years at certain large mining projects in Peru, such as Tambogrande, Majaz 
(Río Blanco), Tía María, Conga and Cañariaco –where local populations have protested to stop 
mines from being developed in the first place. In Pasco this has only occurred, to some degree, in 
one case – the Brocal Company´s San Gregorio zinc open-pit project, which has been 
indefinitely stalled by the community of Vicco, as discussed briefly in Chapter 6. Other mine-
community conflicts in the region have instead involved disputes over the terms and conditions 
of mining operations, not the questioning of the mines´ existence itself. This has to do with 
several issues: the predominance of livestock raising rather than agriculture, the area´s higher 
proportion of underground mining, which employs more people and destroys less land, (the two 
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open-pit mines of Cerro de Pasco and Brocal notwithstanding), and finally the local population´s 
historic dependence on mining work and mining-related economic activity.  
The overall argument of the dissertation can be summarized as follows. Both long-run 
and late-20th century factors have shaped the transition from the predominance of labor conflicts 
to that of mine-community disputes. Among the long-term factors is the shift, traced in Chapter 
1, from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. The more recent, late-20th century 
factors include the “neoliberal” solution to the crisis of the 1970s and 80s – particularly the 
change in the labor laws. More importantly, both the long-term and the more recent factors 
involve a subtle shift in the location of “the social” and the “social burden” - these concepts 
defined both as the site of company interventions into society, and as the locus of people´s 
demands for economic and educational progress in the face of inequality and partial exclusion. 
This shift becomes particularly evident in the case of Huayllay, where the old workers´ camp and 
the local comunidad have essentially fused together. The types of demands and concerns that 
used to be channeled through the world of the mining camp, the union and the workers´ 
collective bargaining agreements with the company are today channeled through company-
comunidad negotiations in which land, rather than labor, is the explicit object of contention. 
Capital has mostly overcome, for now, the obstacles posed by the organization of labor, but it 
has not overcome the power of organized, and in this case landowning communities, a power 
which may be modest in the global scheme of things but which in the case of Peru has increased 
rather than decreased in recent decades.2 Thus, while in the past capital was concerned with 
maintaining “labor peace” in order to be able to proceed with mining operations, today it is most 
concerned with the attainment and preservation of “social peace,” or, to use a more common 
industry term, “social license.” Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs are one way to 
facilitate this, and in this sense they can be seen as an integral and necessary component of the 
                                                          
2 One way that we could think of this in somewhat Marxian terms would be to speculate that while in the late 
twentieth century labor was defeated in its challenge to capital in the realm of value (i.e. the distribution of power 
and of the fruits of society´s collective efforts), the realm of use-value (i.e. the multiple needs, uses, goods and forms 
of wealth in society) has its own separate trajectory, and may continue to grow and change over time, generating a 
surplus that overflows the social forms set by the struggles over value. That surplus will then express itself through 
other social antagonisms that it finds available.  
9 
 
system of production, not unlike similar elements in older times (i.e. worker housing, social 
work, etc.).  
I do not pretend that this argument accurately describes the changes in the conflicts that 
have taken place in all Peruvian mining sites, let alone in mines around the world. For example, 
there is little doubt in my mind that the recent and ongoing conflict over the Conga mining 
project in Cajamarca (northern Peru) has involved the emergence of what Martínez-Alier (2003) 
has called “the environmentalism of the poor” – a concept I do not employ much in this 
dissertation. Some versions of this phenomenon have emerged in the Central Highlands and 
Pasco at certain times in the past, as I discuss in the last chapter of the dissertation, but it is not as 
visible today – at least it does not have the same centrality as in the Conga conflict. Thus, to 
understand the latter conflict we would require different analytical tools and approaches, in 
addition to the ones discussed here. Certainly, the argument summarized in the previous 
paragraph is most relevant to a context like that of Huayllay, which combines a history of 
industrial mining employment, late-20th century restructuring of labor, and strong local 
institutions based around the hold over land. In the case of the city of Cerro de Pasco nearby, the 
first two of these factors are present, but the “local community” is a fragmented urban population 
rather than a landowning comunidad that negotiates with the company. The result is a lower 
corporate preoccupation with “the social” and a decreased ability on the part of the local 
population to bargain collectively with the mining company. Clearly, each site has its own 
particularities, and generalizations are difficult to make. 
Nevertheless, I feel that the approach developed here has a relevance that goes beyond 
the specific case of Huayllay or Pasco Department. Although some features of my research site 
are specific and different from other places, others are more widely shared across mining sites in 
Peru and beyond. In particular, the shift from labor shortage to labor surplus is connected to a 
broader structural feature in capitalism – what Marx called the “relative surplus population” or 
“reserve army of labor” – even if it has taken a particular form in mining contexts and in 
countries like Peru. Moreover, not only is the late-twentieth-century restructuring of labor a 
phenomenon shared across much of the world, but it also necessarily implies shifts in the 
definition and location of “the social” and “the social burden.” And just like a landowning 
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community becomes a way to articulate demands and negotiate conditions and benefits in a 
region like Pasco, around the world new identities and forms of social and political articulation 
are emerging even as older ones decline. Thus, I believe that the arguments developed here serve 
to highlight certain dimensions of mining conflicts whose relevance goes beyond the specific 
case of the mining industry and of Peru, and which can help to understand broader issues of 
shifts and mutations in social forms and antagonisms in contemporary capitalism. 
These arguments are developed gradually over the course of an examination of concrete 
historical and ethnographic material. The first three chapters comprise the social history 
component of the dissertation, and focus primarily on the Huarón mine and the local society in 
Huayllay District, with a secondary focus on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC). The reason 
for this is that the previous works on mining workers in Peru tended to focus primarily on the 
CPC (with the exception of Salazar-Soler 2002 and 2006), leaving aside more rural, medium-
scale mines of which Huarón is just one example. In Chapter 1, after a brief introduction on the 
development of mining in Peru, I trace the historical background of the Huayllay area. I then 
proceed to elaborate the main argument of the chapter – i.e. the transition from labor shortage to 
labor surplus in Huayllay, Pasco and by extension other mining regions in Peru. I find this to be a 
more useful framework from today´s perspective than the narrative of “proletarianization” and 
“working-class formation” (or “peasants into miners”) that was posited by many of the earlier 
studies, and which was critiqued, for the case of Zambia, by Ferguson (1999). The transition 
from labor shortage to labor surplus involves not only the mechanization of mining, but, more 
crucially, the incorporation of rural populations at least partially into the capitalist sphere, with 
its new social dynamics, expectations and needs. In this sense, the discussion of traditional 
exchange systems in the background section of the chapter is relevant to the argument about the 
transition, for it describes some of the older world that was replaced by wage labor and market 
exchange. 
Chapter 2 continues the examination of the social history of mining in this area, but with 
a focus on work, in part through life histories of mining workers and other people involved with 
the mining workforce. The chapter furthermore focuses not just on the sphere of mining work 
itself but also on that of “reproductive work,” in the sense of the reproduction of labor-power. A 
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bridge between these two spheres is formed by a theoretical discussion of the status of 
reproductive and household work within Marx´s labor theory of value. This is a question that 
provoked significant scholarly and political debate in the 1970s. My own inclination is on the 
side of the theorists (such as Smith 1978 and Molyneux 1979) who argue that while reproductive 
and household work may be crucial to capitalist production and deserve close attention, they 
cannot be understood as directly producing value in capitalism. Using concepts from Ollman 
(2003), I propose that “production” is one moment of reification (of “labor” into “capital”) in an 
ongoing process that also includes unpaid domestic labor as well as other activities and relations. 
These are part of a chain of causality, but are marginalized from the moment of “production” 
itself. This supports the view that domestic labor requires different analytical tools in addition to 
those used to understand the exploitation of labor within capitalist production. This discussion is 
relevant to the social history of labor, particularly in places like the mines of highland Peru 
where the reproduction of the labor force for capitalist production has often taken place within a 
non-capitalist sphere.  
Chapter 3 then switches from a discussion of labor issues to one of everyday life in the 
mining camps of Central Peru, taking Huarón as a specific case and moving into the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation (Centromín) at the very end. A large section at the beginning of the chapter is 
taken up with an analysis of household and marital relations in Huarón in the early 1940s. In this 
I follow the new tendency in Latin American social history to use judicial and other quotidian 
archives to examine the everyday social relations and cultural constructs of ordinary people  - an 
approach which is exemplified in the case of Peru by works such as Hunefeldt (2000) and 
Christiansen (2004). Although the focus of this section may seem distant from issues of labor, 
community or land, I believe that a social history must pay attention to issues involving the 
household and marital and kinship relations, which in a sense underlie and to some degree 
determine much of the other relations established in society. However, in the second part of the 
chapter I also shift to a focus on housing and conflicts over space. This follows an established 
tradition in cultural anthropology of examining the space of the house as key to many other 
social relations. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the practice of social work in the 
state-owned mining company Centromín (the former Cerro de Pasco Corporation). This 
discussion not only helps to illuminate everyday life issues further, but is also important to the 
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overall argument of the dissertation in that it helps us to understand how “the social” was defined 
towards the end of the mining camp era, only a decade or two before it began to shift towards the 
sphere of Community Relations.  
Chapter 4 transitions from the mode of social history, with its attention to long-term local 
and regional dynamics, towards a focus on the conjuncture of the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
large numbers of workers departed the mining camps of the Central Highlands during a period of 
social, economic and political crisis, setting the stage for the restructuring of the industry and the 
workforce. However, in order to understand this moment of crisis the chapter also moves 
outwards towards a discussion of the broader global crisis of the 1970s and 80s, in terms of 
mineral prices, long-run tendencies in capitalist production and also national dynamics of crisis 
and violence specific to Peru. I then return to an examination of the “unmaking of the working 
class,” in Salazar-Soler´s (2006) term, using union meeting minutes as well as my own 
interviews about this time.  
Chapters 5 and 6 then shift to a more ethnographic mode, focusing on the two 
comunidades of Huayllay and Rancas today. Chapter 5 sets the stage, describing the basic 
functioning of the two communities, especially as regards land use. It makes the argument that 
the concept of the “peasant-miner” used by earlier scholars still has relevance today (but without 
so much of a need for the “into” of DeWind’s (1987) title), while at the same time the nature of 
both “peasants” and “miners” has changed over time. I provide a description of the basic 
dynamics of mining work today, as it occurs in both communities. I then conclude through an 
ethnographic vignette of a ritual and gathering at one of the rural estancias, as a way to illustrate 
some of the themes of the chapter and of the dissertation more broadly. Chapter 6 then tackles 
some of the central themes of the dissertation, especially how the mine-community relationship 
based around land has acquired preeminence, and how the location of the “social burden” has 
shifted. First I focus on the community of Rancas and its negotiations with the Volcan company 
in Cerro de Pasco over the renewal and expansion of a tailings pit on its land. I then switch to 
Huayllay, discussing how there has been a shift from “labor peace” to “social peace.” In order to 
do this more fully, however, I first need to describe the broader national and global context that 
surrounds the rise of the “local community” as a central actor in the mining world. I then return 
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to the concrete examination of Huayllay, using my interviews and observations to describe how 
many of the demands that used to be channeled through the union and the labor-capital relation 
are now channeled through the negotiations between the company and the comunidad. I examine 
how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is seen as compensation for the use of the land, and 
how it becomes a basic factor of production in mining operations.  
Finally, in the last chapter I examine more closely an aspect that is closely tied to the land 
and that, although it was always there, has also acquired increased visibility in recent years 
alongside the mine-community relation. Namely, I focus on the emergence of “the environment” 
as a category of politics around mining today. I do this in three distinct sections. First, I attempt 
an environmental history of mining in the Central Highlands, to give an idea of the historical 
background to environmental issues today. Second, I focus on the politics of lead contamination 
in the city of Cerro de Pasco today, and discuss how lead has become notorious over and above 
other metals. I also examine how the mining company reacts to accusations of environmental 
irresponsibility, and how health hazards come to be closely associated with issues of monetary 
compensation. Lastly, in the third section of the chapter I switch back to environmental history, 
but this time with the purpose of understanding the emergence of the problematic of drinking 
water in the city today. This brings the dissertation to issues not just of environment but also of 
privatization, the shift away from the old system of “dependence” on the company, and the 





FROM LABOR SHORTAGE TO LABOR SURPLUS:                                                      
THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF MINE LABOR AND MIGRATION 
 
Introduction 
The first three chapters of this dissertation undertake a reexamination of the social history 
of mining labor in the Central Highlands of Peru during the 20th century. They also form part of 
this dissertation´s inquiry into the shift from labor-capital towards capital-local community 
relations as the most visible site of social articulation and politics in Peruvian mining at the end 
of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. In the latter chapters of the dissertation I examine 
topics such as the “unmaking of the working class” in the late 1980s and 90s, the intersection 
between labor and community today, and the emergence of environmental issues as a central 
area of concern.  However, it is first necessary to ground this discussion in the longer history of 
mining in the area, particularly in the age of modern, industrial mining in the 20th century. 
Without this background, it is not possible to grasp the changes that have occurred in the last 
twenty years, or to understand that significant continuities remain. Yet the purpose of these early 
chapters is not merely to provide background, but rather to re-open the question of the social 
history of mining in Peru from a more contemporary historical perspective. While the earlier 
works on mining workers in Peru, based on research carried out from the late 1960s through the 
early 1980s, all provide very crucial and often still valid insights, the history of labor inevitably 
looks different after the crisis of labor of the last few decades. In particular, most of the earlier 
works (especially Flores Galindo 1993 [1974], DeWind (1987) and Salazar-Soler 2002) were 
framed in the context of what they saw as increasing proletarianization and a gradual but steady 
movement from the countryside to the mines, before the disruptions of the late 1980s and early 
90s.   
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The main argument of this first chapter is that we can understand the broad arch of the 
history of mining labor in 20th-century Peru as involving a change from a situation of labor 
shortage to one of labor surplus. I find this framing to be more useful today than the narrative of 
gradual proletarianization, which lends itself to more rigid expectations of what a working class 
should look like. The “shift from labor shortage to labor surplus” framework has the advantage 
that it can at the same time not only relate to similar phenomena around the capitalist world 
(including what Marx called the emergence of the “relative surplus population”) but is also 
empirically verifiable at the national and local levels in Peru, and is less subject to rigid 
interpretations and expectations derived from the “classic” experience of British and Western 
European industrialization. The argument is not only that labor needs decreased, relative to 
capital invested, over the course of the 20th century, but also that people became more willing to 
seek wage employment in the mines, as the focal point of local life moved away from previous 
regional systems of exchange and production (some of which are traced, for specific case of the 
Huayllay area, in the early parts of the chapter).  
Beyond this argument, however, this chapter also seeks to lay the basis for the analysis in 
the rest of the dissertation by presenting a sketch of a specific region and by mapping out the 
basic patterns of migration and workforce formation at a medium-scale mine in central Peru. It 
also attempts to delve into certain issues that I feel are especially important to understanding the 
social history of mining workers, such as the rural context of the mines, in the sense both of the 
regions that workers migrated from as well as the surroundings of the mining center itself. Most 
of the earlier scholarship, with the exception of Salazar-Soler (2002 and 2006), was focused on 
the Cerro de Pasco Corporation – the largest mining company in Peru for much of the 20th 
century. While this focus makes sense in many respects, it tends to overlook the rest of Peru´s 
highly fragmented and diverse mining sector, with its numerous camps stretched across the high 
Andes, constituting partly stable and partly transient communities that straddled the rural and 
industrial worlds. For that reason, in these chapters I focus on one of those more rural medium-
scale mines, Huarón, located in the district of Huayllay where I did field, oral history and 
archival research in 2009 and 2010. Huarón is an old mediana minería mine that was worked on 
an industrial scale beginning in the 1910s. For much of the 20th century, it was owned and 
administered by a succession of French companies, who ran the mine until 1987. The mine 
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continues to operate today, and, together with the neighboring Animón/Chungar mine, forms the 
heart of a mining district that was undergoing a new boom period while I was there. I also use 
evidence from Cerro de Pasco (about an hour away), since part of my research also took place 
there. Additionally, when appropriate, I compare the specific characteristics of this particular 
region with those of other areas in Peru.  
The reason for focusing on the twentieth century is that it constitutes the temporal 
framework for modern industrial mining in Peru, which is usually considered to have begun with 
the arrival of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1903. Yet it cannot be ignored that 
mining has existed in Peru since much earlier than that, and that the pre-1900 context inevitably 
influenced what came later. This is particularly the case when it comes to the organization of 
labor, which, unlike technology or capital, could not be imported wholesale from abroad. 
Foreign mining capital had to adapt to existing regimes of labor recruitment; transformations did 
take place but only gradually and over several decades. For that reason, it is necessary to look 
briefly at the historical development of labor recruitment for Peru´s mines as it developed up to 
1900. 
Mining and labor in the Central Andes 
As is widely known, silver was the main product that connected the Spanish Empire in 
the Americas to the world economy during colonial times. Within Spanish America, the largest 
producers by far were the Central Andes and Mexico. Most important in the early years was 
Potosí (then part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, but present-day Bolivia), which peaked in the late 
16th and early 17th centuries and then began a long decline punctuated by a modest recovery in 
the late 18th century. The mines of Zacatecas and Guanajuato in New Spain (Mexico) were also 
important, and that region would eventually surpass the Andes in silver production. 
Nevertheless, the Central Andes3 continued producing silver, and in the late 18th century Cerro 
                                                          
3 In this dissertation, I follow the usage according to which “Central Andes” means roughly the space occupied by 
the modern republics of Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. “Andean,” on the other hand, should rightfully also include 
countries like Chile, Argentina, Colombia and even Venezuela. The distinction between the two serves to highlight 
the important cultural and linguistic continuities that exist among the three Central Andean countries, with their 
significant indigenous heritage, but it should not be taken as denying the fact that there are also links and 
continuities with the rest of the Andean nations as with all of Latin America. “Central Andes” is thus also different 
from the “Central Highlands of Peru” – the latter is meant to denote a geographic region within the nation, distinct 
from the Southern Highlands and Northern Highlands of Peru. 
17 
 
de Pasco emerged as the second most important Andean silver producer, after Potosí, actually 
surpassing the latter´s production for one year - 1804 (Fisher 1977, 112). Since Potosí and the 
rest of Upper Peru (Bolivia) had in any case been turned over to the Viceroyalty of Río de la 
Plata (present-day Argentina) in 1776, Cerro de Pasco became the most important mining center 
in what remained of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the independent nation that emerged out of it in 
1824. It maintained this position throughout the 19th century, surpassing smaller but important 
mining regions like Hualgayoc (Cajamarca Department) and Huarochirí (Lima Highlands). In 
Peruvian and Central Andean mining, the period spanning from the late 16th to the late 19th 
centuries can be seen as one long age of silver, in which the basic technologies, like mercury 
amalgamation (patio method), changed little. 
 Labor systems, on the other hand, did show some variation. Spanish colonial mining in 
the Andes is infamous for the mita, the coerced labor system that, starting in 1574, required adult 
men in indigenous villages over a wide area to take turns working at Potosí and in the mercury 
mines of Huancavelica (which supplied the necessary raw material for amalgamation). Colonial 
administrators considered the system to be a necessary remedy for the labor shortage that they 
believed threatened to undermine the silver industry and by extension the Spanish Empire itself, 
after the exhaustion of the richer surface ores at Potosí had made mining more difficult and less 
appealing to indigenous workers (Bakewell 1984). Modern historians have emphasized that a 
large “free” labor sector existed alongside the mita throughout the colonial period (Assadourian 
1979; Bakewell 1984; Cole 1985; Tandeter 1992); these workers were more skilled, better paid 
and engaged in different tasks from those of the mitayos. Indigenous community members 
subject to the mita requirement would try to pay for these free workers to take their place at the 
higher market rates, thus avoiding going to the mines themselves. In this way, the communities´ 
wealth drained away to subsidize the mines; colonial mining actually depended in large part on 
these subsidies as well as on other state protections for the industry. 
 Other mining regions, like Cerro de Pasco and Hualgayoc, flourished later in the colonial 
period, by which time the state was less willing to cede to the mining sector´s petitions for a 
forced labor draft (Contreras 1995, 71). Thus, they had to rely on other mechanisms, such as the 
repartimiento de mercancías and the Indian tribute, both of which created a need for cash on the 
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part of the indigenous population and thus led them to seek out employment in the mines 
(Contreras 1988 and 1995, Deustua 1986). As these institutions were abolished over time (in 
1789 and in the 1850s, respectively), other mechanisms for attracting labor remained. For 
example, the right to a portion of the metal extracted (which in Cerro de Pasco was known as the 
huachaca, according to Contreras and Deustua) made mining work more attractive during 
periods in which high-grade ore was found. Most importantly, the mining sector adapted to the 
seasonal nature of agricultural work, which meant that peasants migrated to the mines and then 
returned for the harvest and for planting. The relationship of complementarity between the two 
sectors meant that a large part of the costs of reproduction of the labor force were borne by the 
rural communities, while the cash earned in the mines was used for tribute, for the sponsorship of 
village feasts, or for the purchase of specific goods that required money (Contreras 1988, 130-
138). In this way, the subsidy from the rural world towards the mines continued, as it arguably 
would during the early part of the 20th century.  
Yet this system did not mean that a perfect balance between labor supply and demand 
was always maintained. Although the willingness of more rural areas to supply workers for the 
mines may have been increasing, this did not always keep pace with the growing labor demands 
of the mining industry during periods of increased production and investment; at those times an 
acute labor shortage could be felt. One such period was the 1840s – the decade of the most 
important mining boom in 19th-century Cerro de Pasco and Peru (Deustua 1986 and 2000, 
Contreras 1988). Another was the turn of the century, when large-scale industrial copper mining 
began in Peru. In order to understand how this affected the dynamics of mining labor, we must 
first look at what is meant by industrial mining. In the next section, I briefly discuss two mining 
companies – the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation, which dominated the Central 
Highlands, and the smaller, nearby Huarón mine, where much of my evidence comes from and 
which I use as the focal point for this chapter and the next.  
Industrial mining in Peru: Cerro de Pasco and Huarón 
 In the late 19th century, the new electrical technologies associated with the Second 
Industrial Revolution brought about a sharp rise in the world demand for copper. Metropolitan 
mining companies built giant copper mines in the United States and also traveled the world 
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searching for more copper deposits and building smelters in which to process the metal. In Chile, 
this eventually led to the development of some of the world´s largest copper mines, like El 
Teniente and Chuquicamata, both under U.S. ownership (Klubock 1998, 26-27). In Peru in the 
1890s, local mine owners attempted to respond to the rise in copper prices by switching from 
silver to copper extraction, just as prices for the former product were falling sharply. Their effort 
failed due to a lack of capital at the local level (Dewind 1987, 16-17), but a decade later the 
needed capital arrived from abroad. In 1903, U.S. mining baron James B. Haggin founded the 
Cerro de Pasco Investment Company (later Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation);4 in addition to 
his own capital, he obtained the financial backing of several leading industrialists and financiers 
such as J.P. Morgan, Henry Clay Frick, the Vanderbilts and the estate of George Hearst.5 The 
new company quickly monopolized mineral production in the immediate vicinity of Cerro de 
Pasco, and gradually moved on to purchase the most important mining centers in central Peru, 
such as Casapalca and Morococha. It eventually developed a vast productive network that 
included railroads, hydroelectric plants, smelting and refining centers (first at Tinyahuarco and 
later La Oroya) as well as mines. From its early focus on copper, in the 1930s it shifted its 
production to lead and zinc, becoming one of the largest producers of these metals in South 
America and the world.6  
For much of the century, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC) was the largest mining 
company in Peru; it also became the largest landowner in the country, purchasing a vast array of 
haciendas in the Central Highlands (its Ganadera Division). Yet it was by no means alone; 
Peru´s mining sector in the twentieth century did not depend on one sole company or one single 
metal. Beginning in 1912, there was the Huarón company, to be discussed shortly. Additionally, 
during the first half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1930s and 40s, there was an 
important gold-producing sector, led by Peruvian-owned medium-scale and small scale 
                                                          
4 The company went through several variations in its name during its early history. For the sake of simplicity, 
throughout this dissertation I refer to it as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. 
5 This information  on early shareholders comes from DeWind (1987) and is also mentioned in several other 
sources. It is also found in the Cerro Corporation Archives housed at the University of Wyoming´s American 
Heritage Center.  
6 In 1952, the company claimed to be the largest producer of refined lead in all of South America (Cerro Corporation 
Archive, “General Information,” January 7, 1952).  
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companies, in addition to artisanal and placer gold mining. Although most of these gold 
companies closed around 1950, another vibrant medium-scale sector had emerged by then, with 
(mostly) Peruvian-owned companies like Atacocha (1936), Milpo (1942) and Buenaventura 
(1952) producing silver, lead and zinc. This mediana minería complemented the gran minería 
that included the CPC as well as, beginning in the 1950s, the U.S.-owned companies Southern 
Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) and Marcona Mining Company. By 1974, when it was 
nationalized by the government of Juan Velasco Alvarado, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation no 
longer represented the cutting edge of the Peruvian mining industry in terms either of 
productivity, profitability or technology, having lost that status to the SPCC. Since the 1990s, 
with the numerous new large-scale gold and/or copper mining projects coming into production, 
like Yanacocha, Antamina and Pierina, the aging mines that formerly belonged to the CPC have 
receded even more in relative terms, even if they are still very important producers of lead, zinc 
and silver. 
 Given the pivotal place of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the history of modern 
industrial mining in Peru, it is no surprise that most social science and historical studies of 
mining in the country before the 1990s tended to focus on this company (Flores Galindo 1974, 
Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, Laite 1981, DeWind 1987). In this chapter, although I often mention 
labor dynamics at the CPC, given its importance to the Central Highlands and to Peru as a whole, 
most of my local evidence comes from the Huarón mine, located in the district of Huayllay, 
about one hour by car from Cerro de Pasco.  
As noted above, while for much of the twentieth century Peru´s large-scale mining sector 
(gran minería) was dominated by foreign, primarily U.S. capital, the country´s medium-sized 
mines (mediana minería) were mostly controlled by the domestic mining bourgeoisie. Huarón, 
however, constituted an exception to this rule. Although belonging to the mediana minería, it 
was nevertheless controlled by foreign, namely French, capital. Also, it began relatively early, in 
the 1910s, long before other important medium-scale Peruvian mining companies like Milpo, 
Atacocha and Buenaventura. Thus, during several decades of the first half of the century, it was 
the second-largest mining company in Peru, after the CPC. Although less important in relative 
terms today, for much of the century Huarón was well-known among Peruvian mining engineers 
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as it was a frequent site for internships, trainings and job opportunities. Before using evidence 
from Huarón to discuss the social history of labor in the mines of central Peru in the 20th century, 
I must give some brief background on the formation of the company. 
The Compagnie des Mines de Huaron (CMH) was formed in 1912 to exploit a 
mineralized zone then known as the mineral district of Huancavelica (not to be confused with the 
department and mercury mine of the same name in south-central Peru). One of the mines in the 
area was called Huarón (after a local lake known as Huaroncocha), and over time this name 
came to be used more frequently than the earlier name Huancavelica. These mineral deposits, 
located in the district of Huayllay and containing silver, copper, zinc and lead, had been worked 
on a small scale since at least the early 19th century (and probably much earlier).7 The CMH 
would remain under French control for over 70 years, from 1912 until the late 1980s. An array of 
interlocking French financial and mining interests controlled the company during this long 
period. Most important in the first few decades was the banking house Mirabaud, which also had 
investments in mines in Spain, Mexico, Algeria and the Balkans. Although Mirabaud would 
maintain its influence through the 1950s, already by 1927 other French banking and mining 
groups had bought shares in the CMH, which needed their capital for new expansion projects at 
the mine; among these were businesses like Peñarroya, Société Minerais et Métaux, Neuflize, 
Harth and the Banque de l´Union Parisienne (Chancelier 2001, 228). These companies supplied 
many of CMH´s directors and administrators over the next few decades. In 1953, Mirabaud et 
Cie. merged fully with the Banque de l´Union Parisienne,8 which became the dominant 
shareholder and administrator of the CMH during the decade of the 1950s.9 By the 1970s and 
                                                          
7 It should be mentioned that there is also a community called Huayllay in the department of Huancavelica, which 
only adds to the confusion. 
8 Founded in 1904, the Banque de l´Union Parisienne was one of the largest banques d´affaires (investment banks) 
in France. In the 1970s it fused with Crédit du Nord and both came under the control of Paribas, which in turn sold 
Crédit du Nord to the Société Générale in 1997. 
9 Although Huarón was not itself a uranium mine, in the 1960s the CMH also had close financial links to companies 
involved in the post-war drive to invest in uranium mining for France´s nuclear program; one such company, the 
Compagnie Française de Mokta, bought 20% of Huarón´s stock in 1959 (Troly 2008, 31; Blanc 2009). Huarón´s 
Annual Reports from those years list CMH itself as owning a share of two uranium mining companies: the 
Compagnie Française des Minerais d´Uranium (CFMU) and the Compagnie des Mines d´Uranium de Franceville 
(COMUF). Mokta was acquired by Peñarroya in 1971; this purchase brought Huarón into direct administrative 
control by Peñarroya. In 1986 Mokta was sold to the Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA), 
which in 2000 became part of the French nuclear conglomerate Areva. These corporate connections were likely 
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80s, the mining conglomerate Peñarroya, long dominated by the French branch of the Rothschild 
family, had become the main owner of the CMH, and administered it as part of its vast mineral 
empire, Groupe Imetal.10 In reality, however, all these companies overlapped a great deal, 
forming a tight-knit network of French mining investment around the world that shared not only 
capital but also expertise and professional experience. The French era at Huarón came to an end 
in 1987,11 when a crisis-ridden Peñarroya sold most of its mining assets.12 The Huarón mine was 
bought by the Adminco company, of the Hochschild group, founded by former Bolivian tin 
baron Mauricio Hochschild. Finally, in 2000 Adminco sold the mine to the Canadian company 
Pan American Silver,13 which continues to operate it to this day.    
In terms of its on-the-ground operations, Huarón was not a completely isolated mine. Not 
only was the Cerro de Pasco mine located only 40 km. away (about one hour by car today), but 
also, in the immediate surroundings of Huayllay District, other small and medium-scale mining 
centers emerged and declined over time. The U.S.-owned vanadium mine at Mina Ragra, located 
high up on isolated Lake Punrun at the northern edge of the district, operated during the first half 
of the 20th century.14 The Río Pallanga, Santander and Chungar companies, on the other hand, 
emerged later in the century.15 In particular, Chungar is in a sense Huarón´s twin. Its original 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
known to workers in the Huarón mine; one of my interviewees, a former worker, asserted the belief that there was 
an important uranium deposit at Huarón (which is not the case as far as I know).  
10 Peñarroya was founded in 1881 as a joint enterprise by the Mirabauds and the Rothschilds, though the latter group 
eventually became dominant. Originally created to exploit the rich lead deposits of southern Spain, by the 1920s and 
30s it had begun a global expansion through North Africa, southern Europe and the Americas (López-Morrell 2003). 
In the 1970s the Groupe Imetal, chaired by Guy de Rothschild, brought together Peñarroya, Mokta and the Société 
Le Nickel; these were separated again in the 1980s. 
11 It should be mentioned that since 1978 the CMH had shifted its legal residence from Paris to Lima and became 
the Compañía Minera Huarón. However, until 1987 Peñarroya still owned around 65% of the stock, with the rest 
controlled by various Peruvian companies. 
12 That year Peñarroya fused with the German group Preussag AG Metall to become Metaleurop S.A. 
13 Incorporated in Vancouver, and formerly known as Pan American Energy Corporation and later Pan American 
Minerals Corporation, the company was re-founded as Pan American Silver in 1994. Today it claims to be the 
second-largest primary silver mining company in the world, with mines in Peru, Mexico, Bolivia and Argentina. In 
Peru it owns Huarón as well as a mine in the Morococha District and, until recently, the Quiruvilca mine in the 
northern part of the country.  
14 Although not a large mine by today´s standards, the Vanadium Corporation of America´s mine at Minaragra at 
one time produced 90% of the world´s stock of this rare metal used for industrial and military purposes. 
15 Río Pallanga, which closed in 1983, was owned by Peruvian entrepreneur Roberto Letts Colmenares (who would 
later buy the Volcan Mining Company and the Cerro de Pasco mine). The Santander mine, according to Purser 
(1971, 124) was at one time owned by the U.S. company St. Joseph Lead. It was no longer operational by the time 
of my research, though there were plans to bring it back into production. 
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owners also owned Huarón; when they sold the latter to the French in 1912, they kept some 
mining concessions which they later developed. After the original Chungar mining camp was 
destroyed in an avalanche in 1971, the company moved its operations to the Animón mine, 
immediately adjacent to Huarón. However, it is only in recent years that Chungar/Animón (now 
owned by Volcan, which also owns Cerro de Pasco) has grown to rival or even surpass Huarón 
in production; together, Huarón and Animón form an important nucleus of mediana minería in 
Huayllay District.  
Huarón itself has also undergone significant changes in the nature of its productive 
operations over the years. In the first few years the Compagnie continued previous practices like 
hand-picking the metal and sending it by packs of llamas towards the smelter in Casapalca to the 
south. At the same time, however, it was working on deepening the mine and building its offices, 
workers´ housing and a railroad to connect to the railway line that ran between Cerro de Pasco 
and Lima. Early on, the company´s engineers also harnessed the water in the local lakes 
(Llacsacocha, Naticocha and Huaroncocha) to generate hydroelectric power for their operations.  
A nearby coal mine was also acquired to supply the railroad as well as other uses. The company 
furthermore built its own smelter, which produced copper bars from 1918 through the late 1920s 
when it was abandoned. In the late 1920s, as the mine began to focus on lead and zinc in addition 
to copper, a Differential Flotation Plant was built to process the metal; the modern concentrator 
plant went into operations in 1957. The company interrupted its operations in 1925 due to 
flooding and again in 1930 due to the Depression; other than that, it operated continuously until 
1998 when lake Naticocha collapsed, flooding both the Animón and Huarón mines and 
interrupting production for a couple of years.16  
In terms of the number of workers, although it fluctuated widely with the ebbs and flows 
of production in the company´s first couple of decades, by the middle of the century the Huarón 
workers´ camps were the demographic center of Huayllay District. According to the 1940 
                                                          
16 This technical information on the operations of the Huarón mine during the 20th century comes from: the 
company´s Annual Reports (1912-1920, 1926, 1946, 1960, 1967-1968, 1980-1987) as well as the theses written by 
several Peruvian mining engineers who interned and worked at Huarón, such as Sotomarino (1949), Freyre (1960), 
Curisinche (1974), Calderón (1979) and Peña (1992). These theses, which are housed at Peru´s National 
Engineering University (UNI), are to a large degree reports on the engineers´ work and on the mine´s past and 
present operations. Additional sources are the Boletín del Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Minas del Perú (1919) and Godet 
(1918). Information gathered during my visit inside the mine in 2009 will also be included later in the chapter. 
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census, the combined population of the three Huarón camps clustered around Huayllay was 
3,005, or 43% of the district´s entire population of 6,932. This vastly outnumbered what were 
then the small villages of Huayllay and Huaychao, with populations of 593 and 99, respectively; 
another 1900 or so people were found in the estancias – the shepherds´ houses, spaced far apart, 
in the open grasslands. If we add the workers´ camps of the vanadium mine at Mina Ragra 
(which totaled 1308 people)17, some 62% of the district´s population was found living in mining 
camps in the 1940 census. Of course, this kind of data provides a very simplistic picture; in 
reality people frequently moved back and forth between the estancias and the central villages, 
and between these and the mining centers. Moreover, it is only a snapshot in time; the number of 
workers at Huarón increased over the next few years, and more of them began bringing their 
families to the mine. Thus, by 1953 company´s workforce stood at around 2,000; with their 
families, this represented a camp population of 7,000 (Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times, 
June 1953). The size of the workforce declined somewhat over the next 30 years, as the company 
sought to mechanize its operations. By the mid-1980s, the population of the camps was around 
5,000 (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993, 222). This spatial organization of the district, centered 
around the mining camps, came to an end in the 1990s, when most of the camps were 
dismantled, as they were in mines throughout Peru.  
Like at other mines at the time, the operations of the Huarón company were accompanied 
by the formation of a mining workforce. Later in this chapter, I will discuss the ways in which 
this process took shape, with a specific focus on Huarón but drawing out patterns that were 
common to other mines in the Central Highlands and Peru more broadly. First, however, it is 
important to provide some historical, social and cultural background on the local area of 
Huayllay District, where much of this chapter and the next take place. I conducted fieldwork, 
oral history and archival research there between 2009 and 2010; I also use other sources of 
information when they are useful. 
 
 
                                                          




The local setting 
Huayllay, where the Huarón mine is located, is one of 13 districts that compose Pasco 
Province, which in turn is one of the three provinces in Pasco Department.18 The district gets its 
name from the town of Huayllay, which is not only the district seat but is also the center of the 
comunidad campesina (peasant community) of Huayllay, which owns a large area of pasturing 
land. A smaller town, Huaychao, is also the center of a comunidad campesina; a third, smaller 
and more distant comunidad is Los Andes de Pucará, which emerged from a former hacienda. 
These larger groupings also include a few small villages as well as the many estancias that dot 
the area. As stated above, two important medium-scale mines currently operate in the district: 
Huarón, currently owned by Pan American Silver, and the adjacent Chungar/Animón, currently 
owned by Volcan Mining Company.  
In terms of political jurisdictions, Huayllay District borders the Department of Junín to 
the south and the Department of Lima to the west. In geographical terms, it is situated at the 
southwest edge of the highland plateau that straddles Pasco and the northern part of Junín 
Department – although sometimes referred to as the Bombón Plateau, in the remainder of this 
chapter, I will refer to this as the Pasco/Junín plateau.19 This is a large, high-altitude grassland 
(puna) area located at a more or less uniform height between about 4,100 and 4,500 meters 
above sea level, and situated between the steep Western Cordillera and the eastern quebradas 
(intramontane valleys) that gradually lead into the Amazon lowlands to the east. It is the second 
                                                          
18 There are few studies of the Huayllay area. Amaro (2003) has published a book, Huayllay: Riqueza Cultural de un 
Pueblo Andino, which discusses issues of education and tourism as well as general facts about the community, 
including some folktales and customs. Aranguren (1971) wrote an anthropology thesis for the University of San 
Marcos about the community of Huaychao. Additionally, several groups of anthropology students from the Catholic 
University of Peru have gone to Huayllay over the last 15 years to do short fieldwork practices; their reports are 
catalogued in the university library. Chang (1970) wrote a study of the community of Huayllay for the Ministry of 
Agriculture during the Agrarian Reform; it is discussed later in this chapter. Ramírez (2002, 117-126) reproduces 
certain colonial land documents from Huayllay but does not discuss the community beyond that.  
19 The name Bombón Plateau (Meseta de Bombón) is somewhat confusing as it is sometimes used to refer only to 
the flattest part of the plateau, i.e. the area around Lake Junín. For me, the more relevant geographical category 
includes the entire high-altitude grassland region, including areas like Cerro de Pasco, Rancas and Huayllay, that do 
not identify as much with the name Bombón (which seems to be derived from the old ethnonym Pumpush, once 
applied to people living around the present-day town of Junín).  
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most important highland plateau or altiplano in the Andes – the other being the much larger 
(though slightly lower) altiplano of the Collao, which straddles the Peru/Bolivia border and is 
home to Lake Titicaca as well as to cities such as La Paz and Puno. Although Huayllay is 
certainly part of the Pasco/Junín plateau altitude-wise, it is not located in the flattest, central 
portion of the plateau. Rather, its territory consists of many rolling hills and includes a 
particularly rugged geological formation known as the Stone Forest (Bosque de Piedras), which 
in recent years has become central to local identity as well as an object of tourism promotion 
efforts. The Huayllay area is really situated at the edge of the plateau, close to where it 
encounters the Western Cordillera and the Lima highlands of the upper Chancay Valley - an area 
with which it has historically had strong links. 
Like most of the plateau, this is a livestock-raising area, with little or no agriculture; the 
raising of sheep is most important, followed by llamas and alpacas. Although all of the 
grasslands in Huayllay are certainly in use, today herding is secondary to mining as an economic 
activity. Both Spanish and Quechua  were spoken in Huayllay for much of the 20th century, but 
with Spanish eventually becoming the dominant language.20 Today, the area is primarily 
Spanish-speaking, even if many of the older people still know how to speak at least some 
Quechua. Additionally, some migrants come from regions such as the quebradas of Huánuco 
and Chaupiwaranga that have higher predominance of Quechua speakers – both according to 
popular view and to Chirinos’ (2001) Atlas Lingüístico del Perú, as well as other studies.  
At present, one can reach Huayllay from the departmental capital of Cerro de Pasco in 
about one hour by car.  The town has grown significantly in recent years. The crisis of the 1980s 
and 90s (culminating in the flooding of the two mines in 1998) had drained the district of 
                                                          
20 The variety of Quechua from this area has not been studied in-depth. Yaro is an ethnonym traditionally used to 
describe several of the groups that inhabited present-day Pasco and Daniel Carrión provinces at the time of the 
Spanish Conquest. It is also the name given by Torero (1974) and Mannheim (1991, 11) to describe the varieties of 
Quechua spoken in Pasco, Junín, Tarma and Chaupiwaranga, as a sub-branch of Central Peruvian Quechua 
(Torero´s Quechua I and Parker´s Quechua B). On the other hand, Chirinos (2001) calls these varieties “Yaru-
Huánuco,” thus grouping them with at least certain parts of Huánuco Department. In the 1980s and 90s, regional 
health and educational authorities, together with the Summer Linguistics Institute, published some materials on what 
they classified as the Quechua of Ambo (Huánuco) and Pasco provinces. Black (1990) has similarly published some 
material on what she calls “southeast Pasco and northern Junín Quechua,” in which she includes Huayllay. It should 
also be mentioned that, although all of these varieties belong to Quechua I/Quechua B (Central Peruvian Quechua), 
Huayllay was geographically close to a variety of Quechua II/Quechua A spoken until recently in Pacaraos in the 
upper Chancay Valley, which was studied by Adelaar (1987). 
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population, but the new mining boom that began around 2002 has brought many people back. 
Most of them have made their base in the town of Huayllay itself, since the mining camps were 
largely demolished (and not replaced) in the 1990s. In 2007, according to the national Census of 
that year, the town had a population of 6,736, or 63% of the total district population of 10,617. 
By comparison, the next largest town in the district, Huaychao, had only 404 people. For much 
of the 20th century, however, the demographic center of the district was composed of the mining 
camps, rather than the villages. I will now briefly describe some aspects of the origins and 
historical development of local society. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Old-style champa dwellings in a Huayllay estancia, ca.1915-1917.                                             








Figure 2 – Town of Huayllay, 1940s                                                                                        
(Photo courtesy of Juan Porras Benavides) 
 
The formation of local society 
For the entirety of its colonial history, Huayllay was under the jurisdiction of the western 
Andean slopes – namely Canta as well as the upper Chancay Valley - rather than Pasco. The 
whole area was subject to the reducción program of the 1570s – the massive scheme aimed at 
resettling and regrouping the native population for the purposes of taxation, labor tribute and 
conversion. According to Degregori and Golte (1973, 3), San Juan de Huayllay was one of 
several reducciones made up of llacuaces (a term used in certain documents to refer to highland 
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pastoralists in opposition to valley agriculturalists) 21 – others being the nearby towns of 
Huaychao and Pari, also in the highland plateau. These high-altitude reducciones were grouped 
together with the ayllus of the Hanan Pirca in the upper Chancay Valley - who had themselves 
been “reduced” into eight reducciones centered around Pacaraos – and placed under the authority 
of the corregimiento (later province) of Canta.  This political organization continued into the late 
colonial period, as described by the Spanish botanist Hipólito Ruiz, who traveled the region in 
the 1770s and 80s.22 Already at this time, there was small-scale mining activity in Huayllay, as in 
several places around Canta Province as well as Pasco. Huayllay was also situated right on the 
path taken by mule and llama trains on the way from the mines of Cerro de Pasco towards the 
town of Canta and from there to Lima.23 After independence in 1824, and throughout the 19th 
century, the jurisdictional status of Huayllay seems to have been unclear – sometimes it is 
included under Canta, other times under Pasco and Junín; gradually, it shifted towards the latter.  
In terms of land ownership, the modern comunidades campesinas of Huayllay and 
Huaychao both possess documents that are used to trace the possession of land by the común, the 
pueblo or simply the “Indians” (indios) of their respective communities back to at least the 17th 
and 18th centuries (Aranguren 1971, Ramírez 2002, 117-126). Over time several haciendas 
formed in the area as well, the most important of which were El Diezmo, Huasca/Chuquiquirpay, 
Cónoc, Racracancha, and Quisque. Smaller properties also developed as certain individual 
families claimed particular tracts of land and either passed them on to their children or sold them 
to others. A large part of the communal land documents discuss conflicts between these claims 
upon landed property and the común or the pueblo.24 People today remember certain specific 
                                                          
21 See Duviols (1973). 
22 Ruiz described the ecclesiastical divisions of the province of Canta: it was made up of 9 curatos, one of which 
was the curato of Pari. The latter in turn included 12 anexos, among which were Huayllay, Huaychao, Vichaycocha, 
Pacaraos and other towns (Ruiz 2007, 181).  
23 As Ruiz wrote about Canta Province at the time of his visit in the late 18th century: “The greatest number of 
natives of this province are engaged in arriería (muleteering or transport by llama), principally for the minerals of 
Cerro, carrying the ore from the mines towards the mills (ingenios). Others are occupied in digging mines and for 
this purpose they keep many mules. The women work the fields and care for the family while their husbands are 
away in the mines: They also spin and weave cloth from wool and cotton for their own use.” (Ibid., 182; my 
translation).  
24 Although I have examined many documents from the Huayllay area, I have not looked at copies of the land title 
documents held in Huayllay and Huaychao. Parts of them are reproduced in Aranguren (1971) and Ramírez (2002, 
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families, in particular the Verásteguis and the Anduezas, as having been the most prominent – 
though not the only – landowners in the immediate area around the town of Huayllay, while 
others owned the larger haciendas situated slightly further away.25 Indeed, two members of the 
Verástegui and Andueza families were buried inside the Huayllay church – a sign of their status 
– in the 1870s.26  An Andueza owned a property known as San José, adjacent to the town of 
Huayllay, which he later sold to the French mining company in 1915 as one of the sites on which 
to begin their operations.27 One of the Verásteguis is widely remembered as having directed 
mining operations on a small scale in the mid-19th century, in the area that would later be the 
Huarón mine. A man named Eugenio Verástegui – who may be the same person – also appears 
as gobernador of the district of Huayllay in a document from 1840 (Carrasco 1840, 143). 
Similarly, it may also have been Verástegui whom British naturalist A. Cruckshanks stayed with 
towards the end of the 1820s, when he passed through Huayllay, which he describes as “a small 
Indian town and the center of a mining district.”  
One of our party, a Spaniard, conducted us to the house of the Governor, who was his 
countryman. He had been a soldier in the Spanish army, but having married an Indian 
woman of Huayllay, he settled in the town, where his intelligence and activity procured 
him the office of Governor; to which he added the profession of a miner, and the trade of 
a shopkeeper. Our apartment was in keeping with the mixed pursuits of the master of the 
house; the table was covered with papers relative to the number of recruits, and the 
tribute to be furnished by the Indians under his jurisdiction; a heap of silver ore occupied 
a corner of the mud floor, and candles, sugar, jars of spirits, and similar merchandise 
were spread around (Cruckshanks 1831, 194).  
Around the turn of the century, many people from Huayllay were huacchilleros on the 
nearby haciendas and private holdings, which meant they could keep their own herds on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
117-126). It should be kept in mind that the land titles both of communities and of haciendas are often complex, 
multilayered texts; both parties to a dispute often accused each other of using forged documents. 
25 Other self-proclaimed “notables” (personas notables) of the district appear in an 1853 letter to the President of 
Peru – in which they join other districts of the province of Canta in expressing their support for a particular military 
leader - and include names such as Paz, Estrada, Guerreros, Artica and Madrid. I do not know whether this was a 
previous generation of local elites to that remembered by people today, or whether it simply constituted a different, 
perhaps less powerful sector. 
26 Several of the old churches in Pasco contain the remains of former hacendados or otherwise locally powerful 
families. That is also the case for the church in Huaychao, as well as in Rancas. 
27 This property consisted of 1,331 hectares of land. This is where the Huarón company built its first smelter as well 
as housing for its administrate staff; the latter is in use to this day. 
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hacienda lands in exchange for taking care of the owner´s flock. The latter was often composed 
of herds of llamas – a profitable business for hacienda owners at a time (before the introduction 
of railroad and automobile transport) when these animals were rented out for transport of mineral 
to smelters such as the one in Casapalca. The tight interlinking between the mining and cattle-
raising economies is furthermore shown by the fact that several of the mine owners were also 
hacendados – not just the Verásteguis, but also the Galjuf family, immigrants from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire who had originally settled in Cerro de Pasco. They bought the 
Huasca/Chuquiquirpay hacienda from the De la Torre hacendados and in 1901 formed the first 
formal mining company in Huayllay, the Sociedad Minera Concordia, employing between 25 
and 70 workers at any one time according to Velarde (1906, 31). In 1912, they transferred most 
of their mining claims (pertenencias) to the French Compagnie Francaise d’Études et Entreprises 
Coloniales, resulting in the formation of the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron; the latter began 
operations on a much larger scale than before in 1918.  The portion of the Galjuf claims that 
were not transferred to the French eventually became the Chungar company, today owned by 
Volcan.  
The development of industrial mining brought with it important social transformations to 
the Huayllay area. Other changes, however, were more connected to developments in national 
politics – namely, the new constitution of 1920, approved under the Leguía government. For the 
first time since national independence a century earlier, the constitution recognized the existence 
of indigenous communities (under the name comunidades de indígenas). Moreover, the 
government created a national Department for Indigenous Affairs (the Sección, later Dirección 
General de Asuntos Indígenas), which functioned unevenly over the next few years but which 
provided communities with an avenue to apply for official recognition, which later allowed them 
to assert their rights to property in land. These moves were motivated both by the ongoing land 
conflicts in parts of the country (especially the South) and by the indigenista movement among 
urban intellectuals. They were also part of the early opening by the Leguía administration (1919-
1930) towards indigenous and popular demands – a brief opening that ended when Leguía 
shifted toward a more conservative stance. Over the next few decades, the new Indigenous 
Affairs Department was shifted among various ministries - first the Ministry of Fomento (Public 
Works/Development), later the Ministry of Public Health, Labor and Social Provision, then the 
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Ministry of Justice and Labor, and finally, in 1949, the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous 
Affairs, which lasted until 1965 (Abanto 2011, 3). During this period, a number of communities 
– at first, those with relatively more resources and links to urban society – began applying for 
recognition; the comunidad de indígenas of Huayllay gained legal status through an official 
government resolution in 1929. According to documents from the Indigenous Affairs 
Department, that entity approved the map of the community´s lands two years later, in 1931.28 
Other comunidades de indígenas in the area were also officially recognized around the same 
years: Rancas in 1926, Huaychao in 1933, Villa de Pasco in 1934, and Vicco in 1940.  
The gaining of official status on the part of the comunidad included a process by which 
families that owned or held land privately – described today as propietarios or parceleros – and 
that in some cases reportedly held individual land titles, gave these up in favor of the 
community´s single title, as the law indicated. In the contemporary terms used by huayllinos, 
they became comuneros and usufructuarios. In other words, each individual household was to 
have private usufruct of grazing lands (known by terms such as canchas, pastos, estancias, etc.), 
but they could not sell it, for legal ownership was in the hands of the community. The latter, at 
least in theory, had the power to reassign or redistribute land among different families (as when 
someone left permanently). That is largely the present order in Huayllay today (as in Rancas): 
communal ownership (under the name comunidad campesina or peasant community), and 
private household usufruct. While some propietarios and parceleros consented to become part of 
the comunidad, others did not, and either sold their lands or otherwise left. Certainly, the large 
haciendas, such as El Diezmo, Racracancha or Huasca/Chuquiquirpay, remained in the hands of 
their owners. Thus, by the 1930s the comunidad of Huayllay existed in something resembling its 
present form, although smaller in territory, ringed as it was by the haciendas. 
I have synthesized this account from the descriptions of my informants, focusing on the 
points where they coincide with each other and when possible collating them with written 
documentation. However, many questions remain. What was the exact nature of the connection 
or continuity between the old común or pueblo of Huayllay that appears in the 18th-century 
documents (Ramírez  2002, 117-126) and the comunidad that was recognized in 1929? What 
                                                          
28 Archivo General de la Nación – Dirección General de Asuntos Indígenas, Legajo 3.13.2.17. 
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processes of “communal hegemony” - i.e. political struggles over power and meaning at the 
communal level, to use Mallon´s (1995) formulation – were involved in the formation of the 
comunidad? What relations of power might have existed in the new comunidad between those 
described as the former propietarios/parceleros and the former huacchilleros, and were they 
really entirely different groups? What role did kinship and local/outsider divisions play in 
determining who became part of the comunidad and who did not? A few of the last names that 
people identify as having belonged to the powerful families of the old days are still to be found 
among some huayllinos today, while others are not. Some of my informants emphasize the 
process by which property owners and parceleros gave up their titles to join the comunidad, 
whereas others place greater emphasis on the departure of the former landowning families and 
their replacement by the comuneros. One of them drew an explicit contrast between one former 
landowning family whose members all left the area, and another one which did stay and join the 
comunidad. It was likely a combination of these different patterns.  
Again, as mentioned above, the larger haciendas in the district remained unaffected by 
the formation of the comunidad at this time. Nor did all the shepherds and huacchilleros in the 
district join the comunidad, particularly if they were employed by the haciendas and had come 
from outside the immediate area. It should also be kept in mind that people who did not join the 
comunidad did not necessarily have to leave at this time - the development of industrial-scale 
mining at Huarón after 1912 generated employment opportunities and meant that people could 
live in the village of Huayllay or in the mining camp and not depend on herding activity or its 
products for their livelihood.  
Meanwhile, some of the haciendas in the district were purchased by larger hacendados – 
El Diezmo by Lercari Hermanos (also owners of the Pacoyán hacienda near Cerro de Pasco), and 
the haciendas Cónoc, Racracancha and Quisque by the powerful cattle and mining entrepreneur 
Eulogio Fernandini. The latter was the owner of the Brocal mining company as well as of 
numerous haciendas; together with the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, he was one of the largest 
hacendados in the Central Highlands, his properties covering a large part of Pasco province. In 
the 1950s, the Fernandini haciendas (under the name Algolán S.A.), like those of the CPC, 
intensified their efforts to modernize along capitalist lines, attempting to convert huacchilleros 
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into salaried workers and enforcing their property rights by building fences and expelling 
huacchilla animals. This process was cut short in the early 1960s when the comunidades of 
Pasco waged a campaign to occupy the haciendas; as part of that, in 1962, Huayllay and 
Huaychao occupied the Fernandini lands. The land takeovers across the country pushed the 
Peruvian state to institute a first Land Reform under Fernando Belaúnde in 1964 and a second, 
more radical reform under General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1969 (which also changed the 
name of comunidades indígenas to comunidades campesinas or peasant communities).29 As a 
result, the haciendas largely disappeared from the Peruvian highlands, and in Pasco province the 
change was particularly thorough. Some of the land of the former haciendas in Huayllay district 
was split among the communities of Huayllay and Huaychao as well as neighboring 
comunidades like San Pedro de Pari. Other parts were temporarily turned into CAPS 
(cooperatives that involved the participation of different communities); in the 1980s, these were 
also divided among the comunidades. 
The mine-comunidad relation 
In the 1920s and 30s, the recognition of comunidades de indígenas as legal owners of 
land had an effect on the mining companies that operated on their territory. When companies 
arrived in areas occupied by haciendas or other individual owners, they could simply buy up the 
land – this of course worked only if the owner was willing to sell, but at least the purchase of the 
land was a possibility. This was not the case with the newly recognized communal lands, 
especially after a new Constitution in 1933 added to the protections found in its 1920 
predecessor, by stating that communal lands were “inalienable” (inenajenable) as well as 
“unseizable” (inembargable), which meant they could not be sold. Granted, communal land 
could be expropriated “for reasons of public utility” (a concept equivalent to eminent domain); 
the National Mining Code of 1901 also allowed expropriations of land for mining purposes. Still, 
mining companies recognized the difference inherent in dealing with comunidades as opposed to 
individual owners.30 When needing to use communal lands, the companies, rather than 
                                                          
29 There had also been an earlier, limited Land Reform under the military junta that governed from 1962 to 1963, but 
it had been directed solely at the province of La Convención in Cusco, one of the sites of peasant political agitation. 
30 For example, Cerro de Pasco Corporation official B.T. Colley writes that during the Oroya Smoke Affair, 
company superintendent Harold Kingsmill “was negotiating the purchase of many privately owned properties 
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conducting a simple purchase, would have to establish long-term agreements with the 
comunidades, specifying a rent to be paid as well as other forms of compensation. 
Indeed, four years after its official recognition, the comunidad of Huayllay signed its first 
agreement with the mining company. This was in 1933, around the time the company was 
restarting operations after a temporary closure that was due to the Depression. The agreement 
was in turn revised in 1936 and 1941. Although I do not have the exact wording of the 1933 
agreement, the later revisions discuss its provisions, as well as the complaints that the 
community had brought forward, namely that the company, since beginning operations, “had not 
properly compensated the communal properties” and had occupied 48 hectares of the 
community´s land (Gonzáles et al. 2002).31 This was the land on which the company had built its 
narrow gauge railroad, its “vast housing camps” and its hydroelectric facilities. The complaints 
also made reference to “the damage that the smoke from the San José smelter had produced,” 
and “the harm that the Francois Concentrator Plant was producing through its corresponding 
tailings (lamas) deposit, and the contamination of the waters of the Huayllay river by chemical 
substances” (Ibid.). In return for the community agreeing to renounce all claims in relation to 
these complaints, the company agreed to provide the community with electricity from its 
hydroelectric plant – specifically, it would supply enough electricity to light fifty 40w lightbulbs.  
The discussion of “environmental” issues in the 1933 agreement should not be surprising, 
not only because the company did pollute the area in different ways, but also because 
contamination had already become a source of conflict in the mining areas of the Central 
Highlands at this time. A decade earlier, smoke from the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s smelter at 
La Oroya had decimated communal as well as hacienda lands and prompted conflict at the local 
level as well as the appointment of an official government commission to investigate the matter. 
As a CPC official who was involved in the affair was to write decades later, “the smoke question 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
claiming damages, and arranging with the Government for the payment of annuities for damages to properties which 
legally could not be purchased, such as communities” (Colley 1958, 18). It is not clear whether he is referring to a 
period before or after the 1933 Constitution.  
31 Here I have benefitted from the fact that Gonzáles, Koc-Menard and León´s (2000) essay reproduces the text of 
the 1936 and 1941 agreements as an appendix. This text is consistent with the discussion in Gerardo Bedoya´s 1939 
Indigenous Affairs report, which I analyze below.  
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broke and it entirely engulfed the Corporation for the time being, finally greatly changing its 
history and completely altering its operations and its various products” (Colley 1958, 16).  
Although the operations at Huarón were on a smaller scale, the leaders of the Huayllay 
comunidad had to have seen some of their effects (smoke from the San José smelter, tailings, 
etc.) and connected them to what they had heard about La Oroya.32 Nor is the use of electricity as 
a form of compensation particularly surprising. Mining companies had a near-monopoly on 
electricity in rural areas of central Peru at this time, and were likely the only way for a 
community like Huayllay to gain access to this coveted element of modernity. It´s also possible 
that huayllinos might have heard about the communal project undertaken by the community of 
Muquiyauyo (which was starting to send migrants to Huarón around this time), in the Mantaro 
valley. In the early 1920s, the muquiyauyinos had used their savings from mine work as well as 
technical expertise and contacts gained in the mines to build a small hydroelectric plant, with 
which they soon began selling electricity to the city of Jauja (Adams 1959, Dionisio 1993). 
While a smaller, less prosperous community like Huayllay was not in a position to do something 
similar (and could not in any case have competed with the mine´s hydroelectric plant next door), 
the idea of small towns and comunidades indígenas gaining access to electricity must have 
circulated through the mining regions of the Central Highlands at this time. 
In 1936, the agreement between the mining company and the comunidad had to be 
revised, because of, as the document put it, “the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron having 
increased [through] its activity the amount of land owned by Huayllay that is occupied by said 
Compagnie, having increased especially the tailings deposit... all of which makes a new 
agreement necessary” (Gonzáles et al. 2002).33 The company promised to increase the amount of 
electricity provided to Huayllay from 50 to 100 light bulbs of 40w; other forms of compensation 
are also mentioned. The mine agreed to give the comunidad a one-time payment of 500 soles as 
                                                          
32 As an executive from the company that currently owns the Huarón mine told me, when they arrived in the early 
2000s they found that “there had been a mining catastrophe there.” He was referring to the uncovered tailings ponds 
(one of them immediately adjacent to the town) that had grown over the course of the 20th century and that had been 
left abandoned by the previous company in the 1990s. 
33 This time the representative of the comunidad is explicitly mentioned: Demetrio Herrera, who is listed as having 
received a poder (legal authorization) from his community since 1929; representing the company was its General 
Manager Marcel Cabandous. 
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“definitive compensation” for the loss of land due to the rise in the water level of the lakes 
(Huaroncocha, Naticocha and Lacsacocha) that the company used to supply the canals and dams 
that generated its hydroelectric power. A regular rent payment for the use of land was also 
agreed upon – the company would pay an annual sum of 250 soles for the communal lands it 
used. Furthermore, the mine agreed to cede to the comunidad a large part of the San José estate, 
which it had originally bought from the Andueza family in 1915; however, the comunidad was 
also required to “recognize the validity” of the 1915 purchase (thus implying that it had been 
questioned).34  
The forms of compensation listed above were in return for the community accepting the 
company´s use of 137 additional hectares of land in addition to the previous 48 (for a total 185 
ha.).35 Also, as before, the community gave up all claims regarding any damage caused by the 
company, including from “the eventual tailings deposits that could appear in the properties of the 
comunidad of Huayllay, besides the areas listed in the previous article” (Ibid.). Finally, the 1936 
agreement specified that in case the mining company needed to expand its operations, “for 
whatever reason and on whatever part of the territory of the comunidad of Huayllay,” they would 
pay the comunidad the annual sum of one sol and fifty cents for each new hectare occupied. 
These agreements not only serve to highlight relations between the local community and 
the mining company; they also provide a window into the relationship of these two agents with 
representatives of the Peruvian state. In 1939, an official from the Indigenous Affairs 
Department, Gerardo Bedoya, wrote a report to his superiors about the agreements between the 
community of Huayllay and the Huarón company, based on a visit to the site as well as his 
analysis of the documents.36 The Department had had some involvement in the negotiations from 
the beginning (the original 1933 agreement had been signed by the parties in the Ministry of 
                                                          
34 The company also promised to contribute a one-time payment of 200 soles to help in the construction of a canal 
that the comunidad was planning to build. 
35 Specifically, 30 ha. for a new processing plant, 67 ha. for new tailings areas, 15 ha. for new housing camps, and 
25 ha. for surface area surrounding the mines themselves, in addition to the 48 ha. already discussed in the previous 
agreement. 
36 Bedoya´s report is reproduced in Pinto´s (1978) compilation of documents from the Indigenous Affairs 
Department, Comunidades Indígenas: Documentos.  
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Fomento, which housed Indigenous Affairs at the time). Moreover, as Bedoya noted, the 1936 
agreement stipulated that it had to be submitted for approval and ratification by Indigenous 
Affairs. Bedoya´s remarks should be read with caution; the political orientation of the Indigenous 
Affairs office tended to vary over time, but in 1939 Peru was under the conservative government 
of General Oscar R. Benavides. Moreover, when government officials visited mining regions it 
was common practice for them to be hosted by the mining companies themselves, which often 
made them partial to the latter (if they weren´t so to begin with). In his report Bedoya argued that 
the agreement was “broadly beneficial” to the comunidad. The community was allowing the 
company to use 185 ha. of its land, but on the other hand the company had given them a part of 
the San José estate that it had bought from Andueza in 1915; although the agreement had not 
mentioned the size of this tract of land, Bedoya claimed it was 838 hectares. Thus, the 
community was gaining more land than it was losing.37 He did not consider the possibility that 
the comuneros of Huayllay might have considered the land of the San José estate – immediately 
adjacent to the village of Huayllay - rightfully theirs to begin with. In monetary terms, Bedoya´s 
analysis of the agreement also told him that the community was benefitting more than was 
apparent. It would receive not just the yearly 250 soles in rent payments from the mining 
company, but also what it could charge people both for the use of the 100 light bulbs and of the 
pasture lands in the recovered San José land (the latter according to standard rates charged by 
haciendas). Taking that into account, he argued, the annual revenue received by the comunidad 
would be 2,707 soles, not 250. What Bedoya does not seem to recognize is the fact that most of 
the consumers of the electricity and pasture lands would likely be comunidad members 
themselves, and thus, even if the fees for the service were actually collected, the money would 
flow into the communal institution from within, rather than from without.   
However, Bedoya did object that one element in the agreement was too favorable to the 
company at the expense of the comunidad – its stipulation that the former could expand its 
operations to any part of the community´s lands by simply paying 1.50 soles for each new 
hectare occupied. He argued that “it is not possible to allow such a broad authorization, by means 
                                                          
37 Also, Bedoya claimed, out of the 185 hectares that the company had acquired for usufruct, only 110 ha. were 
really in use at the time of his visit – 50 ha. for company installations, 60 ha. for tailings deposits. On the other 75 
ha. of land, the community´s animals were still grazing, even if the land was technically in use by the company. 
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of which a certain company could occupy... the totality of the lands that make up the patrimony 
of a community” (Pinto 1978, 164).  He thus recommended that the company be required to 
request permission from the Indigenous Affairs department each time it needed to use more land. 
His recommendation was indeed taken up in a 1941 revision of the agreement, albeit in slightly 
modified form: the company could acquire up to 150 additional hectares of land without 
permission; beyond that, it needed authorization from Indigenous Affairs and from the 
comunidad. Furthermore, the annual rent for each additional hectare of land to be paid to the 
comunidad was raised from 1.50 to 2.50 soles. 
Representations by outsiders 
 These agreements show that the legal provisions regarding comunidades de indígenas in 
the 1920s and 30s made a difference in the relationship between the mining company and the 
local population in Huayllay. The leaders of the community were able to negotiate an agreement 
that provided some minimal compensation for the use of land. The Indigenous Affairs office in 
theory provided some assistance to the comunidad, but in this case it was rather sympathetic to 
the company. This is clear from Bedoya´s report, where he describes the company in the glowing 
terms proper to the national discourse that has traditionally associated mining companies with 
modernity and progress (Salas 2008): 
The aformentioned company has been an efficient collaborator in the economic and 
cultural improvement of the whole zone, and very especially of the Indians (indígenas) of 
the community of Huayllay, whose services it employs preferentially, currently paying 
them an average [daily] salary of 2.65 soles for the work undertaken in the interior of the 
mines, and of 2.00 soles for the work conducted on the surface (Pinto 1978, 158). 
 
Bedoya did add some nuance to his account by recognizing that the interactions between the 
company and the local population had not always been positive, though he attributes the change 
to the attitudes of company management rather than to the formation of the comunidad and the 
legal context surrounding it: “The relations between the mining company and the community of 
Huayllay has also had many changes and variations, and it is only from the date Mr. Gustavo 
D´Auriol assumed the management, that they begin to be cordial, with positive benefit, certainly, 
for both parts” (Pinto 1978, 159-160). On the whole, however, Bedoya emphasized the benefits 
that the community derived from the presence of the mine: the company school, hospital and 
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general store. He also portrays the company as a civilizing force, and in the process reproduces 
the idea, common among Peruvian elites and professionals at the time, that coca use was a public 
health problem: “The unquestionable necessity of combating the development of alcoholism and 
cocainism (cocainismo) among our native (autóctono) element, is also the object of an intense 
and feasible (plausible) campaign on the part of the upper-level staff of the company” (Ibid., 
159).  
 The affirmation of cultural hierarchies evident in Bedoya´s statements is indicative of the 
broader ways in which outsiders tended to approach a space like Huayllay at the time. Gunter 
Holzmann, a German chemist who worked at the company´s laboratory in the 1940s, discussed 
the experience in his memoirs. Although more sympathetic to the local population of mining 
workers, his account is by no means free of exoticism, as in this passage: 
Not only did they offer excellent salary and conditions, but also the opportunity to have 
an independent directing position, where I could put my knowledge and skills to the test. 
In spite of the tempting conditions, few were willing to exile themselves to a camp at 
4800 meters, far away from all civilization and surrounded by 2,000 Indian workers 
feared for their frequent strikes and violent rebellions (Holzmann 2000, 101). 
Holzmann´s account is rather vague and seems to be based more on common ideas about Central 
Highlands miners in general – those “feared for their frequent strikes and violent rebellions” – 
than on specific observations. On the other hand, Harry Tschopik, a U.S. anthropologist who 
visited the area in 1947, gives us a different impression. Tschopik arrived in Huayllay as part of 
a research project (“Highland Communities of Central Peru”) organized by the Smithsonian´s 
Institute of Social Anthropology, in collaboration with Peru´s Ministry of Education. As he 
himself acknowledged, his observations were by no means in-depth – he spent only a few days in 
Huayllay, and two months in his entire survey of 14 communities in the central and south-central 
highlands. Still, as an anthropologist, Tschopik was naturally more interested in social and 
cultural dynamics than were other visitors. Unlike the other accounts discussed here, Tschopik 
devotes almost equal attention to both of the communities in Huayllay District – Huayllay and 
Huaychao. According to him, Huayllay village had around 100 houses, ranging from huts made 
of champa (similar to the estancias of the rural surroundings) to rectangular adobe, thatch-roofed 
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dwellings and a few two-story, galvanized-iron-roofed houses in the center of town.38 He 
estimated the population at around 400, though many of the men were away at the Huarón mine 
up the road. Huaychao, on the other hand, was a much smaller village, with only some 20 houses 
but then gradually diffusing outwards into the estancias that dotted the plain. Although it was as 
close or closer to the mine, it had fewer people working in mining.  
However, Tschopik was most interested in the degree of social and ethnic differentiation 
in the two communities, and in the way in which this related to the socioeconomic changes that 
were taking place. He sought to distinguish between Indians and Mestizos, and looked for 
comparison to other parts of the country he had visited. In this sense he described Huayllay and 
Huaychao in contrasting terms. The latter was more rural, less oriented to mining, and had a 
more fragmented population:    
The inhabitants of Huaychao annex, which pertains to the District of Huayllay, are in 
great part Indian shepherds, most of whom live in the scattered estancias.... The 
organization of Huaychao appears to be not unlike that of the more primitive and 
conservative villages of Huancavelica and Ayacucho Departments. Although the Mestizo 
inhabitants of the village proper represent but a small percentage of the total population 
of the annex, they occupy the important political offices (Tschopik 1947, 53-54).  
Huayllay, on the other hand, seemed to him to be homogeneous. Tschopik did acknowledge that 
the “general social-cultural uniformity” which he observed “may be more apparent than real,” 
and could be disproven by more in-depth observation. Overall, however, he made an argument 
about the effect that mining had had on social structure in Huayllay:  
Steady or temporary employment in the surrounding mines has tended to upset the 
established social equilibrium. Opportunities for economic advancement are available to 
all, and Indians and Mestizos alike are in demand as laborers and employees; the fine 
distinctions of class are largely ignored in the labor markets of modern industry. Hence, 
while it seems likely that the class structure of Huayllay a generation ago would have 
resembled more closely that of present-day Huaychao... the present trend appears to be 
toward a leveling of class distinctions (Ibid., 51-52). 
                                                          
38 Two of Tschopik´s observations regarding the physical aspects of Huayllay village are of interest here. He 
confirms the continuity of the company´s provision of electricity as a form of compensation for the use of land. 
Additionally, he discusses the polluting effects of the mine´s activity on the local river: “Flowing from the northwest 
past the town is a small river, highly colored by mineral salts, which carries away the waste and refuse from the 
miens of Huarón. For this reason Huayllay must depend for its drinking water on that piped from several nearby 
springs” (Tschopik 1947, 50).  
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On this basis, he concluded that “in striving for consistency within the present paper we should 
probably – on cultural grounds – consider the bulk of the inhabitants of Huayllay to be Mestizos” 
(Ibid.). The terms “Indian” and “Mestizo” were common in social science discourse at the time, 
and they were also used as categories in the Census (unlike today). The 1940 Census used the 
categories “Indian” and “White or Mestizo;” for Huayllay district (including the camps of the 
Huarón mine), it listed 51% of the population as “Indian” and 49% as “White or Mestizo.”  
Of course, as many scholars of the Andes have pointed out, in practice the categories 
“Indian” and “Mestizo” were relational rather than fixed; nor are those necessarily the terms used 
at the local level, i.e. racial hierarchies can be expressed in other terms such as culture and 
education (De la Cadena 2004). Tschopik based his classification both on the degree of 
differentiation he observed in each community as well as on specific markers, namely language, 
dress and occupation. For information on language use he relied on the opinions of local 
informants. In Huayllay, he concluded that, although the overwhelming majority of the 
population was bilingual, “there appears to be a marked preference for Spanish over Quechua 
and, with the exception of some of the old people, few speak the native language only” (52). In 
Huaychao, on the other hand, the local schoolteacher had told Tschopik that between 30 and 40 
percent of the population spoke only Quechua, while the rest were bilingual. In terms of dress, he 
identifies “mestizo” clothing with either Western-style clothing or miners´ overalls for men and 
de centro (a style originating in the Mantaro Valley) dress for women. “Indian” clothing, on the 
other hand, consisted largely of homespun cloth, “native-woven textiles” and hand-made felt 
hats. Finally, as far as occupation was concerned, Tschopik associated the work of shepherds 
with “Indians,” whereas mining work, for him, was one of the driving factors behind Huayllay 
having become more mestizo.  
Many of Tschopik´s observations were likely accurate – particularly those regarding 
observable aspects such as clothing – while others oversimplify what was no doubt a more 
complex reality, as he was aware. In terms of his discussion of race and ethnicity, it seems to be 
influenced both by the ways in which his informants might have talked about social distinctions 
– in particular, the relationship between shepherds and those whose animals they cared for - as 
well as by the semantic and ideological framework through which race was understood in 
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Peruvian intellectual and political discourse. As De la Cadena (2004) has argued, for much of the 
20th century, the Peruvian state did not promote an official ideology of mestizaje, as in some 
other Latin American countries; nevertheless, the mestizo was seen as an “acculturated” Indian, 
and mestizaje as a process of culture loss and assimilation into national culture. Race was defined 
not in biological but primarily in cultural and educational terms. According to De la Cadena, a 
popular ideology emerged over time to counter this dominant view. This popular perspective 
allows for the possibility of leaving behind “Indian” status and its association with educational 
and economic backwardness, without necessarily abandoning one’s culture; the result is the 
phenomenon De la Cadena calls “indigenous mestizos.”  
In certain areas of the Central Highlands such as the Mantaro Valley, the social and 
cultural changes already underway by the first half of the 20th century already pointed to the 
inadequacy of the acculturation model. In the Mantaro Valley, the decline of extreme social 
inequalities, the gradual adoption of Spanish and the greater integration into national society did 
not preclude the cultivation of a strong regional huanca identity or the maintenance of many 
distinctive cultural traits. This phenomenon was already noted by early observers such as 
Arguedas (1975). Furthermore, the mining industry also played a distinctive role within this 
imaginary. On the one hand, professional and elite Peruvian observers in the first half of the 20th 
century saw highland Indians as naturally suited for mining work, due to their large numbers, 
low wages, and adaptation to high altitude. On the other hand, the modernity and progress that 
the industry was supposed to bring were seen as incompatible with indigeneity (as Drinot 2011 
has argued for Peruvian industrial development in general). Therefore, while Tschopik was 
probably right that the demand for mining workers had helped to level social distinctions in 
Huayllay – as Alberti and Sánchez (1974) argue for the Mantaro Valley – his observations, and 
the way they would be read by Peruvian intellectuals, could not help but be influenced by the 
dominant acculturation model as well as by the particular ways that both race and the mining 
industry were understood in Peru at the time.  
A contrasting account of the Huayllay area comes from the context of the Agrarian 
Reform some two decades later. In 1970, the Department of Peasant Communities of the 
Ministry of Agriculture assembled a team of researchers to conduct a series of studies on the 
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comunidades of Pasco that had received land allocations through the Agrarian Reform. Their 
reports are shaped by a different intellectual and political climate from that which influenced 
both Bedoya and Tschopik. By this time, the use of the terms “Indian” and “indigenous” had 
largely been abandoned by Peruvian social scientists as well as by the state; as a reflection of 
that, in 1969 the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado had officially 
changed the name of the comunidades indígenas to comunidades campesinas. The 1970 Ministry 
of Agriculture reports are focused on comparing among the different comunidades in Pasco 
province and assessing the degree to which each one might be amenable to the new regulatory 
framework (estatuto) for peasant communities as well as to the formation of cooperatives. In this 
context, the concepts of tradition and modernity are preserved, but tradition actually receives a 
more positive valence than modernity, as it is taken to imply a greater adaptability to and 
willingness to comply with the objectives of the Agrarian Reform. Thus, the community of 
Vicco, known for its members´ prosperity and success as truck drivers, is described by Chang 
and Núñez del Prado (1970) as “individualistic,” “inhospitable” and in other unfavorable terms; 
furthermore, the authors argue, “the village of Vicco has ceased to be a peasant community and 
has become a town of Westernized mestizos” (67). Based on that logic, they argue for the 
dissolution of the comunidad of Vicco (which never occurred).  
By contrast, in his report on Huayllay (which does not include Huaychao), Chang (1970) 
describes the huayllinos in more favorable terms, as cordial, prone to cooperation and as 
dedicated to the betterment of their community. Although he emphasizes the processes of 
“transculturation” underway, as well as the division between comuneros and particulares (the 
latter being those who worked at the mining company and were not members of the comunidad), 
he argues that Huayllay “can still be considered to be a true peasant community” (132). This was 
due to its organizational cohesion and the continuing importance of herding activity to its 
economic and cultural life. For that reason, Chang expected that the application of the new 
regulations pertaining to peasant communities would meet with success here, as would the 
formation of a communal cooperative. The intellectual and political climate of the moment (i.e. 
anti-imperialism) is also reflected in Chang´s account of the mine-community relationship: he 
argues that Huayllay is “dominated by” and “dependent on” the mining companies. His 
description of the relationship is much more negative than that of Bedoya or Tschopik: 
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Currently, the comuneros manifest a strong rejection, almost a hatred, of mining activity. 
They feel frustrated that their children, some of whom have university studies,39 are 
obliged to work as salaried workers within a system of exploitation, where they very 
seldom can have the hope of progressing towards a better life. In the same way, they cite 
the scant assistance that the mining companies provide, and the frequent conflicts that 
they maintain with the community (Chang 1970, 139).  
Exchange systems and regional articulation 
 So far we have focused most on two aspects of the local history of the Huayllay area: the 
formation of the comunidad and the relationship with the mining company. These are important 
but not sufficient to get a sense of social dynamics in Huayllay during the time that industrial 
mining has existed there. Just as crucial, if not more, have been the traditional patterns of 
subsistence and activity through which people have made their everyday lives. Foremost among 
these, certainly, has been the raising of animals, primarily sheep, alpacas and llamas, since this is 
a high-altitude puna region. Although secondary to mining as an economic activity today, 
herding continues to be practiced, largely through family usufruct on community-owned lands 
(often, though not always, involving hired shepherds). However, another, closely related sphere 
was historically just as important for the local population: the barter exchange of local products, 
including crafts, for those of valley agriculturalists. When I began research in Huayllay I was 
surprised to find that this was one of the things that people – especially older men – liked to talk 
about the most. Here I will briefly describe this system as it existed well into the 20th century, 
both in terms of local production and of the links it established with other areas of the Central 
Highlands to the west, north and east. 
Barter systems have been described for many Andean communities, most notably by 
Enrique Mayer (2002) for the community of Tangor in the Chaupiwaranga region. As Mayer 
himself notes, while barter and other forms of exchange have been an important component of 
economic life for many valley agricultural communities, for puna pastoralists it was often “an 
absolute necessity:” 
                                                          
39 In the 1950s and 60s there was a campaign to create more regional universities in the Central Highlands, as in 
other parts of the country. In 1960 this resulted in the creation of a Cerro de Pasco branch of the Universidad 
Nacional del Centro (based in Huancayo). In 1965 this branch became the University of Cerro de Pasco – the 
Universidad Nacional Daniel Alcides Carrión. The workers at both Cerro de Pasco, Huarón, and other regional 
mines contributed to the founding of the university through deductions from their payroll.  
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Every year, the same pastoralists came to Tangor with their llamas, donkeys, and horses 
bringing wool, chuño, mutton, and cheeses. They stayed with friends, plied their trade, 
and returned with their animals loaded down with grains (Mayer 2002, 159). 
In the case of huayllinos, they, like many other highland herders, would also go to the 
quebradas (narrow intramontane valley) areas at harvest time, to exchange their own products 
for the corn, potatoes, oca, olluco and other products of the agriculturalists. Many of the 
highland products that they took with them were typical puna items, similar to those carried by 
other herding communities: meat (especially mutton), wool, animal hides, and fish (challwas). 
However, huayllinos had also specialized in the production of a very specific kind of item, for 
which they were regionally known: clay pottery, made by hand and with local materials. This 
was an activity that involved both men and women, although generally in different capacities. 
Together with their other products, the exchange of clay pots tied huayllinos to many 
communities in the northern Lima highlands to the west, in the Chaupiwaranga region and 
Huánuco to the north and northeast, and in other quebradas to the east. On the other hand, there 
does not seem to have been significant exchange with regions to the south such as the Mantaro 
Valley.  
Since pottery is a craft that has drastically declined in Huayllay, I was not able to observe 
it firsthand. There are still a few older people who practice some elements of the craft, and there 
are some incipient efforts to preserve and perform it as part of local tourism promotion efforts 
and as a part of huayllino identity.40 Moreover, there are many people still around who, as 
children, took part in and/or observed both the making of pottery and the process of its exchange 
in the quebradas. I will briefly discuss the process of production of the clay pots based on the 
accounts given to me by my informants.41 Two types of clay were used – one red, the other 
                                                          
40 At one point during my research, a “Festival of the Clay Pot” was held in one of the caseríos (hamlets) of the 
community, but I was not able to attend. This should be understood in the broader context of the discourse of tourist 
promotion, which is widespread in Huayllay today – even if the number of tourists that come through the 
community is actually very modest. However, the recent efforts at tourist promotion, though they help to explain 
something like the formal holding of a “clay pot festival,” are not sufficient as an explanation for the centrality of 
the pottery craft to huayllino identity, which has its roots in the actual role that huayllinos fulfilled within the 
regional puna-quebrada barter system.   
41 I should mention that, although the actual shaping of the pots was done generally by women, my accounts of the 
process all come from men. I did interview a number of women in Huayllay, and conversed with them more 
generally as part of my fieldwork, but the topic did not come up, and at the time I had not realized its importance.  
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described alternatively as white, gray or blue - and both were extracted from specific hills or 
promontories around Huayllay. Each family brought these clays to their estancia – the rural 
shepherds´ dwellings, spaced far apart, where the making of the pots took place. The two clays 
were mixed together, water was added, and a third element was thrown in – a sand-like material, 
also extracted from places within Huayllay´s general territory. People then stepped on the mix 
until it was well-blended; this is the one stage of the production process that people most 
remember having participated in as children. At some point, the mixture was left to rest for a 
period of time, so the whole process could be drawn out over several weeks.  
The next two stages were more divided by gender: the shaping of the pots was generally 
associated with women, and the firing with men. One of my informants, Desiderio Roque, 
described to me how his grandmother would shape the clay with her hands, using only a small 
cylinder and a few other implements, and using the back of a sheep hide as a base. She would 
give the pot its initial round shape and then let it air out while she started on others, until there 
were one or two rows of them. She then picked up the pots again and continued to work on the 
shape, then let them air out again, and finally finished by polishing any rough edges. Although 
people today refer to the products of the craft generically as “clay pots,” they were actually 
different shapes and sizes – large and small porongos for chicha, pots for cooking, kettles, tiny 
decorative pots, etc. 
Once the pots had dried in the sun, the men would lay them out in rows and cover them 
with champa42 as well as llama or sheep dung (takia), both of which are good fuels.  They would 
then light the champa and proceed to let it burn. During the whole firing process, the man would 
smoke, chew coca and drink cane alcohol - the same as on any ritual occasion – while using a 
stick to turn over the champa to keep the fire going. No one was supposed to make any noise 
during the firing; for this reason, the children were taken somewhere else.43 After a while, the 
man would take a small piece of dried takia and throw it against the side of one of the pots; 
judging by the sound, he could determine if it was ready. 
                                                          
42 Champa is a species of highland grass that is cut and dug out together with part of the underlying soil, and that 
serves as a fuel for cooking and other purposes; it burns well and is more economical than buying gas. It is dug from 
the ground shortly before the start of the annual rains, when the ground is driest.  
43 According to another one of my informants, women were supposed to stay away from the firing as well. 
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Incidentally, the craft of pottery in Huayllay is described in a 1918 document by Ernest 
Godet, a hydraulic engineer who spent a few months in the area, hired by the Compagnie des 
Mines de Huaron to build dams and canals for the mine´s operations. Godet had a family 
connection to the University of Neuchatel´s Ethnographic Museum, and wrote a long article 
about the Huayllay region for the university´s Geographical Bulletin. His references to the 
pottery craft are surprising because they are among the few sections of his article that actually 
contain detailed descriptions as opposed to shallow generalizations and commonplace prejudices. 
In general, his description matches the information that people in Huayllay gave me, which 
makes it seem like it might have been based on actual observation.44 
For some reason that escapes us, this work appears to be reserved for the women of the 
region. The man, it is true, piles up the raw pottery in order to fire it, and monitors the 
process, but, with the exception of one particular case, we have never seen men get their 
hands into the clay (Godet 1918, 164)  
Godet describes arriving at an estancia where women were engaged in pottery work, and 
being treated to a demonstration of “the most marvelous handwork precision work that one can 
imagine.”45 
These women crouch in front of a large flat stone; the others stay in front of a short tree 
trunk; the stone and the trunk constitute their work space. They then grab a handful of 
clay and, without tools, without any means other than their fingers and their thumb, they 
knead and dig into the mass, rounding the edges bit by bit; in some twenty minutes they 
have completed a container of exact circumference and whose harmonious profile offers 
the most perfect symmetry (Ibid., 166). 
 Although the two main stages of pottery production – the shaping of the clay and the 
firing – were associated with different genders, there was some flexibility to this. It does seem 
like the firing was almost always done by men, but the shaping of the clay, though generally 
associated with women, could sometimes be done by men; to this day, there are a few men who 
make clay pots themselves. 
                                                          
44 I did not find out about Godet´s 1918 article until long after I had concluded my research. The overall lackluster 
quality of the piece (other than the section on pottery) is my reason for not using it as a source in other parts of this 
chapter. It could of course be used as a text through which to analyze the perceptions and worldview of a European 
engineer of his time.  
45 He erroneously uses the term hacienda to refer to estancias. It´s possible such a usage could have been in place at 




Figure 3 – Memorial plaque for a huayllina woman, Huayllay Cemetery. This is part of a 
new trend, in the region’s cemeteries, of decorating graves with pictorial and/or sculptural 
representations of activities with which individuals were associated in their lifetimes. Photograph 
by Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, 2010. 
 
The making of pottery in Huayllay was timed to coincide with the harvests in the 
quebradas; in fact, people refer to the old exchange trips as “doing the harvest” (hacer la 
cosecha). Clay pots were the most distinctive items by which huayllinos were regionally known, 
but it was not the only one they carried on the trips; they also wove woolen blankets for 
exchange as well as for their own use, in addition to carrying animal hides, mutton, wool and fish 
(challwas). It was usually the men who went on the trips, packing their goods on llamas and 
following by foot; those who were better off rode on horses. The familiarity of huayllino men 
with traveling and with pack animals – derived also from their role as transporters of minerals 
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from the mines to the Casapalca smelter and other locations before the introduction of the 
railroads – led to Huayllay being described as a town of arrieros (transporters or muleteers) in 
the early 20th century, for example in Velarde (1906, 11) and Godet (1917, 138). There were two 
main times of the year for the exchange trips: the potato harvest in May, and the maize harvest, 
to which people traveled beginning in July and more fully in August and September or even 
later.46Although these were the two main crops and they in a sense defined the exchange, other 
crops were obtained as a secondary element in the exchange, depending on the location and 
altitude: Andean tubers like oca (oxalis tuberosa) and olluco (ullucus tuberosus), habas (fava 
beans), barley, wheat, or fruits.  
The llama caravans went in two principal directions from Huayllay: west and northwest, 
on the one hand, and northeast, on the other. The westerly direction was more associated with the 
maize harvest, whereas the northeasterly direction was more characteristic of the potato harvest, 
although both harbored some of each crop, depending on the altitude and the specific location.  
Some of the northeasterly destinations that people mentioned to me were the Chaupiwaranga 
Valley and the immediately adjacent area of southwestern Huánuco Department (for example 
Yanahuanca, Ambo, Caynas and neighboring Huariaca, Pallanchacra and Yarusyacán), as well 
as the quebradas of eastern Pasco Province such as Paucartambo and Huancabamba, and 
sometimes as far east as Oxapampa. To the west, the huayllinos went to  communities on the 
upper Chancay Valley, such as Carac, Coto, Lampián, Huayopampa, La Perla,  Sumbilca and 
Huascoy, or, slightly further south, to villages in Canta Province such as Quipán, Marco and San 
José. They also traveled to communities on the upper Huaura Valley, such as Puñun, Tongos, 
Maray and Paccho.47 By and large, the westerly direction brought huayllinos into contact with 
                                                          
46 Certain varieties of maize were harvested in July or even earlier, while others were harvested in August. Even for 
the early-harvest varieties, some people preferred to wait till the corn was dry. 
47 In her thesis on the community of Huaychao (Huayllay´s immediate neighbor), Aranguren (1971) lists more 
locations as destinations for huaychinos (who had similar exchange practices as huayllinos) on their “harvest” trips. 
To the northeast and east, they went to several locations in the Chaupiwaranga Valley, namely Yanahuanca, 
Chinche, Pomayarus, Huarautambo, Vilcabamba, Rocco, Santa Ana de Tusi and Tángor (the latter the community 
where Enrique Mayer [1974, 1977, 2002] did his research). They also traveled to Huácar (Ambo), Huachón, 
Yarusyacán, Paucartambo, and Ulcumayo. To the west, the huaychinos went to Picoy, Parquín, Santa Leonor, 
Paccho, Ayaranga, Churín, Huancahuasi, San Cristóbal de Rapaz and Oyón, as well as many communities on the 
upper Chancay Valley, such as Vichaycocha, Pacaraos, Santa Cruz de Andamarca, Santa Catalina de los Baños, 
Ñaupay, Ihuarí, Huachinga, Chauca, Lampián, Cárac and Huascoy,  
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communities that were adopting Spanish more rapidly, due to their proximity to the coast, 
whereas the northeasterly route took them to quebradas (Chaupiwaranga, Huánuco, Huariaca, 
etc.) where varieties of Central Peruvian Quechua were more heavily spoken during much of the 
20th century (though also, increasingly, alongside Spanish).48 
 The items were exchanged according to established ratios. For example, Vicente Morales, 
one of my informants, mentioned a specific type of metal container (lata) that was used as a 
measurement. A small blanket (manta) was exchanged for 2 latas of corn, while a large blanket 
(frazada) was exchanged for 6 latas of corn.49 According to him, the llama itself was also used as 
a measurement, since the clay pots were always packed onto the llamas in the same way: the pots 
carried by one llama were exchanged for the amount of potatoes that that same llama could 
carry. Maize, on the other hand, was worth twice as much as potatoes. Aranguren (1971) gives 
some more traditional exchange ratios from the community of Huaychao (47). Similarly, Mayer 
notes the existence of a method of exchange known as unay precio (old price), whereby items 
were priced in terms of coinage that was no longer in circulation, resulting in “prices” that bore 
no resemblance to the actual market prices at the time (Mayer 2002, 154, 159).  
 The trips could sometimes be lengthy. For example, Armando López remembers having 
traveled once with his father to the district of Cayna near Ambo in Huánuco Department; the trip 
took five days, although they stopped along the way. They had horses which they rode, while 
other people had to travel on foot with their llamas. Máximo Roque (born 1934) remembered 
having gone several times with his relatives, accompanying their llamas on foot over the course 
of several days as they traveled to the quebradas to the northeast such as Yanahuanca, 
Pallanchacra and Huariaca. Vicente Morales remembers having done four trips, mostly to the 
maize-growing communities to the west. He described the route to the community of Puñun 
(Huaura Province) to obtain maize: the first day they arrived in the town of Yanamá, then the 
second day to a village called Huamanripa, and finally the third day the party came to a placed 
                                                          
48 I am making this linguistic generalization about language based on ethnographies and other studies of the region. 
It was also made by one of my informants – Armando López. 
49 As Mayer writes when discussing the different systems of measurement in barter exchanges in the Chaupiwaranga 
region: “A fourth option was the lata, a rectangular tin container that manufacturers used to pack and ship 
commercially manufactured lard” (153).  
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called Churincocha; there they had to decide among four different places to go to: Puñun, 
Tungus, Maray or Paccho. When they finally arrived in a community where an exchange was 
going to take place, the people from that town met them in the outskirts and competed with each 
other to grab the pots. The local people then hosted the visitors overnight in their homes; the next 
day, the huayllinos went around town looking for the persons who had taken their pots or other 
items, so that the exchange could be completed (this kind of delayed exchange was also 
described to me by Armando López).Vicente Morales remembers that the people in the maize-
growing community would send them back with foods for the road such as cancha (toasted 
corn), toasted fava beans (habas), and chicharrón (fried pork rinds). On the other hand, another 
of my informants, Desiderio Roque, never went on one of these trips, but he remembers seeing 
his father leaving for the journey and returning a couple of weeks later. Not everyone in 
Huayllay possessed llamas, certainly; they sometimes had to rent them in order to be able to 
travel to the quebradas. 
 In his study of the comunidad of Huascoy in the upper Chancay Valley, Salvador (1983) 
provides a description of huayllino exchange from the perspective of one of the communities that 
bartered with them. According to Salvador, people in Huascoy preferentially exchanged their 
maize for pots, blankets and cloth from Huayllay specifically; the relationship between the two 
communities had reportedly been in place for so long that Salvador wondered if it wasn´t 
indicative of some common origin in the past (Salvador 1983, 180-181). Although by the time of 
his study the custom had “drastically declined,” for much of the 20th century the huayllinos had 
come to Huascoy each year around October, in four or more caravans, each caravan consisting of 
around 50 llamas. As was the case in the Chaupiwaranga community of Tángor, described by 
Mayer (1974, 63), in Huascoy it was usually women who received and exchanged products with 
the men from the high regions. They referred to the huayllinos by terms such as paisanos, 
paishacos, llacuacos (apparently derived from the old term llacuaz), or amigos; they also 
sometimes established compadrazgo relations with them (Ibid., 178-179). Salvador´s description 
matches what people in Huayllay told me – the pots, textiles and other huayllino items passed 
hands first, and then, after a certain time lapse, the huayllinos went to people´s homes to get the 
corn. Similarly, some of the exchange ratios he lists as being in operation between 1920 and 
1960 are exactly the same as those which people in Huayllay reported to me: two latas of corn 
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(about 22 kilograms, according to Salvador) for a small manta (blanket), six latas of corn for a 
large frazada (Ibid., 180).  
 In his discussion of barter from the perspective of the Chaupiwaranga region, Mayer 
(2002) emphasizes the fact that barter is not a precursor to market exchange, as economists have 
often assumed, but rather that it co-exists with the cash nexus, filling gaps that are due to an 
(either systemic or temporary) shortage of cash and also, importantly, protecting people from the 
vicissitudes and exploitative aspects of market exchange. Barter, a “collective and 
institutionalized creation of the peasant sector,” provided a context of greater equality and more 
control over transactions than the often abusive world of Andean markets (Mayer 2002, 165).  
Peasants´ hard-earned cash (often obtained through labor outside the community) was saved for 
those items, like factory-made products, that could only be found on the market; products such as 
corn, potatoes and meat could be obtained without a cash outlay and therefore were. At the same 
time, Mayer acknowledges that things could look different from the perspective of highlanders as 
opposed to quebrada agriculturalists. On the one hand, for highlanders it was more of an 
absolute necessity to leave their ecological zone in order to find products necessary for their 
subsistence. On the other hand, by the time of Mayer´s research (1969-70), corn producers in 
Chaupiwaranga apparently benefitted more than highlanders from barter and therefore were 
“keener defenders” of the system. Highlanders, “despite their apparent isolation, were much 
better integrated into the national market system through the sale of wool and meat, but 
nonetheless also reserved some of their production for the barter sphere” (Ibid., 165).  
In the case of a community like Huayllay, there was the added factor of mining work and 
the increased availability of cash it brought about. Several of the huayllinos I spoke to drew an 
explicit connection between the presence of the mine and the decline of the barter system as well 
as the pottery craft, even if both did co-exist with mining work well into the 20th century. One of 
my informants emphasized that the “pride” (i.e. arrogance) of mining workers and their wives 
caused them to look down on traditional activities such as making clay pots. People also remark 
that the pottery craft in particular suffered from the introduction of cheap factory-made 
aluminum pots in the second half of the 20th century. The production of blankets for exchange, as 
well as the barter of sheep hides and meat, continued for a longer time, though by then trips were 
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made by motorized vehicle or horses rather than with packs of llamas.50 In Huascoy, according 
to Salvador, the barter relationship with Huayllay began to decline rapidly after the construction 
of the road through the upper Chancay Valley. By the time of his writing (early 1980s), people in 
Huascoy had switched much of their maize lands to peach monoculture for the market, and so 
had less corn to barter; besides, by then the comuneros of Huascoy preferred factory-made 
blankets and pots (Salvador 1983, 179-181).  
  Today a few individuals still practice both the pottery and textile crafts on a small scale. 
In connection to the latter, the Huarón mining company today sponsors weaving workshops as 
part of its social responsibility programs, but these are aimed at creating high-end products such 
as alpaca sweaters and scarves to be sold by exporters in Lima, and are completely disconnected 
from the old barter networks. As mentioned earlier, there are some attempts to revive pottery as 
an element of Huayllay´s identity, in connection with tourism-promotion efforts, but for the most 
part the old exchange of clay pots has disappeared. Desiderio Roque told me of how he had 
recently been in Yanahuanca (in the Chaupiwaranga Valley), and many people still remembered 
his grandfather. One of them told him, rhetorically of course, that if he were to bring them some 
of the old clay pots, they would give him the finest items that they had. As Roque told me, “in 
every little town I have visited people always ask about Huayllay: `Do they still make [the pots] 
or don´t they?’” 
 
The social dynamics of mining labor and migration  
In the introductory section of this chapter I provided some background on mining and 
labor systems in Peru in general, and more specifically on modern industrial mining, which in 
the early 20th century was pioneered by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and secondarily by the 
Compagnie des Mines de Huaron. The second section sketched a profile of the local society of 
Huayllay District and surroundings, as it has changed over time. In this section I return to a 
specific focus on mining, namely on the migration of mining workers and their families from 
                                                          
50 That was the case also in the last few decades of the pottery craft. As Desiderio Roque put it, “they no longer went 
on foot with their llamas, rather they went on horse, by car, but they carried their pots. They were not the authentic 
travelers anymore” (ya no eran los auténticos viajeros).  
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other regions. I start by briefly examining the following question: Given that the company 
recruited many of its workers from areas outside the immediate locality, which regions were 
these? 
 
Figure 4 – Departments of Peru                                      
                                                    
I have not been able to gain access to personnel records from the Huarón company that 
would allow me to determine directly where its workers came from. However, there is another 
kind of archival material that allows us to do this indirectly; the result is less exact but useful 
nonetheless. The information in question comes not from company records but from a local 
56 
 
judicial institution, the Juzgado de Paz (Justice of the Peace) of the district of Huayllay. Over the 
course of the 20th century, thousands of local disputes were aired here, over issues ranging from 
injured reputations to conflicts between common-law spouses to accusations of cattle-rustling 
(see Chapter 3). Either the Juez de Paz or an aide took notes of each dispute; in most cases – 
though not all – they also recorded the place of origin of the litigants. In a mining district like 
Huayllay, one would expect to find individuals not just from the immediate locality but also from 
other regions, and this is indeed what we find.  
As records of migration to the Huarón mine, the Juzgado de Paz documents are of 
significant but limited utility, since they pertain not only to the mining camp but rather to the 
district as a whole. However, as described earlier, the mining camps of the Huarón company 
constituted by far the largest population center in the district, and contained 47% of the district 
population of 6,932 according to the 1940 census. Also, they were located close to the village of 
Huayllay where the Juzgado de Paz sat; this meant that the Juzgado was easily accessible from 
the camps. This is in marked contrast with the other, smaller mining company that operated 
within the district´s boundaries in the first half of the century, the U.S.-owned Vanadium 
Corporation of America (practically the only global producer of this rare metal at the time). 
Vanadium’s camps at Minaragra and Jumasha, on Lake Punrún, were distant from the district 
seat of Huayllay. Although the residents of Vanadium´s camps constituted 19% of the district´s 
population in the 1940 census, in the 1940-42 Juzgado documents only one case explicitly 
mentions people from those camps coming to the Juez. Individuals living in the Huarón 
company´s camps, in contrast, fill the pages of the Juzgado documents.  
I do not at present have Juzgado de Paz cases from the first two decades of the Huarón 
company´s operations – the period from 1918 to 1940 when short-term migration and the debt-
labor system known as enganche (see below) would have been most prevalent. Rather, I have 
anylized place-of-origin information from the Huayllay Juzgado for three moments in time: 
1940-42, 1969, and 1975-76. Since the 1969 and 1975-76 data are close to one another in time, 
what we really have are two moments in time, allowing us to observe differences between the 
early 1940s, on the one hand, and the late 1960s to mid-1970s, on the other. For the 1940-42 and 
the 1975-76 periods, the data allows us to distinguish between the general population of people 
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who aired their disputes before the Huayllay Juzgado, on the one hand, and the more specific 
subset of parties to disputes who stated a direct connection to the Huarón mine, either through 
occupation or through residence in the company camps, on the other. For 1940-42 this subset 
was 57.8% of the total, while for 1975-76 it was 52.7% of the total. I list the results of the 
analyses in Appendix A, where I also discuss their limitations as well as other possible 
interpretations of the data. Here I will simply summarize the main long-term trends that emerge.  
The areas of origin for people appearing before the Juzgado can be classified into the 
following categories: Huayllay District itself, other parts of the Pasco/Junín plateau (i.e. the high-
altitude, livestock-raising region of which Huayllay is part), the Mantaro Valley to the south, the 
Lima Highlands to the west, the Chaupiwaranga Valley and other quebradas (intramontane 
valleys) in Pasco department, and finally the quebradas of Huánuco further north, which in a 
sense form a continuous quebrada region with Chaupiwaranga. The immediate local area of 
Huayllay District appears as the place of origin for close to 50% of the parties to disputes in both 
the early and later periods; if we limit the analysis to individuals who stated an explicit 
connection to the mine, the percentage of locals goes down to around 28% (which makes sense 
since more migrants were found among the mining families as opposed to those in the rural 
estancias). These proportions are consistent accross time. Similarly stable are the percentages of 
people who come from the nearby plateau communities, areas that were roughly similar to 
Huayllay in terms of culture, ecology and an economic focus on livestock rather than agriculture; 
they account for around a third of migrants (i.e. not including the native huayllinos) or slightly 
more. What changes is the origin of more distant migrants. Whereas in 1940-42 the Mantaro 
Valley to the south accounts for a significant portion of migrants (around a third), this goes down 
to almost 10% by the late 1960s and mid-70s. Similarly, whereas the quebradas of Huánuco to 
the north are barely represented in the 1940-42 data, they account for a significant percentage of 
migrants in the later data (25% in 1969 and 41% in 1975-76, to be precise). If we combine 
Huánuco with Chaupiwaranga and the other quebradas of northern and eastern Pasco Province 
(which share a lot of cultural similarities with Huánuco, even if they are on the other side of the 







Figure 5 – Central Highlands of Peru, with locations mentioned in text              
 
The historical literature on mining in Peru provides evidence, from other mining centers 
in the Central Highlands, for both of the trends discussed here: the relative importance (though 
not uniqueness) of the Mantaro Valley as a source of workers in the early 1900s, as well as the 
gradual emergence of other, more peripheral areas as sources of migrants during the course of 
59 
 
the century. Similarly, the reasons for migration and the social dynamics that emerged around it 
were similar at many of the mines. For this reason, the Huarón mine cannot be discussed in a 
vacuum. In this section I will discuss some of the social patterns involved in the formation of the 
mining working class in the 20th century; Huarón will be the focal point for analysis but in the 
context of broader dynamics and patterns, as documented both in the secondary literature and in 
my own primary sources. Because of the importance of the Mantaro Valley region as a source of 
migrants to Huarón and other mines in the Central Highlands from colonial times through the 
first half of the 20th century, I will begin by briefly describing the main characteristics of this 
region as well as its relationship to the mines. I will then discuss the problem of labor shortage as 
well as the enganche system in late-19th and early-20th century Peru. Following that, the next 
three sub-sections focus on changing patterns of migration to the Huarón mine specifically. 
Finally, and most extensively, I discuss the change from a situation of labor shortage to one of 
labor surplus, both through documents and through the perceptions of people in Huayllay today. 
Mining and the Mantaro Valley 
 The significance of the Mantaro Valley region as a source of mine workers did not begin 
in the early 20th century, but rather has roots much earlier in time. In fact, as Contreras (1988) 
argues for the Cerro de Pasco mines, migration from this region, as a proportion of the total, was 
if anything greater in the first three quarters of the 19th century, before the decline in silver 
production that began around 1870. He analyses death and marriage records in Cerro de Pasco, 
which contain information on individuals´ locations of origin. During the period 1845-1900, the 
city´s population had a strong migrant component – around 50% of individuals registered as 
deceased had been born outside the city. Certainly, the Mantaro Valley was not alone in sending 
workers to Cerro. A significant number of migrants came from the areas corresponding to the 
contemporary department of Pasco – namely, the northern half of the Pasco-Junín plateau plus 
the Chaupihuaranga and other narrow valleys (quebradas) surrounding Cerro de Pasco. 
References to recruitment of workers in the nearby quebradas are also present in the evidence 
presented by Contreras and by Deustúa (1984) as well as in other primary sources. Other regions, 
such as Huánuco, Huancavelica, Lima Highlands and even Ancash Department, were also 
present, although in smaller numbers. Yet over the long run, more migrants to Cerro de Pasco 
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came from Junín department, where the Mantaro Valley is located, than even from Pasco 
Department itself. Namely, Junín Department provided 43.4% of the migrants in the 1845-1900 
period, versus 25.2% for Pasco Department (Contreras 1988, 116).51  
Most of the migration from Junín Department came from the provinces that roughly 
correspond to the Mantaro Valley: Jauja, Huancayo and Concepción. During the period 1845-
1870, these provinces together accounted for around 40% of migrants to Cerro, which decreased 
to around 23% in the 1875-1900 period (Ibid., 121).52 This decrease had to do partly with the 
decline in silver production at Cerro, which meant that labor needs were lower and could be 
more easily satisfied at closer range, without having to recruit workers from more distant areas 
like the Mantaro Valley or Huancavelica.53 As the production of copper began to replace that of 
silver in the 1890s, and especially after the arrival of U.S. capital in the following decade, labor 
demand once more outstripped supply. Labor recruiters once again looked to the Mantaro Valley 
as a reliable source of workers, ensuring that that region would continue to be of central 
importance to the mining industry through at least the first half of the 20th century. The 
prevalence of workers from the Mantaro Valley at many of the mines of the Central Highlands is 
documented not only in Contreras´ demographic data, but also in many narrative accounts by 
mining engineers and others from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
 The Mantaro Valley is one of the most important and best-known regions of the Central 
Highlands of Peru. Although the Mantaro River as a whole runs all the way from the Pasco-Junín 
plateau to the Amazon rainforest, the term “Mantaro Valley” usually refers to the present-day 
provinces of Jauja, Concepción, Huancayo and Chupaca (Junín Department) only. This is where 
the river valley broadens out to form one of the largest and most fertile agricultural regions in 
Peru – a rarity in a country known for its challenging, difficult geography. This area has always 
supported a relatively dense population and produced a large agricultural surplus that was traded 
with other regions – primarily the regional mining economy centered in Cerro de Pasco in the 
19th century, and the large urban market of the national capital, Lima, in the 20th century.   
                                                          
51 If we instead look at marriage records (which were analyzed for the period 1820-1900), the proportion is 29.1% 
for Pasco Department and 40.3% for Junín Department (Contreras 1988 116). 
52 If we include Tarma as part of the Mantaro Valley, the percentages for the two periods increase to 46.2% and 
28.4%, respectively. 
53 Migration from Huancavelica decreased from 8.6% to 1.3% between the two periods (Ibid. 121). 
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The Valley has also been known to historians and social scientists for its particular 
characteristics in terms of land tenure and social organization during the 20th century. These 
include the dispersion rather than concentration of land holdings, the relative absence of extreme 
forms of social and ethnic inequality, and the accelerated processes of cultural change that took 
place over the course of the century. Some scholars have emphasized special conditions during 
the Conquest and the colonial period that led to the descendents of the huanca polities retaining 
most of their land, so that haciendas formed in the upper reaches of the valley and surrounding 
highlands but not in the fertile valley floor (Arguedas 1975, Espinoza 1973). Without denying 
the importance of these long-term factors, other scholars have instead emphasized the significant 
processes of change that took place during the late 19th and 20th centuries (Alberti and Sánchez 
1974, Long and Roberts 1984).  
In particular, Alberti and Sánchez argue that although it is true that large estates did not 
form in the lower Mantaro Valley, and landholdings remained unusually dispersed even in the 
19th century, this does not mean that at that time the region already possessed the relative social 
and ethnic homogeneity we associate with it today. The population was differentiated between a 
white and mestizo elite, which resided either in the city of Jauja or in one of several district 
capitals, and an Indian peasant majority. The elites maintained power not through direct control 
of land but rather through their monopoly over political offices, education and access to markets. 
This order collapsed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a result of several factors, 
including the emergence of new political jurisdictions to which non-elites had access, the growth 
in commerce and transportation, the entry of peasants into wage work at the mines in the early 
1900s, and the arrival of new ideologies from the national capital and beyond.  Such changes 
took place in the Mantaro Valley earlier than in many other parts of highland Peru. Similarly, 
scholars have focused on the rise of a “bourgeoisie of peasant origins,” which spearheaded a 
“peasant model” of capitalist development in contrast to the “Junker model” of other regions in 
Peru such as Cajamarca (Mallon 1983, 340-341). Others have examined the ways in which 
Indian/mestizo distinctions broke down in Valley communities such as Muquiyauyo in the early 
20th centuries (Adams 1959). Already in the 1950s, Peruvian writer and anthropologist José 
María Arguedas described the characteristics of the Mantaro Valley that set it apart from the 
regions of southern Peru with which he was familiar and in which feudal-like relations still 
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prevailed at the time. Like Arguedas, more recent writers like Romero (2004) see the Valley as 
having undergone a profound process of mestizaje – but mestizaje understood not as something 
opposed to indigenous culture or implying its complete dissolution and absorption by the 
dominant society, but rather as “the gradual appropriation of modernity by indigenous Andean 
peasants” (Romero 2004, 45). People selectively adopted aspects of Western culture (most 
notably the Spanish language) and vigorously pursued integration into national society, but at the 
same time maintained at least some local cultural elements, such as music, art and rituals, while 
at the same time constructing a strong regional huanca identity. Beyond academic analyses, the 
Mantaro Valley is well-known in Peru for its music, dances and festivals, as well as for the 
commercial vibrancy of its main city, Huancayo. 
Since the Mantaro Valley is the best-studied area of the Central Highlands, there exists 
the tendency to conflate the two,54 thus confusing part with whole and obscuring the different 
characteristics of other regions such as Huánuco, Pasco or the highlands of Lima. Similarly, it is 
important to guard against the tendency to paint a homogeneous image of the Valley; the 
characteristics sketched in the previous paragraph are true only as a first and broad 
approximation to the area. If we examine the literature more closely, it becomes clear that during 
the course of the 20th century, the decline of social and ethnic inequalities was accompanied by a 
hardening of economic class differences, both within and between communities (Laite 1981, 
Mallon 1983). For a sample of the diversity of communities in the Mantaro Valley and 
surroundings, one need only compare a large, prosperous community on the valley floor, like 
Muquiyauyo (Adams 1959), with a relatively isolated, poorer community on the upper slopes 
like Huasicancha, which had to battle for centuries to recover lands from the neighboring 
haciendas that grew at the southwestern edge of the Valley (Smith 1991). 
We have seen that the Mantaro Valley long provided a significant share of workers to the 
mines of Pasco and other areas of the Central Highlands. The reasons for this are multiple. The 
more obvious factor involves altitude, geography and population density. Most of the mines were 
located at high altitude, near grassland areas where pasturing rather than agriculture was the 
predominant activity. In these regions, population density was relatively low, with the exception 
                                                          
54 See, for example, Flores Galindo (1974: 26-29). 
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of a mining town like Cerro de Pasco where a population had already formed that lived not from 
animal herding but rather from mining and commerce. Mining companies thus had to look for 
laborers in lower-altitude valley regions, where agriculture permitted more dense settlements and 
thus generated a larger population from which to recruit workers. Although many of the 
quebradas (narrow valleys) fit this criterion, it makes sense that the Mantaro Valley, as the most 
productive and most densely populated agricultural region in the Central Highlands, became an 
important source of labor to the mines.  
However, there were other factors that also determined a particularly close relationship 
between the mines and the Mantaro Valley. As Alberti and Sánchez (1974) and Mallon (1983) 
have pointed out, around the turn of the century the Valley had already begun an incipient 
process of capitalist development and dislocation of traditional structures. This made peasants 
more eager to seek out opportunities to earn cash, such as through work in the mines; as Alberti 
and Sanchez emphasize, people migrated to the mines either to earn cash to invest in agricultural 
production back home (in the case of prosperous peasants) or because their landholdings were 
too small to support a family (in the case of poor peasants). A region in flux, undergoing 
multiple social and economic transformations, like the Mantaro Valley, would be more likely to 
yield a surplus population for wage work elsewhere.  
However, there is a further reason why the region became an important source of labor 
during the early years of industrial mining, in the early 1900s. As Contreras (1987) points out, 
the Mantaro Valley communities had become specialized in seasonal mining work already by the 
late 18th and19th centuries, developing a reputation for being efficient workers. In fact, he traces 
this specialization to the late 16th century, when groups of xauxas and taramas from the region 
were included in the mita (forced labor draft) for the mercury mines of Huancavelica to the 
south. As Huancavelica declined and then closed in the late 18th century, the pole of migration – 
no longer under the mita – shifted from the south to the north, i.e. towards Cerro de Pasco. At 
least some of the Mantaro Valley communities thus developed skills and experience in mining 
work that were eagerly sought out by the mines (Contreras 1988: 116-120). Although in the mid-
20th century many communities in the Valley would turn away from mining work towards other 
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alternatives, such as migration to Lima, in the early 1900s the effects of this long-term, deep-
rooted connection to the mining industry were still felt.  
This does not mean, however, that the rural population of the Mantaro Valley and the rest 
of the Central Highlands was completely amenable to the labor needs of industrial mining during 
these early years. As mentioned earlier, the sudden increase in labor demand brought on by the 
arrival of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1903 created a situation in which a shortage of 
workers was palpable – similar to what had occurred during previous short-term mining booms 
in 19th-century Cerro de Pasco, but this time on a larger scale. Moreover, the new mining 
entrepreneurs were less able than their 19th-century counterparts to adapt their production 
rhythms to the seasonal nature of the labor supply. This situation of shortage was stated 
explicitly by mining engineer C.E. Velarde in his 1908 survey of the Peruvian mining industry. 
While he wrote that “in general, in the entire highlands the workers needed by the operations 
have been found, among the indigenous population,” he also remarked, specifically for the Cerro 
de Pasco region, that, 
Since some time ago, there is in this whole area a shortage of hands, due to the great 
momentum gained by the operations of the mines; and because of the intermittent manner 
in which the enganchados provide their services, alternating them with their agrarian 
labors (Velarde 1908, xxxiii-xxxiv). 
 
In a similar way, in 1903 one official of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation wrote to another 
complaining of the labor shortage and highlighting the seasonal nature of the problem: 
Not only ourselves but Fernandini, Patrons, Azalia and Nations [other mine owners in the 
region] and many others with whom I have talked recently are complaining of the 
difficulty to get sufficient labor among the Cholos.55 The only place in which we are not 
short is here in Cerro in the shafts. For the past month the Cholos have been going into 
the low country to harvest the potato crop; hundreds, yes, thousands, migrating for this 
purpose. Some of them have returned and others are returning, and I expect within the 
next 2 or 3 weeks that labor will be more plentiful (Cerro Corporation Archive, American 
Heritage Center. “Employees” - Letter from A.A. Abbott to F. Klepetko, July 16, 1903). 
 
                                                          
55 In Peru, cholo is an originally derogatory ethnic term that has varied in meaning over time, referring either to 
Indians in general, to urban Indians only, or to mestizos, as well as other shades of meaning. Today, it functions 
either as a derogatory term or as one of endearment and sometimes an affirmation of cultural pride. In early 20th-
century mining company documents such as this one, cholo is used to refer to Indians, in particular in their condition 
as workers.  
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Labor shortage and enganche in Peru 
The situation described by Velarde and by A.A. Abbott was but one instance of a much 
broader phenomenon that characterized not just the mining sector but large-scale agriculture as 
well, and that was not limited to Peru but rather common to many parts of Latin America since 
the mid-to-late 19th century. Elites complained of the labor shortages that they believed stemmed 
from both the thinness of the population as well as the unwillingness of rural people to work in 
sugar plantations, road construction and mines. Different types of labor shortages had existed 
before, for example in Potosí in the 16th century, when the problem was addressed through the 
institution of the mita. But novel developments beginning in second half of the19th century upset 
the precarious balances between labor supply and demand achieved over the course of the 
colonial period. New export booms were reconnecting Latin America to the world economy and 
solidifying its position as a producer of raw materials; this was reinforced by the rise of liberal 
ideology, which promoted free markets and production for export. This development led to 
sudden – if localized - increases in the demand for labor, at the same time that colonial-era 
mechanisms designed to extract labor from the population were being phased out.  
In Peru, for example, the Indian tribute was abolished in 1854, removing what had been 
an important incentive for highland indigenous peasants to look for cash-earning opportunities in 
the mines and elsewhere (Contreras 1988, 57). That same year, President Ramón Castilla decreed 
the abolition of slavery, freeing the 26,000 or so Afro-Peruvian slaves, most of who lived in 
Peru´s coast. Coastal cotton and sugar planters found themselves without their traditional slave 
labor pool, and they sought a substitute in the importation of Chinese indentured servants, often 
under slave-like conditions. These laborers also became the workforce for the guano boom of the 
1850s and 60s – a period which saw labor recruitment practices as extreme as the kidnapping of 
over 3,000 Polynesian islanders to work on the Peruvian coast in 1862-63 (Maude 1981). Around 
100,000 Chinese workers came during these decades, but in 1874 international pressure brought 
the so-called “coolie trade” to a halt in Peru. Guano was already in decline by that time, but the 
sugar plantations of the northern coast were growing. As they saw their Chinese labor force 
gradually age or move to the towns without being replaced, sugar planters experimented with 
Japanese immigrants as well as coastal residents, but both sources were found to be inadequate in 
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numbers. Gradually, the northern coastal planters turned towards the highland peasantry, 
especially the neighboring highland department of Cajamarca.  
 At the same time as in the sugar industry, in the rest of highland Peru rural people were in 
demand as laborers for the construction of roads and railroads and, as always, for the mines. It 
was among all these sectors that, as in several other Latin American countries, the well-known 
system of enganche (“hooking”) developed, as a way of increasing control over the labor supply 
by linking work to legally enforceable debt. As Flores Galindo writes, quoting Pedro Muñiz, 
“enganche was in those years a ´national institution´” (Flores Galindo 1993, 41); similarly, 
Blanchard (1982) writes that “the system quickly emerged as the principal means of obtaining 
workers for rural jobs in Peru” (67). In the historical literature on Peru, enganche is generally 
understood as a form of labor recruitment in which agents (known as enganchadores) advanced 
cash loans to peasants, which they then had to repay by working in the mines, plantations or 
other sites. The system was based on people´s need for cash (which could also be encouraged by 
the enganchadores) and on their inability to repay in any form other than their labor; a crucial 
element was also the cooperation of local authorities in enforcing enganche contracts. It thus had 
features akin to many other labor systems around the world, such as debt peonage or indentured 
servitude, and can be seen in a historical and geographical continuum with such systems. 
Although historians of Peru have focused on the heyday of enganche as lasting from the second 
half of the 19th century through the 1920s, its origins lie further back in time; Contreras 
speculates that enganche in the Cerro de Pasco mines began in the late 18th century (Contreras 
1988, 63). Similarly, Klarén sees enganche as having its roots in “the post-Conquest Spanish 
perversion of the Inca mita system” (Klarén 1978, 242) as well as in the institutions of slavery 
and indentured servitude. Moreover, the term enganche was used more widely in the sense of 
recruitment – in the 19th century, it often referred to military conscription. Rather than a single, 
unique entity, thus, what historians have called “the Latin American enganche system” (Brass 
1990) can be understood as the particular set of forms that labor recruitment took during the mid-
to-late 19th century export booms in Peru and much of Latin America – a period of widespread 
labor shortages in a context marked by various forms of coercion and hierarchical power 
relations at the local level.   
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 In Peru at the time, enganche was widely criticized as coercive and oppressive. In her 
1913 denunciation of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, indigenista activist Dora Mayer criticized 
the company for using enganche, which she called “a system of debt slavery, well-known to the 
people in countries like England who are interested in the lot of the oppressed races” (Mayer 
1913, 20). Other attacks on enganche appeared around the same time, and in 1914 this campaign 
led to the passage of certain legal provisions discouraging the practice (Flores Galindo 1974, 42; 
Dewind 1987, 162-163). In more recent years, historians have taken a more nuanced view of 
enganche. In his 1974 study of the CPC´s mining workforce, Flores Galindo criticized the 
common view of enganche as the sole mechanism of labor recruitment in the early years of the 
mines and as based primarily on the enganchadores´ ability to deceive rural people, who were 
portrayed as naive.  He emphasized the “push” factors in the countryside which made people 
willing to work in the mines for short periods of time, rather than susceptibility to outright 
deception. Similarly, in Latin Americanist historiography more generally there has emerged a 
“revisionist” literature on enganche (Blanchard 1979, Bauer 1979) that has sought to 
characterize it as non-coercive and as an arrangement that rural people could manipulate in their 
favor. This literature has in turn been critiqued by scholars who continue to emphasize the 
aspects of enganche that most resemble debt bondage (Loveman 1979, Brass 1990). In any case, 
this debate has influenced historians working on specific countries and led them to question an 
uncritical reliance on earlier activist sources (like Dora Mayer, cited above) and to examine the 
various modalities of enganche in specific context on the basis of primary sources. 
 In the mines of central Peru, the early period of industrial mining was characterized by 
short-term migration and seasonal labor shortages, as well as by the widespread use both of 
enganche and of subcontracting (contratas). Foreign companies like the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation and the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron built their labor recruitment strategies on 
the existing practices of Peruvian mine owners and entrepreneurs. As the literature indicates, 
over time a transition took place, as production was gradually mechanized, the workforce 
stabilized and enganche was abandoned in favor of direct hiring. Yet this transition did not take 
place at the same rate or in the same way everywhere - smaller, less mechanized mines tended to 
stabilize their workforce more slowly if at all; labor recruitment practices akin to enganche 
continued to be practiced in small-scale gold mining into at least the 1980s (Castro de León 
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1985). Even for industrial mining, scholars differ on issues of periodization. Flores Galindo 
(1974), who studied only the period from 1900 to 1930, saw the 1920s as a moment of change 
from what he called a “mixed proletariat” – composed of peasants who worked a few months in 
the mines and a few months in their lands – to a “transient proletariat,” in which most workers 
labored at least a few years in the mines. On the other hand, DeWind (1987) saw the whole first 
half of the twentieth century as a long, more or less unbroken period characterized by low-skilled 
workers with very high labor turnover. According to him, the change would have occurred only 
in the 1950s, when the Cerro de Pasco Corporation began to stabilize its existing workforce 
rather than seek out new workers, at the same time that it was mechanizing production. The two 
authors also differ on the ways they interpret the seasonal nature of labor and the persistence of 
labor shortages in the early part of the century. Influenced by E.P. Thompson, Flores Galindo 
emphasized the ways in which these features constituted forms of “resistance to 
proletarianization.”  DeWind, on the other hand, argued that seasonal, short-term labor was not 
so much resistance to proletarianization on the part of peasants as it was functional to the needs 
of the mining company, since it kept wages low. Most likely, both factors were at work. 
Labor at Huarón in the early 20th century 
Like Cerro de Pasco, the early years at the Huarón mine were also characterized by 
seasonal work with frequent interruptions. This was described to me by Máximo Roque, a native 
of Huayllay who worked at the company from the 1950s through the 1980s. In the following 
quote he refers to an earlier period during which his father and other members of his family 
alternated work at the mine with their participation in the regional barter system: 
My father, some of my relatives, they just worked for a few months at a time. In other 
words, Huarón was like a mother... A mother. They went in, they left, people left the 
mine, people went in to work some two, three months. They said, I´m going to do a 
cachuelito [odd job or job on the side]. In the winter months.56 I´m going to do a 
cachuelito, they said. So then they went [to the mine] for two or three months. December, 
January, February. Even March for some of them. In April they were already leaving 
because they had to prepare to go do a barter (trueque) with the valleys... In May they 
had to leave for the potato harvest, taking [their] pots on their llamas. 
 
                                                          
56 People refer to the rainy season as the “winter” (invierno), even though nighttime temperatures are actually 
slightly higher at that time. 
69 
 
In a fashion similar to workers from agricultural zones, Roque´s description shows people from 
Huayllay working in the mine during the rainy season, and then leaving again when it was time 
for the harvest. Although in Huayllay there was no agriculture, huayllinos were still tied to the 
agricultural calendar because of their exchange relations with areas like the northern highlands of 
Lima and the quebradas of Pasco department. Although local huayllino workers were thus in 
some ways similar to those from more distant areas, the quote above also shows a particularly 
close relationship with the mine – labor was seasonal, but it was likely to be repeated year after 
year.  
Roque´s narrative about his father´s time may refer to the early years of industrial 
mining, that is, after either 1912 (when the French first arrived) or 1918 (when the mine finally 
went into full production). Or it may refer to the period before that, when the mines in Huayllay 
were worked on a small scale, under a series of mine owners based in the area. As mentioned 
earlier, at the time the mines of Huayllay were commonly known by the name Huancavelica (not 
to be confused with the department of Huancavelica in south-central Peru). During the first 
decade of the 20th century, according to Velarde, the number of workers in the mines of 
Huayllay/Huancavelica fluctuated around 45, though it could go as low as 25 or as high as 70 
(Ibid., 31). Yet already at this time, mining entrepreneurs and engineers like Velarde were 
envisioning a much higher level of capital investment, likely coming from outside, and similar to 
that which had arrived in Cerro de Pasco in 1903 and which would arrive in Huayllay with the 
Compagnie des Mines de Huaron in 1912.57 Such an increase in capital investment and in 
operations was fully justified by the richness of the mineral deposits, but it entailed the need for a 
much larger labor force, which raised the specter of a labor shortage. Velarde acknowledged that 
there was already a labor force in the immediate vicinity of the mines: “In Huayllay and its 
surroundings you can easily get good mining workers, who work under conditions more 
advantageous for the owner than those of Cerro de Pasco and Yauli58” (Ibid. 31). “Advantageous 
                                                          
57 In fact, it is likely that Velarde´s 1906 report (part of a series of reports prepared over many years by the 
government´s National Mining Engineering Corps), which described the potential of the Huayllay mines in positive 
terms and highlighted the need for more capital, played a role in attracting the interest of the French investors who 
later formed the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron.  
58 At the time, references to the mining district of “Yauli” usually referred to the Morococha and Casapalca mines, 
among the most important in Peru in those days, as well as smaller mines nearby. 
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conditions” seems to have referred to the fact that labor here was cheaper, probably because it 
was a more rural area, people were less dependent on mining income, and the demand for labor 
in the mine had till then been lower. Nevertheless, this was a high-altitude herding area, rather 
than an agricultural region, so the local population density would not be enough to meet the high 
labor demands of a larger-scale operation: 
Labor in Huancavelica [Huayllay] is very cheap. The peons from the neighboring areas 
work for fifty cents up to one sol for a workday of 10 hours, with small breaks, and right 
now it is easy to get people; but for larger-scale operations needing 300 or more peons, it 
would be necessary to resort to more distant locations; in this case the greatest difficulty 
would be generating the current [of migrants], since the day´s pay would not increase in 
any noticeable way. In Cerro de Pasco, hundreds of expert workers are brought from the 
faraway province of Jauja, through the system of enganche, and the average cost of 
operations has decreased rather than increase, due to the steadiness of the work as well as 
to the higher output of the workers from Jauja.  (Ibid., 39, my translation). 
From Velarde’s description it is clear that keeping wages low was an important priority in 
Peruvian mining at the time (as sources from other mines also indicate). The labor shortage could 
have the effect of raising wages to a level that was unacceptable to mining entrepreneurs; for this 
reason, it was necessary to promote active labor recruitment over a wide area, rather than letting 
the market forces of supply and demand operate in the strictly local labor market. Velarde 
directed anyone interested in larger-scale operations in the Huayllay mines to look to the 
example of Cerro de Pasco nearby, where enganche was being used.59 He also made it clear that 
the Jauja/Mantaro Valley was the primary area where the mining industry sought out large 
number of workers for enganche. Besides being numerous, already at the time they were seen as 
being more skilled than people from high-altitude areas like Huayllay; this greater ability could 
make up for the costs involving in recruiting people over long distances. 
 After the arrival of the French in 1912, laborers were in demand for the expansion of 
mine shafts and tunnels and for the construction of the smelter, which went into production in 
1918. Thus, industrial-scale operations had only recently started when the decade of the 1920s 
began. As noted earlier, Flores Galindo saw this decade as having witnessed a shift in the Cerro 
mines from strictly seasonal migration to migration for a few years at a time. In her discussion of 
                                                          
59 Thus, the reason for enganche was not just resistance to proletarianization, as several scholars have emphasized, 
but also the mining industry’s need for cheap labor, as DeWind (1987) has argued. 
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migration from the villages around Jauja (in the Yanamarca Valley, part of the Mantaro area), 
Mallon (1983) also sees the 1920s as a point of transition: “If one were to choose a decade in 
which significant progress was made toward proletarianization it would have to be the 1920s” 
(254). This is because, although migrants still maintained connections and access to land in their 
rural villages, many of them were now staying away for years at a time, and some were taking 
their families with them.   
 Yet if the 1920s were a period of gradual change in migration patterns to the mines, 
according to Flores Galindo and Mallon, this process was cut short abruptly by the Depression 
and the consequent drop in metal prices. In the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, some of the 
operating units were closed and overall two-thirds of the workforce was laid off between 1929 
and 1932 – in response both to the economic crisis and to the first systematic attempt at 
organizing unions in the mines. At Huarón, the mine had already been closed for 3 years starting 
in 1925, due to flooding; it reopened in 1928, but only a couple of years later it closed again due 
to the Depression. In his study of migration from the Mantaro Valley communities of Ataura and 
Matahuasi, Laite (1981) recounts what happened when the mine closed:  
The French-owned Huaron mine closed and its workers also returned to their villages 
seeking sustenance. Many of them were enganchados unable to afford transport, and a 
long column of workers and their families filed through the Andes on their way back to 
the Mantaro valley. It was a four-day walk, but many took longer, having to work in the 
fields by the wayside to earn sustenance for the next day´s march (68).60 
 
A similar image of reverse migration from all the mines during the Depression is evoked 
by Augusto Mateu Cueva, a writer, mineworker and Communist activist from the Mantaro 
Valley. In a 1940 book of prose poetry, he described the events of 10 years earlier: 
Caravans of workers with their wives and children migrate everywhere, carrying their 
odds and ends on their backs, and followed by their dogs. Yesterday, it was from the 
countryside to the mine; now it is from the mine to the countryside (40). 
                                                          
60 It is not clear what is Laite´s source for this passage. It occurs in the historical background section of his study, 
but there is no mention to workers from Huarón in the other studies on the history of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation 
that Laite might have used as sources, such as Flores Galindo (1974), Bonilla (1974) and DeWind (1977). This 
reference to Huarón probably came from his interviews with former workers in the communities of Ataura and 
Matahuasi. The date he gives for the closure of the mine is 1933, but this is contradicted by the data provided by 
Sotomarino (1947), which states that the mine closed in 1930. This makes more sense as it coincides more precisely 




 For some communities, the Depression was not only an interruption but also a turning-
point. Laite describes the contrasting cases of Ataura and Matahuasi; while the former renewed 
migration to the mines at the same rate as before once the economy recovered, in Matahuasi 
mining never recovered the importance it had had before the Depression, as more and more 
people migrated to Lima rather than to the mines. Thus, already in the 1930s, some Mantaro 
Valley communities like Matahuasi were beginning to transition away from mining work 
towards migration to the coast as well as transportation and commerce in the region itself.  
Migration from Muquiyauyo to Huarón 
However, the Valley as a whole still sent large numbers of workers to the mines in the 
1930s and 40s, as the data we presented for Huarón in 1940-42 shows. One particular case 
deserves special mention: that of migration from the community of Muquiyauyo to the Huarón 
mine beginning in 1934. This was studied by anthropologist Richard N. Adams as part of his 
1949-50 fieldwork in Muquiyauyo, published in his 1959 book A Community in the Andes: 
Problems and Progress in Muquiyauyo. According to Adams, before the Depression the 
muquiyauyinos had worked primarily at the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation – not just in 
Cerro itself but also in the company´s other units such as Morococha and Oroya. But in 1934, 
between 70 and 90 workers from Muquiyauyo left the CPC mines and switched to Huarón. This 
case serves to illustrate some of the links between migration, proletarianization, race and class. 
 Located at the northern end of the Mantaro Valley, near the city of Jauja, Muquiyauyo 
was well-known in indigenista and intellectual circles, where it was regularly described as one of 
the most developed, progressive and best-organized communities in the Mantaro Valley if not in 
all of Peru (Castro Pozo 1924, 67; Mariátegui 1952 (1928), 86-87; Tschopik 1947, 46-48; 
Pulgar-Vidal 1947, 22). Hildebrando Castro Pozo, a socialist, indigenista and, for a brief time in 
the 1920s, the head of the nascent Indian Affairs bureaucracy, was the person who first brought 
the peculiar features of Muquiyauyo to the public eye. Among these was its complex communal 
institution – which would obtain official recognition as a comunidad indígena but which also 
fulfilled the functions of a cooperative and an industrial development association. More striking 
was the fact that in the late 1910s the community had built a small hydroelectric plant, the first in 
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the Valley, and had begun selling electric power to the city of Jauja, in a reversal of usual urban-
rural power relations. The construction of the plant, which occupies an important place in the 
official memory of the community (Dionisio 1993), was in part financed through the remittances 
from muquiyauyinos working in the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation; certainly the idea 
for the plant had come from the experience in the mines. The community apparently also had a 
reputation for left-wing politics,61 though Adams believed that this was limited to a few young 
people who had migrated to Lima and were active in José Carlos Mariátegui´s political circle 
(Adams 98-99). 
 Adams traveled to Huarón and interviewed the muquiyauyino workers there, including 
some who had made the original switch from the CPC mines. When asked why the shift had 
occurred and why Muquiyauyo had begun sending migrants to the French-owned mine, they 
gave several reasons. According to them, Huarón had higher pay and better working conditions 
and vacations; the company sponsored more and better fiestas following customs from the 
region; there were more opportunities to rise in the company hierarchy than in the CPC mines; 
also, the first few individuals who made the switch were muquiyauyinos with good reputations so 
the rest followed them. However, Adams suspected there was another reason, related to the 
others, that was important but was not voiced explicitly (Adams 90-91). Namely, the Huarón 
company had started by hiring two individuals from Muquiyauyo who were from families that 
had been socially classed as Indian, rather than mestizo; they were part of a process of upward 
mobility by which several young people from the former “Indian caste” had acquired 
professional education in the previous few years (in this case as an accountant and as an 
engineer). Furthermore, the company hired them not as obreros but rather as skilled technicians. 
To understand what this meant, we must refer to the historical development of social 
distinctions in Muquiyauyo as described by Adams.62 Muquiyauyo had originated as a settlement 
that brought together Huanca ayllus from the Mantaro Valley with Yauyos groups from the 
                                                          
61 Apparently, President Luis Sánchez Cerro (1931-33) believed Muquiyauyo to be a focus of Communist activity 
(Adams 99).  
62 Adams´ ethnographic and historical account is fairly rigorous and useful, I believe, for understanding the social 
changes that took place in one community in the first half of the 20th century. At the same time, one must be critical 
of the influence of modernization theory evident in his work, as well as of the fact that he mostly ignores the 




highlands of Lima, who had been transported to the area by the Inca. Yet already in the late 
colonial period a few white/mestizo families had settled in the area and claimed properties. In the 
19th century, the town was divided between these two “castes,” with the majority Indians 
maintaining separate communal authorities and mestizos controlling access to the formal 
political system, as in much of Peru at the time. This division began to break down in the late 
19th century, when a local conflict led to the abolition of the distinctive institutional markers that 
separated the Indians from the mestizos – the Indian communal lands and the Indian authorities, 
such as the alcalde de campo – at the same time that a few Indians began entering district 
political offices that had previously been monopolized by the mestizo families. In the early 
1900s, a new communal structure began to coalesce among the Indian population, but it 
eventually came to include the mestizos as well. This became the comunidad de indígenas in the 
1920s, but was also explicitly conceived as an “industrial community,” due to its role in 
implementing communal projects such as the hydroelectric plant. Some Indians gained access to 
more educational opportunities as well as to work in the mines, and differences of dress and 
language between the two groups began to disappear.  
A double movement thus took place – the community gradually became more “mestizo” 
in the eyes of outsiders, as educational and economic changes took place; after 1943, all births in 
the parish began to be recorded as mestizo. At the same time, both the former “Indians” and the 
former “mestizos” were now part of the “indigenous community” (comunidad de indígenas) as 
recognized by the state bureaucracy. A process of social convergence had taken place; yet it was 
not complete, for class distinctions were emerging between rich and poor community members. 
Although many individuals of Indian descent had achieved significant social and economic 
mobility, to some degree the new class distinctions mapped onto the former “caste” division, 
with mestizos more likely to be at the top. Furthermore, as Adams describes, even in 1949-50 he 
still noticed that some social distinctions between Indians and mestizos were maintained at 
occasions like village feasts and work parties.  
Thus, in this context, it is easier to see why it might have made a difference that when the 
Huarón company hired the first two people from Muquiyauyo in 1934, they were professionals 
from families that had formerly been socially classified as Indian. Many muquiyauyinos of 
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Indian origin had worked in mines before, but they had done so as obreros, or manual workers. 
When a person from Muquiyauyo had risen to a higher position in the mines, it had always been 
a mestizo. The company´s hiring decision in 1934 was almost certainly fortuitous – foreign 
companies generally did not recognize highland social distinctions unless a very clear 
phenotypical difference was present. Nevertheless, Adams believed this decision made a big 
impact on workers from Muquiyauyo, namely those of Indian origin, who consequently saw 
greater opportunities for upward mobility at Huarón rather than at the CPC. Adams´ hypothesis 
is consistent with Alberti and Sánchez´s (1974, 44, 200) argument about the role played by 
migration to the mines in the alteration of traditional social structures in the Mantaro Valley. 
Differences between migratory streams 
 Adams´ study also gives a temporal sense of how by the middle of the 20th century 
migration to Huarón was abandoning its seasonal nature and becoming more long-term. Of the 
25 muquiyauyinos he interviewed there, all but one had been working between one and fourteen 
years, and the majority had been working at the mine between 3 and 8 years. Furthermore, 21 of 
the 25 had worked at other mines previously (Adams 97). Thus, at least among these workers the 
gradual development of a more stable working class was clearly underway by 1949. However, 
this conclusion must be nuanced. Workers from Muquiyauyo and the rest of the Mantaro Valley 
were obviously not the only workers at Huarón, even at mid-century, as we saw from the 
archival documents analyzed earlier. The workers from different regions occupied different 
locations in the workforce hierarchy, and their profile differed as to length of stay and skill level.  
This is described by Guillermo Flores Pinedo, a Peruvian mining engineer who worked in 
Huarón for a time and wrote his engineering thesis about the functioning of the mine in 1948. He 
explains how workers from the Jauja Valley (another name for the Mantaro Valley) tended to be 
more skilled and work for longer periods: 
The majority of obreros, especially the maestros (master drillers and timbermen) and 
foremen, are people from the Jauja Valley, very good miners, long-suffering and tough 
for mining work, whatever may be said against them. This personnel is stable at the 
Company, remaining there for years and getting trained at the different tasks in the mines, 





However, there was another part of the workforce that differed from the other as to length of stay 
and the kinds of tasks they performed at the mine: 
Another [segment of the] workforce is that formed by men from the lower quebradas of 
the department of Pasco, such as Chacayán, Tápuc, Vico, etc., who stay in the job for 
only a few months, then leave in order to harvest their crops, and then return again, and 
so they never manage to get ahead, never reaching beyond the level of an assistant 
(Ibid.).63 
 
 Flores´ description is geographically consistent insofar as the three communities he 
names are all in Pasco department. On the other hand, only Chacayán and Tápuc are in the 
quebrada (narrow intramontane valley) zone, while Vicco is actually in the plateau region. His 
account might not be based on careful ethnographic observation, but at the very least it would 
have expressed a common perception among the mining engineers at Huarón. He describes a 
two-tiered workforce – on the one hand, a group of stable workers performing the more skilled 
jobs, such as master driller or foreman; on the other hand, less stable workers performing the less 
skilled tasks. In itself, this distinction was not new – it built on a similar division in 19th-century 
and colonial mining between those who cut into the rock at the mine face and the apiris who 
carried the ore to the surface; only now the variety of tasks and jobs at the mine was of course 
greater. But attached to this difference in skill levels and tasks performed is a geographical 
distinction: workers from the Mantaro Valley are at a higher, more skilled tier in the hierarchy, 
while those from the quebradas are at a lower level.  
One cannot but detect a tone of judgment in the engineer´s description of the second 
group of workers, unlike the first who are described admiringly as possessing more of an 
industrial work ethic. The first two communities he names, Chacayán and Tápuc, are part of the 
quebrada of Chaupihuaranga. It could be that his inclusion of the plateau community of Vicco is 
an error, or it might be that he saw the plateau migrants as being in the same category with the 
quebrada workers rather than with those from the Mantaro Valley. It is likely, furthermore, that 
the workers from the region of Huánuco – who made up an increasing portion of migrants to 
Huayllay District by the 1960s and 70s – would have been categorized as being similar to those 
from Chaupihuaranga communities like Chacayán and Tápuc. As we mentioned earlier, the 
                                                          




quebradas of Chaupihuaranga and of southwestern Huánuco share many similar characteristics 
and in a sense comprise one single agricultural region that straddles departmental borders 
between Pasco and Huánuco.64 This whole area has sent migrants to the mines of Pasco since the 
19th century if not before, even if such migration increased greatly in the 20th century. Today, 
migrants from the quebradas (around the Chaupihuaranga and Tingo Rivers as well as Huánuco) 
comprise a significant portion of the population of the city of Cerro de Pasco. Some of them also 
work as shepherds for the plateau communities surrounding Cerro. In a reversal of the pattern 
found in other regions of Peru, here modernity is linked to high altitude, while the lack thereof is 
associated with the lower-altitude quebradas. The Mantaro Valley, on the other hand, is not 
commonly referred to as a quebrada, and is in any case less important as a source of migrants to 
Pasco today.  
Thus, it is not surprising that workers from Huánuco were also seen by at least some as 
being more closely tied to agriculture and thus lower in the dominant cultural hierarchy. One of 
my interviewees, the wife of a Huarón worker for several decades, specifically referred to 
workers from places in southwest Huánuco Department in a derogatory manner. The company 
had put cables outside the workers´ housing, for people to hang their clothes to dry, but someone 
had stolen the cables during the night. She argued that “those kinds of things” were done by 
“people from Llata, from Jesús, Dos de Mayo,65 those people who have chacras (plots of land), 
who have animals, cattle...” While in a different context this kind of statement about someone 
possessing land or animals could be construed positively, as an indication of prosperity, in this 
case she mentioned it while discussing company inspections of workers´ housing – a context in 
which proximity to the agrarian world was usually construed in a negative way, as implying a 
lack of education and of urban customs. That cultural and educational hierarchies existed among 
the workers at Huarón – not just between obreros and empleados, but within the obrero category 
– was stated explicitly by another of my interviewees, even if he did not connect it to 
geographical origin. Ernesto Blanco, the son of a mining worker who grew up in the Huarón 
camps in the 1960s and 70s, described it thus: 
                                                          
64 For historical interconnections between communities on both sides, see Fonseca (1966).  
65 I.e. Llata Province, Dos de Mayo Province, and Jesús District within Lauricocha Province, Huánuco Department. 
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I remember very well, that the Huarón company had classified its workers. There were, 
for example, workers who were illiterate, who had a low academic level, they were made 
to live in the Huancavelica camp. Those who were a bit better were made to live in 
Shiusha. And the empleados, who had better preparation, were made to live in 
Quinientos. Or in San José. So, the people were classified.66 
 
From labor shortage to labor surplus 
Just as there were changes over time in terms of the areas that workers came from, and 
the locations that each group of migrants occupied in the mine hierarchy, there were also 
transformations in the nature of labor recruitment. As we saw earlier, the early 20th century was a 
period in which labor shortages periodically plagued the mining industry; in general, the 
dominant industry and state discourse was of a country with a small population and a lack of 
available workers. This created the need for proactive labor recruitment practices that implied 
venturing into the villages to obtain workers – in particular through the modality of enganche, 
which in its classic version meant creating a situation of indebtedness as a way of compelling 
people to work. As DeWind argues, enganche was in large part designed to counter the seasonal 
labor shortages that arose during harvest time (DeWind 1987, 156). The literature on the history 
of mining in Peru has argued that a decline in the use of enganche took place over the course of 
the first half of the 20th century, paralleling a transition from short-term towards more stable 
labor. DeWind argues that by the 1920s, anti-enganche regulations led to a partial reduction in 
the practice, or to the use of contractors who themselves probably used enganche; yet the system 
continued to be used for some time. Tracing the precise evolution of the use of enganche is 
complicated by the fact that the disrepute of the system led the mining companies to avoid 
discussing it or to claim that it was already in the process of being phased out. For example, in 
his 1917 defense of the mining industry and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, journalist Marcial 
Helguero y Paz Soldán quoted the general superintendent of the company as simultaneously 
acknowledging and disowning enganche, while announcing its gradual decline. 
People have talked a lot about the ´enganche´ system... There has been the attempt to 
slander us because we have employed this modality of work with the Indians. But, is it 
our fault? We did not bring that custom with us. It existed in Peru since time immemorial. 
We did nothing more than simply put it to good use - at first. Not anymore today, because 
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it has given us bad results. The company lost over twelve thousand pounds in one year, 
because the enganchados did not fulfill their obligations and left, taking with them the 
money that they had already received as an advance (Helguero y Paz Soldán 1917, 16). 
Helguero y Paz Soldán himself attempted to de-emphasize the prevalence of enganche; he 
countered an early 1920s account by a traveler from the U.S., Edward Ross, who in his book 
South of Panama (quoted in DeWind 1987, 166) stated that around 4,000 out of 7,840 CPC 
workers were enganchados. Helguero presented enganche as the exception rather than the rule:  
All the work is currently done by ´maquepueros´(free workers), and it is only during 
periods of great labor shortage that workers in Jauja and the nearby districts are sought 
out, and given an advance for the train trip... The need to employ people from the outside 
is gradually decreasing, and, as I said earlier, a race of miners is being formed, little by 
little, one that does not need to be begged to serve this Company...” (Ibid. 17).  
 
Helguero´s account may be seen as propaganda for the company, and its basis in reality 
questioned, or it may also in part reflect the particular characteristics of the city of Cerro de 
Pasco (on which it is focused), where ´a race of miners´ had indeed been forming for much 
longer than at other mining centers, i.e. since at least the 19th century. At other mines the process 
took longer, and enganche persisted for many years. Bonilla (1974) quotes a report by an 
enganchador (labor recruiter) travelling through the Mantaro Valley in 1946, recruiting for the 
Cerro de Pasco Corporation. He reports having heard that “´in all these towns and others of the 
province there are many individuals in charge of recruiting to work at Pachacayo, Huarón, 
Castrovirreina, Río Pallanga and mines of the south” (Bonilla 45).  
On the one hand, at Huarón, U.S. anthropologist Harry Tschopik wrote that in Huayllay 
District, which he visited briefly in 1947, “all go to the mines voluntarily, since the system of 
enganche is said not to exist in this area” (Tschopik 1947, 52). On the other hand, in his 1948 
thesis about Huarón, cited earlier, engineer Guillermo Flores Pinedo wrote: 
To obtain the labor, especially for the shovel men (lamperos), the system of recruitment 
through enganche is used, in which an individual – someone who knows the region – 
recruits the workers for the Company, receiving a commission for that service. (Flores 
1948,109) 
Another engineer, Celso Sotomarino, who like Flores worked at Huarón for a time and wrote his 
thesis about it in 1949, used the term enganchar while discussing the problem of labor shortages: 
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In the Huarón company there are many work sections paralyzed for this reason [labor 
shortage], even though the company pays employees in the most populated and 
proximate locations, such as Cerro de Pasco, Huánuco, Canta, Junín and Huancayo, who 
have as their mission to enganchar workers (Sotomarino 1949, 77).  
However, the use of the term enganche does not necessarily imply that the system continued in 
its classic form. Enganche had never referred to just one standard form of labor contracting, but 
rather could mean recruiting in general – as we mentioned earlier, in the mid-19th century it often 
referred to military recruiting. Although there are many accounts that show that enganche often 
functioned through debt in the early 20th-century mines and sugar plantations, by the 1940s in 
popular usage it may simply have come to refer to any time that agents went around looking for 
workers. This is how it seems to be used in Flores Pinedo´s brief definition quoted above. The 
“hook” of debt may still have played a role, but in general the aspects of the system that had 
most resembled debt peonage in the late 19th century were probably very limited by the middle 
of the 20th. A definitive study of enganche in the mines – which would imply working with 
archival sources produced by the contractors themselves, as well as certain local archives – has 
not yet been conducted. 
 In any case, what is shown by the two engineers´ accounts, as well as the one quoted by 
Bonilla, is that labor shortages continued to be enough of a problem that proactive recruiting was 
still necessary. Indeed, this is explicitly acknowledged in Sotomarino´s account, which sounds 
very similar to earlier views about labor shortage, even if it also mixes in his own critique of the 
low salaries: 
CMH [Compagnie des Mines de Huaron] is no exception to the well-known phenomenon 
of labor shortage that currently afflicts all the mining companies. And this circumstance 
is made worse by the fact that it has as its neighbors other companies that constitute 
competition in this crisis [of labor shortage], and besides the fact that the salaries are not 
in accordance with the intensity of the effort that the mining worker must exert. The 
problem of labor shortage evidently has to do with two main factors: the shortage of 
population from which Peru as a whole suffers, and [the fact] that since agriculture is the 
basis of the life of the inhabitant of our highlands, it draws many hands [brazos, “arms”] 
away from mining, especially during the time of the potato harvest (Sotomarino 1949, 
76). 
This late-19th/early-20th century discourse about labor shortage was thus still common among 
mining engineers (and other professionals) as late as the 1940s. It was not limited to engineers 
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working in Huarón or in the Central Highlands for that matter. For example, in 1949 engineer 
Eloy Yépez wrote very similarly about the situation at his workplace, the Ccochasayhuas mine, a 
small-to-medium gold mine owned by the Banco Wiese (a Peruvian banking house) and located 
in Apurímac Department in southern Peru. Unlike Huarón, Ccochasayhuas was not part of a 
larger mining region, and did not have to compete for workers with other mines, yet in Yépez´s 
view it still suffered from the same problem of labor shortage: 
The problem of manpower, common to the country as a whole, especially in the mining 
industry, does not spare Ccochasayhuas. During the times of planting and harvesting, 
absenteeism is very accentuated, leading to a critical situation in the work inside the 
mine, and creating distressing conditions for sustaining the production of the mineral 
(Yépez 1949, 52). 
Furthermore, he added that “the exploration of new areas has had to be limited due to the lack of 
workers, or else it has been paralyzed entirely whenever the scarcity of people was most acute” 
(Ibid., 30). 
However, the relationship between labor supply and demand, whether in actual reality or 
in engineers´ perceptions, was about to change. Although numerous scholars have described the 
increasing person/land ratio in the highlands in the first half of the 20th century, and although, as 
Contreras writes, the “demographic explosion” in 20th century Peru has its roots in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries,” these trends did not become widely evident to observers until the 1940s 
(Contreras 2004, 213). The massive migration from the highlands to the coast, in particular to 
Lima, in the 1940s, 50s and 60s – similar to rural-urban migration in many Third World 
countries at the time – impressed upon elites the notion that the country was changing 
dramatically. Laments about a “lack of hands” were replaced by cultural anxieties about the 
decline of the old order and its hierarchies, and about the “invasion” of the coast by highlanders 
(whereas before the question had been how to attract them to work in modern coastal 
agriculture). Not only was population growing, but the decline of traditional economies and the 
stagnation of prices for agricultural food products as a result of import policies (Long and 
Roberts 2001 [1984],104-108) meant that, in the highlands as a whole, more people in rural areas 
were willing to seek work in highland mines or coastal plantations. References to labor shortages 
as such disappeared from the record, at least as far as modern sectors like industrial mining or 
coastal agriculture were concerned. Over the course of the second half of the 20th century, under 
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the influence not only of evidence of domestic population growth but also of transnational 
population control discourses, it would become commonplace in Peru to describe the country as 
being overpopulated rather than lacking in people as had been the case until mid-century.67  
 In the mines, at least in the more modern ones, the mid-century was a point of inflexion 
not only in terms of the supply, but also of the demand for labor. For the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation, DeWind sees this moment as beginning the era of “the mechanization of 
production” (1987, 64). After pressuring the Peruvian government into issuing an investment-
friendly mining code in 1950, the company began a program designed to reverse the declining 
trend in its rate of profit by increasing worker productivity through capital-intensive projects. 
These included the introduction of open-pit mining – first in Toquepala (a joint venture between 
CPC and ASARCO) and, beginning in the late 1950s, in the company’s original mining site at 
Cerro de Pasco. At the CPC’s underground mines, where the nature of the deposits was not 
amenable to open-pit mining, a series of new technologies were introduced that tripled worker 
productivity between 1954 and 1969, even if it continued to lag far behind that of the open pits 
(Dewind 1987, 96). This process of underground mechanization intensified after 1967 when 
trackless mining was introduced at the CPC’s new underground mine, Cobriza. Over the next 
few years, the new technology would find its way into most medium-scale mines of the Central 
Highlands. All this increased the capital/labor ratio, required more skill from workers and limited 
the demand for labor. As DeWind writes for the CPC, 
As the technology required more specialized skills, the company imposed more 
impersonal and restrictive criteria to determine who would be hired. Prior to the 1950s, 
the company’s recruitment of laborers had been almost entirely unselective. (194) 
Similarly, based on his interviews with Cerro de Pasco Corporation executives in 1960, 
Bourricaud (1961) describes the company´s new attitude towards its workforce: “The labor 
policy is commanded by three rules: Do not fire, do not hire, train as much as possible the labor 
already employed” (37). “Do not fire” was more of a necessity imposed on the company both by 
the increase in union demands after 1956 – with labor stability gaining importance among 
                                                          
67 This discourse – common to many third-world countries - was one of several factors that helped to create the 
conditions for aggressive birth control programs such as the forced sterilizations of the 1990s (at a time when birth 
rates were actually already declining). 
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workers´ foremost concerns – and by new government policies that did not look well upon the 
dismissal of workers. These pressures in turn made it more imperative to limit the hiring of new 
workers and instead focus on improving the productivity and qualifications of existing workers. 
Although mining companies frequently exaggerated the constraints imposed on them by unions 
and by government policies, it cannot be denied that this was a factor, alongside technological 
change and the mechanization of production. 
This multilayered process cannot be assumed to have been uniform at all the mines in 
Peru. Even among the different mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation there were significant 
differences in the level of mechanization and productivity, and the CPC as a whole lagged 
behind the new Southern Peru Copper Corporation (of which CPC owned a part) (DeWind 1987, 
115-116). Huarón also lagged behind the CPC in terms of technological change; to this day, 
workers who have experience in the different mines in the area do not consider Huarón to be one 
of the most advanced (in comparison, for example, to the Milpo mine). However, Huarón also 
saw technical changes and efforts at improving productivity and the quality of the workforce 
rather than expanding the quantity of laborers. A 1954 thesis by an engineer working in the mine 
shows that these ideas were already circulating at this time. Whereas only 5 years earlier his 
colleague Celso Sotomarino had lamented the prevalence of labor shortages, now engineer Juan 
Hoyos Castillo focused on the negative impact of unstable labor on the workers´ level of skill; 
one of his suggestions for the Huarón company was aimed in this direction: 
Stability of labor, at the present time there is little in the way of specialized personnel, 
because of their short duration on the job; this problem could be solved by improving the 
conditions of life, principally as far as housing is concerned, and giving more facilities to 
the workers (Hoyos 1954, 170).68 
But at Huarón these changes took place at a slower pace than at the CPC. Bourricaud, 
who visited both companies in 1960, emphasized the differences and similarities between the 
two: 
                                                          
68 The narrative portions of these theses by engineers working at Huarón should not be interpreted as being exact 
representations either of company policy or of the reality of the workforce (unlike when they provide technical data, 
which was usually copied from company documents). Rather, they simply show us what ideas and discourses were 
circulating among engineers at the time.  
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Since many years ago, the ‘Cerro de Pasco’ [Corporation] was trying to make its 
workforce sedentary, whereas Huarón, for example, did not worry over a very elevated 
turnover. But as the need for more qualified workers begins to be felt, the company that 
pays the cost of their training seeks to preserve them for itself and to have them at hand 
(Bourricaud 1967, 92).  
 
Like the CPC, Huarón took advantage of the drop in world metal prices in the late 1950s 
to begin to limit the size of its workforce. As Bourricaud noted in 1961, in 10 years the company 
had doubled its production, yet the number of obreros had been reduced from around 2000 in 
1954 to slightly under 1800 in 1959 (Bourricaud 1961, 348). At the same time, however, the 
number of empleados69 had risen from 228 to 313, indicating the beginnings of an effort to shift 
resources from the less skilled towards the more skilled end of the workforce. The size of the 
labor force did not increase again after this; rather, it continued to gradually decrease, so that by 
1979 there were 1003 obreros, 257 empleados and 57 upper level staff, making for a total direct 
workforce of 1317 (Calderón 1979, 22). This downward trend continued in the 1980s, so that by 
1987 the company´s report to shareholders stated a total workforce of 1,125, of whom only 844 
were obreros. By this time, the causes of the workforce reduction were not only mechanization 
but also the crisis of the Peruvian mining industry in the 1980s, which kept the company from 
hiring new workers.70 Also, the figures given here are for direct, payroll workers only, and do not 
include those employed by subcontracting firms. Subcontracting had been common in the early 
part of the 20th century, but it returned to prominence in the last few decades of the century, so 
that by the 1970s and 80s union leaders saw it as a growing problem. At the same time that those 
employed directly by the company had developed into a stable, unionized workforce, a parallel 
subcontracted sector had emerged as a form of competition. After the mass departures of stable 
workers in the early 1990s, as in other mines, subcontracting increased dramatically, as did the 
use of temporary contracts even among direct workers; by 2009, only 30% of the workforce 
consisted of stable, payroll workers.  
                                                          
69 Again, obreros and empleados were the two “castes” in Peruvian labor (to use D.S. Parker´s term), with separate 
legal regimes governing labor relations, health insurance and pension plans. The two categories corresponded in 
part, though not completely, to the U.S. terms “blue collar” (obreros) and “white collar” (empleados).  
70 Finally, the early 1990s saw hundreds of workers leave Huarón, under pressure from the company at a time when 
many other companies were actually closing altogether. 
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Thus, the late 1950s were a point of inflection, when a reduction occurred in the total 
workforce, after which no return to previous levels would occur at the Huarón company, like at 
many other mines. If subcontracting could theoretically leave the total labor demand unaffected, 
that was not true for mechanization, which replaced some workers with machines and required 
the others to stay more years on the job so as to learn to be able to handle the new technologies. 
This occurred at the same time that the labor supply was on the increase. In this way, the era of 
labor shortages and of active recruitment ended at Huarón, as in most other mines of the Central 
Highlands.71  
The memory of the previous period of labor shortage, and its contrast with the situation 
today, emerged spontaneously in several of my conversations and interviews in Huayllay, 
showing that there is local awareness of this historical transition. Blanca Chávez,72 a native of 
Huaychao – the other village in Huayllay District – told me about her father´s experience 
working in the mine. Before becoming part of the stable, unionized workforce (from which he 
retired in 1980) her father had worked seasonally. At that time, she said, people would leave and 
then they would be much sought after - the company would seek them out to return to work (a 
veces volvían hasta rogaditos a trabajar). They would “return, then leave, then return.” In its 
emphasis on the seasonal nature of work and the constant turn-over characteristic of times past, 
Blanca´s comment is similar to Máximo Roque´s account quoted earlier. However, she also 
highlights the fact that the company had to ask people to return to the mine; in colloquial usage, 
the term rogadito (from rogar, to beg or implore) implies being sought out, being in demand.  
Another of my interviewees, Vicente Morales, used the same term when describing the 
way working in the mine used to be in the old days. Now in his sixties, he worked for sixteen 
years in the nearby Río Pallanga mine, before returning to Huayllay, his hometown, and settling 
down as a baker. Before that, his father had worked at Huarón. I had asked Mr. Morales a 
                                                          
71 For the sugar industry of the northern coast, which had relied on enganche of workers from the highland 
department of Cajamarca, this transition occurred around the same time or a bit later. In her study of Cajamarca, 
Deere (1990) writes of “the generation of surplus labor in the highlands in relation to job opportunities” and “the 
generation of surplus labor in relation to the opportunities for employment in the coast” as having occurred by the 
1970s (266-267). Similarly, Scott (1976) writes of “the secular decline in demand for highland labor on the part of 
the sugar plantations” (338-339) and argues that “the system of enganche finally disappeared for the recruitment of 




question about the clay pots that huayllinos used to make and exchange for agricultural products 
from the valleys. He explained that this was “for the livelihood of each community member;”73 it 
was an important part of the household economy – “we lived from that.”74 When the mining 
company arrived, “all that was abandoned; because now there was [an activity] from which to 
eat.”75 In other words, in his narration, mining appears as the activity that replaces the pottery 
craft as the source of supplementary income for the household. In fact, it was such an ample 
source of employment that the company actually needed more people: 
The company even went looking for people. There weren´t a lot of people. For example if 
I was absent [from work] today, already the next day they were coming [for me], “why 
don’t you work,” like that. It was rogadito.  
When I asked him to explain more what he meant, Mr. Morales emphasized that he was talking 
mainly about the earlier period, when his father was working at Huarón: 
I know that from when I was a child. When my father, my father always, sometimes, 
when there was some important occasion [compromiso], he would not go [to work]. The 
next day the foreman was already arriving [makes sound of knocking on door]: “Why 
hadn´t you come to work, let´s go. From the moment you start to work you will earn your 
tarea [payment for task completed],” he said. He would go in at 9 or 10 in the morning. 
He would work until 4 or 5 in the afternoon, and done, he had earned his tarea. 
 
This passage mentions something that other people also told me was a common phenomenon in 
the old days: the huayllinos, who were close to their village (unlike the workers who had 
migrated from farther away), would attend special events like weddings or community feasts, 
and then not return to work when they were supposed to. Here the company is portrayed as 
tolerant of this fact because it was so much in need of people. Mr. Morales furthermore contrasts 
this with the present: 
And now to enter the company, there are a lot of things required, exams, everything. Of 
the lungs, of the heart, sight, everything. Now it’s a lot of medical exams (chequeo) to go 
in to work. But not back then. People skipped work, they kept working, they skipped 
work, they kept working. Now when someone skips work they kick them out right away.  
 
                                                          
73 “Para sostenimiento de cada comunero” 
74 “Con eso vivíamos pues.” 
75 “Ya allí todo eso se ha dejado. Porque ya había pues de donde comer” 
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Here he emphasizes the barriers to employment that exist today, in particular the medical exams 
that young people looking for work in the mine must go through. Also, the company can now 
afford to be much stricter with people who miss work. The increase in work discipline over time 
is something that is widely known and discussed in mining areas like Huayllay. While 
sometimes it is explained as due to changes in ownership of a particular mine (for example, in 
Cerro de Pasco, from state back to private ownership in the 1990s), in Mr. Morales’ account the 
reduced tolerance for absenteeism is directly tied to changes in the balance between labor supply 
and demand. 
 A similar comparison between past and present was drawn by Octavio, a man who had 
moved from Tarma, where he had worked in a cement plant before studying in the university in 
Cerro de Pasco and then moving to Huayllay, where he was my neighbor for a time. He told me 
how “in the time of the French” the mine owners and managers had to go looking for workers. 
They would go through the countryside, and when they saw a shepherd, they would tell him to 
come work, and they would give him food and supplies (víveres) as an advance, in that way the 
shepherd would be motivated to work. But now, Octavio said, that has changed, now people 
have to go looking for the engineers and practically beg them for a job. Also, before people were 
afraid of the mine, it was terrifying to them. Now they are used to it, “it´s like their house.” 
Octavio directly mentioned the advance payment in the form of goods that was one classic 
feature of enganche. He also included as part of his account the change in people´s attitudes 
towards the mine – an increased desire to work there and a heightened disposition to mining 
work, even when now it is more difficult to find a job. In his case, however, he preferred not to 
work in the mine – there you could perhaps earn a good salary, he said, but you stayed at the 
same level and did not advance. Instead, he was trying to start his own contrata (contracting 
firm) to provide transportation to the mining company. 
 Lastly, Edgar Urbina,76 a young man who like Blanca Chávez was a comunero of 
Huaychao, and who was occupying a position of authority in the village municipality (centro 
poblado menor77) at the time I met him, also spoke explicitly about the change that had occurred 




from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. This was in response to my question 
about whether there were older people in Huaychao who had worked in the mine in times past: 
Before, our elders told us that they used to seek them out to get them to work. But not 
any more. Now they have to have two years of experience. Yes, in all [the companies], 
that’s at the national level. And if you don’t manage to do that, if you don’t have two 
years’ experience, how are we going to enter into the mine? It´s very hard. 
 
I asked him to explain in more detail what he meant about people being “sought after” for work: 
Yes, because in the mine there were few people that wanted to work. In other words, 
there was greater quantity, or more of a chance to work back then. Also demographically 
we were few, so there was more of a chance. I have heard that from our old people... 
Now one has to look for [a job]. If you go for a job, there will be, for one single position, 
10 or 15 people applying.  
 
Like Vicente Morales, Edgar Urbina emphasizes the barriers that have arisen to keep young 
people from the locality from obtaining employment at the mine easily. In his case, he focuses 
not on health and physical exams but rather on the two years´ experience requirement commonly 
found in the mines today, as well as on the competition for each position. 
 Thus, the transition from labor shortage to labor surplus not only appears in the 
documents, rather it is also something of which many local people are explicitly aware. This 
historical transformation was the product of several factors: mechanization, population growth, 
and the decline of other local and regional economic activities such as cattle-raising and crafts 
(in Huayllay district itself) and agriculture (in many of the regions that sent workers to the mine). 
The increase in labor supply and the decrease in labor demand does not mean that mining wages 
are now lower than they were in the early 20th century. Although the supply-and-demand 
mechanism is no doubt a real force in the determination of prices (including the price of labor 
power), it is only one of several factors. Another factor that is equally and probably more 
important is the social determination of the needs of workers and their families, which shape the 
value of labor-power and which, as Marx pointed out, contain a “historical and moral element” 
having to do with “habits and expectations” (Marx 1976, 275). A closely related factor is the 
degree to which people become directly dependent on the capitalist economy for their livelihood 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
77 Since the 1990s, certain villages which are not important enough to be the district seat are nevertheless elevated to 
the category of centro poblado menor, which means they have their own mayor – previously, the term “mayor” 
(alcalde) was only used for the district or provincial authority. The mayor of a centro poblado menor usually has 
much less in the way of funds and political authority than a district or provincial mayor. 
89 
 
and social/cultural reproduction, rather than having it merely as a complement to a non-capitalist 
sphere. 
Although a nationwide phenomenon, the transition highlighted here takes different forms 
in different places. The mining workforce at the Huarón mine was progressively reduced during 
the second half of the 20th century and then drastically cut in the 1990s, culminating in the 
temporary closure of the mine as a result of the 1998 flood that inundated both Huarón and 
Animón and killed 6 workers. In Huayllay, the 1990s were a time of crisis and unemployment, 
when many people left the district looking for work elsewhere. Since 2002, the rise in metal 
prices - which has aided the reopening of Huarón under a new administration, as well as the 
expansion of operations at the formerly small Animón mine (which is now comparable in scope 
to Huarón) - has to some degree masked the long-term trend discussed here. In 2009, there were 
around 1500 individuals employed at the Huarón mine, of whom around 30% were stable, 
payroll workers, another 30% were on the company payroll but on temporary contracts, and 40% 
were subcontracted. At the immediately adjacent Animón mine, according to one company 
official with whom I spoke in 2010, there were between 1700 and 1800 people working at any 
one time, of whom around 400 were on the company payroll and the rest worked for one of 67 
contractors. Nevertheless, the condition of labor surplus is widely noted in Huayllay, even during 
a mining boom such as the one that has taken place over the last decade. Even if more people are 
working in mining in the district than ever before, the population is also much greater. 
Mechanization creates the need for a highly diversified workforce, segmented according to levels 
of skill and training. In such a context, among many local people there is a deeply felt sense of 
being excluded not just from work in general but in particular from the more skilled jobs. If in 
the 1950s and 60s the company attempted to keep workers longer in order to train them, today 
Huarón and Animón, like other mining companies in the region, expect to be able to hire workers 
who are already trained, without having to bear the cost of such training – thus the two years´ 
experience requirement. This is true also for mining contractors, who perform much of the work 
at the two mines in Huayllay District – and who, unlike the main companies, are under much less 




Thus, although the area was undergoing a “boom period” at the time of my research, and 
although many local people did work at the two mines, there was a widespread sense that gaining 
access to a good job at the companies was difficult. The mining companies no longer sent labor 
recruiters out to the field; rather, they or their contractors hired skilled operators from different 
locations (Huayllay itself, Cerro de Pasco, Huancayo, Lima) who applied on their own. At most, 
when they needed a particular type of operator on short notice, the contractors might put a flyer 
on a light post or on one of the outdoor bulletin boards where people in Cerro go looking for 
jobs. Rather than the company trying to convince people in Huayllay itself to come work at the 
mine, the community had to pressure the mine to sign convenios or agreements in which the 
company agreed to take on a certain number of community members (comuneros) as workers. 
On the other hand, the effects of mechanization on labor demand at underground mines 
like Huarón are less dramatic than in open-pit mines. The most important technological change 
in underground mines was the introduction of trackless mining, which in Huarón took place 
beginning in the 1970s. This and other changes at that time reduced the demand for labor, 
certainly, but in the years since there have not been transformations in the productive process 
that were as significant. In underground mines, the 1990s saw the collapse of labor unions, the 
changes in labor laws and the consolidation of the subcontracting system, but not a new 
technological revolution. The difference in labor requirements between underground and open-
pit mines, on the other hand, is dramatic. The technological leap of the “new mining” that 
emerged in Peru after the 1990s has consisted precisely of the proliferation of new open-pit 
mining projects, so that they comprise a higher proportion of total capital invested in mining than 
before. In open-pit mining areas the labor requirements are much lower and the sense of labor 
surplus is therefore greater. The ability of companies to diffuse local conflicts by offering jobs at 
the mine is thus lower in comparison to underground mines likes Huarón, even if it is also 
limited in the latter. Also, although in Huayllay district there is a sense of exclusion from the 
more skilled jobs, it´s less intense than in areas where people have little or no previous mining 
experience and thus find it harder to convince a new company to give them jobs.78  
                                                          
78 In this paragraph I am comparing Huayllay to places like Espinar (Tintaya mine) and Cotabambas/Grau (Las 




 In this chapter I have provided an overview of the main structural aspects of the 
formation of the mining workforce in the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century. I have 
done so through a specific focus on the Huarón mine but with a secondary focus on the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation and, to some degree, the rest of the Peruvian mining industry. The reasons for 
focusing on labor are several. First, as stated in the introduction, issues of labor have largely 
been left aside in recent studies of mining in Peru, both in their historical and contemporary 
aspects. Second, the twentieth century was a time in which, in Peru as in many other countries, 
labor constituted a central site of intervention by governments as well as political activists. The 
“labor state” described by Drinot (2011) for early-20th century Peru was one manifestation of 
this. Third, in the specific local setting analyzed in this chapter – Huayllay - the mining camps 
constituted the demographic center of the district during much of the century. Thus, it was partly 
around the labor link with the company that much of the “local community” constituted itself at 
the time – which does not mean that there weren´t other, parallel communities such as the 
comunidad campesina, which I have also examined. 
 In the first section of the chapter, I discussed some of the long-term aspects of labor 
recruitment in mining in the Central Andes, and discussed what is meant by modern industrial 
mining in Peru. I then introduced the local setting of the district of Huayllay, where the Huarón 
mine is located, and which provides much of the evidence for this dissertation. In the third 
section of this chapter I examined the long-term trends and dynamics of migration and the 
formation of the workforce in the mines of central Peru. I tried to maintain a balance between a 
specific local focus on Huarón, a wider regional lens on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, and a 
broader national perspective.  
 As stated in the introduction and in the fourth section, one of the main arguments of this 
chapter is that there was a transition from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus in 
Peruvian mining in the 20th century. To some degree, this was the case in other modern, capital-
intensive sectors of the Peruvian economy as well, namely export-oriented agriculture. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
an area with very limited previous experience in mining; thus, the number of local people who had previous training 
in mining jobs was much less than in Huayllay. 
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transition is also illustrative of broader, interrelated tendencies present in capitalism worldwide, 
such as the development of the reserve army of labor and the switch from absolute to relative 
surplus-value (through technological change). However, these trends take particular forms in 
different parts of the world. In Peru, as in the mining regions of southern Africa, the shortage of 
labor in the early 20th century had to do with the persistence of traditional economies and the 
resulting relative weakness of push factors from the countryside (at least when compared to the 
classic case of English industrialization). Also, it is important to point out that the phenomenon 
described by the sources was a shortage of the kind of labor the companies wanted – abundant, 
low-wage and, importantly, year-round labor. Similarly, the labor surplus found today is not 
unlike that found in most capitalist economies, but it has particular characteristics in Peru and in 
the mining areas described in this chapter. Compared to the industrialized countries, in rent-
dependent mineral-exporting nations like Peru there are obviously fewer industry jobs overall in 
the economy; in that sense there is the potential for a greater labor surplus. However, on the 
other hand, due to the somewhat lesser advance of capitalist relations of production, there are 
more opportunities in petty commodity production, commerce and what´s commonly called the 
“informal sector.” And, in the particular area described in this chapter – Huayllay District and 
the rest of the Pasco/Junín plateau – there is some access to land, for many people though not for 
everyone, through the institution of the comunidad campesina. There are also differences, as 
described, between the kind of labor surplus found in an underground mining area like Huayllay 
and an open-pit mining project. Thus, there are historical and regional specificities that go 










MINING AND WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the main long-term trends and dynamics in the 
formation of the workforce in the mines of Peru in the 20th century, with a particular focus on the 
Huarón mine and the Central Highlands more broadly. In this chapter I switch from the long-
term dynamics of migration towards the topic of work itself. In this first section I provide a brief 
overview of the nature of mining work during the 20th century, with a focus on work methods 
and dynamics as well as mine accidents. I then switch to a more narrative mode as I discuss the 
life histories of four mining workers at the Huarón mine as well as one individual who did not 
work at the mine but was closely involved with the mine workforce. Since these accounts are 
based on my conversations with living individuals, they naturally shift the discussion towards the 
latter decades of the 20th century (thus providing in a sense a preview of some of the issues 
discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6).  
In the third section of this chapter, I switch to a theoretical examination of an issue that is 
particularly important to the social history of migrant labor and extractive industries in 
agricultural and rural societies, but also to the study of labor in advanced capitalism as well: the 
nature of work involved in the reproduction of labor-power, in particular household labor, and its 
relationship to value production in capitalism. Finally, in the last section of this chapter I return 
to a concrete and historical mode, as I examine issues related to the reproduction of labor-power 
in the mines of the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century. First I review the relationship 
between mining and rural production, and how the latter performed much of the work necessary 
for the reproduction of labor-power in mining, as was emphasized by DeWind (1987). I then 
examine the gender division of labor and household work in the mines of the Central Highlands 
and in the Huarón mine in particular.  
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Technology and production 
As mentioned earlier, during the first few years after its founding in 1912, the Compagnie 
des Mines de Huaron built a hydroelectric power system, a narrow-gauge railway (which 
replaced llama transport) and installations such as offices and workers´ housing. A smelter was 
also completed in 1918, but it was always said to have never worked up to full expectations, and 
it was abandoned in the late 1920s. In the 1930s the Huaron company (like the CPC) expanded 
its focus from copper to lead and zinc; a Differential Flotation Plant was built in that decade, and 
the modern concentrator plant took over in 1957. In terms of the actual extraction of ore from the 
ground, the first few years were devoted to expanding and deepening the tunnels and galleries 
used by the previous owners (the small Concordia and Venus companies, formed by mineowners 
from Cerro de Pasco) as well as earlier miners. The first few reports to stockholders testify to the 
challenges posed by flooding as shafts were dug deeper than ever before, and to the role that the 
generation and use of electric power played in solving this and other problems, as well as in 
allowing mechanical perforation.79 As DeWind (1987) describes for the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation, the four most important types of machinery in those early years were compressed 
air drills, slushers, hoisting winches and pumps, all of them powered by electricity (DeWind 
1987, 44): 
On the basis of the new technology, mining became an integrated and continuous 
activity. The processes of extraction, concentration, smelting and refining were 
maintained 24 hours a day as each stage fed into the next... The major source of energy 
driving the entire system was electricity (Ibid., 40-41). 
Like the larger CPC, the Huaron company harnessed the water resources in its immediate 
vicinity in order to generate electricity. Some power was also generated through the use of coal, 
                                                          
79 In the words of the 1914 report (on the 1912-1913 period), three years before electric power became available, 
“our horizontal labors have continued without difficulty, but our work downwards has been hampered, then slowed, 
then halted at 16 meters below the old workings, by a rise in the water level beyond the abilities of the necessarily 
rudimentary means of drainage that we have at present” (CMH, Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 27 Mars 1914, 
p.4; my translation). In its 1917 report, the company noted that “the absence of power during the previous year has 
not allowed us to push forward very actively” inside the mine. However, the hydroelectric plant had finally been 
completed at the end of 1917; its purpose was to “provide the power necessary for mechanic perforation, for 
ventilation and drainage of the mine, for the lighting of the houses in our mining camp, etc.... Since the closure of 
this year [1916] and the completion of the hydroelectric plant at Francois, which has allowed us to make use of 
mechanical perforation, the development of the mine has been pursued vigorously” (CMH, Assemblée Générale 
Ordinaire du 11 Mai 1917, p.4; my translation). 
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especially for use by the smelter. Although there were many similarities between the two 
companies, Huaron´s operations were necessarily on a smaller scale and developed at a slower 
pace. That was even truer of the other, smaller Peruvian-owned mines of the early 20th-century. 
As is well-known, industrial mining tends to have one of the most male-dominated 
workforces of any sector of the economy. This is not necessarily the case for artisanal, informal 
or small-scale mining, particularly of gold; there, women play a significant role to this day, 
working alongside men. However, historically, when mining work has come to involve going 
underground, cutting into the rock and carrying heavy ores, the association of mining with 
masculinity has come to be taken for granted. In the early years of industrial mining at Huarón 
and similar mines in central Peru, women did play certain roles directly in the productive 
process. In particular, before concentrator plants became common, the separation of high-grade 
from low-grade ore was done by hand. This step in production, known as pallaqueo in Peru, took 
place on the surface outside the mine entrance. It served to prevent the low-grade ore from being 
included in the shipments to the processing mills, which would have been uneconomical – 
whether such shipments were carried by animals, as in the early days, or, later, over railroads. 
This work was traditionally done by women, old men and children. Contreras writes of how in 
19th-century Cerro de Pasco women had been in high demand to work as pallaquires (Contreras 
1988, 108).  Similarly, Cerro de Pasco Corporation official B.T. Colley wrote of how a large 
plant for handpicking ores existed in Cerro de Pasco in the early 1920s. The company had 
constructed a concentrator plant, but there was opposition to this as the hand-picking method was 
preferred, so that first concentrator was closed down (Colley 24). As late as 1930, when 
Communist Party organizer Jorge del Prado arrived in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s 
Morococha mine, the first job he got was in pallaqueo, at the picking plant.80   
 At Huarón, there are reports that handpicking was used in the early days, as was common 
at the time. This old practice continued even after the construction of the company´s copper 
smelter in 1918, since the latter could function with high-grade ores only. However, already by 
the 1930s many or most of the people engaged in pallaqueo or hand-picking would have been 
                                                          
80 Del Prado actually worked alongside old men in pallaqueo, but he still attributes the term to the Quechua word for 
old woman, palla. 
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displaced by the construction of the first flotation plant for concentrating ore; it is likely that 
many of them were women, although I do not have direct evidence on that fact for Huarón. Such 
displacement of hand-pickers did not take place in all mines at once; it depended on the scale of 
operations and their degree of technological advancement. For example, in 1949 the 
Ccochasayhuas gold mine in southern Peru still employed around 50 pallaqueras (gendered 
feminine and thus, almost certainly, mostly women) who worked 8 hours daily in a yard 
(cancha) located in the bottom of a dewatered lake; they picked out gold ore from old mineral 
wastes that had been discarded by miners since colonial times but which had become recoverable 
under modern processing techniques (Yépez 1949, 52-53). Similarly, Nash (1979) reports that in 
the San José mine in Oruro, Bolivia, over 250 women were fired when the concentration plant 
was installed in 1967; they were replaced by 17 male operators (Nash 197). Nor was handpicking 
the only possible job that could be done by women in 20th-century industrial mining; Thede 
(1982) reports that in the early days of the Milpo mine in Pasco Department (in the mid-century) 
women were employed in sewing sacks for carrying the ore, but this was later discontinued 
(Thede 5-6).  
Beyond the sphere of direct production, women were certainly employed as office 
workers, teachers and, beginning in the 1950s, social workers. However, from at least the 1930s 
onwards, when discussing the workforce engaged directly in production at a medium-sized 
industrial mine like Huarón, we are talking primarily about male workers. I have not found 
references to women employed in production at the mine, as pallaquires or in another capacity, 
in either the local archives of the Juzgado de Paz (which often, though not always, list 
individuals´ occupations) or in the engineers´ reports and company annual reports that I have 
examined.  
The most common method used in underground mining in 20th-century Peru has been 
overhand cut-and-fill (corte y relleno ascendiente). As DeWind shows, it was already used in the 
CPC mines in the early 1900s (Ibid., 46-48). In spite of the many changes that have taken place 
in terms of machinery, overhand cut-and-fill is still by far the dominant method used in Huarón, 
as I saw during my visit to the underground mine in 2009 (although sub-level caving methods 
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were expected to become more important there in the future).81 The overhand cut-and-fill method 
means working upwards from one level to the one above, knocking out or blasting the ore and 
letting it fall to the lower level, from where it is removed; most of the empty space (stope) is then 
filled in with waste rock so that work can continue above. For much of the 20th century (unlike in 
the present), this method involved the work not just of drill operators but also of shovel men and 
timbermen. Furthermore, whereas today scoop loaders and dump trucks are used to carry the ore 
from the stope to the concentrator plant, until the 1970s this was done via small railway cars that 
went all around the mine. In his 1949 mining engineering thesis based on his experience working 
at the Huarón mine, Sotomarino (1949) writes that overhand cut-and-fill was used in most of the 
mine at the time, but the alternative method of square-set stoping (cuadros de stope) was used in 
the Travieso section, due to the specific characteristics of that copper-rich area. Sotomarino also 
describes what he saw as the typical sequence followed by an imaginary obrero who went to 
Huarón looking for work in the 1940s, without previous mining experience: 
When he comes looking for work, he will come before the Chief Foreman, who, on 
realizing that our man does not yet know anything, will assign him to be an shovel man 
on the surface [lampero de superficie]. Tempted by the slight improvement in salary that 
it implies, he will soon become an underground shovel man [lampero de mina], in which 
position he will have the opportunity to observe the others´ work; a preference for one 
activity or another will arise in him, and intermittently he will need to perform the duties 
of an assistant and later of a master driller or timberman.   
Sotomarino´s description is an idealized depiction of upward mobility in the mine; 
obviously not all workers completed this process successfully. As we saw earlier, another 
engineer at the time, Guillermo Flores Pinedo (1947), emphasized how workers from the 
Mantaro Valley tended to stay longer on the job and make the full progression to master driller 
or timberman, whereas workers from the quebradas of Pasco Department never stayed long 
enough to make it past the assistant position. Sotomarino´s description is interesting, however, 
not so much for its applicability to all workers as for the idea it gives us of the different steps in 
the mine hierarchy: 
As time passes, the Chief Foreman will occasionally need someone who can act 
temporarily as a Foreman, so the obrero will need to summon all his dedication and 
                                                          
81 This visit was conducted jointly with Jessica Smith. 
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enthusiasm so as to not disappoint, and then it is only a matter of time before his ascent to 
[the position of] Foreman on a permanent basis. In this capacity he will come into contact 
with the Engineer, a man bent on ensuring that his knowledge results in an increase in the 
output of the workforce, in the extraction of the best possible tonnage, as well as in the 
achievement of the best possible safety conditions for the workforce; if our man performs 
up to those standards, he will subsequently become a Chief Foreman, which is the highest 
level in the mine hierarchy to which he can aspire. 
 
Work Accidents 
Before continuing the discussion of work at the mine it is necessary to include an 
important aspect of mining anywhere: accidents and work hazards.  Around the world, 
underground mining work has historically been a dangerous occupation; that has been the case in 
the Andes as well. In representations of Spanish colonialism in the Americas, the Potosí silver 
mine has become synonymous with dangerous working conditions as well as coerced labor (the 
mita system). The arrival of modern industrial mining in early 20th-century Peru would have a 
contradictory effect on mining-related hazards. On the one hand, the closure of the long era of 
amalgamation of silver, in the last few decades of the 19th century, meant the end of the use of 
mercury (the key ingredient in amalgamation), whose negative health effects had been 
documented for mining sites such as Cerro de Pasco in the 1820s (see Rivero y Ustariz´s 1828 
report) as well as earlier. 82 Additionally, certain occupations that had formerly been among the 
most onerous - like the apiris who carried the ore on their backs - were eliminated in mines like 
Cerro de Pasco and Huarón in which narrow-gauge mine railways and electric-powered hoisting 
winches took over their functions. Furthermore, modern industrial mining would eventually 
develop safety standards and mechanisms that would be introduced, to varying degrees and at 
varying speeds, around the world.  
 On the other hand, the expansion of mine galleries and shafts to unprecedented lengths 
and depths, under the requirements of industrial, electric-powered production, as well as the 
extensive use of explosives, initially increased the risk of accidents from rock falls, explosions 
and gas poisoning. In January and August 1910, two major explosions at the Cerro de Pasco 
                                                          
82 For an analysis of the process by which amalgamation was abandoned as the primary method for processing silver 
in late-19th century Peru, see Contreras (2004, 114-146).  
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Corporation´s Goyllarisquizga coal mine killed twenty-nine and seventy workers, respectively, 
according to press accounts at the time (Blanchard 1982, 39). As Blanchard argues, the impact of 
the second accident also contributed to speeding up the passage of Peru´s Law of Professional 
Risk/Work Accident Law, which directed companies to pay indemnifications for workers killed 
or injured on the job. The explosion also prompted an official investigation by the Ministry of 
Public Works/Development (Fomento) and the National Mining Engineers´ Corps, which found 
many deficiencies and hazards in the company´s work methods (Mayer 1913, 42-55). The 
Mining Engineers´ Corps published statistics on mining accidents in the Pasco and Yauli mineral 
districts (i.e. Pasco Department plus the Morococha and Casapalca mining areas in Yauli) during 
the early years of the century. According to them, between 1908 and 1920 mining accidents in 
these two areas caused 527 deaths (Flores Galindo 1974, 63). To take a particular year for which 
we have more specific Corps statistics available, in 1918 there were 52 fatalities listed for the 
Pasco and Yauli regions, at a time when the total combined number of mining workers and 
employees recorded for those two areas was 10,260. Two of those deaths took place at the 
Huarón mine (both attributed to rock falls) while 26 fatalities occurred at the CPC´s mines and 
subsidiaries.83 These statistics should be taken with a grain of salt, however, since they seem 
likely to miss fatalities at smaller, more isolated mines. Additionally, they give a figure of only 
25 fatalities in 1910, even though just the Goyllarisquizga accidents (also located in Pasco) 
caused a larger number of deaths that year, if we believe the press accounts cited by Blanchard 
(1982, 39). 
On December 5 1928, a cave-in and flood at the CPC´s Morococha mine killed at least 28 
workers; the accident had been caused by workings that got too close to the bottom of Lake 
Morococha. This tragedy caught the attention of José Carlos Mariátegui, the founder of Peruvian 
Marxism, who published accounts of the accident in his biweekly paper Labor and initiated the 
first contacts with the mining workers of the Central Highlands – contacts that would lead to the 
first systematic attempt at unionization in 1930. It was shortly after the Morococha accident that 
the CPC organized its first Safety Department and set about implementing policies that, by its 
                                                          
83 Here I include accidents at the CPC-owned Morococha Mining Company, but not the Sociedad Backus y 
Johnston, which was acquired by the CPC only that year (1918).  
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own account, helped to significantly reduce the rate of fatal accidents over the next decade and a 
half (Kohl 1945, 567).  
 At Huarón, there were also numerous accidents during the early years. Alejandro Freyre, 
also an engineer who worked at the mine, wrote in his 1960 thesis about a collapse that had taken 
place in the Travieso section, reportedly in 1924. Whether or not the year is accurate, he provides 
a description based on what had by then apparently become company lore, as well as on his own 
excavations and measurements: 
It was in reality a huge interior collapse due to bad working conditions. According to 
versions from individuals who worked during that time, it occurred in 1924 in the Block 
1 Francois of the 600 level. This area was worked by the cut-and-fill method, filling in 
the stope with the residue from the blasts, after picking out the richest mineral. [The 
collapse] occurred in circumstances in which a 5-meter block of great potential had been 
found; given this great richness, they opted to extract all of the mineral that had been 
blasted out, thus leaving the stope without the necessary support. Additionally, it seems 
that the ceiling was raised higher than permitted by safety rules, without covering it with 
timber, so that [the stope] was 7 meters high and 30 meters long... At that time, the 
drilling was done on top of scaffolds or ladders, and even, according to witnesses, on 
wheelbarrows stacked up on top of each other. Suddenly the ceiling caved in, and the 
rock collapse extended as far as 60 meters above; and it is believed that all the obreros 
working in that area were killed (Freyre 1960, 105-106). 
Freyre mentions a gallery and a chimney that were excavated (apparently under his 
watch) in order to explore the area of this collapse; these tests left “no doubts that it effectively 
took place and moved a great volume [of rock] of Travieso” (Ibid.).  
A series of cases in the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz minutes from 1938 provide us a partial 
window into accidents and compensation at the Huarón mine at this time. On January 7 of that 
year, the Juez de Paz was witness to four transactions between the company representative 
Fausto Orihuela Carrión, and accident victims or their relatives. It is not clear why these four 
cases were settled on the same date, whether they had to do with the same accident, or when 
exactly the accident(s) had taken place. In the first case, 38-year old Petrona Huacachin, a native 
of Ulcumayo near Tarma, received a one-time compensation of 540 soles, “according to the 
law,” for the death of her son, Pedro Arroyo Huacachin, who had died “as a consequence of the 
collapse of a block of mineral.” According to the transcript, the money came through the 
Compañía Internacional de Seguros del Perú (an insurance company), where the company 
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apparently had a policy, and was “for six years of service that [the deceased] had provided” the 
company. In return, Petrona Huacachin agreed to the formulaic statement whereby she “received 
the aforementioned sum to her complete satisfaction, renouncing definitively any claim she 
might make, [the issue] being settled for the first and last time.” In the next case, 60-year old 
Catalina Lozano, a native of Muquiyauyo near Jauja in the Mantaro Valley, received a one-time 
payment of 362 soles for the death of her son Lorenzo Bautista Lozano, who had died in the 
Huarón mine. The same provisions and legal formulas as in the previous case applied.   
Similarly, 50-year old Rosa Pizarro from Muquiyauyo received compensation of 332 
soles “for the first and last time” for the death of her husband Vicente Flores as a result of a rock 
collapse in the Sésamo section of the mine. On the other hand, Julián Lazo from Apata (also near 
Jauja) received a compensation payment of 532 soles for his own injury at the mine, namely a 
fractured femur resulting from a fall. Similarly, on January 24, 36-year old Dámaso Collazo 
received 160 soles for an accident in which he had broken his right leg. Two months later, on 
March 14, the Company representative gave 23-year old Seferino Campos, a native of Cerro de 
Pasco, 552 soles as compensation for an accident in which he had lost three fingers. Surprisingly, 
the records for that year also register two cases in which compensation was given for accidents 
which supposedly had taken place at a much earlier date. On January 8, 1938, the Company gave 
60-year old Anselmo Luján Millán, from Huamalí in the Mantaro Valley, a compensation 
payment of 600 soles, for a work accident that had occurred in September 1922; the minutes 
remark that this transaction was “the last and definitive one.” Similarly, the same day, a payment 
of 400 soles was given to Asunción Dionisio, also from Huamalí, “for the last and definitive 
time,” as compensation for an accident suffered by her son Juan Rivera in the Huaron company´s 
railroad in December 1922.  
 In Peru, compensation payments such as these were first mandated by Law 1378, the Ley 
de Accidentes de Trabajo (Work Accident Law). Signed on January 20, 1911, after several years 
of public debate, it was the first such law in Latin America and the second in the Western 
Hemisphere (Blanchard 1982, 39). Before that, workers or their families could in theory sue 
employers for damages under the Civil Code, but that rarely ever happened.  Law 1378 
mandated an indemnity in the form of a percentage of the worker´s salary during convalescence, 
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or permanently in the case of incapacitation; this pension was given to the worker´s family in 
case of a fatal accident. The law was one of as many as twenty major labor regulations 
introduced between 1900 and 1920, and it was part of what Drinot (2011, 28) has called “the 
labor state” – the process by which the Peruvian state created itself by acting upon labor to 
police, protect and “improve” it. That process was similar to that taking place in fully 
industrializing countries, yet in Peru it had particular features due to the fact that labor was seen 
as a vehicle for the civilizing of the nation. As Drinot writes, “the law constituted the state as a 
paternal figure overlooking the safety of his worker-sons and worker-daughters” (Ibid. 30). Yet 
as Drinot, Blanchard and other authors make clear, the Work Accident Law faced huge obstacles 
in terms of implementation: 
The most common shortcoming was the refusal of companies to pay compensation if they 
believed the worker responsible for the accident. This could be rectified by judicial 
intervention, but in some areas no judge was available and there was confusion where the 
worker could go for legal redress. Companies also ignored judicial decisions (Blanchard 
1982, 106-107). 
 Certainly, many aspects of the cases from Huarón from 1938 seem strange or overly 
vague. What was the rationale for the different amounts of compensation, and why did some 
workers receive more for a broken leg or hand than was given in other cases for a worker´s 
death? On the one hand, the fact that the transcripts mention an insurance policy in all the cases 
(except the two that were apparently carryovers from sixteen years earlier) makes it seem like 
strict rules and calculations may have been followed in determining the amounts. On the other 
hand, it is also likely that, although law 1378 no doubt contributed to affirming workers´ right to 
some type of compensation, its specific provisions did not actually dictate what occurred on the 
ground. Although the law supposedly mandated an indemnity in the form of a small pension (a 
fraction of the wage) paid to a deceased worker´s family, all of the cases mentioned above 
involve a lump-sum, one-time payment. This may have been the preference of the workers or 
their families, or it may have been preferred by the company. As Blanchard writes,  
Companies also paid voluntarily so that no legal action was necessary. Some avoided 
paying long-term indemnities by settling on a lump sum... Much was still left for the 
employers themselves to decide, and they invariably protected their own interests first 
(Ibid., 40).  
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Similarly, in a 1938 report about the conditions of indigenous workers in Peru, Chilean 
labor lawyer and International Labor Organization official Moisés Poblete Troncoso wrote about 
the way that accident compensation payments actually functioned in many mining areas: 
As far as the payment of compensation for work accidents, because of the ignorance of 
the Indians, especially in those centers in which there is no authority to make sure that the 
appraisal [valorización] of the injuries is done correctly, the author was able to ascertain 
that it is done solely based on the opinion [apreciación] of the bosses (Poblete 1938, 
149). 
Other questions also remain – Why are almost all of the workers involved in these compensation 
cases from the Mantaro Valley (a region that, admittedly, was the source of many workers, but 
not all) rather than also from, say, Huayllay itself? Were their cases linked to each other in some 
way?  
 Huarón, like the CPC, did implement certain safety measures over the course of the 20th 
century. In 1954, Engineer Juan Hoyos Castillo wrote that the Department of Safety, Industrial 
Hygiene and Welfare had recently been formed (Hoyos 1954, 154). A few years before, another 
of the engineers, Celso Sotomarino, gave a description of what safety was supposed to look like 
at the mine in the late 1940s: 
In the upper-level staff of the Company there is an Engineer who is in charge of work 
safety. This is also a task given to the Chief Foremen, in its partial and local aspects, and 
they must consult with [the Engineer] whenever necessary. They must make sure that the 
protection and safety equipment is always in a perfectly maintained and working state, 
and periodically check the winches, shaft cages... Check the galleries and stopes being 
worked, to make sure that there are no toxic gases, and if there are, to ventilate them 
intensely so as to cause them to dilute (Sotomarino 1949, 79). 
Nevertheless, although these and other measures no doubt contributed to reducing the 
accident and fatality rates at the mine, fatal accidents have continued to occur to this day, as in 
other mines. A safety official at the Huarón mine whom Jessica Smith and I interviewed in 2009 
told us that in the five years he had been working there (2004-2009), 9 workers had died. Indeed, 
if we examine the official accident statistics from Peru´s Mining and Energy Inspection Office 
(OSINERGMIN), we see that in the four years from 2007 to 2010 (inclusive), there were 215 
fatalities in accidents in Peruvian mines. Of these, 7 took place at Huarón (two in 2007, two in 
2008, 1 in 2009 and two in 2010), while 6 occurred at its neighboring mine Animón. If we look 
104 
 
at the entire 11 years from 2000 to 2010, 654 workers have died in accidents in Peruvian mines 
according to OSINERGMIN.84 Today, at mines like Huarón and Animón, accident fatalities 
usually occur one at a time, as a steady, yearly trickle (usually two per year) and thus do not 
garner as much press attention as the larger-scale, multiple accidents that used to occur with 
greater frequency. There are of course exceptions, as when Lake Naticocha, which overlays parts 
of both the Huarón and Animón mines, collapsed in April 1998, completely flooding both mines 
and rendering them unworkable for a couple of years; six Animón workers died on that occasion.  
 The most catastrophic accident to have occurred in the Huayllay region, however, was 
not a workplace accident, although it did involve the mining population. On March 18, 1971, an 
avalanche destroyed the camp of the Chungar mining company, killing hundreds of people. As 
mentioned earlier, the Galjuf family had sold much of its mining possessions to the French 
Huarón company in 1912, but it kept some, and later in the century, together with other 
investors, it formed the Chungar company. By the 1960s, their main mine was located next to 
Lakes Chungar and Yanahuin, some 15 km. from that company´s present site at Animón and 
some 17 km. from Huarón. This is situated towards the southwest, on the border between 
Huayllay District (Pasco Department) and the Department of Lima, almost at the Continental 
Divide. The disaster occurred shortly after 8:00am, when an avalanche with an estimated volume 
of 100,000 m³ fell from a 400-meter high rocky outcrop situated near Lake Yanahuin (Plafker 
and Eyzaguirre 1979, 275). The rocks fell into the lake, and the resulting water displacement 
generated a wave that reached a maximum height of 30 m. and hit the mining camp, destroying 
almost everything in its path. Since most of the men had just entered the mine for the day shift, 
the wave killed mostly the women and children at the camp. Some of the water also entered the 
mine shaft, killing several workers, though most of them survived and managed to get out.  
Occurring less than a year after the 1970 earthquake and landslide in Ancash to the north, 
the Chungar disaster attracted some international attention and national relief efforts.85 Official 
reports in the days after the avalanche placed the death toll at around 256 (El Peruano, March 22 
                                                          
84 Of these, 36% were on the payroll of the mining companies themselves, while 64% were subcontracted workers.  
85 The 1970 Earthquake was the deadliest natural disaster in the history of Peru, killing between 70,000 and 100,000 
people. Part of the destruction occurred when the earthquake triggered an avalanche that destroyed the towns of 
Yungay and Ranrahirca, killing an estimated 18,000 people.  
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1971, 1), though there were many missing; most estimates place the final toll somewhere 
between 400 and 600 (Plafker and Eyzaguirre 1979, 269). The cause of the rock slide is not 
clear; unlike the 1970 landslide in Ancash, it was not triggered by an earthquake. Early news 
reports that an earthquake had accompanied the avalanche were later shown to be false (Ibid. 
276). And although there are glaciers in the general region, the avalanche itself was not made up 
of ice but rather of boulders and blocks of limestone. Plafker and Eyzaguirre (1979), who visited 
the site a after the disaster, wrote that data was too sparse to make definitive conclusions but that 
the avalanche seemed to have been caused by a long-term process of natural erosion that had 
created an oversteepened slope. A previous, much smaller rockfall had occurred on the exact 
same spot a year earlier, and had generated a slight wave from the lake that also washed along 
the shore where the camp was. Although that earlier wave “did not cause any damage, residents 
were sufficiently alarmed to request that the camp be moved to higher ground for safety. After an 
investigation, however, the camp was considered to be a safe site” (Ibid., 276). Thus, there may 
also have been negligence on the part of the company in not heeding warnings that could have 
alerted them to the impending catastrophe. Many people from the surrounding communities, 
including Huayllay, Carhuacayán and Vichaycocha, lost siblings, children or other family 
members in the March 1971 disaster.86 The Chungar company has since moved most of its 
operations to its other mining area, Animón, immediately adjacent to Huarón.  
 
The workforce at Huarón: Life histories 
 I will now discuss the nature of work at the mine from the perspective of some of the 
individuals who worked there, as told to me during my research. Naturally, these accounts 
mainly tell us about the last few decades of the 20th century – i.e. from the late 1960s to the 
present. This was the period both of the introduction of new technologies at underground mines 
                                                          
86 For example, one of my interviewees, Anselmo Roque, the young president of the comunidad of Huayllay in early 
2010, explained to me how his father had lost his first wife and two children in the disaster, and, traumatized by this, 
had decided to leave mining and dedicate himself to livestock-raising (after which Anselmo was born). Another 
time, while riding the combi on the unpaved road from Huayllay towards the coast, an older woman (originally from 
Vichaycocha, married to a huayllino) pointed out to me the old mining camp site where the avalanche had occurred; 
she had lost several family members there as well.   
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and of the increased frequency of strikes by workers, as well as of the general economic crisis 
that affected Peru (like much of Latin America and Africa) beginning in the mid-1970s and 
particularly in the 1980s. I will try to place each account in the context of the individual´s longer 
life trajectory, or at least those parts of their story that they discussed with me. Each of these life 
histories is based on one or more recorded interviews, which has allowed me to go back and 
listen again to specific details I did not pay attention to at first. In some cases, I had additional 
informal conversations or general fieldwork interactions with the people in question, which also 
added a bit to my understanding of their life story.  I do not pretend to give a complete account 
of their lives, activities or concerns. The stories presented have gone through several layers of 
selection and elaboration: what people were able to recall, what they saw as most important or 
relevant, how they interpreted our interaction, what they choose to tell, and finally how I have 
selected from the dialogue, rearranging elements into a more or less orderly narrative. No doubt 
there are many aspects of their life histories that are missing here. I have tried to elaborate these 
narratives not only by carefully following the interviewees´ own words but also by interpreting 
them in the context of what I know about local and regional society and of the history examined 
in these chapters. These life histories are meant as a complement to the other methodologies used 
in this dissertation, since they provide a different window into local life and into the social 
relations formed around the mining industry in this particular corner of the Central Highlands of 
Peru.  
Domingo Soto 
Domingo Soto was born in the city of Cerro de Pasco, in the neighborhood of Esperanza; 
his father worked in the mine there, while his grandfather had previously been a mining worker 
at Huarón. His father perished in a mine cage accident at the Cerro de Pasco mine when Don 
Domingo was four or five years old; afterwards, his uncle took him to Lima, where he lived till 
the age of 25. In Lima he worked as a mechanic and specialized in Volkswagen cars, but he was 
paid too little, 25 soles a day (in the late 1960s). In particular, he highlights the fact that he had 
difficulty paying his room (casa, para pagar, no había). Another uncle then convinced him to 
come work at Huarón, in 1968; he began as an assistant carrilano – i.e. working with the rail 
cars inside the mine. He says he made 63 soles a day (around US$1.60 at the time), which was 
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“more or less okay” (más o menos regular) for that time, plus the mine offered him housing in 
the camp. Don Domingo remembers being given a carbide lamp attached to his helmet; since he 
was not accustomed to it (no tenía la costumbre), it weighed heavily on his head, and it would 
frequently turn off on its own. So he asked a cousin to lend him a battery-powered lamp, and 
then “I was able to work well.”87 After the standard 3-month trial period, he passed into the 
company´s regular payroll (planilla), and thus also became a member of the union. After some 
time as a carrilano, he passed through other occupations inside the mine: assistant driller 
(ayudante perforista) and chimenero – i.e. the person who places the explosives to clear mine 
shafts and chimneys of debris.88 Eventually, he became a maestro palero – i.e. the skilled 
operator of a mechanical excavator (pala mecánica).  
Don Domingo emphasized that during the ten years he worked underground he was “very 
cautious” (muy cauteloso). Nevertheless, he told me about a few occasions on which he 
witnessed and/or narrowly escaped accidents in the mine. Once he was switched out of a section 
shortly before a cave-in occurred; afterwards he helped to get out the bodies of the two workers 
who had died. Another time was when he had been working six or seven months. He was about 
to enter a particular area inside the mine, but the maestro (master driller or timberman) who was 
with him began to chew coca and told him not to enter yet: “don´t go in yet son, the ground is 
making noise... the ground lets you know” (todavía no entres hijo, está sonando el terreno...el 
terreno te avisa); indeed, they could hear a slow intermittent noise. So Don Domingo began 
smoking a cigarette89 while the maestro continued chewing coca, saying “We will give the 
abuelito his coca.” It should be mentioned that in Huayllay, Rancas and other areas of Pasco 
                                                          
87 In his thesis about the Huarón mine (1949, p.79), Engineer Celso Sotomarino writes that electric lamps were 
actually supposed to be prohibited in the more dangerous sections of the mine; there, workers had to use carbide 
lamps, because they shut off automatically when there was too much gas in the air, and thus served as a warning. 
Domingo Soto´s narrative shows some of the reasons why workers might have preferred electric lamps to the 
discomforts of working with carbide lamps, and it highlights the gap between regulations and practice when it came 
to safety. 
88 I was able to understand this particular term thanks to María Rodríguez´s (2004) linguistic thesis on mine 
terminology at the Uchucchacua mine (Oyón Province, northern Lima Department). Her definition (p.140) is 
consistent with Domingo Sotos´s description. 
89 It should be mentioned that coca, cigarettes and alcohol are the three elements that accompany ritual, ceremonial 
or special occasions in this region, as in many other parts of the Andes. That was the case on countless occasions 
during my field research in Huayllay and Rancas. Cigarettes are mainly sold for these occasions, as their 
“recreational” use in the Western sense is not common here.  
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Department the Spanish term abuelo (grandfather – diminutive abuelito) is used to denote the 
mountain or earth as an animate being; it is used almost interchangeably with other terms like 
jirka or cerro (both of which mean mountain, in Central Peruvian Quechua and Spanish, 
respectively).90  At that moment, the foreman came by and shouted at them for sitting around for 
so long, and told them to get to work; “the ground is making noise,” they began to answer. 
Suddenly, as the men were talking, there was a rock fall in the area they were about to enter, and 
they narrowly avoided death. This story is not only representative of the dangers implied in 
mining work, but also of the ritual role played by the chewing of coca previous to any important 
or risky activity, whether inside or outside the mine. 
When he had been working at Huarón five or six years, Don Domingo settled down with 
his wife, who was originally from the community of Vilcabamba in the quebrada of 
Chaupiwaranga (Daniel Alcides Carrión Province); they had four children – two boys and two 
girls. He also served as a union delegate representing his section of the mine. In that capacity he 
remembers organizing to obtain work implements from the company such as boots, soap and 
gloves – for example, they got the glove allotment increased from once a year to once every six 
months and then to once every three months. Once around the year 1973 he participated in a 
strike and walked to Lima on a marcha de sacrificio (“sacrifice march” as the miners’ marches to 
the cities were known from the mid-1960s through the 80s), demanding higher wages. He also 
played in one of the soccer teams at the mine. 
After working underground for ten years, Don Domingo´s back was damaged and his 
spine bent, and he had to have treatment for almost six months. He managed to switch to 
working in the mine´s sampling laboratory, where he worked for five years. The lab worked 
round-the-clock on three 8-hour shifts, and he sometimes had to work during the night or early 
morning; the cold was uncomfortable and his spine continued to hurt. For those reasons, in 1983, 
                                                          
90 I base this assertion on my own fieldwork in Huayllay and Rancas, specifically on the occasions in which I saw 
alcohol, coca or other items offered to the abuelo, jirka or cerro, whether as a formal offering (mesa) or as a brief 
libation. In my experience these terms are mostly used interchangeably; if there are fine differences between them, I 
have not been able to detect them. Mesas and libations can be directed at or placed in a mountain, or they can be 
directed simply at the ground. The terms are also used in the context of illness, as when the abuelo or cerro “gets” 
you. Of course, on these topics there is a wide literature in Andean anthropology, which no doubt influences my 
interpretation of what I observed locally, on this point I have attempted to stick to my own observations. 
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he talked with his wife and decided to leave the mine. Besides, at that time the crisis and first 
wave of mine closures had started; although the mass workforce reductions wouldn´t happen for 
almost a decade, the company was already beginning to encourage workers to leave. Don 
Domingo got a payment from the company as an incentive to leave and used this to buy a small 
plot of land on which he built his house. Although it was more common for retiring mining 
workers to seek warmer, gentler climates like Huánuco or Huancayo – or, alternatively, the 
greater opportunities of the capital, Lima – Don Domingo decided to build his house in Cerro de 
Pasco, which, as he put it, “is my homeland” (que es mi tierra).  
He was only around forty years old, so he continued working, but now dedicated himself 
to commerce. He would buy merchandise and take it to sell in the Huarón mine, where as he 
says, his former workmates would buy from him (los compañeros me colaboraban con la 
compra); he also went around selling in other mining camps in the region, like Raura and 
Buenaventura (Uchucchacua). He gave me a positive assessment of his life buying and selling 
merchandise after retiring from the mine: “I did well, and I am still doing well at my age” (me ha 
ido bien y me sigue yendo bien ya con la edad que yo tengo). He also learned to weave, and 
bought a small loom on which he makes sweaters and other items, which he also sells. His oldest 
son also works in clothing (confección), while one of his daughters began to study a journalism-
related career in the university at Cerro de Pasco. When I met Don Domingo in 2008, he could 
be found most days in his small stall in Cerro de Pasco´s main market area, Huamachuco, where 
he sold sweaters, blankets and related items. I interviewed him there in November 2008, and 
visited him occasionally after that. 
Although like many of my interviewees Don Domingo compares the gringos – such as 
the French at Huarón – favorably in relation to the Peruvian engineers and managers who later 
ran the mines, he does not idealize the franceses, either. He emphasizes that “we worked in 
terrible conditions” (trabajábamos en pésimas condiciones), referring to the lack of sufficient 
implements such as boots and gloves during his first few years at the mine. In general, his 
assessment of the role played by the union is rather positive - he stresses that back then “we were 
very united in Huarón” and there were good union leaders (dirigentes). However, like many 
other former workers he attributes the later decline of the union to the fact that certain leaders 
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“began to sell out” (comenzaron a venderse) – this is a common discourse that emphasizes 
corruption rather than structural factors or larger political forces. When I asked Don Domingo 
about political activities at the mine, he mentioned that there was a lot of talk of Mao, Fidel 
Castro and Che Guevara, as well as other political currents such as the APRA and Acción 
Popular. His own political sympathies tended to run more towards the left – yet he also 
emphasized that “we were not very political at that time...Politics was an outside thing, we were 
dedicated to working, there was little politics for us” (No éramos muy políticos para esa vez... La 
política era fuera, nos dedicábamos a trabajar, muy poco era la política para nosotros). His 
assessment of the changes that have taken place in the mines is almost uniformly negative – 
although he is appreciative of the technical improvements that have taken place in mining, he 
also emphasizes that “the subcontractors work in an inhumane way” (las contratas trabajan en  
un estado antihumano). He also expresses bitterness over the gradual destruction of the city of 
Cerro de Pasco by the Volcan Company. 
Octavio Dominguez  
 Octavio Dominguez91 worked for 19 years at the Huarón mine – from 1972 to 1991. I 
interviewed him once in 2008 – unlike most of the other individuals discussed in this section, I 
was not able to find him again, so the account given here is less detailed. Don Octavio was born 
in a nearby hacienda (some 15 km. from Huayllay) that was still owned at the time by the 
Lercari Brothers firm. His parents were from two nearby plateau communities, on the Junín 
department side. They worked as shepherds for, as he put it, the gamonales,92 taking care of the 
hacienda´s flocks. His mother died when he was small, and gradually the family moved towards 
the town of Huayllay, though they did not yet become comuneros. By the age of 22 he had 
already formed his own family, with a woman from Huayllay, so he was concerned about 
income, and he saw that he could make more working at the mine than continuing to work with 
the animals. His brother was already working at Huarón, so he talked to the administrators about 
                                                          
91 This is a pseudonym. When offered a choice, he preferred that I not use his real name. 
92 Gamonal is a pejorative term for hacendado. According to De la Cadena (2000), in southern Peru at least, large 
hacendados used the term gamonal to refer to the smaller hacendados who they claimed were less civilized and 
more brutal in their treatment of Indian peasants. Opponents of the haciendas, on the other hand, used the term 
gamonal to refer to all hacendados, large and small. 
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getting him a job. He says his starting daily wage was 162 soles (slightly under US$4 at the 
time).93  
Don Octavio began working as a lampero (shovel man). In his account, he highlights the 
arrival of new machines a couple of years after he started – before that, he said, it was all “shovel 
and wheelbarrow.” Thus, during the process of mechanization in the 1970s, he learned to operate 
one of the first types of scoop loaders that arrived at the mine, and worked in this capacity for 
many years. Although like all direct payroll workers he was affiliated to the union, he never 
occupied a position there, nor did he have a lot to say on the topic. He does remember some of 
the strikes that took place, but says he never participated in a marcha de sacrificio, though his 
brother did. In 1991, during the crisis, the company began offering workers incentives to leave, 
threatening that if they waited too long they would get nothing and lose their jobs anyway. Like 
other former workers I interviewed, Don Octavio remembers consulting with his wife and 
deciding to leave the mine. He says he later realized it had been a ruse (artimaña) on the part of 
the company. They moved from the mine camp back to Huayllay, and his huayllino father-in-law 
convinced him to become a comunero as well; in any case he was expected to do so if he wanted 
to be able to keep a few animals again.94 In 2008, he participated in the paro (strike/road 
blockage) that the comunidad of Huayllay waged against the Animón mine, in which several 
comuneros were wounded; they demanded that the company accept more people from the 
community as direct, payroll workers, in return for the additional hectares of land the company 
had recently occupied.  
At the time I met him, Don Octavio had an ongoing trámite (paperwork) to gain 
recognition and compensation for professional illness, given that he had worked underground for 
19 years; his application had been rejected initially, so he was now working with the assistance 
of a lawyer. He had a small shop in Huayllay as well as some sheep. His had several sons-in-law 
                                                          
93 These were the decades when state protections (such as job stability) and relatively strong unions were gaining 
important wage increases for mining workers. This could account for the significant difference between Domingo 
Soto´s starting wage from three years earlier and Octavio Dominguez´s. Alternatively, it could be due to a lapse in 
their memory.  
94 “Mi suegro era comunero, entonces, a veces por la exigencia de él, me dijo ya pues tienes que ser comunero, 
entonces ya he visto que, como había la comunidad, más que nada como tenía mis animalitos, ya tenía que entrar 
ya, forzosamente comunero.” 
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(yernos) who were working for subcontractors at the Animón mine; before the latest rise in 
production in the early 2000s, they had also been ganaderos. Unlike some of my other 
interviewees, like Domingo Soto and Gaudencio Machacuay, he was not particularly critical of 
the subcontractor system, or if he was he did not express it; he felt his sons-in-law were doing 
well for themselves.  
Gaudencio Machacuay 
Gaudencio Machacuay worked at Huarón for 27 years, from 1967 to 1994. I was initially 
directed to him by Domingo Soto, since the two had worked together inside the mine and had 
been friends. I interviewed Don Gaudencio twice, in 2008 and 2010, and spoke with him more 
informally around Huayllay other times. He was originally from a comunidad campesina called 
Huayre, near the southeastern shore of Lake Junín on the other side of the plateau. He first 
worked at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s San Cristóbal mine for seven years, from 1960 to 
1967, then came to Huarón, where he met his wife, a huayllina, and ended up staying.  He 
described his first job at Huarón alternatively as ayudante (assistant) and as operario (laborer). 
Eventually, he became a master driller, and later spent many years as a foreman (caporal). 
During his years in the mine, however, Don Gaudencio also performed a variety of other jobs: 
electrician, tubero (mine plumber), and carrilano (working with the mine rail cars); as he 
described it, “a bit of everything” (un poco de todo). He expressed pride in some of the more 
complicated tasks in which he participated over the years, especially the tunneling work 
developing new areas of the mine. He also remembers narrowly escaping a rock fall in one 
instance as well as a gas leak on another occasion.  
Don Gaudencio served in several positions within the union (sindicato); he also 
participated in a marcha de sacrificio once, during a strike demanding higher salaries. The 
workers walked from Huarón south through Carhuacayán, over a high mountainous area in the 
direction of the Central Highway, but when they arrived in San Mateo de Huánchor they were 
blocked by the police; only a group that had gone earlier by car was able to get to Lima. On that 
occasion the workers were not able to get more than what the company had initially offered. He 
also remembers the social life of the mining camps, in particular the feasts, such as the 
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cortamontes during carnavales. 95 Like several of my interviewees, he liked to talk about the 
Señor de los Milagros, a Catholic religious festival that was particularly popular in the Huarón 
mining camp, as it is in Lima.96 Each of the representatives (delegados) of the different sections 
would make a small altar for the Señor de los Milagros and they would stay up all night before 
the procession. The company provided people with cane alcohol and coca to be able to conduct 
the feast properly. For the Day of the Worker (1st of May), the company would have 
pachamanca prepared for all the workers, and each section would get together to celebrate. The 
union also organized festivities of its own.  
Don Gaudencio retired from the company in 1994, during the years when the company 
was aggressively trying to reduce its workforce. He says his overall retirement settlement 
amounted to around 20,000 soles (around US$7,000 or 8,000 in the mid-to-late 1990s), which is 
more than some workers got, but he considers that it did not adequately compensate 27 years of 
“sacrificing yourself in the mine, [with] risk to your life” (que tanto te has sacrificado en la 
mina, riesgo de la vida). Like other workers, he feels that if he had held out longer, he could 
have gotten more. After leaving the mine, he began the process of joining the comunidad 
campesina of Huayllay, which he could do since his wife was a huayllina. However, since Don 
Gaudencio was a yerno (in-law) of the comunidad, they required him to sponsor one of the 
fiestas before he could acquire full comunero status, which he did in 1999. The fiesta 
sponsorship was his first cargo; afterwards, he occupied two positions of authority in the 
comunidad and sponsored one more fiesta (in 2009), so that by the time of our second interview 
he had completed four cargos in all, and felt that he had fulfilled his duties to the comunidad. 
Don Gaudencio considered himself “wholly [netamente] huayllino” and was strongly 
opinionated on matters pertaining to the comunidad and to the administration of the communal 
                                                          
95 The cortamonte (called yunsa or unsha in other parts of the Peruvian highlands) is a traditional ritual/celebration 
done during Carnavales in February, which involves dancing in a circle around a tree planted specifically for the 
occasion and hitting the tree with an ax; the person who gives the final cut becomes the next year´s sponsor. 
96 The Señor de los Milagros originated in Lima, where it attracts the most followers, but it is also celebrated in 
other places. In the Huarón mining camp it was one of the most important religious festivals of the year.  
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lands 97 He also complained that people were being granted full comunero status at younger and 
younger ages and that they were not being made to fulfill the cargo requirements.  
In January 2008, Don Gaudencio´s son died in a gas leak accident at the Animón mine.98 
After the tragedy, he felt that priority should have been given for his other son, who also worked 
in the mine through a contractor, to be shifted to direct, payroll status (planilla), and he resented 
the fact that this had not occurred. In general, he was critical about the change that had occurred 
from the days of “all-payroll” (pura planilla) to the present of “all-contractor” (pura contrata) 
work. Like many other former workers, he had a slightly nostalgic view of the old French 
administrators and engineers, in contrast to the Peruvians who have replaced them since. When I 
first visited him, in 2008, he was also well aware of the drop in mineral prices that year (a result 
of the world financial crisis) and had heard rumors that the mines might close soon (which they 
did not). 
Although he claimed he only had a few huacchilla99sheep himself, his involvement with 
the granja comunal over the years had kept him connected to the world of ganadería (livestock-
raising), and he was often out in the campo (fields, grasslands) with the animals. I once asked 
him how mining work compared with work with the animals in the campo. I will conclude his 
account by quoting his reflections on this comparison, in which he stressed that both have their 
risks and that work in the campo should not be idealized.  
Well, in reality, the mine also, when you get used to it it´s like your house... In the campo 
you suffer from cold, you suffer from the altitude. And the difference with the mine, the 
only difference is the smoke, and the risk... In the mine, it´s risky, from the rocks that 
could fall. In other words, you leave your house for the mine with two possibilities: to 
                                                          
97 By this he was referring not to the entirety of the Huayllay´s legal communal property (most of which is held in 
private family usufruct through the estancias) but rather the portion that is administered directly by the comunidad 
as an institution, as a way to provide it with income; this is also known as the granja comunal. It is distinct both 
from the cooperative (in which only a subset of comuneros are members) and from the estancias. 
98 This accident is recorded in the OSINERGMIN statistics cited earlier, which give the name of each fatality.  
99 Huacchillas are sheep that are held privately by households and pastured according to traditional methods; they 
are defined in opposition to herds owned by large units that use economies of scale and, at least in theory, more 
advanced methods. Said units were represented in the past by the (modern) haciendas, later by the SAIS and CAP 




come back or to not come back. On the other hand, in ganadería [cattle-raising], it’s the 
same – there might be a conflict with the cattle-rustlers, your life is also at risk... At this 
time of the year [the rainy season], for example, you suffer a lot being with the animals – 
when there is lightning, when there is rain. But in the dry season [verano], on the other 
hand, the campo is beautiful. Beautiful, quiet, you are there lying down in the campo 
watching your animals. But in this [rainy] season, the campo is sad... Many people say, 
the campo is easy. No. You suffer. In the campo you suffer. You have to follow behind 
your animals all the time. It’s like in the mine, you have to do your job. If you haven’t 
done your job, the boss is there, the foreman is there.100  
Desiderio Roque 
 Desiderio Roque belongs to a later generation of workers than Gaudencio Machacuay and 
Domingo Soto; although more contemporaneous with Octavio Dominguez, he differs from the 
latter in that his father was already engaged in mining rather than in shepherding work. Also, 
Don Desiderio´s story differs from the ones told so far in that he, like a number of workers of his 
generation – though by no means all – pursued some university studies before entering the mine, 
even if he did not complete them. I conducted several recorded interviews with Don Desiderio, 
in addition to more informal conversations when I visited him in his house a number of times. He 
was one of the more expansive individuals as far as sharing details of his life trajectory with me, 
and I can only include a fraction of it here. Don Desiderio is a huayllino, though he was born not 
in the village of Huayllay or on an estancia but rather in the Huarón mining camp itself, in the 
early 1950s, and grew up there as one of 8 siblings. His family still had an estancia, though, and 
he remembers seeing his grandmother´s pottery work there (see description in Chapter 1). He 
also remembers seeing his father leave for the quebradas to conduct exchanges, though he never 
accompanied him. His father worked at the concentrator plant at Huarón for approximately 40 
years, from the 1950s to the 1990s, while Don Desiderio himself worked underground in the 
mine from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s.   
                                                          
100 “Bueno en realidad, la mina también, cuando te acostumbras es como tu casa... En el campo sufres de frío, 
sufres de altura. Y la diferencia la mina, solamente diferencia es el humo, y el riesgo... En la mina, está riesgoso de 
la roca que va a caer. O sea vas de tu casa ya con dos condiciones a la mina: volver o no volver. En cambio en la 
ganadería, tal igual también – puede haber cualquier conflicto con los rateros, también está en riesgo tu vida... 
Ahora por ejemplo este tiempo, se sufre bastante con ganados. Cuando hay rayo, cuando hay lluvia. Pero en 
cambio, en tiempo de verano, es lindo el campo. Lindo, tranquilo, estás botado allí en el campo mirando tu ganado. 
Pero en cambio este tiempo, es triste el campo... Muchas personas dicen, es fácil el campo. No, se sufre. En el 
campo se sufre. Tienes que estar atrás atrás de tu ganado. Es como si fuera en la mina, tienes que cumplir tu 
trabajo. Si no has cumplido, allí está el jefe, está el caporal.”  
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Don Desiderio belongs to a generation that saw regional universities being created in the 
Central Highlands – in particular the Universidad Nacional Daniel Alcides Carrión (UNDAC) in 
Cerro de Pasco, the Universidad Nacional Hermilio Valdizán in Huánuco, and the Universidad 
Nacional del Centro in Huancayo, all of them in the 1960s. Similarly, the high school in 
Huayllay had also been created in 1961; before that, students who wanted to continue beyond the 
elementary school level had to go to Cerro de Pasco to study. In the 1960s and 70s, the middle-
aged workers in the different mining centers of Pasco Department, most of whom only had an 
elementary school education, were making efforts to ensure that their children completed high 
school and, in some cases, that they would attend one of the newly-created universities.101 In 
1972, Don Desiderio graduated from the high school in Huayllay; he wanted to study to become 
a mining engineer, but couldn´t get in. His father told him that he should at least start with a 
program that he could do right away, and later change to a different program. So he started 
accounting at the UNDAC, but he didn´t like it, and ended up switching to the university in 
Huánuco to study law (derecho), spending a little over a year there. He also did odd jobs while 
studying to buy his books and other things. He would go back to Huarón to play soccer, and in 
that way he befriended one of the engineers at the mine. The latter offered him a job; it was as a 
temporary worker at first, but soon he was offered a more stable position (estable), and that 
proved too tempting, even though it was for working underground. Like other workers, Don 
Desiderio began as a shovel man (lampero), but after three months he was assigned to be an 
assistant to one of the drillers. Eventually, he became a master driller, but during his time in the 
mine he also did other jobs like timberman (enmaderador), and learned to operate new, modern 
machines like the new Wagner excavators that were being brought in at the time. 
At the time he began working at the mine, Don Desiderio was around 23 years old, and 
thought it would be for the short term only, telling himself, “I will make money for a couple of 
years, then I will leave.” But he ended up staying; looking back, he says he felt he couldn´t really 
afford to continue studying, and his younger siblings needed financial support, for which his 
father´s salary wasn´t enough. Regardless of the reasons at the time, he says that staying at the 
                                                          
101 Public universities in Peru are all free of charge; however, there are still costs involved in terms of room, board, 
materials, etc.; furthermore, studying uses up time that could be used working and earning money to contribute to 
one´s family.  
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mine was a setback (retraso) for him: “Of course, in economic terms it gave you some relief, but 
it was a setback in terms of knowledge.”102 As he put it, “I had traded in my studies for the 
mine.”103  
When I asked him about his first impressions of the mine, he says he felt 
“uncomfortable” (incómodo) and asked himself, “What am I doing here? Better I go work 
someplace else, do something, or apply to be a teacher (postular al magisterio), because in those 
days there was room in the magisterio, with a high school degree.”104 His discomfort also had to 
do with what he had been used to hearing from people around him – an expectation of progress: 
Before I entered the mine, well, they told me that the mine is rough, that our old folks are 
miners, and the children are also miners, and we have to aspire to something. So then our 
aspiration was different. Not to be miners. That is how the mine hit me hard (Allí es 
donde me choca fuerte la mina).105   
According to Don Desiderio, this discomfort was compounded by his first experiences 
once inside the mine, when some of the older workers (personas ya de edad) treated him with 
disdain: 
People tried to berate you. They said, “hey, you can´t even lift a piece of wood! How is 
the company accepting these people? You´d be fine for doing cleaning in the offices!”106 
His sense of alienation from some of his fellow workers wasn´t just due to age; it was 
also due to the fact that he felt marked out as a person with some higher education: 
                                                          
102 “Claro económicamente te aliviaba pero era un retraso en conocimientos.” 
103 “Mis estudios lo había canjeado por la mina.” 
104 “¿Que cosa hago aquí? Mejor me voy a trabajar a otro sitio, hacer algo, o postular al magisterio, porque en 
esos tiempos había campo en el magisterio, con quinto año de secundaria.” It is important to note that the teaching 
profession (magisterio) has been an important vehicle of upward mobility in highland Peru in the second half of the 
20th century. 
105 “Antes de que yo entre a la mina, pues me decían que la mina es bravo, que nuestros viejos son mineros, y los 
hijos también son mineros, y nosotros tenemos que aspirar a algo, entonces nuestra aspiración era otra. No ser 
mineros. Allí es donde me choca fuerte la mina.” 
106 “Personas que, te trataban de humillar. Decían que, ´¡Oye tú no puedes alzar ni un palo! ¿La empresa como 
recibe a esta gente? Tú estás bien para que hagas limpieza, en las oficinas.´” 
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At some point I mentioned, I had been studying in the university. So then they called me, 
hypocritically they insulted me, “this guy says he is a university student.” And there came 
a moment where I had to explain: “No. I was a university student... I am the same as you, 
I am a miner. I am not a universitario.”107 
Although he tried to appear as just another miner, to counter the image of weakness that the older 
miners tried to project on him, Don Desiderio recognizes that at other times he fought back 
against their disdain by playing on educational hierarchies: 
I also berated them... ´I am young still, not like you, you are old and you are in the mine,´ 
I told them. ´You think I am just a nobody? At least I have finished high school´ I told 
them. So I insulted them too, like that.108 
Don Desiderio highlights his initial discomfort at the social relations that predominated in 
the workplace – the frequent teasing, offense: “everything is done in a rough, playful way, they 
even mess with, talk badly about your family, about your partner (pareja).”109 Another element 
of these social relations included the small favors and services that those in a less powerful 
position had to provide, particularly when they were new at the job. For example, one of the 
older workers (perhaps a master driller or foreman, though he did not specify this) might call him 
over during the Monday morning shift: 
‘Come here, kid’, they would say... ‘Yesterday I got drunk, when are you going to buy 
me something? Go to the restaurant, on your account, get a snack, bring a soda. Okay, I 
will give you some overtime, I will give you something in return [te voy a reconocer en 
algo],’ he says. ‘But boss, if you get used to this you will keep asking me,’ I would tell 
him. ‘No, no, this stays between you and me – you always have to pay your dues’ 
[siempre tienes que matricularte]... ‘Okay boss, but how do I get out?’ I tell him. ‘What 
will he say, if I run into the engineer they will say, where are you going?’ ‘Tell him 
you´re going to the infirmary, to the hospital.’ Like that, they taught you. That´s how I 
learned.110 
                                                          
107 “Algunas veces les comenté, yo estaba estudiando en la universidad. Entonces me llamaban, así hipócritamente 
me insultaban, ´dice que es universitario ese pata.´ Y llegaba un momento donde les aclaraba. ´No. Fui 
universitario... Yo soy igual que ustedes, soy minero. No soy universitario.´” 
108 “Los humillaba yo también... ´Soy joven todavía, no como tú, viejo estás en la mina,´ así les decía. ´Van a pensar 
que, soy cualquier persona. Por lo menos he terminado mi secundaria,´ le decía. Así también yo les ofendía pues.” 
109 “Todo es a la maldad, juego, inclusive tocan hablar mal de tu familia, mal de tu pareja.” 
110 “Chico, te decían, ven... `Ayer me he tirado una borrachera, ¿a qué hora me vas a invitar? Vete al restaurante a 
tu cuenta, pide un piqueo, una gaseosa tráete. Ya, te voy a pasar en sobretiempo, algo, te voy a reconocer en algo´,  
me dice. `Pero jefe, si te acostumbras me vas a pedir ya´, le decía eso. `No, no, ya eso queda entre nosotros – 
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Other times, a young or low-level worker might feel forced (por obligación) to go to a 
birthday celebration for one of “the bosses” (los jefes), and bring a pack of beers, or contribute 
for the preparation of the food, “all for free.” In the quote above, Don Desiderio uses the 
expression “tienes que matricularte” (literally – you have to register) in a sense that is familiar in 
Peru, as denoted by other expressions such as derecho de piso (“right-of-floor”) that refer to the 
small and large exactions to which new employees are subjected in a workplace, as a way of 
“paying one´s dues” and keeping the job. His comments reference this well-known, generalized 
practice as well as the thick world of (often hierarchical) social relations that existed in the 
mining workplace, and that were played out both during ordinary breaks as well as on special 
occasions.  
 I quote Don Desiderio´s remarks not because they necessarily convey an accurate or 
complete representation of social relations down in the mine, but because I think they provide a 
window into certain important aspects of mining work that are not always easy to get at from the 
outside: the daily rhythms of teasing, humor and gendered discourse, replete with the everyday 
conflicts and hierarchies of any workplace but under the particular conditions of an all-masculine 
workforce and the specific stresses and hardships of the mine. Don Desiderio´s description must 
be understood in the context of his ambivalent feelings towards his experience in the mine and 
towards his decision to stay there for as long as he did. It should not be thought that he 
necessarily looked down on his fellow mining workers or considered himself their superior. In 
fact, in another of our interviews he explicitly voiced a critique of what he saw as the excessive 
pride (orgullo) of many mining workers (and their wives) at Huarón, who, according to him, 
thought they were too good to continue engaging in traditional activities like pottery or to attend 
the same school as the comuneros in the town of Huayllay. Although I do not necessarily agree 
that “pride” was the central issue in both of these developments, Don Desiderio´s comments 
nevertheless highlight the fact that he is explicitly critical of elitist attitudes. And just as he 
criticizes the attitudes and practices of his fellow mine workers, he also acknowledges that he 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
siempre tienes que matricularte pues... ´Ya jefe, pero ¿cómo salgo yo?´ le digo. `Que me va a decir, si me encuentro 
con el ingeniero van a decir, ¿a dónde vas?´ `Dile que estás yendo al tópico, al hospital. Ya, te enseñaban. Así 
aprendí pues.”  
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eventually came to have good conversations with some of them, especially when he became 
more involved in the sindicato (union) after several years of working in the mine. 
That involvement formed a central part of my conversations with Don Desiderio; like 
Gaudencio Machacuay, Desiderio Roque not only was affiliated to the union but also occupied 
several positions as a dirigente (officer). First, he was named a delegate from his section; later, 
he occupied the positions of Secretary for Welfare (Asistencia Social) and then Deputy Secretary 
of Organization (Subsecretario de Organización). Finally, he became Vice-President 
(Subsecretario General) of the union. His discussion of sindicalismo (unionism) is too extensive 
to include here. He expressed great pride in some of the things he was able to do in the union, but 
also has a humorous and irreverent view on many aspects of sindicalismo.  
Don Desiderio´s period of work at the mine came to an end in 1993, when he was 
pressured into leaving by the company. In his case, he argues, his situation was complicated by 
the fact that he along with other union leaders had been accused of fomenting an illegal strike, 
around the time the new labor regime pushed by President Fujimori came into place (Law 728). 
Only six months earlier, he had begun living with (conviviendo) with his wife, and she advised 
him to accept a settlement from the company and leave. Nevertheless, he managed to hold out a 
bit longer than his comrades and thus managed to get more out of the company – twelve monthly 
salaries, plus a bonus of 3,000 soles (a bit under US$1,500 in 1993), in addition to the legally-
mandated compensation for labor time (CTS).  
Don Desiderio and his father had always talked about the goal of starting a small family 
business (empresa) to work in transport. Since his father had worked in the concentrator plant, 
which operated on three continuous 8-hour shifts a day, he had never been able to do overtime, 
and yet he had managed to save a small amount of money. Don Desiderio, on the other hand, did 
have the option of working overtime in the mine, so his father advised him to save all of the 
earnings from that and use only the regular 8-hour wages for daily expenditures. There was no 
other way to save, because the regular paycheck always got diluted by the descuento por caja – 
the purchases against one´s salary at the company store; besides, they had a large family. After 
leaving the company, they combined these savings with Don Desiderio´s termination settlement 
and purchased a car with which to start an empresa transporting passengers. After they finished 
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paying off that first vehicle, they bought a combi (passenger van), and in that way started to grow 
the empresa. At one point, a driver they had hired crashed and destroyed one of the cars, which 
set them back, but eventually Don Desiderio´s siblings came of age and got drivers´ licenses too, 
so they could help in the driving. The family eventually had two small empresas – one 
transported passengers between Huayllay and Cerro de Pasco, the other contracted with the 
mining company, transporting employees. Eventually, however, things started going badly. Don 
Desiderio´s father passed away, and the plans they had made together for expanding the 
empresas were interrupted. Quarrels arose between the siblings, debts mounted, and eventually 
the vehicles were repossessed. “I lost everything,” he says – “so much money, so much time.”  
At the time of our conversations, in 2008 and 2009, Don Desiderio was busy undertaking 
the first steps to create a new empresa, also to work in transportation but with the hopes of 
eventually branching out into other areas. He told me he had just spent 3,000 soles on drafting 
the project and on the paperwork to get the empresa registered. He lived not in the town of 
Huayllay but rather up in the small, wind-swept settlement of La Hueca, adjacent to Francois, the 
last portion of the old Huarón housing complex that still remains, next to the concentrator plant 
and main entrance to the mine, at 4,600 meters above sea level. He is separated from his partner, 
who now lives in Huancayo (where she was originally from), and their children move back and 
forth between the two places. Two stepchildren were also living with him when I met him. For a 
time, his stepdaughter sold coffee and panqueques111 out of their house, in the evenings around 
the 8pm shift change at the mine. His stepson, on the other hand, had begun working 
underground, through a subcontractor at the Huarón mine, a short walk from their house. Don 
Desiderio had at least partial access to his grandparents´ old estancia, in another part of 
Huayllay´s territory, and had a few sheep, llamas and alpacas there. He also had been talking 
with the owner of a small new radio station in Huayllay about the possibility of having a one-
hour radio show about mining labor law – a topic on which he feels he can instruct the current 
generation of mining workers in Huayllay, based on readings he has done over the years as well 
as on his experience in the old union. His stepdaughter had also voiced the possibility of 
                                                          
111 Not U.S.-style pancakes, but rather a doughy, fried flatbread that is popular in this region. In Cerro de Pasco as in 
Huayllay, a popular afternoon-to-evening meal (lonche) consists of panqueques with a choice of either coffee, hot 
chocolate, or a hot cider made of either apple or maca. 
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someday following in his footsteps and studying law in one of the regional universities, and he 
said he would support her.  
Estela Páucar 
 The last life story I will discuss here is not of a mining worker, but rather of someone 
who had close contact with the world of mining workers (and was on the company´s payroll) 
through her job as secretary of the mining union at Huarón, Estela Páucar.112 Like Desiderio 
Roque, Estela was born in the Huarón mining camp; her parents were from Palcamayo, near 
Tarma in Junín Department, and had moved to Huarón to work. Her father worked in the 
concentrator plant for 37 years. She grew up in the 1960s and 70s, a time when the labor force 
had stabilized to a great degree and a sizeable community of workers and their families had 
formed at the mine. She describes a world in which sons followed their fathers into the mine; as 
she put it, “it was a hereditary matter.” On the other hand, as discussed earlier, by this time a 
number of mining workers were making efforts to have their children pursue university degrees 
in the new regional universities. Doña Estela herself would study accounting as well as 
economics at the university in Cerro de Pasco. Around the same time she was beginning her 
studies, however, the union at Huarón had a job opening for a secretary position; ten people 
applied – all men except her. The applicants were given an exam, and Estela came in second. 
However, the man who came in first had a wife and two children, and the monthly salary offered 
was only 9,600 soles, an amount which by the late 1970s had been drastically cut by inflation.113 
This was not enough to support a family, so the man decided to decline the offer, and the job was 
offered to Estela; since she was single, she could manage it.  
She began work on July 1979. In the first few years, she says, she had some difficulty 
learning how to manage the union, since she was studying accounting, and “to enter the world of 
the proletariat was different.” Besides, at the time there were around 2,130 workers affiliated to 
the union, so it was a complex organization. Nevertheless, she says the old leaders (dirigentes) at 
the time were experienced, and they helped her out. There were 24 dirigentes in all – 12 office-
                                                          
112 Pseudonym 
113 According to the data I have available, this would have amounted to between US$70 (at the beginning of 1978) 
and US$40 (at the end of 1979).  
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holders (titulares) and 12 deputy office-holders (subdirectiva). The different offices in the union 
included Organization, Discipline, Procedures (Técnica), Statistics, Subsistence, Women´s 
Affairs (Asuntos Femeninos),Welfare, Culture and Sports, Minutes (Actas), and Archives. One of 
Estela´s many jobs was to coordinate with the Secretary of Women´s Affairs to organize the 
women´s committees (comités de damas) in the camp. Although these committees were 
especially active during times of strikes, by the 1980s there were also efforts by the National 
Mining Federation to centralize and coordinate the activities of the comités de damas in the 
different mining camps across the country. Together with the members of the comités, Estela 
traveled to seminars, congresses and trainings in Lima, where she met not only women from 
other Peruvian mines but also, as she put it, compañeras from Brazil, Argentina and other 
countries. She emphasizes that “I learned a lot thanks to the union,” and that the congresses and 
trips were “an opportunity to be able to get out, learn more, have more social contact.” She also 
highlights the strength that the women´s committees had in the mining camp: “A union leader 
who did not respect a decision by the comité de damas, was removed immediately, and also 
repudiated by the people.”114 
In the 1980s, the economy and the mining sector were in crisis and the company was 
beginning to roll back benefits that the workers had enjoyed for several decades – such as the 
coal, firewood and school supplies that were given to the families, as well as any monetary 
bonuses beyond the regular monthly salary. In Estela’s account, the union resisted some of these 
cutbacks in benefits, but they also eventually had to accept them: 
Everyone was looking out for the future of their children, they did not want to lose their 
jobs. Of course, it hurt, right? But in the end, in order to maintain their job stability, they 
accepted. But, not on their own will, rather through a unanimous decision of the mass. 
That was determined in a general assembly.115 
In the end, however, the company began pressuring the workers to accept cash incentives 
and leave the company. Doña Estela sees this as a conscious attempt to weaken the union; in her 
                                                          
114 “Dirigente que no respetaba decisión del comité de damas, era retirado inmediatamente, y repudiado también 
por la gente.” 
115 “Todos velaban por el futuro de sus hijos, no querían perder sus empleos. Claro, dolía, ¿no? Pero en el fondo, 
por querer mantener una estabilidad de trabajo, ellos aceptaban. Pero, no a voluntad propia, sino a decisión 
unánime de la masa. Eso determinaban en una asamblea general.” 
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account, the company accomplished this partly by fomenting divisions along generational and 
educational lines – pitting the younger workers who had completed high school or pursued some 
higher education against the older generation who had only done elementary school. They also 
managed to scare some of the older workers by telling them that they would lose their 
compensation for time of service (CTS), which legally did not make sense. After the majority of 
the workers had left, the company began demolishing the camps; Estela was part of a group that 
held out almost to the end, until about the year 2000, refusing to leave the housing blocks. By 
this time she was already married; many young couples, she says, had no house of their own to 
go to outside the camp, so they held out as long as they could. In the 1990s there was a lot of 
unemployment in the area, and even the few workers who were still left in the company were 
taking pay cuts or not being paid regularly – after the mine flooded in 1998, they were not paid at 
all. At that time, the Mining Federation was encouraging the comités de damas to form 
microenterprises (microempresas) to make up for the lost income from the mine, by producing 
clothes to sell in the markets and fairs. Doña Estela also got together with some of the miners´ 
wives to form a comedor popular – the self-run “people´s kitchen” model that had become 
generalized throughout the country during the economic crisis of the 1980s, and that by the 
1990s began to receive more state support and assistance. The comedor popular they formed 
received official authorization from the office of the National Food Assistance Program 
(PRONAA) in Cerro de Pasco, and still functions to this day. 
 At that time, Doña Estela was still officially the secretary of the sindicato; although the 
union was technically her patrón (boss), her salary had always been paid by the company, 
according to an agreement (convenio) between the company and the union, whereby she earned 
the same as an obrero. In 2000, a representative of the company convinced her to resign, saying 
that all of her employee benefits, pension rights and compensation for time of service (CTS) 
would be respected, just like with any worker. However, soon after the Adminco (Hochschild) 
administration sold the mine, and the new company refused to acknowledge Doña Estela´s 
claims. Thus, she initiated a legal proceeding against her patrón, the union, and got a court order 
impounding the union hall in her favor until she was paid. However, she says one of the 
remaining union leaders “betrayed” her and gave the key to the building to the mining company, 
which took it over and turned it into a dining hall for its employees. When I met her in 2009, her 
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legal dispute with the company continued, and the court order impounding the old union hall was 
technically still valid and was her “last hope” for getting the company to pay what she was owed.  
 Doña Estela is married to a huayllino, but she herself is not a comunera. Her husband is 
now working at the Animón mine. She also maintains a strong connection to her family´s village, 
near Tarma. She once bought six sheep and tried to keep them with her in Huayllay, but was told 
she could not use the pastures near the town, so she had to take the animals to her family´s 
village. After I interviewed her in 2009, I would sometimes run into Estela and her daughter as 
they were taking her husband´s lunch to the 11:00am bus that would take it up to the mine. She 
said her husband was not interested in things related to sindicalismo, and there are no strong 
unions in the two mines in the district now anyway. Estela, on the other hand, still thinks a 
strong, independent organización sindical is important:  
A union organization is the axis, the engine of a working class... That´s why a lot of 
exploitation of man by man will continue, if the union does not function, because the 
company will do anything to be able to continue exploiting man.116    
 
Value and reproductive labor in Marxist theory 
In the previous chapter I gave a broad overview of migration and work in 20th-century 
industrial mining in central Peru, with a particular focus on one mining company and on the 
transition from labor shortage to labor surplus. In the first sections of this chapter I have focused 
on the nature of industrial mining work and the mining workforce. Towards the end of this 
chapter, I will discuss issues of work not in the mine but rather in the sphere in which labor-
power was reproduced and replenished. This will involve a discussion of the mine-countryside 
relation, but also of the mining household. First, however, it is necessary to analyze the 
theoretical status of such “reproductive” work, as this constitutes an important question in social 
history and in studies of migration as well as in the study of work in the industrialized world. 
                                                          
116 “Una organización sindical es el eje, es el motor de una clase trabajadora... Por eso es que va a seguir 
existiendo bastante explotación del hombre por el hombre, si es que no funciona la organización sindical, porque la 
empresa se vale de todo para poder seguir explotando al hombre.” 
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Here I examine this topic from the perspective of Marxist theory, which is where most of these 
debates have occurred. 
At the heart of Marx´s analysis of the capitalist mode of production is his conception of 
surplus value and the exploitation of labor. As is well known, for Marx the tendency within the 
capitalist mode of production is for value to be equated with socially necessary labor.117 Labor 
produces this value as part of the industrial labor process, and receives a portion of the newly-
created value back in the form of a wage.118 The remaining portion – surplus value – becomes 
the source of the capitalist´s profit and of the augmentation of capital.119 This surplus value arises 
because of the peculiar, contradictory character of labor-power under capitalism. It is treated as a 
commodity like any other, with a value of its own (the earlier labor required to produce it), but it 
has the specific property of being able to create new value – for in capitalism, as we said, value 
is equated with labor.120 Moreover, because it is a property of living human beings, labor-power 
                                                          
117 That is, the proportion of the total social labor taken up, on average (not in each specific case), by the production 
of any particular item. Marx learned the labor theory of value from Smith and Ricardo, but unlike the latter, he 
emphasized the social and abstract character of value – i.e. value as a force and a social relation that manifests itself 
in the aggregate and in the long run.  
118 This “newly-created value” does not include the value contained in the means of production (i.e. machinery, raw 
materials), which is merely transferred to the product without augmentation. The study of constant capital, 
technology and means of production was central for Marx, as part of the analysis of relative surplus value, the rate 
of profit, the theory of crises, and many other crucial aspects of his work. It was not, however, central to the specific 
issue of the origins of surplus-value, and for that reason Marx abstracted from constant capital in his discussion of 
the concept. For Marx, technology increased the productivity of labor, but in the long run (the time frame for which 
his theory of value is designed) this lead to a reduction in the value and in the price of the commodity; thus, it could 
not be the source of surplus value.  
119 For Marx, it was crucial to point out that such augmentation could take place only in production, not in 
circulation – i.e., not by buying cheap and selling dear, which could lead to individual fortunes but not to an increase 
in the overall capital of the society, since it tended to cancel out. 
120 To put it in Marx´s terms, all commodities have a use-value and an exchange-value – the latter being ultimately 
(in the long run and in the aggregate) an expression of the commodity´s value, i.e. of the proportion of social labor 
time that it requires for its production. The commodity labor-power has a value like any other commodity – the labor 
needed to produce it – and it also has a use-value. Its use-value consists of the production of value. The capitalist 
treats labor like any other commodity – pays for its value (the wage) – and consumes its use-value, i.e. sets it to 
creating value. This arrangement allows the capitalist to follow the rules of free-market exchange – i.e. that 
commodities be paid for at their values – while at the same time extracting surplus labor from the workers. The 
production of surplus value in capitalism is thus rooted in the articulation of the public and private spheres. The 
former is the “exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham” – in Marx´s words – while the latter is 
the “hidden abode of production” where the capitalist can rule as a despot (Marx 1976, 280). Capital hires labor in 
the public sphere and sets it to work in the private sphere; it thus maintains a dual character of being about freedom 
and domination at the same time.  
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can be exercised in a variable way. Specifically, workers can be made to labor longer than 
needed to produce the value of their wages. That extra time is called surplus labor and the value 
produced during it is surplus value, while the other portion is called necessary labor and its 
product is the wage. Surplus value can be produced in one of two ways: either by extending the 
working-day beyond necessary labor, or by using technology to increase productivity and 
cheapen subsistence goods, thus reducing the time needed to produce the sustenance of the 
workers (i.e. reducing the necessary labor fraction of the working day).  The first kind is absolute 
surplus value, the second is relative surplus value; Marx believed both were present within the 
capitalist mode of production, but the second tended to outweigh the first as capitalism became 
more developed.  
 This, in a very broad and abstract sense, is Marx´s account of the origin of surplus value; 
it is also his concept of “exploitation,” by which he understood the extraction of surplus labor 
from the worker by the capitalist.121 It is this dynamic that attracted the most attention from Marx 
himself and from later Marxists, both at the intellectual and at the political levels.122 But the 
focus on the exploitation of wage labor in the context of industrial capitalist production ignored 
many forms of oppression and domination that existed in the world and that actually affected 
larger numbers of people. In a broad, aggregate scale, and in the long run, issues of value in 
Marx´s sense do affect much (indeed most) of humanity, since they condition the relationship 
between capitalism and other modes of production (and help explain the devaluing of the latter) 
and since they lie at the heart of phenomena such as economic crises. But in an immediate sense, 
                                                          
121 Specifically, Marx equated the degree of exploitation with the rate of surplus-value – i.e. the ratio of surplus labor 
to necessary labor, or of surplus value to the value of labor-power: “The rate of surplus-value is therefore an exact 
expression for the degree of exploitation of labor-power by capital, or of the worker by the capitalist” (Marx 1976, 
326). The absolute magnitude of exploitation, on the other hand, is equated with the duration of surplus labor itself 
(Ibid.). 
122 Attempting an interpretation of the meaning and consequences of exploitation of labor in concrete terms, we can 
say that, for Marx, exploited workers in fully-developed capitalism would receive a wage that was sufficient to 
maintain and reproduce them as workers (and, to the degree that it was necessary, as social beings), but they would 
either 1) work long hours, 2) see the value of their labor power (and thus to some degree of their social personhood 
and social power)  decrease, in the sense that, although their consumption might remain the same or even increase, it 
would represent an ever-shrinking portion of the total social product, which would be massively expanding due to 
advanced technology. Again, the first would correspond to absolute surplus value, the second to relative surplus 
value; in practice, both occur simultaneously, and in conjunction with other phenomena such as what Marx called 
original or “primitive” accumulation (in David Harvey´s terms, “accumulation by dispossession”).  
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the focus on the exploitation of wage labor by itself does not directly help us understand relations 
such as ethnic/racial discrimination, unpaid domestic work, or the role of natural resources in the 
formation of wealth – the latter particularly important for the study of “nature-intensive 
commodities” such as minerals (Coronil 2000, 357). Marx did develop concepts for 
understanding some of these phenomena – primitive accumulation in the case of colonial 
dispossession, ground rent (both absolute and differential) in the case of natural resources – even 
if he did not give them the same attention he granted to the exploitation of wage labor. However, 
in the case of domestic work his silence was greater. Marx did open up an avenue that could 
have led to an examination of domestic labor, by taking seriously the need for worker´s labor 
power and social personhood to be replenished every day, and by recognizing the complex 
nature of workers´ needs, which were not a physical/biological given (as Ricardo and Malthus 
believed) but rather were “themselves products of history” and had to do with people´s “habits 
and expectations” (Marx 1976, 274-275). 123 However, he focused only on the commodities that 
workers purchased for their subsistence (food, clothing, etc.), without noting the fact that these 
needed to be actively transformed through a process that involved work, before they could 
satisfy people´s needs (Federici 2006, 3). In this way, Marx effectively rendered invisible the 
work of the millions of individuals – usually family members – who perform this activity.124  
 A reaction against this invisibility of domestic work in Marxist theory came as part of the 
intellectual and political ferment of the women´s liberation movement in the late 1960s and 70s. 
The “domestic labor debate” was one of the key questions in the emerging Marxist feminist 
scholarship (Dalla Costa and James 1971, Seccombe 1974, Federici 1975, Smith 1978, Vogel 
                                                          
123 For Ricardo’s and Malthus’ views on the nature of needs as biological givens, see Himmelweit 1983, 569. 
124 There were several reasons for this omission. One is the inherent male bias present at the time and in his work; 
another is Marx´s aim of analyzing not social reality as a whole but the capitalist mode of production in particular, 
which requires him to abstract (sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently) from relations and spheres that are 
not contained within capitalist production. Another reason, as Silvia Federici argues, is that Marx “accepted the 
capitalist criteria for what constitutes work,” due to the fact that he “remained wedded to a technologistic concept of 
revolution, where freedom comes through the machine;” he thus was less interested in those spheres of work where 
technology did not or could not enter. Furthermore, as Federici reminds us, the role of the modern working-class 
housewife did not fully emerge in England until the late 19th century, after Marx had completed his writings. During 
the early Industrial Revolution, through Marx´s lifetime, capitalist accumulation had been based on cheap labor and 
on the unlimited extension of the working day, not only for men but also often for women workers, so that, 
according to Federici, “reproductive work was reduced to a minimum” and   the working class was “almost unable 
to reproduce itself” (Federici 2006, 3-4).  
129 
 
1983, Himmelweit 1983, Molyneux 1983, among others). Prominent in these arguments was the 
work of a number of individuals associated with the Italian autonomia movement as well as 
currents in Great Britain and North America. Intellectuals and activists like Mariarosa Dalla 
Costa, Selma James and Silvia Federici drew attention to the contribution that women´s unpaid 
domestic work made to the capitalist economy as a whole, and demanded “wages for 
housework.” While other sectors of the feminist movement warned that this demand could have 
the pernicious effect of entrenching the domestic role of women even further, “wages for 
housework” proponents like Federici argued that “to say that we want money for housework is 
the first step towards refusing to do it, because the demand for a wage makes our work visible, 
which is the most indispensable condition to begin to struggle against it” (Federici 1975, 5).125 
For some of these writers, making the work visible meant reacting against the traditional Marxist 
omission on this point by placing domestic labor at the heart of the production of value in 
capitalism. As Dalla Costa and James126 wrote in 1971, “within the wage, domestic work 
produces not merely use values, but is essential to the production of surplus value.” They 
furthermore specified that “what we meant precisely is that housework as work is productive in 
the Marxian sense, that is, is producing surplus value” (Dalla Costa and James 1971, 16). These 
writers, as well as others such as Seccombe (1974), made the argument that unpaid domestic 
work - performed mostly by women - produced the value of labor-power, and thus was part of 
the process of value production as a whole. More value was produced, and more surplus value 
appropriated by capitalists, as a result of domestic work performed in the home. 
 Just as the “wages for housework” campaign was criticized by other sectors of the 
women´s movement for its perceived political implications and limited scope, the theoretical 
arguments of its proponents also received criticism from Marxist analysts. Some of them 
recognized the importance of the domestic labor debate but objected to the idea that unpaid 
domestic labor created value (or, for that matter, surplus value) in Marx´s sense. In particular, 
Paul Smith (1978) criticized the lack of rigor in relation to this specific matter as it had appeared 
                                                          
125 Similarly, Dalla Costa and James (1971) had written that “the demand for a wage is only a basis, a perspective, 
from which to start, whose merit is essentially to link immediately female oppression, subordination and isolation to 
their material foundation: female exploitation.” (20) 
126 The authorship of this well-known text is actually disputed between Dalla Costa and James. 
130 
 
in the different sides of the domestic labor debate. He argued that domestic work in the 
household was not subject to the pressures and regulatory force of the law of value, which is the 
tendency for commodities to be exchanged at rates proportional to the amount of socially 
necessary labor they represent, and thus could not be seen as having been incorporated into 
society´s pool of abstract, homogeneous, value-producing labor.127 Domestic labor was indeed 
necessary for capitalist production, but it was not internal to it; rather, it was “one of its external 
conditions of existence, which it continually reproduces” (Smith 1978). 128 Smith emphasized 
that Marx´s concept of value was precisely an attempt to represent the perspective of capital; 
thus, “it is not Marx´s theory of value which marginalizes domestic labor, but the capitalist mode 
of production” (Ibid., 215). Using Marxist terminology, Smith argued that domestic labor does 
create the ability of wage labor to produce value – but this ability is labor-power´s use-value 
(which is consumed by the capitalist in the labor process), not its value. The value of labor-
power is still that of the commodities purchased for subsistence - a value that the unpaid 
domestic laborer transfers into the commodity (labor-power) without altering its magnitude. 
 Maxine Molyneux (1979) agreed with Smith that housework was “not subject to the 
general equalization of labor,” hence “there is no basis for the calculation of a transfer of surplus 
labor-time” from the domestic sphere to the world of commodity production (Molyneux 1979, 
9).129 Moreover, she critiqued the assumption, which had been present in the domestic labor 
debate till then, that domestic labor actually had a significant effect on the value of labor power 
                                                          
127 For Smith, the fact that domestic labor was not allocated through the Law of Value was seen in that “when the 
process of capitalist accumulation draws women into capitalist production as wage workers, this is not instead of, 
but in addition to, their performance of domestic labor” (Smith 1978, 205). Similarly, “domestic labor does not 
cease to be performed when there is relative overproduction of its particular product” (Ibid., 206). Moreover, 
domestic labor was not subject to the process by which “labor is socially regulated through exchange in its methods, 
technology and productivity” (Ibid., 205). All this meant that something other than the Law of Value was regulating 
and commanding domestic labor. 
128 This discussion is linked to Marx´s emphasis on the close, symbiotic relationship between use-value and value 
(the latter expressed as exchange-value), in spite of their opposition as distinct aspects of the commodity.  
129 Like Smith and Molyneux, Lise Vogel (1983 and 2000) also agreed that domestic labor does not produce value in 
the Marxist sense, although she at first argued that it could be seen as part of or continuous with Marx´s notion of 
the “necessary component” of the working day under capitalism. Necessary labor was thus “a more complicated 
conceptual category than previously thought,” containing “two components, one with value and the other without” 
(Vogel 2000, 162). She seems to have later retreated from this model, while arguing that “whether domestic labor is 
conceptualized as a component of necessary labor or not, the bottom line is that some way to theorize it within 
Marxist political economy must be found” (Vogel 2000, 162).   
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and helped to keep wages low. Picking up on Marx´s mention of the “historic and moral 
element” of the value of labor power, Molyneux argued that this value was shaped by so many 
social, cultural and political factors (in the process of definition of the workers´ “needs”), that 
unpaid domestic labor at home was just one of them: “Within this multiplicity of determinations, 
the contribution of housework to establishing the value of labor power plays a relatively minor 
role” (Ibid., 10). It wasn´t clear at all that domestic labor actually cheapened the value of labor; if 
anything, Molyneux pointed out, it was usually higher-paid wage workers in the advanced 
capitalist countries who had gained the option of maintaining a full-time housewife through the 
“family wage.”130 This led her to criticize the general functionalist tendency of the domestic 
labor debate, which assumed that housework always served an essential function for capital, 
whereas in reality “the confinement of women to the domestic sphere may be advantageous in 
some circumstances but not in others” (Ibid., 25). If anything, she argued, the domestic labor 
debate had so far largely ignored a type of household work that was actually of much greater 
benefit to capital (because it was much costlier to buy in the market) than servicing the 
immediate needs of the wage worker – the work of raising and caring for children, i.e. of 
reproducing the future generation of workers.  
Molyneux argued for a shift from a narrow focus on housework towards examining the 
broader socioeconomic relations established by women and the household as a whole; she also 
criticized the attempt to assimilate housework into the analysis of capitalism as an abstraction, 
arguing that “the emphasis must be shifted from the level of the capitalist mode of production to 
the level of determinate social formations and their reproduction” (Ibid., 22). Moreover, she 
criticized the economicism that had characterized the domestic labor debate; although the 
oppression of women certainly had an important economic dimension,  
An understanding of women´s subordination cannot be reduced to economic or material 
factors alone, even when these are conceived in the broadest terms; it also entails 
consideration of the important work currently being carried out in the field of 
                                                          
130 Molyneux did acknowledge that under  specific conditions in which low-cost subsistence services (such as 
domestic work) are not available on the market, it could be said that having families perform their own housework 
does help to maintain the value of labor power at a lower level than if they had to pay for housework. But even in 
this case, other determinants of the value of labor power have to be present initially in order to raise the wage to a 
level high enough that maintaining family members engaged full-time in domestic work is even a possibility.  
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psychoanalysis, sexuality, language and ideology. It therefore involves, by extension, an 
analysis of inter-sexual and inter-familial relations (Ibid., 22). 
 As Vogel (2000) describes, the debate on the value of domestic labor was largely 
abandoned after the late 1970s and early 80s, although domestic labor analysis continued on 
other fronts. It is not the purpose of this chapter to offer a wholly new perspective on the debate 
of the 1970s. However, my own position is closer to that of Smith and Molyneux in asserting the 
importance of the distinction between capitalist value production and the forms of surplus 
extraction involved in unpaid domestic work, as well as the close links between the two 
(depending on the particular historical situation). The merit of the domestic labor theorists and 
activists of the 1970s was to bring housework, and along with it the experience of millions of 
people – a “massive laboring population in late capitalism completely outside the organizations 
and struggles of the proletariat” (Seccombe 1974, 3) - to the forefront. They were correct in 
pointing out that Marxism had neglected this crucial aspect of social reality. However, the 
importance of distinguishing firmly between something like domestic labor, on the one hand, and 
value-producing labor in Marx´s sense, on the other, lies in the fact that such a distinction helps 
us to understand value in capitalism not just as involving exploitation but also exclusion. 
Certainly, the existence of unpaid domestic labor can, under certain circumstances, contribute to 
keeping the rate of surplus value high, by placing limits on the portion of the working day taken 
up by necessary labor (because it supplies goods and services needed for sustenance, which the 
worker does not then need to pay for). In that sense, domestic labor can be said to create or cause 
a certain rate of surplus value; however, causality in general is not the same as production in 
Marx´s specific sense.  
The difference is not just one of theoretical semantics, but rather of specific moments 
within a larger dialectic (Ollman 2003, 66); “production” is one moment of reification (of 
“labor” into “capital”) in an ongoing process that also includes unpaid domestic labor as well as 
other activities that may be necessary for capital. Unpaid domestic labor in this sense is one step 
removed from surplus value, for it creates the use-values that sustain and reproduce the 
producers of surplus value. In particular historical and cultural contexts, capital does cause 
family members (spouses in particular) to work long hours at domestic chores, but it then 
excludes them from the status of value producers, by recognizing as the value of labor power 
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only that of the subsistence commodities purchased by the worker, not the work that goes into 
processing them after they´re bought. This is a structural matter, and it would not be a simple 
task to change people´s minds so that they do recognize other forms of work and value, Of 
course, through politics and struggle people can seek to assign value to other activities or 
products, but this will eventually come into conflict with the functioning of capitalism itself.131 
Domestic labor performs a necessary service for capital, but the capitalist mode of production 
tends towards a structural inability to recognize the value of this service. In that sense, this 
discussion allows us to see value in capitalism not just as a quantitative matter involving 
exploitation and the enrichment of some at the expense of others, but also as involving a semiotic 
dimension that selects certain agents and forms of activity and systematically  devalues others, 
even as it manipulates them and appropriates their products.  
The discussion has so far focused on unpaid domestic work only – that performed by 
household members, often women, and which sparked the “domestic labor debate” of the 1970s. 
We have so far abstracted from another very important type of reproductive labor – that 
performed by paid domestic laborers. 132  The importance of this type of labor is evident in both 
Third World as well as advanced capitalist societies, albeit in different ways. From the 
perspective of Marxist political economy, paid domestic work has traditionally been mentioned 
in the context of the distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” labor, both of which 
are paid. This is a relatively neglected conceptual distinction, which has attracted little attention 
                                                          
131 This actually makes sense if we remember the radical working-class politics of the Wages for Housework 
campaign, which certainly would have had no problem with undermining capital as a result of its demands. As 
Federici wrote, “We struggle to break capital´s place for women, which is an essential moment of that planned 
division of labor and social power within the working class, through which capital has been able to maintain its 
power. Wages for housework, then, is a revolutionary demand not because by itself it destroys capital, but because it 
attacks capital and forces it to restructure social relations in terms more favorable to us and consequently more 
favorable to the unity of the class” (Federici 1975, 5).  
132 As Duffy (2007) writes, social science scholarship has had to come to grips with “the inadequacy of the equation 
of women with unpaid domestic work in the private sphere and men with paid work in the public sphere...Two 
concurrent trends have made the limitations of this view more clear in recent decades: the increasing numbers of 
women in the paid labor force and the heightened visibility of the role of paid workers in reproductive labor. As a 
result, the concept has been expanded to bridge the unpaid and paid spheres” (Duffy 2007, 315). Going further, 
Constable (2009) writes of “the commodification of intimacy” to argue that the line between paid work and the 
intimacy of the home is not always so clearly drawn: “As scholarship on transnational intimacies illustrates, 
relationships assumed to be based primarily on paid work for money are often understood to involve complex forms 
of intimacy, love or emotion, and those assumed to be based on love are linked in new and evolving ways to 
commercial practices and material desires” (Constable 2009, 56).  
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even among Marxist theorists. Gough (1972) laid out Marx´s arguments on the matter, while 
raising some questions about their internal consistency and applicability to contemporary 
capitalism; Savran and Tonak (1999), on the other hand, vigorously reassert the validity of the 
productive/unproductive distinction.  
For Marx, “productive” labor refers to labor that directly produces surplus value. Two 
conditions must be met for labor to be considered “productive” in this sense: it must be 
employed directly by capital, and this capital must be productive (rather than commercial or 
financial) capital – that is, it must be capital that directly produces use-values and does not 
simply move money around. “Unproductive” labor, on the other hand, is exchanged for revenue 
– either profits or wages – or for non-productive capital.133 Marx initially got this definition from 
Adam Smith, but, unlike the latter, he included immaterial production and services such as 
transportation within productive labor, so long as they took place within a capitalist enterprise 
(i.e. producing surplus value) and were a necessary part of the production of the finished use-
value (Gough 1972, 53). Unproductive labor on the other hand, could produce essential use-
values, but it did not immediately produce surplus-value. As with the concept of value itself, the 
productive/unproductive distinction does not refer to any intrinsic worth of the activity in 
question, but rather seeks to represent its relationship to capital.134 As Savran and Tonak argue, 
                                                          
133 Thus, not only are wage workers hired individually out of revenue or wages included within the category of 
“unproductive” workers, but also wage workers who are employed by capital that is engaged in circulation (or, 
presumably, finance) rather than production. According to both Gough´s and Savran and Tonak´s interpretations of 
Marx, commercial workers would be engaging in “production” in so far as they package and transport the product to 
the buyer, but would be engaging merely in circulation at the moment they sell it. This is probably the most 
controversial aspect of the productive/unproductive labor distinction. For Savran and Tonak, the classification of 
people engaged in the circulation of money as “unproductive” of surplus value is a necessary consequence of Marx´s 
key argument that value can only be augmented in production, not in circulation – i.e. value cannot be produced by 
buying cheap and selling dear, which is presumably what “pure merchant capital,” considered in the abstract, does. 
The distinction between production and circulation is grounded in that between use-value and exchange-value – 
production modifies use-values, whereas circulation changes the commodity into or out of the money form. 
According to Savran and Tonak, this is the definition of production in general, and is one of the two criteria for 
defining “productive labor” under capitalism – the other being that this production take place under capital.  
134 This is made clear by Marx, who writes that “Milton, who wrote Paradise Lost, was an unproductive worker. On 
the other hand, a writer who turns out work for his publisher in factory style is a productive worker” (Marx 1976, 
1044). While it is clear that Marx is not being judgmental or dismissive of people who fit into the “unproductive” 
category simply because they do not work directly for capital (such as a teacher, or Milton, or Marx himself for that 
matter), that is less clear for the case of individuals who are classed as “unproductive” not because they do not work 
for capital but because they work in (purely) commercial or financial activities. As Savran and Tonak write, “it is 
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Major sections of the working class in capitalist society are unproductive workers. 
Naturally, this does not imply in any sense that they are less important either for the well-
being of society or for the class struggle and for revolutionary strategy. The distinction 
PUPL [productive/unproductive labor] is significant exclusively for the analysis of the 
various significant variables of the capitalist economy such as the value of labor-power, 
the rate and mass of surplus-value and hence the rate of capital accumulation. This is 
sufficient ground for taking the distinction seriously for it is only through an examination 
of these variables that Marxists can adequately analyze the historical trajectory and the 
cyclical fluctuations of capitalist accumulation. (Savran and Tonak 1999, 147) 
Paid domestic workers hired on their own would be included within the group of 
“unproductive” workers, while those who do the same kind of work but are employed by a 
capitalist enterprise providing, say, cleaning services, would be grouped with “productive” 
workers.135 The former, together with other “unproductive” workers such as most teachers – 
who, like domestic workers, produce useful and necessary services but are not employed by 
capital -  could very well help to raise the productivity of labor and thus the rate of surplus value, 
but they would be contributing to surplus value indirectly rather than directly.  
Again, the issue is not one of presence or absence of causality but of moments within a 
process; “productive” workers are simply situated in the moment in which labor is reified into 
capital (a location that in a sense grants them a “privileged” status) but all the previous steps are 
part of the process as well. This does not necessarily mean that a surplus is not extracted from 
“unproductive” workers; the extraction of surplus is common to many modes of production, but 
the extraction of a surplus in the form of surplus value is unique to the capitalist mode of 
production.136 The exploitation of “productive” wage labor – i.e. the production of surplus value 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
true that Marx regards the expenses of circulation (which obviously include the wages of workers employed in this 
sphere) as the faux frais of capitalism, as an expression of its irrational nature” (Savran and Tonak 1999, 143). 
135 This change in the status of a particular kind of work, depending on whether it is employed by capital, is made 
clear by Marx: “A singer who sings like a bird is an unproductive worker. If she sells her song for money, she is to 
that extent a wage-laborer or merchant. But if the same singer is engaged by an entrepreneur who makes her sing to 
make money, then she becomes a productive worker, since she produces capital directly.” (Marx 1976, 1044).  
136 Again, surplus value is the particular form that surplus extraction acquires in the capitalist mode of production – 
it is when workers are paid a wage (in theory enough to cover the reproduction of their labor power according to 
historically defined “needs”) but then made to work longer than is necessary to produce that wage, and the 
difference (surplus value) turns into profit and capital with which to begin the whole process again. In this way a 
surplus is extracted in a way that is different from that of feudalism or tribute economies. In capitalism, workers 
hired out of revenue or wages, such as independent domestic workers, are also made to work beyond what they 
would need for their own sustenance (which thus constitutes a surplus), but the difference does not immediately 
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– always needs other mechanisms of extraction; one such is primitive accumulation (what David 
Harvey has renamed “accumulation by dispossession”). “Unproductive” wage workers, or 
unpaid domestic workers such as housewives/husbands for that matter, may also be subject to 
their own particular mechanisms of surplus extraction.137 These mechanisms may be pre-existing 
and may be appropriated by capital, or they may be set up by capital itself, or a combination of 
the two. Also, as Molyneux points out, they may not necessarily be functional to capital.  
It thus becomes important to maintain the distinctions between the different spheres and 
modes of appropriation and to map out the links between them and the moments of 
transformation that they undergo; both the boundaries and the links have concrete implications. 
The production of value and surplus-value in the Marxist sense can then be “provincialized” 
(rather than diluting the concept by assimilating all forms of work to it) without losing sight of 
its central importance in the capitalist world economy as well as its status as one element in a 
longer chain.138 As Molyneux argues, this requires both shifting between the abstract level of the 
capitalist mode of production and the “determinate social formations,” as well as moving from a 
purely material lens towards perspectives that also examine cultural, ideological and other 
aspects - without losing sight of the crucial material dimension.  
In this section, I have discussed the theoretical status of reproductive and particularly 
domestic labor, from the specific perspective of Marxist theory. In the following section, I return 
from an abstract to a concrete level to more directly examine the question of reproductive labor 
in the mines of the Central Highlands and in the Huarón mine in particular. First I discuss the 
relationship between mining and rural production, and the reproductive role that the latter 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
become capital – it may turn into pleasure, status or well-being for the person who hires the labor, or it may simply 
free them up to go work as “productive” workers for capital. 
137 It should be mentioned that Molyneux (16-19) is critical of the notion that unpaid domestic workers constitute a 
separate “domestic mode of production” that is “client” to the dominant capitalist mode, as Harrison (1976) 
believed. While subordinate modes of production certainly do exist within the general capitalist social formation, the 
unpaid domestic work of spouses does not have enough independence to be considered a separate mode of 
production. It would instead seem to be a mechanism that is appended to, without really being included under, the 
capitalist mode of production.  
138 See Coronil´s (1997; 61) call to “displace the capital/labor relation from the ossified centrality it has been made 
to occupy by Marxist theory.” 
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fulfilled for the former. Then I examine some aspects of domestic and reproductive labor at the 
Huarón mining camp. 
 
The division of labor and the reproduction of labor-power 
The relationship between mining and rural production in the Central Highlands  
 Migration to the mines of central Peru in the 20th century was not solely an individual 
decision but rather one that involved and affected an entire household. This was true both when 
workers migrated alone and when they were accompanied by at least part of their families. The 
back-and-forth migration pattern characteristic of the mines in the first half of the 20th century 
has been noted by several authors; it was rooted both in the desire on the part of mining 
companies for low-wage (rather than skilled) labor and in the need of migrants to maintain a foot 
in rural production. This pattern meant a continued participation by the household in agriculture 
and/or animal husbandry, even when one or more of the adult males was working in the mines. 
Naturally, it was often women who had to perform a greater share of agricultural duties. As 
Mallon (1983) writes for the Yanamarca area of the Mantaro Valley in the early 20th century, 
when people were migrating to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s mines, “most male migrants 
depended on wives and other female relations to tend the agricultural side of the household 
economy, often with the aid of occasional wage labor” (254). Similarly, for Huayllay in the mid-
1940s – where herding rather than agriculture was the traditional basis of the economy – 
Tschopik (1947) wrote that “the tending of the flocks and herds is today largely the work of the 
women and the less acculturated Indians of the surrounding estancias” (Tschopik 1947, 52). 
This general pattern – an intra-household gendered division between mining work and 
work in the rural subsistence economy - did not entirely disappear later in the century, at least for 
communities that were close enough to the mining centers that even stable, long-term workers 
could keep part of their family in the home village. Such was the case for the Mantaro Valley 
village of Ataura, where Laite (1980) conducted his research in the early 1970s, and many of 
whose adult men worked in the CPC´s metallurgical complex at La Oroya: 
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Women working the land are a common sight. The wives and mothers of migrants tend 
several small plots of land scattered around the village. At seed time and harvest they will 
call upon another female relative for hand-work, or engage a retired immigrant with a 
pair of oxen. As he ploughs the woman will bring him beer and food which they take 
together, gossiping. He receives a flat cash rate for the job and the woman helps him 
carry his implements home (Ibid., 108-109).  
During the same period, this situation was replicated in many communities in the herding 
region of the Pasco/Junín plateau.139 Even after the relative stabilization of mining labor in the 
1950s and 60s, the proximity of these communities  to the mines meant that workers could 
maintain close links to their home village, where their family members often took charge of the 
flocks – which by then constituted only a secondary component of the household economy, 
 To the degree that this occurred, the division between the mining enclave and the 
surrounding society and economy was also – in part – a gendered division of labor. And in turn, 
the gendered division of labor at the mine cannot be understood without reference to the 
relationship of the mine to the surrounding society, in particular to rural production in agriculture 
or cattle-raising. This relationship, like domestic labor, is crucial to understanding the 
reproduction of the labor force. For that reason we must examine it briefly, primarily through the 
work of scholars who examined the Peruvian mining industry – and the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation in particular – in the 1970s. DeWind (1987) devoted much attention to the back-
and-forth migration patterns of the first half of the 20th-century and the corresponding “peasant-
miner” nature of the workforce – something agreed on by virtually all who have researched the 
history of mining n Peru, even if they may disagree somewhat about exact periodization (see 
previous chapter). On the basis of this “peasant-miner” phenomenon, DeWind argued that the 
agrarian sector subsidized part of the company´s profits, by allowing it to pay wages that were 
below what would otherwise have been needed to reproduce the worker´s labor power:  
                                                          
139 In a 1970 Agrarian Reform Report written for the National Office of Peasant Communities, Chang and Núñez del 
Prado write about the plateau community of Villa de Pasco, which at the time had many of its men working in the 
mines: “Paradoxically, the comuneros, in spite of their fundamental cattle-raising roots, currently have this as a 
secondary activity. They leave in the hands of the women, children and old people everything relating to their family 
herds [ganadería familiar]... The women are the ones who practically carry the greater part of community life on 
their shoulders: they play the double role of housewife and shepherd for the family flocks, with the help of their 
children; additionally, they substitute for their husbands in the communal faenas when the latter cannot attend” 
(Chang and Núñez del Prado 1970, 11, 28-29).  
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A portion of the profits of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation were produced in the 
agricultural sector. Throughout the company´s history the mine workers rarely lived on 
their wages alone but depended on agricultural produce for part of their livelihood. The 
close ties of the labor force to the agricultural sector enabled the company to reduce its 
wages, save on costs and reap higher profits on its mining operations. (DeWind 1987, 
229).  
The relationship to agriculture was not only with peasant production but also with the 
CPC´s own haciendas, which it began to acquire after the “smoke affair” of the 1920s damaged 
the haciendas in the vicinity of the La Oroya smelting complex and compelled their owners to 
sell their land to the company. Once the “Cattle-raising Department” (División Ganadera) had 
been created, the company began acquiring more properties well beyond the Oroya area, 
eventually accumulating around 300,000 hectares (Martínez-Alier 1973, 6), before the Agrarian 
Reform of the 1960s expropriated this land. During those several decades, the CPC used its meat 
and dairy products to provide food to its workers at low cost and thus cheapen the cost of 
subsistence, thereby countering pressures to raise wages. This arrangement was predicated on the 
process of primitive accumulation that had originally led to the formation of the haciendas at the 
expense of indigenous lands during the colonial period and the 19th century (a process to which 
the company became the heir when it purchased the estates). In addition to this, the company´s 
División Ganadera attempted to further modernize its haciendas and implement more efficient 
methods, which required securing and reinforcing boundaries with neighboring communities that 
had previously been more porous; this was interpreted by the neighboring population as an 
expansion into communal land.140 That these processes of dispossession (either past or present) 
were not trivial is shown by the fact that the CPC´s haciendas were among the first to be 
                                                          
140 This process is described by Martínez-Alier (1973): “The expression ´expansion of the haciendas´ refers to the 
effective exercise of property rights within the boundaries of the haciendas... My impression is that in the Central 
Highlands all of the haciendas have titles that go back to the colonial era. However, those titles have been the object 
of dispute, and, what from the point of view of the hacendado is taken to be the effective occupation of the lands 
that are [his/her] property, is considered dispossession by the Indians” (Martínez-Alier 1973, 2-3). What this means 
is that the process of primitive accumulation consisted not only of the initial formation of the haciendas in the 
colonial period, but also of the moment in which the owners decided or were compelled to effectively enforce their 
property rights, as the CPC did in the 20th century and in the 1950s in particular, in order to modernize its haciendas 
and make them more productive. It should be mentioned that for Martínez-Alier, this modernization consisted not 
only of enforcing boundaries but also of expelling shepherds´s own sheep (huacchillas) from the haciendas and 




occupied during the land recuperation campaigns that peasant communities of the Central 
Highlands (particularly in Pasco and Junín Departments) undertook in the early 1960s.   
For this reason, DeWind emphasizes the role of both the haciendas and the peasant 
communities in subsidizing the reproduction of the company´s labor force: “Through its ties with 
both peasant villages and large commercial haciendas the company drained wealth out of the 
agricultural sector” (DeWind 1987, 229). Similarly, Laite (1981) discusses the role played by 
rural communities of origin in reproducing the labor power of migrant workers (such as the 
Mantaro Valley workers whom he studied), whom he contrasts with fully industrial proletarians: 
It is the relation of migrant labor to the means of reproduction that clearly distinguishes it 
from an industrial working class. The industrial proletariat reproduces physically and 
culturally within the industrial sector, supported by the State and by wages that are high 
enough for both the laborer and his family to subsist and reproduce. The reproduction of 
a migrant labor force, in contrast, occurs outside the industrial sector. Industrial wages do 
not necessarily cover the subsistence costs of either the worker or his family. Workers 
must organize their own subsistence in the agricultural sector (Laite 1981, 201).  
Earlier in this chapter we saw that Molyneux (1979) disputed the argument that unpaid 
domestic labor always played a significant role in the determination of the value of labor-power 
and helped to keep wages low. However, it is harder to dispute the argument, made by both 
DeWind and Laite, that agricultural production in central Peru helped to keep mining wages low 
for much of the 20th century, thus contributing to a higher rate of surplus-value for the mining 
companies. Granted, as producers of “nature-intensive commodities,” to use Coronil´s (2000; 
357) term, the mining companies derived large part of their profits from (absolute) rents rather 
than from the production of surplus-value.141 However, the fact that the dynamics of surplus-
value production common to other capitalist sectors were not entirely absent from the mines is 
evidenced not only by the large workforce employed at the time, but also by the fact that the 
mining companies actively sought cheap labor and saw this as one of the main advantages of 
                                                          
141 Marx´s concept of absolute rent refers to the surplus-value that is drained from other capitalist sectors towards 
those engaged in the extraction of natural resources, by virtue of the latter´s control over a scarce resource and thus 
exemption from the equalization of the rates of profit, as well as by virtue of political relations. Differential rent, on 
the other hand, is a better-known concept; in Marxist terms it refers to surplus-value that is drained from less 
productive towards more productive enterprises within the same extractive or agricultural sector – this value can 




hiring local, mostly indigenous workers as opposed to bringing more expensive labor from the 
outside.  
One way to interpret this would be to say that local labor was paid below its value. A 
different, stricter interpretation (one more in line with Smith´s arguments detailed in the previous 
section of this chapter) would argue that labor-power was paid at its value, but that this value 
was low because the number of subsistence commodities purchased in the market was limited. 
The “necessary component” of the working day was thus kept short and the rate and mass of 
surplus-value could be kept high. The “peasant-miners” of the first half of the 20th century were 
in a sense suspended between two spheres – the capitalist mining industry, on the one hand, and 
peasant household production, on the other. The latter did not directly figure as (abstract, 
homogeneous) value for the capitalist sector, but it produced a crucial use-value – labor-power – 
that was extracted from it like a surplus or tribute.142 Certainly, this unstable “peasant-miner” 
labor may not always have been the most productive or skilled, but still, its working day could be 
extended well beyond the (low) point of “necessary” labor.  
This articulation between the capitalist and non-capitalist worlds was thus a source of 
profitability for the mining companies in Peru, as it has been in other parts of the world where 
people who have a partial basis in non-capitalist production work for low wages in the capitalist 
economy.143 Workers in the early years were barely paid enough to maintain themselves as 
individuals, let alone a “family wage.” The subsidy from the peasant household economy to the 
mining economy could take the form of produce taken by the worker from his village to the 
mining camp. As Chilean labor lawyer and International Labor Organization official Moisés 
Poblete Troncoso wrote, in a 1938 report, based on his visit to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation 
camps,  
                                                          
142 These distinctions may seem overly abstract, but I believe the first interpretation (superexploitation, i.e. labor 
paid below its value) emphasizes the additional surplus extracted from the worker (beyond normal surplus-value); 
the second interpretation highlights a surplus extracted not just from the worker but from his/her family and from the 
non-capitalist economy in general. This would be more similar to tribute than to surplus-value in the capitalist sense.   
143 “Capitalist” is here understood in a narrow sense that refers to the presence of capital investment and profits, 
rather than in a broader sense referring merely to the presence of market exchange and money – the latter being a 
precondition of capitalism but not unique to it.  
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The author conducted a survey among several families of Indian obreros and among the 
obreros themselves, and was informed that said salary is not enough for the Indians to 
meet even their essential expenses. When the families of the majority of the obreros stay 
back in their regions of origin, they send agricultural products every week to the Indians 
who labor in the mines, so that they can at least satisfy their nutritional needs (Poblete 
1938, 144). 
More significantly, the subsidy from the peasant household economy consisted of the 
maintenance, at little or no cost to capital, of the worker´s family as well as of the reproduction 
of the next generation of workers. 
Nevertheless, there was a change in this relationship in the second half of the 20th 
century, once mining companies attempted – to varying degrees - to stabilize their workforce. 
This led to workers and their families being less associated with rural production and more 
restricted to the world of the mining camp itself. In fact, DeWind argues that at the CPC this 
contributed to the radicalization of the mining unions in the late 1960s and 1970s; the company 
had sought to turn its workers into permanent, more skilled laborers, and the workers demanded 
that salaries rise to a level high enough to make this viable.144 Other factors intervened too. 
Population growth in the Peruvian countryside during the course of the century meant that there 
was an ever-increasing group of people that could not be sustained by the land. Moreover, the 
reforms undertaken by the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) – 
particularly the Agrarian Reform and the formation of “industrial communities” – had some 
effect of furthering the split between the mining and the agrarian worlds. These reforms made it 
difficult for someone to be both a member of the newly-formed “industrial communities” at each 
workplace, and at the same time a comunero in their comunidad campesina of origin. 
Nevertheless, this process of “proletarization” was always incomplete, and some households 
continued to be split between the mine and the community and to draw part of their sustenance 
from rural production. This was especially the case for workers who came from communities 
                                                          
144 “The workers were not demanding ‘raises and improvements which exceed the social and economic bases which 
could justify them’ as the company claimed, but rather what they needed to maintain themselves as the skilled, 
disciplined and permanent labor force required by the new mechanized productive system. The real problem was 
that the mechanization of production had not increased productivity enough both to pay the workers adequate wages 
and to raise the company’s profit level. Unable to raise the productivity of labor any further, the company tried to 




that were relatively close to the place of work, such as the matahuasinos and ataurinos who 
worked at the La Oroya smelting complex and whom Laite studied, or the workers who came to 
the Huarón mine from the surrounding plateau area.  
 Yet another way to study the mine-countryside relationship would be to focus not on the 
reproductive role of the rural world for the mines but rather on the potential for mining income to 
be channeled back to the rural sector. This is a complex topic and one that cannot be dealt with 
adequately here. However, Long and Roberts (2001 [1984]), who have most studied this issue, 
particularly for the Mantaro Valley, argue that significant links did emerge between the mining 
economy and the rest of regional society, but that this “did not result, however, in a significant 
regional accumulation of capital in agriculture and industry” (Long and Roberts 2001 [1984], 
83). They point out that mining wages for the most part were not invested back in agriculture. 
This was in part because those wages were too low and in part because agricultural prices 
stagnated during much of the 20th century, due to the various governments´ free-trade policies, 
which permitted the massive importation of wheat and flour and even of Peru´s most traditional 
crop, the potato (Ibid., 103-108). This made investment in agriculture unattractive. Some mining 
workers were able to save, certainly, but they put these savings to other uses: 
The savings of the mining workers were invested in the purchase and improvement of 
houses, in helping the villages to improve their infrastructure and in the establishment of 
small businesses such as shops, or in transportation. A few investments were made in 
agriculture through the purchase of land, cattle or a tractor and the improvement of the 
resource base through the use of fertilizers and other modern inputs. The general 
impression, however, is that salaried work in the mining sector constituted a complement 
to small-scale agriculture, allowing families to sustain themselves in spite of an 
inadequate and fragmented resource base (Ibid., 102; my translation).145  
Naturally, this relative lack of investment in the agricultural sector meant that there were no 
large-scale efforts on the part of some peasants to accumulate land in order to rationalize 
production – something that would have resulted in the dispossession of other, less successful 
peasant families. Rather, agricultural holdings in the Mantaro Valley remained dispersed and 
large numbers of people were able to maintain a base in rural agriculture. Although Long and 
                                                          




Roberts characterize the regional economy as “dualistic,” because of its separation into the 
capital-intensive, internationally-connected mining industry and the local, labor-intensive 
agricultural sector, they argue that a symbiotic relationship developed between these two 
spheres. 
This dualistic structure was not based on the separation of economic sectors but rather on 
a pattern of exchanges and interdependencies between them. The large mining company 
benefitted from the cheap labor force and inputs subsidized by peasant agriculture; this 
inhibited the consolidation of landholdings and the expansion of agricultural production 
(Ibid., 114).146 
If significant investment in rural production (agriculture/cattle-raising) was lacking in the 
Mantaro Valley – the most economically dynamic area of the Central Highlands – it was even 
more absent in other parts of the region, such as the sheep-raising communities of the 
Pasco/Junín plateau, such as Huayllay. My impression is that mining income in Huayllay – and 
probably in other similar communities – has historically been invested in home-building, 
educating one´s children, setting up shops or other forms of commerce, and in building a base in 
cities such as Cerro de Pasco or Lima. Locally there is a strong and widespread discourse about 
the community´s traditional activity of livestock-raising (mostly sheep, llamas and alpacas) being 
in a neglected and stunted state – although all lands are certainly in use. As in many communities 
in the plateau, a significant population has developed that is more dependent on mining than on 
cattle-raising for its subsistence, and that complements both activities with small-scale commerce 
and a few trades. A certain level of local and regional economic development has occurred in 
connection to mining activity (although with the latter as only one of several causes), even if it 
has been limited and even if it has come at the expense of the sacrifice of many mining workers 
over several generations as well as the everyday labor of their families.  
The gender division of labor and reproductive labor in Huarón 
 In the previous section I discussed how the gender division of labor mapped onto the 
mine/rural economy division, not just at Huarón but at the other mines of the Central Highlands 
                                                          
146 This of course contrasted with the consolidation of landholding in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s own 
haciendas, which as described in the previous paragraph led to significant conflicts with neighboring communities. 
However, those were mostly sheep-raising haciendas located in the higher-altitude regions closer to La Oroya, Junín 
and Cerro de Pasco, not in the Mantaro Valley region discussed by Long and Roberts.   
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as well. However, this was only partially true.  It is true that many women took charge of 
agricultural and cattle-raising activities while men were working in the mines, but, especially in 
the early years, men also would return to these activities after their short periods of work in the 
mine. And, as we have already seen, an increasing number of workers also lived in the mine 
camps with spouses and/or other family members. In both the villages and the mine, patterns 
involving a gender division of labor played a role in daily life, even if there also had to be 
enough flexibility to accommodate the gender imbalances created by migration.  
The ethnographies on the general areas from which workers migrated to Huarón – the 
Mantaro Valley, the northeastern highlands of Lima Department and the Chaupiwaranga and 
Huánuco regions – provide different views on this matter. In his study of the Mantaro Valley 
community of Muquiyauyo, Adams (1959) emphasizes the overall flexibility of men´s and 
women´s roles, particularly in agriculture, where only plowing was really restricted to men, and 
even that was flexible sometimes. He draws out some of the implications of this: “The fact that 
there is so little specialization in the field labor provides a certain amount of independence for 
widows, widowers and younger unmarried people who must carry on the field work without the 
aid of a family” (Adams 1959, 123). The pattern he documented in his 1949-50 research was one 
in which many young men were away at the mines – many of them at Huarón, others in the CPC 
– but also in which the community was making rapid economic progress and some young men 
were going into professions, while some of the women were becoming teachers. Women also 
dominated commerce and fairs, while the small shops in town – usually opened by families with 
a connection to the mines - could be operated by either men or women. 
 Whether due to a difference in perspective or an actual cultural difference between the 
two regions, Mayer (1974) focuses less on flexibility in his discussion of the gender division of 
labor in the Chaupiwaranga Valley community of Tangor, where he conducted research in 1969-
70. He is more emphatic about agriculture being a male task, while the storing and management 
of household supplies – including, but not restricted to food – was a sphere controlled by 
women: “Households thus constitute pools of labor resources which are managed by the male 
head of the household, usually the husband, and accumulated goods which are allocated by the 
woman head of the household” (Mayer 1974, 64). While Mayer emphasizes that there are 
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household tasks that can be done by either men or women, he does highlight that “it is almost 
taboo that a man should busy himself with cooking pots” (Ibid., 65).  
We can also examine Bourque and Warren´s (1981) study of gender inequality in the 
context of social change in Mayobamba and Chiuchin, two towns situated in the upper Chancay 
Valley in the highlands of northern Lima department, not far from the Huarón mine and adjacent 
to several communities that had regular barter relations with Huayllay. Like many other parts of 
the Central Highlands, this was a bilingual region, though with Spanish gradually gaining the 
upper hand over Quechua as “the language of everyday discourse” (Bourque and Warren 1981, 
4).Their perspective is somewhat different due to their direct focus on the dynamics of gender, 
power and inequality; they thus provide analysis on these issues directly rather than simply 
mentioning the gender division of labor as part of an ethnography. Bourque and Warren focus on 
specific aspects of female subordination in this context of rapid transition, such as inequality in 
inheritance patterns, lower rates of literacy, and the marginalization of women by the local 
political systems, including the institution of the peasant community. While on the one hand they 
argue that “the division of labor by sex is not rigid and a day´s work by a woman is, in fact, 
reckoned as the equivalent of the same amount of work by a man” (Ibid., 9), they also highlight 
...the sexual division of labor which assigns to women the responsibilities for cooking, 
harvest storage and management, clothing production, laundry and child care... Given the 
general lack of mechanization, electric power, refrigeration, and running water, the 
performance of such tasks as cooking, laundry and clothing production take awesome 
amounts of time, effort and endurance (Ibid., 97-98). 
 They also make their account more complex by drawing out the differences between 
Mayobamba, a peasant community, and Chiuchin, an emerging roadside commercial town: 
Like Mayobamba, Chiuchin is a highly stratified town with broad patterns of economic 
participation for both sexes governed by a minimal sexual division of labor. In contrast to 
the agricultural community, Chiuchin´s commercialized economic base offers women the 
opportunity to accumulate capital or engage in steady wage labor (Bourque and Warren 
1981, 144). 
At the time of their research (the late 1960s and 1970s), Bourque and Warren show, this 
area of the upper Chancay Valley, like many parts of the Central Highlands, was undergoing a 
process of increasing integration with the dominant coastal society through migration as well as 
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the entrance of national institutions into local life. They argued that the forces of outside change 
“show no clear counter-trend” to patriarchy because the values of the dominant coastal society 
“either reinforce existing patterns of male dominance or offer a still more restricted view of 
women´s roles” (Ibid., 218). At the same time, however, Bourque and Warren were concerned to 
show that inequality was not being mechanically reproduced; they argued that women “actively 
locate assistance for masculine tasks in the sexual division of labor, broaden their access to 
critical resources, influence decision making, and formulate new options based on migration and 
education for themselves and their children” (Ibid., 214). Moreover, they highlighted the 
existence of forms of labor and economic cooperation among women, both within and across 
economic strata.147 
In Huayllay itself, the gender division of labor cannot be understood in isolation from the 
fact that this is a high-altitude herding area, unlike agricultural regions like the Mantaro, 
Chaupiwaranga and upper Chancay valleys. Agriculture, and the element of plowing that 
(usually) tends to fall under the purview of men, is virtually absent in Huayllay and the 
surrounding plateau.148 The work involved in herding animals – above all sheep, and secondarily 
llamas and alpacas - has traditionally been performed by both men and women, even if, as 
Tschopik described for Huayllay in 1947 (see above), it was a task that fell to women when men 
were away working in the mines. Today at least, in both Huayllay and Rancas, where I have 
done fieldwork, there are also factors other than gender that structure the relationship of people 
to herding work – in particular class, or relative access to job opportunities or income derived 
from mining. In other words, shepherding may be done not only by women but also by men who 
don´t have access to a job in the mines – say due to lack of required work experience, or lack of 
membership in a comunidad that has agreements (convenios) with the mining companies to give 
its comuneros priority for jobs.  There are certain very specific aspects of herding work that can 
                                                          
147 Allen (1982) has critiqued Bourque and Warren´s work arguing that, in addition to ignoring issues of ethnicity, it 
focuses too exclusively on gender subordination, and downplays the importance of areas where women have 
substantial control, such as animal raising and commerce. 
148 The one important crop of the Pasco/Junín plateau is maca, which today is grown extensively in certain areas on 
the southeastern shore of Lake Junín, like Carhuamayo, Huayre and Junín. However, it is not grown to any 
significant extent in Huayllay. 
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be split according to gender – for example, the slaughtering of animals, or some of the rituals for 
the increase of sheep during carnavales in February.149  
 Although livestock-raising was the traditional basis of the economy in Huayllay, it was 
for a long time supplemented by the production of crafts for exchange, namely clay pots and 
textiles. In the previous chapter I described the division of labor involved in the production of 
pottery in Huayllay: generally, women made the pots and men fired them, even if there has 
always been some room for flexibility of roles as well. Furthermore, it was usually men who 
went on the trips to exchange the pots, textiles and animal products with the communities of the 
quebradas. This traditional disposition of huayllino men towards traveling and transporting with 
llamas, like their work in the mines later, depended on the ability of women to take care of 
animal herds at home.   
Still, this division of labor was intensified when twentieth-century industrial mining took 
significant numbers of men away from traditional subsistence activities that had involved the 
household as a whole. Their entry into mining work created a vacuum in their home regions that 
was often filled by women, and in many cases it also created the necessity for either spouses, 
daughters or other female relatives to move to the mining camp in order to perform needed tasks 
that happened to be associated with women, in particular cooking and washing clothes. In the 
case of some male workers, as we saw, relationships were formed at the mine itself that then 
allowed for the performance of these activities. In those cases in which men traveled alone to the 
mine, other people – often, but not exclusively, women – performed these services for them in 
exchange for a payment. The question of “reproductive labor” – or, work aimed at the production 
and restoration of labor-power - arose for mining companies as part of the problem of labor more 
generally. As we have seen, in the first half of the 20th century the problem of labor was one of 
shortage – i.e. how to attract sufficient numbers of workers at the appropriate times. Increasingly, 
there was also the question of obtaining labor of a sufficient quality, and/or retaining it for a 
longer period in order to train it. In the second half of the 20th century, the problem of labor was 
                                                          
149 This is based on my observations during the pishtapakuy (slaughtering of animals) before the patron saint´s feast 
in Rancas, and during the February ceremonies (marcación de ganado/herranza) for the sheep in Huayllay. 
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centrally one of reducing worker absenteeism, improving worker productivity, and avoiding 
labor conflicts and the increased costs that could result from them.  
In so far as it intersected with any or all of these issues, then, the labors of cooking, 
washing and other domestic tasks could be of  significance for mining companies, even if, as 
Molyneux (1979) argued, these forms of work by themselves probably do not determine the 
value of labor power in most contexts. The importance of food and cooking is evident in a 1920 
report by a superintendent at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s coal mine at Goyllarisquizga, 
which comments on a recent company effort to send food down to the mine for workers who 
apparently had not been receiving lunches150:  
The feeding has undoubtedly helped greatly to maintain the labor supply at the mines, 
and more work is got out of the men. Formerly at lunch time with few exceptions, they 
simply chewed their coca. Now, however, many of the shovelers and carreros, which is 
the class of men that required helping, avail themselves of the good food sent down the 
mine to them” (CPC archive – Goyllarisquiga Coal Mines, Annual Report - 1920).  
This quote not only highlights the importance that the feeding of workers could have for 
a mining company – it also reminds us that we can by no means assume that a situation of 
domesticity was available to all workers. The fact that this particular effort was directed at 
shovelers and carreros (those who pushed wagons inside the mine), who tended to be the less 
stable, less skilled workers, hints at the fact that a domestic sphere at the mine was often not part 
of these particular workers´ experience – at least not in Goyllarisquizga in 1920. To the extent 
that such a domestic sphere, however partial, did become available to a number of workers, 
however, industrial mining created a space of household labor in the camps that mirrored the 
space of mining labor in the mine. For many if not most workers, the preparation of their lunches 
would be done by their spouses (as in Huarón and Chungar/Animón today) rather than by 
someone paid by the mining company. This domestic sphere had to adjust to the distinct rhythms 
and timings of mining production – in terms of when to prepare food, how often to wash work 
clothes, etc. 
                                                          
150 Goyllarisquizga, the only important coal mine in the Central Highlands at the time, was situated close to where 
the Pasco/Junín plateau drops off into the Chaupiwaranga Valley. 
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In the next chapter I examine issues of conflicts between men and women in Huarón and 
Huayllay around 1940-42, through the traces that spousal disputes left in the Juzgado de Paz 
records. The specific issue of domestic labor does not often find explicit mention in these cases 
though it probably played a role in many of them. The very absence of domestic work from the 
record is probably a testament to its pervasiveness, in the sense that it was taken for granted. 
However, a few of the cases from the Juzgado, from different years, do specifically mention 
issues of household work as being part of the dispute. One case examined in the next chapter is 
that of Inés Cuadros and Justino Colca, from La Oroya and Huarochirí Province, respectively, 
who were splitting up after what they claimed had been a convivencia of 3 months. Responding 
to Cuadros´ accusations about his “bad character in the home” (mal carácter en el hogar 
marital), Colca countered that Cuadros “does not do her part of giving him his food at the right 
times, when he works or comes out of work he asks her for something to eat, but she gives it to 
him in a very bad mood” (no cumple con darle sus alimentos a sus horas, que cuando el trabaja 
o sale de su trabajo le pide que comer, mas ésta se lo da de muy mal humor).  
In a case from a later book of Juzgado notes, from the year 1949, a man complains about 
his 19-year old wife leaving their home in the Francois camp at Huarón, and taking his things; he 
argues that he had given no motive for her decision to abandon him, “only, as in any home, there 
were a few moments of discord, over not washing the clothes” (tan solo, como en cualquier 
hogar no faltaba unos pequeños disgustos, por no lavar la ropa). In a much later Juzgado case, 
from 1976, a woman from one of the communities in the Junín/Pasco plateau, living in the 
Huarón mine with her conviviente, accuses him of having beaten and thrown her out over an 
incident involving the cutting of firewood for cooking. She had asked him to cut the firewood 
and this had made him angry, although he did it anyway; he then went out and came back at 
around 11 o´clock at night, having drunk alcohol, demanding to know “why she forced him to 
cut the firewood, that he was not her servant” (que por que le obligaba a rayar leña, que el no 
era su muchacho). These few cases show that arguments over household tasks could be a trigger, 
if not necessarily the root cause, for marital conflicts or even domestic violence, or alternatively 
they could be invoked as a justification; it is likely that a number of other cases involved these 
issues as well, even if on paper the disputes are simply attributed to “inability to get along” or 
“bad treatment” (malos tratos).  
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In her discussion of domestic life during the California Gold Rush of 1848-1853, Susan 
Lee Johnson (1999) writes of a “world upside down,” in which the shortage of women led to 
many men taking part in, and taking turns at, “household” tasks that would have been performed 
by women in their regions of origin. I have not found evidence for such a situation in Huarón or 
similar mines in the Central Highlands of Peru, which does not necessarily mean that it did not 
occur. In any case, the situation was different - the mines were not as distant from people´s home 
regions, so it was not as hard for family members to accompany workers. Furthermore, workers 
who traveled to the mine alone would not necessarily have had the flexibility, space or 
implements necessary to perform their own domestic tasks – crowded as many of them were into 
shared rooms lacking any implements. By and large, these workers had to pay other people for 
board (pensión) – often provided by women or families as a way to earn extra income.  
For example, one of my interviewees, Emilia Flores,151 who was from Cerro de Pasco, 
lived with her husband in one of the sections of the workers´ camps at the Huarón mine. Her 
husband had begun working in the mine in the 1960s, first as an assistant timberman. Emilia 
“couldn´t make ends meet” (no me alcanzaba) with her husband´s wage, so she decided to start 
providing board to twenty people at the camp – presumably, though she does not specify, 
workers who did not have families with them. She and her husband did not have any tables in the 
room(s)152 they occupied at the camp, just some pieces of wood; they used those to make 
benches and tables for the boarders (pensionistas).  Later on, she recalls, the salaries began to 
rise, including her husband´s, but she continued taking on boarders throughout her time at the 
camp, which lasted over two decades. This was in addition to her other activities, which included 
raising four children. In our interview, Flores was critical of the other workers and their families, 
who she said were always going to the company to ask for loans even when only a week had 
passed since payday. She related her exemption from this general pattern to the fact that she 
worked providing board – for one thing, she had no time to go to the company offices, and, for 
another, her work gave her enough money. Flores furthermore highlighted the fact of her 
economic independence from her husband, for, in her words, “I never saw my husband´s wages, 
                                                          
151 Pseudonym 
152 In the interview Emilia Flores is not clear on whether they had only one room or two contiguous ones. Both 
arrangements were common for couples at the camp. 
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either, because he never told me, ´I make this much, I have that much.´”153 While Flores´ 
portrayal of her neighbors should be taken with a grain of salt, colored as it is by her particular 
construction of the past during our interview (i.e. her view of the workers as taking advantage of 
a generous company), her testimony is interesting in the emphasis it places on her economic 
independence as well as her hard work.  
Her story thus not only highlights one of the ways that workers who did not have families 
with them procured their daily sustenance; it also shows that at least some women could organize 
their economic lives in the mining camp in such a way that they could avoid dependence on a 
man´s wages from the mine. This brings us to another dimension that is crucial in any discussion 
of the gender division of labor in the mining camp: the involvement of both men and women in 
commercial activity – both the preparation and selling of food in the form of regular board, as in 
Flores´ case, and buying and selling more broadly. A case from the 1940s shows that commercial 
activity could support a single woman who was not permanently attached to a family or partner 
at the mining camp. In November 1940, Filomena Rojas and Ignacia Orozco came to the 
Juzgado de Paz to accuse a third woman, Graciela Meza, of “defamation against their honor” 
(difamación contra el honor). All three were listed as residing in the market of the Huarón mine 
camp, where they had stalls. Meza agreed to take back her offensive comment (the content of 
which is not stated) and recognize its falsehood so as to, in the words of the Juez or notetaker, 
“allow the claimants to keep their honor before society” (dejar a las demandantes libres en su 
honor ante la sociedad). Ignacia Orozco was a widow, while Filomena Rojas was married and 
actually came to the Juzgado accompanied by her father, who was listed as a native of Huayllay. 
Graciela Meza, on the other hand, was a native of the town of Tápuc,154 and no marital status 
was listed for her, nor was she accompanied by anyone. This could simply have been an 
omission; however, she reappears in another case seven years later, which provides more 
information. At that time, the teniente gobernador of the Huarón mining camp came to report her 
                                                          
153 “No he conocido el sueldo de mi esposo tampoco, porque él nunca me ha dicho tanto gano, y tanto tengo.” 
154 In the notes it lists her origin as “Tápuc, province of Tarma.” I am not aware of any town called Tápuc in said 
province, while there is a very well-known community called Tápuc in the Chaupiwaranga Valley (Daniel Carrión 
Province). On the other hand, she may have been from the district of Tapo in Tarma province, in which case the 
name was misspelled in the notes. Both alternatives are possible, but the latter seems more likely.  
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death. He describes her as having worked as a vegetable vendor (verdulera) in Huarón “since a 
long time ago,” and emphasizes that she “does not have any relatives in Huarón.” Meza had died 
of a “colic” while in someone else´s house, while her own door was locked; for that reason, the 
teniente gobernador was asking for permission to enter her room so as to look for an address or 
some information that would allow him to notify a relative of Meza´s death, and to inventory her 
possessions.  
The Juzgado minutes are not precise as to whether Meza lived in the workers´ housing 
blocks or in the small informal settlement immediately adjacent to the camp, nor do they explain 
the exact circumstances under which she had originally arrived; however, this case highlights the 
presence of independent women traders as part of the life of the mining camp itself. Commerce 
has accompanied mining activity in the Andes at least since Potosí´s heyday in the late 16th 
century. The 20th century industrial mining concerns such as the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and 
the Compagnie des Mines de Huaron also operated company stores (mercantiles), which 
competed with independent traders who operated at weekly or bi-weekly fairs and, to a lesser 
extent on regular days as well. Women were an important presence in the fairs at the mining 
camps as they were in the markets in many of the regions where workers came from. As Adams 
wrote for Muquiyauyo,  
With the exception of the soap vendors and the clothing merchants, all the sellers at the 
fair in Muquiyauyo are women. In a few cases a Muquiyauyino and his wife will work 
together in the preparation of the lunches and breakfasts, but on the whole the selling and 
buying is done almost entirely by women (Adams 1959, 138).  
At Huarón, since the dismantling of the camps, the bi-weekly fair has moved to the town 
of Huayllay, which now fulfills many of the functions of the old mining camp. These fairs attract 
a large number of vendors and merchants, both men and women; at the time of my research, 
there were also three very small markets that operated in Huayllay on a daily basis, in addition to 
the shops that sold dry goods.  The ubiquitous nature of small commerce and food vending in a 
place like Huayllay, as in other parts of the Central Highlands, should be taken with a grain of 
salt, however. As one of the women who sold lonches (afternoon/evening meals) in the center of 
Huayllay town explained to me, many of the foods that were regularly sold there were things that 
she (a huayllina) did not grow up eating; these new foods had come from other places in recent 
154 
 
years. In the past, she said, everyone ate at home; “there wasn´t all of this,” she said while 
pointing to the dozen or so carts that sold food here every evening. Although saying that 
“everyone ate at home” is probably an exaggeration, it does highlight the fact that, in spite of the 
importance of commerce in mining regions, there have also been spaces where vending and trade 
have been less present, such as the world of the isolated estancias where many huayllinos have 
spent time at some point in their lives.  
In this chapter I have examined issues of work in the mining camps, both inside and 
outside the mine. The discussion here has also touched on a number of everyday-life issues, still 
through the prism of labor. In the next chapter, I move more squarely into a focus on everyday 
life in its own terms, by examining issues of that are essential to social history such as the family, 
marital relations and the home itself, as well as the company interventions into everyday life that 


















THE HOUSEHOLD AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE MINING CAMPS 
 
 In the first chapter of this dissertation I began a reexamination of the social history of 
industrial mining labor in Central Peru, focusing mainly on structural aspects of migration and 
on the transition from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus. As mentioned, my 
intention there was not only to provide historical background for the rest of this dissertation but 
also to push forward the discussion of the history of mining labor in Peru – a topic which has 
largely been absent from recent scholarship on the country. In the second chapter, I examined 
issues of work at the mine, as well as the work involved in the reproduction of the labor force, a 
type of work that is essential to capitalism yet is excluded from the direct sphere of value 
production. In this chapter, I focus on issues of the household as well as more generally everyday 
life in the mining camps.  
There are several reasons for doing this. First of all, in recent years these issues have 
become part of the scholarship not just on mining but on labor in general around the world, yet 
they have not yet been explored for mining labor in Peru. Second, and more generally, the 
history of everyday life in the 20th century is still at an incipient stage in Peru, without a 
significant presence either in scholarship produced inside the country or outside. While there are 
some studies for the colonial and 19th-century periods, historians of 20th-century Peru have not 
yet begun a significant examination of issues of everyday life through sources such as judicial 
(or, for that matter, police) archives. This is especially the case for more rural areas. Lastly, the 
focus of this chapter on the themes of household and community in the mining camps provides a 
link between issues of labor and those having to do with the “local community” – a relationship 
that is central to this dissertation.  Attention to the household necessarily directs us to the ties that 
existed between the mining camp and the workers´ communities of origin. Additionally, it allows 
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us to comprehend the mining camp itself as a local community, one formed through the 
relationship between labor and capital.  
The relationship between households and capital in Latin America has been examined by 
a number of scholars. Two examples, both drawn from cases of transnational enclave production, 
provide contrasting perspectives. In his study of the El Teniente copper mine in Chile during the 
first half of the 20th century, Klubock (1998) examines the shift from a situation of high labor 
turnover and unstable relationships between men and women towards the formation of a 
relatively stable community of male-headed households in the 1930s and 40s. In Klubock´s 
perspective, this change, while conditioned by structural features of the world copper industry, 
was brought about through the active policies of the mining company, which in this way sought 
to obtain workers who would be both more skilled and less rebellious. This included 
interventions into the workers´ non-work lives and forms of recreation as well as the active 
promotion of an ideology of domesticity and the provision of significant incentives for the 
formation of stable male-headed families. Both men and women initially resisted this in different 
ways, but eventually came to accept the new order while reformulating its precepts. Women 
articulated the ideology of domesticity to make claims on their husbands, while both men and 
women built on the newfound stability and cohesion of the community of households to nurture 
a militant working-class culture that forged links with the nationalism and paternalism of the 
Popular Front governments and challenged the company´s power.  
 In contrast, in her study of the “banana zone” of Caribbean Costa Rica during roughly the 
same period, Putnam (2002) argues that attempts at social/moral reform on the part of the United 
Fruit Company or the state were either absent, ineffective, or simply irrelevant to the actual lives 
of men and women. Within the constraints of political economic forces and shifts, migrants 
created autonomous spaces of kinship and survival through multiple overlapping communities 
and relationships. The high labor turnover and unstable relationships that were maintained 
throughout this period suited the needs of capital in Caribbean Costa Rica in a way that they did 
not in the El Teniente mine in Chile after the 1930s. In both cases, however, men and women 
entered into relationships that exchanged men´s economic support for women´s labor of social 
reproduction and for sex. In El Teniente the nature of this “contract” shifted over time, but this 
157 
 
did not alter the unequal nature of the exchange. In Costa Rica, the more transitory nature of 
sexual and marital relationships throughout the period in question, together with the greater 
opportunities for women´s self-support in the informal economy, meant that women had more 
opportunities to shape or escape these unequal exchanges. Violence against women was common 
in both, however, and was shaped both by changing socioeconomic structures as well as by 
ideologies about gender and sexuality.155 The latter was not unrelated to the masculinized work 
culture of the banana plantation and the mine, where women were mostly excluded from wage 
labor in the company and in which the labor of social reproduction was devalued, in spite of its 
centrality to workers´ survival. Whereas according to Klubock women in El Teniente resisted 
this by using the terms provided by the ideology of domesticity, in Putnam´s account women in 
the banana zone protected themselves by forging kinship networks and economic independence 
as well as using the language and ideology of honor.  
 In this chapter, I examine some of the same issues as Klubock and Putnam; concretely, I 
analyze certain aspects of household relations and the social world in the mining camps of the 
Central Highlands – the traditional mining heartland of Peru - in the 20th century. With the 
exception of the final section, I focus primarily on the Huarón mine in Pasco Department - but 
always placing it in its regional and national context, as a particular case of a medium-scale 
mining camp of the Central Highlands. For reasons that have to do both with choice of focus as 
well as with the nature of my sources, I work mostly from the social world up, rather than 
focusing on the capitalist enterprise itself. In this sense my methodological approach is closer to 
Putnam´s than it is to Klubock´s. In the first section, I analyze material from a local 
judicial/dispute-resolution archive from Huayllay District, in the Huarón mine´s sphere of 
influence (and in which around half of the cases – possibly more - involve individuals with a 
direct connection of work or residence to the mine).156 The purpose of this section is to examine 
                                                          
155 Similarly, in her study of relationships between men and women during the Chilean Agrarian Reform, Tinsman 
(2002) argues for the importance of sexuality – as a concept distinct from gender in general – to patriarchal power, 
and to the latter´s intersection with class: “Sexuality should have a centrality to feminist materialist analyses that 
they have often lacked” (Tinsman 2002, 11). 
156 I say “possibly more” because there are a number of cases where people simply don´t state their work or place of 
residence. In any case, the mining camps were the demographic center of the district at this time, and exerted a 
considerable influence over the entirety of the local area. 
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household, marital and family issues at the mining camp – to give an idea of how these 
relationships functioned in a context of migration and wage labor, and of how relations of gender 
and sexuality might have shaped everyday life. I attempt to do a critical and contextual reading 
of the documents as well as work from the topics that are most salient in them, in particular the 
separation of couples as well as monetary exchanges involving support for children. Although 
the archive comes from the Juzgado de Paz of Huayllay District, the majority of marital disputes 
(as opposed to, say, conflicts over property) involve migrants from other regions, and it is on 
those cases that I focus. The temporal focus of this section is on the years 1940-42. While this is 
in part due to the sources that were available to me, there are also other reasons for focusing on 
the 1940s. First, it is a period almost at mid-century, halfway between the eras of labor shortage 
and labor surplus discussed in the previous chapter. Second, given the private nature of the 
material discussed (the fact that it has to do with issues of marital and sexual conflicts voiced 
before a local dispute-resolution authority) I feel that a temporal focus that is somewhat removed 
from the present is less intrusive.  
 In the second and third sections of this chapter, I delve more deeply into issues directly 
involving the mining companies, which are relatively absent from the first section of the chapter. 
I do this through a focus on a very concrete topic: housing and living space, as well as the 
conflicts and tensions that arose from it. This is a crucial issue not just for this chapter but also 
for the rest of my dissertation, since the changes that occurred in Peruvian mining since the 
1990s have involved a reconfiguration of space and of the division between the sphere of 
production and that of reproduction. First, I provide a long-term perspective on mining company 
housing as it developed over the course of the 20th century. Then, I shift to a more dynamic 
approach by examining the ways in which housing emerged as a site of conflict and contestation 
informed by ideologies of civilization and hygiene. In this discussion I look at both Huarón and 
the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. Finally, in the last part of the section I shift fully to the CPC in 
order to examine one key way in which companies attempted to intervene directly into the lives 
of workers and their families: the practice of Social Work, as it developed as part of the labor-
centered paradigm of governmentality in 20th century Peru. After a brief overview of Social 
Work in the mines, I focus on the life history of one particular social worker, whose experiences 
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and perspectives help to illustrate the tensions and complexities involved in the mining 
companies’ relationship with the communities of workers in the mining camps.  
 
Household and marital relations in a mining district: Huarón and Huayllay, 1940-42 
In this section, I use primary documents from an archive in Huayllay to delve deeper into 
the nature of households and family dynamics – in particular marital relations – at the Huarón 
mine at a particular moment in time, the early 1940s. The archive in question is the Huayllay 
Juzgado de Paz – the same one I use in Chapter 1 and in Appendix A to inquire into the locations 
and regions from which people migrated to the Huarón mine. As we noted there, this archival 
material pertains to Huayllay district as a whole, not just to the Huarón mine. Most cases, 
however, denote at least a partial connection to the mine, and it is primarily on these that I will 
focus. To put it simply, 62 cases (63.3%) out of the total 98 cases in the 1940-42 actas from the 
Juzgado de Paz have at least one party to the dispute (and usually both parties) with a direct 
connection to the Huarón mine – either because they stated that they worked there and/or resided 
in one of the company’s camps. I discuss this at somewhat greater length in Appendix B.  
 What are the cases about? Of the 98 cases in the 1940-42 book of minutes from the 
Huayllay Juzgado, 60 cases (61.2%) involve disputes either between husbands and wives or, 
more commonly, between convivientes – a man and a woman living together without legal or 
church marriage. These disputes include everything from separation and the recognition of 
children by their fathers to - less commonly - accusations of infidelity and/or domestic violence. 
Some of the other cases include spouses as well, but in those they are usually on the same side, 
against a common adversary who has offended or harmed them in some way; the 60 cases 
involving couples, on the other hand, are those in which a dispute between individuals involved 
in a relationship of marriage or of convivencia – either in the present or in the past - is the main 
cause for coming before the Juez de Paz. The 38 non-couples cases, meanwhile, have to do with 
either physical fights, accusations of theft, or most commonly, slander and defamation of 
character (injuria, difamación) – the latter, though, often having to do with issues of sexuality as 
well. If we look at the 62 cases with a stated explicit connection to the Huarón mine (either 
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through residence or employment of at least one of the two parties involved), we find that 43 of 
these cases (69.4%) involve disputes between couples. Among the 36 cases without a stated 
explicit connection to the Huarón mine, we find that only 19 cases (52.8%) involve disputes 
between couples.  
 The prevalence of cases involving issues of marriage, convivencia and sexual relations is 
not limited to the 1940s, but persists to the present, according to Vicente Morales, the assistant 
juez de paz whom I interviewed in Huayllay in 2010. Don Vicente, an elder huayllino and former 
mine worker, answered my question about what types of cases he sees most often:  
Within the juzgado there are many complaints. Most of all, [they are] about abandonment 
by the husband, the wife, we see that there is resentment, they separate, the children are 
left helpless, so then a few months go by and they request child support [pensión de 
alimento].  
He saw Huayllay´s status as a mining area as one factor contributing to the prevalence of cases 
of abandonment and unstable relationships:  
Also here as a place of work, we have living among the population, personnel from two 
companies, both Huarón and Chungar. So then they, always, as men, they utilize the girls, 
and then once they´re already pregnant there it all goes off-balance, they go away to their 
towns, the girls are left here with a child. That´s a big problem here... That happens a lot, 
since they are people from other places [gente ajena]. And at the same time they come 
like that, having a wife, and here they deceive the girls... For example here people work 
who are from Huancayo, from Lima, from Arequipa, Trujillo. From everywhere. The 
company, people who have a role in the company, who know how to operate jumbos, 
drills, all that, prepared people come. But here they pass for single, but in their home 
town they are married.  
Don Vicente’s statement evokes what is perhaps a stereotyped vision of mining town life, 
even if it is also one based at least in part on his own knowledge and experience as both a local 
resident and as a person who regularly arbitrates such disputes. In one sense, in his comments 
local women are portrayed as victims who are duped and betrayed. However, as he himself made 
clear to me (and as we will see for the 1940s), not all cases of conflicts between couples are like 
this; many of the disputes involve the separation of men and women who have been together for 
some time (and who are no longer so young). Furthermore, not all cases involve men who have a 
wife back home and who pass for single – that is simply one particular type of case. 
Nevertheless, Don Vicente’s comments do highlight the conflictive link that has historically 
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existed between mining (an industry with very particular gender dynamics), sexuality and family 
relations.  
 Returning to the 1940s, the Juzgado de Paz cases provide a window into the nature of 
households, families and relationships between men and women at the mine, as well as into the 
frames and concepts through which such relationships were articulated and understood. This 
window is partial and does not result in a representative sample.  As we will see, of the 60 
spousal disputes in the 1940-42 files, only 9 cases (14.8%) are between individuals who are 
married to each other (casados) either by the Church or the state. Of the other 51 spousal cases, 
the vast majority are between former or current convivientes. This contrasts with the 1940 census 
which shows more married adults than convivientes in Pasco department (by a 3:2 ratio). 
Although the census figures likely overestimate marriage rates, and in any case lump Huarón and 
Huayllay together with a much larger area, the contrast between the two figures shows that the 
juzgado archive privileges convivencias. Furthermore, it privileges those convivencias that were 
marked by dissension and that often ended in dissolution or abandonment. Nevertheless, by 
using these sources critically, and by keeping in mind the larger context, we can gain some 
insight into the nature of the households that existed at the mine, how they were formed and 
dissolved. This will in turn allow us to better understand the relationship between industrial labor 
at the mine, on the one hand, and the work of reproduction of labor power, on the other, as well 
as the relationship between the mining enclave and its surroundings. Before we delve into these 
issues, it is necessary to briefly discuss in more detail the nature of the archive, its characteristics 
and its limitations, given that it constitutes an important source for this chapter. 
The nature of the source: The Juzgado de Paz 
 The Juzgado de Paz is an important institution in Peru. In general terms, the Juez de Paz 
is someone who resolves disputes and fulfills certain judicial functions at a local level, but who 
is not a professional judge or lawyer but rather a local resident appointed to the position for a 
limited period of time. Although there is probably a great deal of variation across the country, 
my interviews and conversations with two Jueces de paz (in the communities of Huayllay and 
Yarusyacán, both in Pasco), as well as the hundreds of records of cases I have reviewed in 
Huayllay, paint a picture that is largely consistent with legal scholar Hans Jurgen Brandt´s 1990 
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study of the Juzgado de Paz as an institution. Jueces de paz are officially part of the national 
justice system, and try to abide by rules and procedures encoded in law, but they are often also 
part of a local space, where they know people by name and are in touch with local customs and 
norms. In both Huayllay and Yarusyacán the Juez de paz is elected in the communal assembly; 
both of the judges I got to know were older members of their communities, who had only 
attended elementary school but who had gained wide-ranging experience as adults – in their case 
working at various mines as well as other pursuits. Brandt writes that at a national level, the 
Juzgado de paz is the sphere of the justice system that is most frequently visited by people on the 
lower end of the socioeconomic scale; more economically powerful groups go to the professional 
judges of the higher courts – usually located in departmental capitals or other important cities. At 
the time of his study, there were 4,049 jueces de paz in Peru, versus 1,239 professional judges; 
the non-professionals thus comprised 77% of the total number of judges in the country (Brandt, 
1990, 87).   
 Brandt´s observations on the functioning of the Juzgado de Paz pertain to the 1980s, 
however. Do they apply to the years from which the cases discussed here come? Certainly, as a 
part of the justice system, the institution of the Juzgado de Paz would have reflected the local 
and regional configuration of power. In areas where power was exercised in a highly unequal and 
despotic manner, the Juez de Paz would have been likely to side with the powerful, whether 
landlords or town dwellers vis-a-vis rural people. Indeed, in a well-known 1888 speech, Peruvian 
radical writer Manuel Gonzáles Prada had denounced “the tyranny of the juez de paz, the 
gobernador and the priest, that trinity which brutalizes the Indian.” In the early 20th century, 
local and regional authorities such as the gobernador157 and the prefecto were those charged with 
suppressing rural unrest, recruiting labor for public works and generally reinforcing the local 
system of power; it is likely that jueces de paz often fulfilled similar functions. Yet it does seem 
like in Huayllay at least, by the time the documents cited here were produced, the Juzgado de 
Paz was less like that described by González Prada and more like that found in the district today 
and described for the national level by Brandt. No doubt this had to do both with the specific 
social characteristics of the area (as opposed to other parts of the country) and with changes in 
                                                          
157 Not a governor in the U.S. sense but rather the district-level official charged with security and law enforcement. 
The prefecto would fulfill a similar function at the departmental level. To this day, the gobernador is still chosen 
from above by the national government; the position of prefecto, on the other hand, no longer exists. 
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the local power structure that took place in the first part of the century: the formation of the 
comunidad de indígenas and the play of forces (such as mining wage work) that tended to erode 
previous social inequalities based on access to land and traditional social distinctions. All this 
was in spite of the inequalities that persisted between the population of Huayllay and, on the one 
hand, the mining company, and on the other, the large and medium-sized haciendas (El Diezmo, 
Huasca, Racracancha) that encroached on the comunidad´s lands.  
While the owners of these haciendas and mining companies still had undue influence at 
the departmental and national levels at mid-century, this was less true at the local district level. 
Although several of the district mayors during the 20th century were officials of the mining 
company – a common situation in mining regions where companies wielded significant influence 
- other local authorities were members of the comunidad de indígenas of Huayllay. For example, 
such was the case of Alejandro López Guerreros, who became gobernador of the district in 
1954, and who later, as personero of the comunidad in the 1960s, led the campaign to recover 
communal lands from the haciendas.158 Similarly, Santiago Pajuelo, who served as juez de paz in 
the early 1940s, later appears as litigant in a case himself, when in 1949 he denounced that two 
employees of the Hacienda El Diezmo (owned by the Lercari family, possessors of several 
estates in Pasco Department) had attacked his two young children while they were pasturing their 
animals near the border between the comunidad land and the hacienda. The hacienda employees 
had requisitioned the animals - twenty llamas and two horses – apparently claiming that the land 
belonged to the hacienda. Here the former juez de paz appears not as an ally of the hacendados 
but rather as their adversary in a typical conflict between hacienda and comunidad members over 
access to land. 
 The Juzgado de Paz material from Huayllay thus constitutes an archive that must be 
understood in the context of its particular social conditions. In a sense, the social world into 
which it introduces us occupies an intermediate position, located between the national extremes 
represented by urban elites and middle classes on the one hand, and by the most socially 
excluded rural areas on the other. As noted above, the Juzgado de Paz today is not an institution 
                                                          
158 This particular bit of information comes from a late 1980s publication by the community of Huayllay, given to 
me by Dalia Roque, who was one of the people involved in the edition. It contains a short biography of Alejandro 
López Guerreros and a few other community leaders. 
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frequented by the middle or upper classes of Peruvian society, who, as Brandt writes, “never go 
to the juez de paz no letrado to resolve their conflicts (Brandt 203).” This was already the case in 
Huayllay District in 1940-42 – hacendados and hacienda employees are absent from the record 
(except in a very few cases where they are denounced by people from the community), even 
though there were still several small and medium-sized haciendas in and near the district at the 
time. Nor do the French managers and engineers from the mining company air their own 
interpersonal disputes before the juez de paz. Brandt sees a geographical specificity to the 
institution, in the sense that the juez de paz tends to be a more important figure in rural areas and 
in the highlands: 
In traditional areas the custom of couples going to see the juez de paz to seek mediation 
in the conflict is more widespread. This custom fades away with the process of the 
“modernization” of society (Ibid., 207). 
Brandt writes that “in the highlands especially, this custom is very deep-rooted, regardless of the 
level of ´development´ of each location” (Ibid., 209). However, although this may have been the 
case at the time of his writing (the 1980s), it´s not clear that everyone in the highlands always 
had access to the Juez de Paz in their locality. Earlier in the century, did rural people go to the 
Juez de Paz in those regions where semi-feudal relations were most entrenched, just like they did 
in places like Huayllay that were undergoing significant social and economic transformations? 
What about those places where the language gap between a Quechua-speaking community and 
the Spanish-language judicial system (of which the Juzgado was ultimately a part) was greater 
than in Huayllay?159 Even in Huayllay district itself, people living in the camps of the Vanadium 
company are underrepresented in relation to those living and working in Huarón – only one of 
the 1940-42 cases involves someone at the former company, even though according to the 1940 
census the Vanadium camps accounted for almost 19% of the district´s population. This shows 
that, for whatever reason, not everyone had the same level of access to or connection with the 
                                                          
159 By most accounts, the population of Huayllay District in the 1940s would have been mostly bilingual, with a 
minority but significant sector of Quechua speakers who did not also speak Spanish. However, there is no explicit 
mention of linguistic diversity in the Juzgado cases I have examined. The cases consist of notes taken by the Juez de 
Paz or his assistant, and some of them could very well include translations from Quechua. As I note later on in this 
chapter, it is possible that the label analfabeto (illiterate) used in some of the cases might be referring to a linguistic 
difference rather than simply to the inability to read and write.  
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Juzgado. Thus, the Juzgado is not a direct, all-encompassing window into the life of the district, 
but, read critically, it can provide important evidence.  
 Moreover, although, as shown above, the Juez de Paz was not simply an ally of the 
hacendados, the mining company or regional elites, this does not mean that the Juzgado was an 
egalitarian space. On the contrary, the Juez de Paz was a figure of local authority, alongside 
others such as the gobernador and the teniente gobernador. Although it seems that, as today, 
many people saw the Juzgado as a relatively effective way to resolve disputes or to obtain some 
minimum degree of security (for example child support), the Juez was also someone who 
admonished and who threatened punishment if agreements were not kept or his directives not 
followed.160 As a few of the case transcripts show, he also occasionally had to collaborate with 
the gobernador or with a representative of the guardia civil161 to seek out and apprehend 
individuals who disobeyed his authority.162 The authority invested in the Juez by the national 
judicial system no doubt merged with local, communal and patriarchal forms of authority and 
power. On the one hand, a lot of the cases are brought forth by women, seeking support for their 
children or denouncing bad treatment on the part of their husband or conviviente; in that sense, 
the Juzgado seems to have been a space that provided women a minimum of leverage in their 
relationships. On the other hand, the Juez was always male,163 and in any case the notions and 
criteria that he worked with were derived from national codes and local custom that were not, on 
                                                          
160 It´s not clear whether these punishments were always enacted or whether they were simply threats. In his analysis 
of Juzgado de Paz cases concerning marriage agreements, Brandt argues that the stern warnings are usually just 
threats: “It must be noted that the juez de paz at certain moments utilizes intimidating phrases towards the 
intervening parties... According the information supplied by the jueces, this intimidation – which has no legal basis – 
is not carried out. It would not be possible to legally sanction the infraction; such non-fulfillment, however, entails 
something more serious: the contempt of the members of the community towards the person who does not fulfill the 
agreement” (Brandt 1990, 321). 
161 The Civil Guard, one of several arms of the police in Peru for much of the 20th century, merged into the National 
Police of Peru in the late 1980s.  
162 See the case of Melesio Guzmán and Isabel Quispe, later in this chapter. 
163 At least in all the cases I have and in all the information I have from the early and mid-20th century. In terms of 
contemporary jueces de paz, I have encountered one woman who was occupying this position, in a working-class 
neighborhood of Huancayo that sprung up as the result of a planned takeover of unused lands in the 1980s. She was 
the wife of a former worker at the state mining company and had been active in the mining women´s movement in 
the 1980s.  
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the whole, egalitarian in terms of gender, even if both contained certain elements that could be 
used in women´s favor.  
Furthermore, although we cannot see all (or most of) the ways in which gender structured 
the interactions before, during and after the appearance before the Juez de Paz, there are a few 
clues in the case minutes. Men usually appear alone before the Juez (or at least, no 
accompanying relative is mentioned), while women are often accompanied by a relative (often 
their father or mother), who is explicitly mentioned in the notes. This is particularly true in 
disputes involving people from the local area, as opposed to women who were from outside and 
who do often appear on their own. Moreover, in the 1940-42 cases, there is a stark difference in 
how men and women certify their participation and agreement in the case minutes – men almost 
always sign their names, while women almost always place their fingerprint on the page and/or 
have a man (their relative or one of the witnesses present) sign on their behalf. Accompanying 
the signature is usually a phrase such as “on behalf of [woman´s name], who doesn´t know how 
to sign, I will do it” (a ruego de ____, por no saber firmar, lo hago yo). This is related to the 
significant gender gap that existed in the process – already underway at this time, for men – by 
which schooling and literacy were becoming more common in rural areas and small towns in the 
Central Highlands as in several other parts of the country.  
 The Huayllay Juzgado de Paz records are different from the judicial documents used by 
historians like Hunefeldt (2000) and Christiansen (2004). They have worked with materials from 
larger, more formal courts: conjugal suits from Lima´s archbishopric (at a time when marriage 
was strictly an ecclesiastical matter in Peru), in Hunefeldt´s case, and criminal trials from the law 
courts in Cajamarca (northern Peru), housed in the departmental archive. Thus, although their 
documents are older (from the 19th century), they are often longer and more extensive, since they 
include written materials that were prepared by the different parties to disputes – or by the 
scribes who wrote on their behalf – over the period of time that the trial or suit lasted. That is not 
the case with the Juzgado de Paz; these were oral sessions in which the parties aired out their 
disputes and either the juez or an assistant took notes and drew up an acta or record of the 
agreement that had been arrived at – these minutes and records of agreements are the only traces 
167 
 
that get preserved from each case.164 In essence, they constitute summaries of what the parties to 
the dispute have said, filtered through the juez or the notetaker. Thus, the language tends to be 
formulaic, with the same phrases repeating themselves from case to case. This is especially true 
at the beginning and end of each case; in the middle, however, the specifics of each litigant´s 
version of events are recorded, giving more individuality to each case and allowing us a 
(mediated) glimpse into the concerns motivating each party to the dispute as well as the 
strategies through which they hope to obtain the desired result. Sometimes, the narrative shifts 
abruptly into first person, reflecting more closely the words used by the litigants.  
 The Juzgado de Paz is also different not only in the kind of documentation that it 
produces, but also in the nature of the decisions that are made. In a sense, it is more of a dispute-
resolution mechanism, backed by local and patriarchal as well as judicial authority, than a 
regular law court in which judges emit sentences. As Brandt writes in his discussion of cases 
involving couples, 
When the parties – be it the couple itself or their relatives – go to the juez de paz or the 
teniente gobernador, they do not have the intention of bringing about a formal accusation 
(for example, a criminal prosecution in the case of domestic abuse).  That is, they are not 
thinking of a trial that ends in a sentence, instead what they seek is the mediation of the 
authority so as to attempt to reestablish the balance that has been lost in the relationship. 
The majority of accusations and suits are the legal coating of an interest that is not 
attended to in the law codes: mediation among different points of view, negotiation 
among different interests, moral support and pressure to fulfill local social and cultural 
norms. The objective is not to obtain a juridical treatment of each aspect of the conflict, 
but rather a global solution, an agreement, and harmony between the parties (Brandt 
1990, 218; my translation).  
Although Brandt may have an idealized image of equilibrium and balance in the relationship and 
in the community, and although he bases his analysis on a reading of cases from later in the 
century (as well as on interviews with Jueces de Paz in the 1980s), his comments do reflect 
certain aspects that pertain to the cases from Huayllay, even in the 1940s. Many of the cases 
carry a heading like Acta de conciliación de mutuo acuerdo (Record of conciliation by mutual 
                                                          
164 In his 1938 Manual para Jueces de Paz, Peruvian legal scholar Felipe S. Guerra makes this clear: “The jueces de 
paz will not admit any written materials in the verbal cases, nor in the conciliation cases... and will limit themselves 
to extending by means of an acta, the summary of the circumstances of the case, as a mere record of what they have 
heard verbally from all the individuals who have attended the judicial act” (Guerra 1938, 16).  
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accord). They almost always conclude with an agreement between the parties rather than a 
sentence by the Juez – even if the latter´s watchful eye and authority (and threats of punishment 
for non-compliance) are ever-present, and constitute the reason for bringing the dispute into this 
space rather than attempting to resolve it out in the open.  
Furthermore, the sources of law were also different for the Juzgado de Paz as opposed to 
the professional law courts such as the Juzgados de Primera Instancia in the provincial capitals. 
The Huayllay Juez de Paz certainly operated within the framework of national law, as codified in 
the Civil Code and other bodies of law, but it seems clear he also went beyond it, basing his 
work on local and regional customs and norms as well as official law. This helps to explain why 
so many of the 1940-42 cases from Huayllay have to do with the separation of common-law 
partners (convivientes), when no provision for this type of union (or its dissolution) existed in the 
Peruvian Civil Code until 1984 (though the Code did of course address the recognition of 
children born outside of wedlock, including those born in what we would term convivencias). As 
Brandt writes, “the Juez de Paz does not only admit proceedings specified in the Civil Code and 
the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in a sui generis manner [admits] those that have their basis 
in customary law, such as the actas of marriage and the separation of convivientes” (Ibid., 
317).This foundation in unwritten, customary norms would have been even more the case in 
earlier years, before the last few decades when there have been some efforts to provide official 
training to the Jueces de Paz in each region. 
Short-term and long-term relationships, marriage and convivencia: historical and regional 
contexts 
 Just as it does not include all sectors of the district´s population equally, the archive also 
does not provide a representative sample of all types of marriage or kinship relationships. A 
judicial or dispute-resolution institution naturally privileges conflict, rupture and dissension over 
stability and amity. If treated uncritically, this can lead the analyst to over-emphasize the former 
at the expense of the latter. On the other hand, this kind of archive can provide a useful 
supplement to other kinds of evidence – in particular, life histories collected by anthropologists 
and oral history researchers, which tend to focus on long-term, more or less stable relationships 
and families. Such is the case in the life histories analyzed by Mallon (1983) in her discussion of 
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migration from the community of Acolla to the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the 
early 20th century (Mallon 1983 254-263). In general, anthropologists of rural areas, especially 
those influenced by Chayanovian and other models of the household, tend to emphasize 
continuity and the reproduction of the family life cycle over time. While this is understandable 
and certainly useful, it can also lead one to overlook less stable relationships, which become 
particularly important in situations of migration, flux and social change. In this sense, archives 
produced in the context of judicial systems and the resolution of disputes can provide a useful 
corrective and provide an interesting and different perspective on everyday life. The use of 
judicial archives to examine topics related to family, gender relations and sexuality has grown 
more common in other countries in recent years, becoming an important methodology of social 
history and related fields. Most historians have utilized materials from professional law courts or 
police files rather than the kind of dual institution that the Juzgado de Paz represents in a place 
like Huayllay – at once a dispute-resolution mechanism ran by (certain) local people and a part 
of the national justice system. In Peru, however, work on social, family and gender history 
through judicial sources is still in its incipient stages, especially for the 20th century.  
 In the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz cases from 1940-42, most unions are described as 
convivencias and a few are described as marriages. In Peru as in much of Latin America, 
convivencia refers to a man and a woman living together without formal Church or civil 
marriage, and is usually translated into English as “consensual union.” When I interviewed the 
assistant Juez de Paz of Huayllay in 2010, he explained to me that only convivientes could come 
to him to resolve disputes; married couples had to go to the higher court, located in Cerro de 
Pasco and presided over by a professional judge. I do not know whether it is really true that 
married couples are completely excluded from use of the Juzgado in actual practice today. They 
were not in 1940-42; the cases from those years include several marital disputes between 
individuals who state they are married (casado/a). Namely, of the 60 cases involving disputes 
between couples, 9 cases (15%) are between people who are said to be married to one another at 
the time of the dispute. In 51 of the cases (85%), the man and woman involved in the marital 
dispute are either explicitly said to be current or former convivientes (most common) or, in a few 
cases, they are said to be “single” (soltero/a) but described as living together in a conjugal-type 
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relationship, which in essence makes them convivientes.165 These percentages are not by any 
means representative of the proportions of convivencias vs. married couples in the areas; they are 
simply an illustration of the types of cases and the types of individuals who tended to visit the 
Juzgado de Paz. As we can see, although technically married couples may not have been 
supposed to use the services of the Juez de Paz, in practice some of them did.166  
 The distinction between marriage and convivencia, and between short-term and long-term 
relationships, is a complicated one. In recent years, numerous historians of Latin America have 
examined everyday constructions of marriage, sexuality and honor for both the colonial and post-
independence periods. Using judicial, notarial and police documents, they have highlighted the 
power and influence of official moral codes as well as the reformulation and transformation of 
these codes in everyday practice, especially among plebeian sectors. In Peru, national laws until 
the early 20th century recognized marriage as a religious sacrament rather than a civil contract; 
civil marriage did not become even a possibility for most of the population until after 1918 
(Hunefeldt 2000, 83-86).167 Yet although Catholic Church marriage had been the official, state-
sanctioned ideal since the time of the Conquest, in practice convivencia was very common in 
Peru, as in much of Latin America.   As Christiansen (2004) writes, “regardless of institutional 
attempts to encourage formal marriage, it is generally accepted that common-law marriage was 
the norm for many in colonial and nineteenth-century Latin America” (57).  
 In fact, such common-law unions had deep roots in medieval Spain, where they were 
known as barraganías. These were supposed to be more or less stable and seem to have involved 
the drafting of a written agreement, often in the presence of a notary or scribe. As Spanish legal 
scholar and historian Francisco Martínez Marina wrote in 1808, regarding earlier times, 
Barraganía was not a vague, indeterminate or arbitrary liaison; it was founded on a 
contract of friendship and company, whose principal conditions were permanence and 
                                                          
165 In 2 cases (3%), it is not clear whether they are married or not. 
166 In fact, people often went to the Juzgado with different kinds of issues that were technically not within the Juez´s 
legal purview For example, with transactions involving property, it was not uncommon for people to state that they 
come to the Juzgado “due to the lack of a notary.” There is another book of cases, from 1937-41, which I have also 
examined; it is primarily devoted to property transactions and related issues. 
167 As Hunefeldt explains, civil marriage technically existed since 1897 and even earlier, but it was only performed 
in a few provinces and was mostly reserved for non-Catholics and foreigners. 
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fidelity... The frequency with which the local laws [fueros] talk about barraganas, both 
among clerics and laymen, and even among married individuals, as well as their 
provisions and civil laws about the conservation, subsistence and rights of children and 
mothers, shows how universal the custom was (Martínez Marina 1808, Libro Sexto, 21-
22; my translation). 
Laws and customs regarding barraganía were actually codified in the Siete Partidas, the highly 
influential 13th-century Castilian legal code, which stated that   
Holy Church forbids that any Christian man have barraganas, for to live with them is 
mortal sin. But the wise men of old who made the laws permitted that some men might 
have them without civil penalty, for they held that it was a lesser evil to live with one 
woman than many, and that the paternity of the children would be more certain 
(translated by and quoted in Borah and Cook, 1966, 950).168 
Although barraganía is a term that has fallen into disuse, the institution was in a sense the 
antecedent of modern Latin American convivencia. Hunefeldt writes that “from early in the 
colonial period, barraganía was an accepted form of marriage with the advantage or 
disadvantage (depending on who was asked) of avoiding the once-and-forever clause in Catholic 
vows” (Hunefeldt 2000, 106). In those days long before the modern institution of civil marriage, 
barraganía was a civil institution somewhat resembling marriage. However, Peru´s first Civil 
Code, issued in 1852 and based partly on the Napoleonic Code, contains no mention of either 
barraganía – unlike the Spanish medieval laws of the Siete Partidas – or, for that matter, 
convivencia. In fact, already the first project for a Civil Code for Peru, in 1834, had explicitly 
criticized the Siete Partidas for their tolerance toward barraganía.169 The Civil Code of 1936, 
like that of 1852, also ignored this type of union, and it wasn´t until the 1979 Constitution and 
                                                          
168 In the Spanish original (1807 edition): “Barraganas defiende santa eglesia que non tenga ningunt cristiano, 
porque viven con ellas en pecado mortal. Pero los antiguos que fecieron las leyes consintieron que algunos las 
podiesen haber sin pena temporal, porque tovieron que era menos mal de haber una que muchas, et porque los fijos 
que nasciesen dellas fuesen mas ciertos” (Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso El Sabio, Tomo III, Partida Quarta, 
Título XIV. Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1807, p.85).  
169 This was M.L. Vidaurre´s Proyecto del Código Civil Peruano (1834). After quoting a section of the Siete 
Partidas that mentioned barraganía, Vidaurre argued: “Those who celebrate the customs and good morals of the 
ancient Spaniards, and ponder the corruption and reduction in morals [desmoralización] of our days, should pay 
attention to this and other similar specimens [monumentos]. It will be seen then, that concubinage [amancebamiento] 
was permitted, and rewarded over other, less scandalous unions.  Title 13 of the fourth partida is a shame [baldón – 
shame, affront] for Spain. It deals with barraganas, and says in the introduction, that although the Church has 
prohibited them for all Christians, the wise men realized that it was better to have one, than many” (Vidaurre 1834, 
204-205; my translation).  
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the 1984 Civil Code that convivencia was legally recognized and the rights and responsibilities it 
entailed specified.  
The changes in civil and ecclesiastical laws and attitudes do not necessarily imply a 
change in people´s behavior, however. In her discussion of 19th-century Lima, Hunefeldt 
highlights this gap between official doctrine and everyday practice: 
According to the church, sex should take place within marriage; premarital and 
extramarital sex were condemned. However, illegitimacy rates in Lima remained high 
throughout the nineteenth century, indicating a serious weakness in the church´s control 
over this intimate sphere of life. A high percentage of Lima´s inhabitants did not comply 
with the church´s sexual and courtship rules – or at least failed to follow the dictated 
schedule for rites of sexual passage – instead marrying after having had sexual relations, 
and even after having one or more children, or not marrying at all (Hunefeldt 2000, 179). 
This by no means implies that the preoccupation with honor, well-documented in Latin 
American historiography, was not present here. As Chambers (1999) has argued in her study of 
urban Arequipa, Peru, the 19th-century saw a shift from an elitist towards a more egalitarian, 
republican conception of honor that was tied to conduct rather than to status. But although the 
link between honor and women´s sexuality continued to be central, the stress was placed on 
long-term faithfulness rather than on virginity at marriage:   
Plebeian women, like elite women, were expected to conform to gendered notions of 
honor, although sexual fidelity after marriage was more important than chastity 
beforehand. As long as a single woman was involved in a long-term relationship with a 
reasonable expectation of marriage, she could still claim that her conduct was honorable 
(Chambers 1999, 177). 
In a similar but more emphatic vein, Christiansen, in her study of late-19th century Cajamarca 
(northern Peru), stresses the way in which people viewed long-term convivencias as not too 
different from formal marriage: 
Popular attitudes reveal little prejudice against what official ideology labeled ´illicit 
sexual relations;´ on the contrary, many common-law unions functioned as permanent 
unions...The population at large did not endorse the state´s strict differentiation between 
formal and common-law marriage. On the contrary, most lower-class people treated 
informal unions much the same as marriage (Christiansen 2004; 56-69).  
This pattern, certainly to be found in Peru today, has coexisted with a parallel tendency to value 
Church (and later civil) marriage as more prestigious than informal union, and to attach a slightly 
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pejorative valence to the term convivencia. The balance between these two tendencies has varied 
historically depending on class and location as well as on social and economic changes over 
time.  
 If at the national level a gap has traditionally existed between official, elite discourses 
and popular practice around morality, sexuality and honor, for rural and indigenous Andean 
populations in particular there has been a gulf between local marriage practices and outsiders´ 
(mis)perceptions of them. Sensationalized images of and discourses about Andean sexuality and 
marriage appear periodically to this day;170 though not exclusively, they have often centered on 
the supposed institution of “trial marriage,”171 known variously as servinakuy, watanaki or by 
other terms.172 Though without the sensationalism, early anthropologists of the Andes (in the 
mid-20th century) still maintained the concept of “trial marriage.” As W.E. Carter wrote in 1977, 
“trial marriage has long fired the imagination of Andean scholars” (Carter 1977, 177). On the 
basis of his own fieldwork in Bolivia as well as that of other contemporary anthropologists like 
Ralph Bolton and Xavier Albó, Carter argued that what had been interpreted as “trial marriage” 
was simply one step in the multi-stage, complex series of rituals that constituted marriage in 
many Andean communities and that could extend over a period of years. That particular step did 
often involve cohabitation (before the Church wedding component of the marriage process), but 
                                                          
170 For example, in film depictions (such as the 2006 Madeinusa) and in common statements by urban or middle-
class people.  
171 Writing about “trial marriage” in 1965, U.S. anthropologist Richard Price highlighted “the more than four 
centuries of active opposition by the Church and ridicule by the non-Indian highland population.” He argues that 
“although Peruvian folklorists rarely tire of this quaint subject, we have yet to read an adequate description or 
analysis” (Price 1965, 310, 314). 
172 One particularly crass example of such sensationalized misperception comes from Huayllay itself. In 1915, the 
Compagnie des Mines de Huaron hired Ernest Godet, a Swiss engineer, to oversee the harnessing of the area´s lakes 
for the mine´s water needs and to build a first hydroelectric plant. Godet, who had a family connection to the 
University of Neuchatel, wrote an article for the Bulletin de la Société Neuchateloise de Géographie, in which he 
attempted a geographic and ethnographic description of the area around the Huaron mine (commonly called 
Huancavelica at the time – again, not to be confused with the department of the same name in south-central Peru). 
Godet´s article is permeated with superficial impressions and commonly-held prejudices from the time. On the 
subject of marriage, he writes: “In the Huancavelica region people practice free love par excellence; all the 
formalities of marriage are reduced to the following: I like you, come live with me; you no longer suit me, go 
away!” He later nuances this by adding a reference to Church marriage and “trial marriage,” but again in a 
sensationalist way: “In certain cases, when the family has maintained a few Christian beliefs,   the young Indian who 
desires to marry will request the intervention of a priest; however, before asking for the blessing of the Church, he 
will sometimes seek permission... on a trial basis (!) for a period of time to be discussed” (Godet 1918, 177-179; my 
translation – ellipsis and exclamation point in the original). 
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only as part of a structured, long-term series of transitions in which permission from family 
members was a crucial (and ritualized) element: 
In all societies, marriage implies public recognition, by means of a prescribed ritual, of 
the fact that two individuals have begun a new way of life. We are accustomed to 
associating such recognition with a single rite. Perhaps this is because a single rite 
suffices in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Could it be our ethnocentric perspective that has 
led us to seek an analogous single rite to validate the marriage contract in other societies? 
Could it be that Andean trial marriage has nothing trial about it at all, but is merely the 
first of a series of interrelated life crisis rituals, none of which can stand alone, but all of 
which contribute to the sealing of the marital bond?” (Ibid., 211)173 
 
The legal category of convivencia, as recorded in judicial, census and other records, would thus 
tend to lump together a stage of the marriage process in Andean communities, as described by 
Carter, with all other forms of cohabitation in national society as a whole. Carter´s discussion 
directs our attention to certain general features of rural and indigenous Andean forms of marriage 
that have been misunderstood by outside observers. Actual marriage practices in Andean 
communities have varied greatly, not only in terms of ritual – as described by Price (1965), 
Carter (1977), Bolton (1977), Valderrama and Escalante (1998) and others - but also as regards 
the presence of the Church and state, the level of integration into the broader society, and the 
ways in which socioeconomic changes over time transform the opportunities and constraints 
faced by women and men. 
 Although ethnographies of the Central Highlands of Peru have paid extensive attention to 
issues such as the household, reciprocity and the relationship between kinship and commerce, 
they have focused less on the meanings, rituals and forms of marriage. This is consistent with the 
general tendency of scholarship on the Central Highlands to foreground questions of political 
economy and economic anthropology rather than issues of culture and meaning as in the more 
uniformly Quechua-speaking southern highlands of Peru. Examining the areas from which 
                                                          
173 In terms of the “trial” aspect of “trial marriage,” already in 1965 Price had written about watanaki in Vicos: “the 
possibility of separation, despite its actual infrequency, lends the institution the flavor of a trial period which many 
commentators have mistaken for its sole function” (Price 1965, 320). On the basis of Price´s data and Mishkin´s 
1946 estimations, Carter wrote: “If accurate, such figures reveal two important facts: 1) separation can and does 
occur both during the watanaki and after formal marriages; and 2) for both the incidence is so low that when one 
compares it with separation and divorce figures from U.S. society, [one] is forced to ask whether it is the Andean 




people migrated to the Huarón mine (and to other mines in the region), however, we can get 
some idea of the relationship between Church/civil marriage and convivencia in these locations 
at different points in time. In his study of the Mantaro Valley community of Muquiyauyo – 
which at the time of his research (1949-50) was sending many of its young men to Huarón – 
Adams (1959) does not delve into these issues in great detail, but provides some general 
impressions: 
Most of the couples living together in Muquiyauyo are married, but there are some who 
live in common-law marriage; they are referred to as convivientes... Some informants 
claimed that there were no cases of common-law marriage in Muquiyauyo, but I 
encountered a few in my surveys (Adams 1959, 160).174  
It is possible that Adams may have underestimated the prevalence of convivencia, or not paid 
enough attention to the complex relationship between convivencia and marriage. On the other 
hand, as we will see shortly, the rate of formal marriages does seem to have been higher in the 
Mantaro Valley than in other areas of the Central Highlands at this time.  
 In their examination of two towns in the highlands of Lima department, Bourque and 
Warren (1981) devote a greater share of their attention to issues involving conjugal relations. 
Their study, which focuses on the interaction between local structures underlying women´s 
subordination, on the one hand, and processes of integration into coastal and national society, on 
the other, is based on research carried out in the late 1960s and 1970s in Mayobamba and 
Chiuchin – the first a comunidad campesina, the second a crossroads trading town. The two are 
located in the general area of the northern Lima highlands from which a number of migrants 
came to the Huarón mine at certain points in the 20th century. Furthermore, some of the villages 
in the immediate vicinity of Mayobamba and Chiuchin, such as Tongos, Maray and Paccho, 
maintained traditional exchange relations with Huayllay, the community on whose territory the 
mine is located – i.e., they were destinations for the llama caravans that came from Huayllay to 
exchange their clay pots for local maize (see Chapter 1). Thus, it can be reasonably said that the 
area was not only proximate but maintained some direct connection with Huayllay and the area 
                                                          
174 According to Adams, between 20 and 30 percent of births registered in the district records were out of wedlock; 
he furthermore argued that “no condemnation is attached to an illegitimate child” (Ibid.).  
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around the Huarón mine.175 In their discussion of marriage, Bourque and Warren highlight the 
contrast between past and present practices;  
In the Chiuchin-Mayobamba region, local communities regulated marriage practices in 
the past through mechanisms such as trial marriage, arranged marriages, and the use of 
powerful intermediaries for marital negotiations between families. In many areas, trial 
marriage practices (called servinacuy) died out in this century. Mayobambinos recall that 
a couple established a household together, usually in the home adjoining the home of the 
boy´s family, after a period of courtship (Bourque and Warren 1981, 99). 
Bourque and Warren´s use of the term “trial marriage,” and their description of past practices, 
may or may not be influenced by the direct comparison they make to Vicos, the community 
studied by anthropologists (like Price, quoted above) involved with the Cornell-Peru Project in 
the 1950s and 60s:  
The transition from trial marriage to formal marriage was controlled by community 
officials. It was their responsibility to periodically round up all the couples who had lived 
together for more than a year and hold them until their godparents arranged for the legal 
marriage of the young couples. These spring round-ups involved communal celebrations 
and resulted in high rates of formalized unions among townspeople. Some aspects of trial 
marriage are still practiced in neighboring Tongos and in towns to the north such as 
Vicos (Ibid., 99). 
By contrast, when describing conjugal unions at the time of their research, Bourque and Warren 
emphasize the decline of parental and communal control and highlight the prevalence of the 
institution of convivencia rather than “trial marriage:”  
In the present, community control of marriages has weakened. Most marital unions now 
begin when a couple decides to live together, establishing an independent household into 
which children are born. These nonlegalized unions (known as convivencias) do not give 
parents or the community many formal opportunities to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of a couple... While most marriages begin as consensual unions, there is a tendency for 
most to be legally formalized through civil marriage in later years (Ibid., 100). 
                                                          
175 In their discussion of Mayobamba and Chiuchin, Bourque and Warren write that “barter with other highland 
communities, using overland trade routes and llama packs, is still practiced, though coastal trade is much more 




Although, like other scholars whose work we have quoted here, Bourque and Warren highlight 
the close relationship between convivencia and marriage, they are more emphatic in asserting the 
inferior status of convivencia and the disadvantages it held for women when compared to the 
more desirable option – legal marriage176 (Ibid., 100-102). 
 Within my own research, I happened to pay more attention to issues of marriage and 
spousal relations in the community of Rancas than in Huayllay. Rancas is located about an hour 
away by car from Huayllay and about 8 km. from the city of Cerro de Pasco. It thus belongs to 
the same general geographic area as Huayllay – the highland plateau that straddles Pasco and 
Junín departments at around 4,300 m. As in Huayllay, Rancas´ traditional subsistence base is 
centered on the raising of animals – sheep, llamas and alpacas, for which the high-altitude puna 
is specially suited; like in other communities of the area, over the course of the 20th century 
Rancas also became heavily oriented towards a combination of mining work, migration to urban 
areas, and commerce. In Rancas, as in many of the cases I have mentioned, both convivencia and 
civil/Church marriage are present. Certainly, the three weddings I attended there were all 
between couples who already had children; one was a young couple, the other two were middle-
aged (one of the couples already had a grandchild).177 In one of the cases, the spouses had 
decided to have a Church/civil wedding because being married was a prerequisite to sponsoring 
the annual patron saint´s feast, something which they had already agreed to do. I knew several 
couples that were not married by law but that constituted stable, long-term unions and were 
treated as such by everyone in the town; it was generally expected that this would eventually lead 
to a Church and civil wedding. Nor had parental approval been unimportant at the start of these 
unions. This general pattern is no doubt similar to that found in much of Peru. It does not mean 
that there was no variation in the community; I knew at least one recent case of elopement – also 
a well-known practice in the Andes and in Latin America – as well as of couples who got 
married before having children. Similarly, as with other issues, people highlight variations that 
                                                          
176 By the time of Bourque and Warren´s study, and in the particular locations of Mayobamba and Chiuchin (which 
no longer had a resident priest as in the past), civil marriage was more common than Church weddings (Ibid., 99).  
177 In one of the weddings, I attended only the nighttime celebration; in the other two, I was able to be present in at 
least some of the rituals the night before and the day after the wedding – in particular, the ceremonial sessions in 
which godparents and relatives advice the bride and groom. A longer description of these events would be out of 
place in this chapter. 
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have taken place over time in regard to marriage. Weddings used to last several days and involve 
a more elaborate celebration than today. Moreover, certain patterns and customs have fallen into 
disuse. One elderly woman recounted how her marriage (in the 1940s) had been arranged for her 
by her parents, so that her husband was a stranger to her on their wedding night.178 She was the 
only one of her siblings who had this type of marriage; it is no longer common today. It is also 
likely that the length of convivencia before Church/civil marriage has varied greatly over time. 
Today, it responds not only to custom but more importantly to practical considerations and the 
constraints faced by specific individuals.  
 In Appendix C I present and analyze census data on the proportions between marriage 
and convivencia in Huayllay, Rancas and the Pasco region as a whole, both in the latest census 
(2007) and in the 1940 census, the latter corresponding to the time period from which the 
Juzgado de Paz cases come.While according to the 1940 census around 60% of marital unions in 
Pasco province as a whole (including Huayllay) were civil and/or Church marriages, and 40% 
were convivencias, we earlier saw that in our (clearly non-representative) 60 marital dispute 
cases from the Huayllay juzgado de paz in 1940-1942, only 15% were married couples. The vast 
majority of the remaining 85% were either current or former convivencias. Many of the latter 
were no doubt long-term unions that were in practice very similar to marriage – in fact, a few of 
them are couples seeking to move from convivencia to married status (others remain as long-
term convencias). Other cases, however, were shorter-term unions that were in the process of 
dissolution or had already dissolved. The juzgado de paz cases almost always record 
relationships at moments of rupture, dissension or at least tension, since that was what the juez 
was a recourse for. These tensions could arise from a number of causes: aggression or “bad 
treatment” at home (malos tratos), infidelity or abandonment on the part of one of the partners, a 
woman´s refusal to carry out expected domestic duties, or simply “incompatibility of characters” 
– to use one of the juzgado´s standard, stock phrasings. Sometimes, the archive shows the juez de 
                                                          
178 I heard this story from this person in Rancas in 2011; also present was Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, who had already 
interviewed her and recorded her story as part of her earlier research. She subsequently shared her impressions with 
me in order to help me understand this modality of marriage. Bourque and Warren recount having heard similar 
narratives from elderly women in Mayobamba and Chiuchin: “Many older women portray themselves as the 
unwilling partners to arrange marriages. Some women remember the frightening experience of being locked in a 
house with a bridegroom who was a virtual stranger” (Bourque and Warren 1981, 99-100). 
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paz calling on the two individuals to reconcile and resolve the cause of the problem, which they 
agree to attempt to do. Other times, however, we see the relationship at the moment in which 
both partners agree to dissolve it and settle an acta de separación.  
Strictly speaking, by helping to certify the dissolution of a convivencia relationship, the 
juez de paz was not using the Civil Code or other national law as his basis. As we have already 
discussed, both the 1852 and the 1936 Codes recognized marriage only, not convivencia; in those 
codes “separation” referred to the separation of married couples (although the Code did 
implicitly acknowledge the offspring of convivencias, in its extensive regulations on “illegitimate 
children” – regulations that as we shall see clearly did influence the juzgado de paz´s work).179 
Although today there are handbooks and other materials for jueces de paz that talk about 
mediation in disputes involving couples as one of their most important functions, and that trace 
this and other types of cases to “customary law” (derecho consuetudinario),180 that was not the 
case for the 1930s and 40s. The Reglamento de Jueces de Paz, in effect since 1853 and subjected 
to many piecemeal modifications over time, did not mention issues involving convivencia, or any 
sort of marital-like relationship for that matter.181 Nevertheless, whether due to “customary law” 
or other sources, it is clear that in Huayllay in the 1930s and 40s the juez de paz played an 
important role in the mediation between couples and the separation of convivientes; as Brandt 
(1990, 207) argues, this is the case for jueces de paz in much of Peru to this day.  
                                                          
179 The 1852 Code did not recognize divorce in the modern sense, since it defined marriage as an ecclesiastical 
matter. Short of annulment – very difficult to obtain – the Church only recognized a form of separation that did not 
dissolve the marriage bond or allow remarriage; this separation is sometimes called “divorce” in the 1852 code, but 
is not divorce as we know it. The 1936 code, by contrast, did allow both civil marriage and civil divorce; 
“separation” was a necessary first step towards divorce, for those cases in which “mutual dissent” (mutuo disenso), 
rather than a specific offense on the part of one of the spouses, was the only reason given for divorce.  
180 For example, the Instituto de Defensa Legal´s 2007 Manual del Juez y Jueza de Paz states that “On many 
occasions, the Jueces de Paz themselves employ the norms of the community to resolve a conflict, since there are 
many problems within communities that national law does not regulate, for example the life of convivientes, the 
raising of children, the situation of stepchildren, the use of pastures, of water, among others. This is regulated by 
customary law, which are the values, norms and procedures through which the community lives in harmony” (43).  
181 Its provisions and language did evidently influence the jueces de paz (some of the Huayllay cases mention the 
Reglamento), but the text itself focused mostly on issues involving commercial transactions, debts, and the juez de 
paz´s role in the early stages of a civil or criminal investigation that would go on to higher instances. 
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In the following discussion, I will illustrate and compare some of the different kinds of 
relationships that the archive documents, namely short-term and longer-term relationships. All 
names given here are pseudonyms. The purpose of this analysis is not so much to tell stories or 
specific details as it is to highlight the different kinds of households that existed in the mining 
community at this time, as well as the dynamics of marital disputes and the different factors 
shaping the options open to men and women.  
Types of households: Short- and long-term convivencias 
Many of the 1940-42 cases involve the dissolution of convivencias that had lasted a 
relatively short time. In 1941, 28-year-old Inés Cuadros, a native of La Oroya, accused her 
conviviente Justino Colca of (in the notetaker´s phrasing) “bad character in the home, this being 
the third time that he causes frequent fights for insignificant reasons.” Colca, a native of a village 
in Huarochirí Province in the Lima highlands to the southwest, was a 21-year old obrero; he had 
been living with his conviviente in the mining camp at Huarón for the past 3 months. He 
countered Cuadros´ charges by in turn accusing her of not living up to her obligations at home 
such as providing meals at the right times, and of having left the room they shared together, 
taking some of his things.182 Although they spoke negatively of one another, they came to an 
agreement about seeking a separation. According to the case record, the juez “admonished them 
severely making them see the nefarious consequences that would result from this separation and 
from the thinness of character of both of them,”183 but then proceeded to draw up the agreement. 
Justino Colca would be obligated to give Inés Cuadros a monthly pension of 15 soles for the 
maintenance of their 5-month-old daughter, who had apparently been born before their 
convivencia had begun. This payment would continue for the duration of her “nursing” 
(lactancia).  
A second case involving a short-term relationship is that of 21-year old Rosa Huamán, a 
native of Junín, on the highland plateau that extends to the east of Huayllay. Unlike Inés Cuadros 
                                                          
182 “El demandado Justino Colca, dice que su conviviente Inés Cuadros, no cumple con darle sus alimentos a sus 
horas, que cuando él trabaja o sale de su trabajo le pide que comer, mas ésta se lo da de muy mal humor” (JPH, 
1940-42).  
183 “El Juzgado de mi cargo oyendo a las partes las amonestó severamente haciéndoles ver las consecuencias 
funestas que les han de sobrevenir por tal separación i por ligeresas de carácteres de ambos.” 
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in the previous case, Huamán is not listed as currently residing in the mine camp, but instead in 
La Oroya. However, she had previously been the convivienta of 27-year old Reynaldo Porras, 
who worked as a carpenter in the Huarón mine and resided there. According to Huamán, Porras, 
a native of the Oyón region in the northern highlands of Lima Department, had abandoned her 8 
months earlier, after having cohabited (convivido) for 3 months. After the abandonment, she had 
given birth to their son, who was now 5 months old. Like Inés Cuadros, Rosa Huamán was 
asking for child support (pensión alimenticia). However, unlike in the previous case, the man 
does not seem to have come into the juzgado with his former convivienta at first. Rather, he 
appears to be summoned by the Juzgado after Rosa Huamán had given her initial deposition. 
Nevertheless, Reynaldo Porras does not offer resistance, but instead agrees to Huamán´s 
demands for child support. He also recognizes his paternity of the child in a more formal way 
than is recorded in the two previous cases.184 Porras then agrees to give a monthly sum of 10 
soles to his son until he turns 3, after which “another judicial contract will be drawn up.” 
Both cases share certain features in common. Each one of the couples is made up of a 
individuals who are from two different places – in fact, two different regions – and who almost 
certainly would have met at the mining camp. They are all relatively young, in their 20s, and had 
conceived a child either before their cohabitation or during it. And the relationship has dissolved 
after only 3 months as convivientes. There are other aspects of these short-term relationships as 
well that will be discussed in greater detail later on. For now, I will move on to discussing unions 
and households that lasted longer – even if the nature of the archive means that most of the 
longer relationships recorded there did eventually dissolve, too. Compared to the shorter-term 
relationships, most of these longer-term convivencias – though not all - consisted of individuals 
who were from the same location, as recorded in the notes. It is likely that many of them 
constituted households that had already formed before arriving in the mine. An example of a 
longer-lasting relationship that eventually separated is that of Rosario López and Isidoro Soto, 
both from Huayllay District, the local area. Soto was a 31-year old obrero; according to the acta 
drawn up for them by the juez, he and López had been together for 10 years. In August 1941, the 
                                                          
184 In the transcript of the Cuadros/Colca case, paternity is simply assumed, and the only question is how much the 
father will provide in support. In the Porras/Huamán case, on the other hand, a birth certificate in the district 
municipality is explicitly mentioned - the juez/notetaker writes that Porras has been summoned “so that he can 
recognize and at the same time authorize the birth certificate of the child.” 
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two convivientes agreed to separate “for not being able to compromise character-wise during all 
the time they´ve been together as spouses [cónyuges] for 10 years of mutual services in the 
home” and also due to “bad treatment” (malos tratos) on the part of Soto towards his partner.185 
They also came to an agreement regarding custody over their children, who were aged 9 years 
old and 6 months, respectively: they would stay with their mother and receive a monthly stipend 
from their father, until they reached a certain age when they would go with their father. As in 
many other cases involving women from the immediate locality, Rosario López did not attend 
the Juzgado on her own, but rather accompanied by her father Atilio, described as a 62-year-old 
obrero.   
In other cases, the number of years the household had lasted is not stated in the notes, but 
we can infer its longer and relatively stable character from certain pieces of evidence, for 
example the number of children. In early 1942, Octavio Urbina and Encarnación Villanueva 
came to the Juez de Paz and expressed their desire to draft a “separation agreement by mutual 
accord” (acta de separación de acuerdo mutuo) – the standard name for this type of contract in 
the Juzgado notes – due to “not understanding one another in marital life in other words in 
convivencia” (por no comprenderse en la vida marital o sea de convivencia). Villanueva and 
Urbina were both from one of the relatively large communities in the Junín/Pasco plateau, fairly 
close to Huayllay, and they were living in one of the Huarón company´s camps. Urbina, aged 47, 
was an obrero at the mining company; an occupation was also listed for Villanueva – unlike 
most women in the Juzgado cases – in this case being “her home” (de su casa). Urbina was 
described as “able in the Spanish language,” while Villanueva was noted down as “illiterate” 
(analfabeta).186 The two of them had had six children: two boys and four girls. The agreement 
                                                          
185 “...por no transigir en caracteres todo el tiempo que llevan como cónyuges de 10 años de servicios mutuos en el 
hogar, y por malos tratos, de palabra i obra ocasionados por Soto.”  
186  It is not clear whether this phrasing simply referred to her inability to read and write (shared by almost all 
women who appear in the Juzgado archive and who abstain from signing at the end of the actas) or whether it 
referred to something more, for example a higher proficiency in Quechua than in Spanish. It should be noted that at 
this time, although perhaps the majority of the population of these regions of the Central Highlands were bilingual, a 
substantial percentage would still have been Quechua monolinguals. This was the case more for women than for 
men. In the Juzgado cases, again, almost all women have their inability to read and write explicitly mentioned at the 
end of the actas, when they abstain from signing, but only certain women, like Encarnación Villanueva, are labeled 
analfabeta at the beginning of the acta. The juxtaposition and proximity of the statement of Urbina´s fluency in the 
Spanish language with that of Villanueva´s analfabeta status would also seem to suggest that the latter is meant to 
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that was drafted in the presence of the juez disposed that the boys would go with their father and 
the girls with their mother. At the same time, however, the father asserted or was made to assert 
his continuing commitment to supporting all his children financially - “according to his 
possibilities” (según el alcance que lo tuviera) – and to “give to his children the goods acquired 
during the life of convivencia” with Villanueva. In another of the Juzgado´s typical phrasings, 
Urbina and Villanueva were both commanded to “not offend” each other “in word or deed, in 
this and any other jurisdiction” (no ofender ni de palabras ni hechos en esta y en cualquiera otra 
jurisdicción). Although as in all the other cases, here we do not know for sure all the different 
aspects of this family, the number of children and the reference to the goods acquired during the 
relationship suggest certain stability and relative permanence, even if in the end this household 
seems to have dissolved too.  
Another similar case, between Melecio Guzmán and Isabel Quispe, gives a bit more 
detail about a longer-term union that was in the process of dissolution. In June 1941, 37-year old 
Isabel Quispe came to the juez de paz accusing her conviviente, 30-year old Melecio Guzmán, an 
obrero at the mine, of “continuous bad treatment” (continuos maltratos).187 Guzmán and Quispe 
were both from a community in the Junín/Pasco plateau (a different one from that in the 
Villanueva/Urbina case above). The notetaker recorded that Guzmán agreed not to mistreat 
Isabel again, and that “neither would he give any motive for ill-feeling or continuous anger in his 
home.” Quispe in turn was expected “to not abandon her home again without previous notice or 
without sufficient motive.” Furthermore, she was to “seek out all possible ways to maintain 
tranquility and harmony in the home” (procurará buscar los medios posibles a fin de mantener 
la tranquilidad i armonía de la casa). Melecio Guzmán agreed to invest his savings of 40 libras 
(400 soles) in the construction of a house in their home village, in the name of their daughters 
Ana and Genoveva. Although the notes recorded Guzmán as making this announcement, they 
also remarked that this sum of money had been “acquired jointly by him and his conviviente 
Isabel.” Lastly, the Juez told them that if they did not fulfill their part of the agreement they 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicate a linguistic difference rather than merely an inability to read and write. No other mention of linguistic 
difference occurs in the Juzgado notes, and the Quechua language is never explicitly mentioned.  
187 Again, this is one of the standardized phrasings used by the Juzgado, rather than the words that were necessarily 
used by Quispe. 
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would be sanctioned with 3 days ´ imprisonment and a fine of 100 soles “to benefit public works 
in this locality.” 
As in all the Juzgado cases, we do not know all of the details of the dispute outside of 
what made it onto the acta that was recorded by the juez or his assistant and read to the couple. 
What was the exact nature of Guzmán´s ill-treatment of his partner, and of her reaction, beyond 
the formulaic phrases used by the Juzgado, such as maltratos or “abandon her home” (abadonar 
su domicilio)? Was Guzmán´s commitment to start building a house in their home community an 
entirely separate issue, or was it the primary or ultimate purpose of the visit to the Juzgado? In 
any case, it indicates at least the expectation (either on the part of the couple themselves or of the 
juez) of continued stability in the relationship, as well as of maintaining close links to the home 
village and all that implied in terms of family and community relationships (as opposed to the 
inevitably more fluid nature of life in the mining camp). However, a month later Isabel Quispe 
went to the Juzgado again, this time accusing her conviviente of “abandonment” (abandono). 
Apparently, he came with her, but when the juez and the couple interrupted the discussion to 
make time for the midday meal, Melecio Guzmán left for the mine and did not come back. For 
that reason, and because he had not fulfilled his part of the agreement from the previous month, 
the Juez wrote that Guzmán had acted “in a rebellious and mocking manner towards my 
authority” (a rebeldía i burla de mi autoridad), and asked the teniente gobernador of Huarón 
that he “capture” Guzmán and bring him so he could be punished with 4 days in the local jail cell 
and pay a fine of 30 soles.188 Four days later, Guzmán and Quispe reconvened before the Juez, 
who recorded their agreement to separate: 
There not being any mutual understanding from either of the parts towards the other, they 
separate from marital life by mutual agreement...  given the motives already stated they 
separate in a definitive way from the life of convivientes, under the intervention of the 
authority of this office.189 
                                                          
188 This was less money and more jail time than had been threatened the previous month in case Guzmán and Quispe 
did not fulfill their agreement.  
189 “No habiendo absolutamente comprensión de ninguna de las partes de mutuo acuerdo, se separan de la vida 
conyugal... dado los motivos ya expuestos se separan desde la fecha en forma definitiva de la vida de convivientes, 
bajo la intervención de la autoridad de este despacho.” AJPH, July 1941. 
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The agreement drawn up further stated that the couple´s two daughters would stay with their 
mother, and would receive a monthly payment of 15 soles from their father. At the age of 7, the 
eldest daughter would be placed under her father´s custody (pasará en poder de su padre). This 
latter provision appears in many of the cases – see López/Soto case above - and it is not clear 
that it was always actually carried out; this will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
 In this section we have seen two types of households that existed at the mine: short-term 
unions between people from different places, and longer-term relationships between individuals 
from the same location. However, these were by no means the only types of unions that existed 
at the mine. Although on average it does seem like relationships between people from different 
places were more likely to be shorter and less stable than unions between people from the same 
location, this is not true for every case. Historically, in the mines of Central Peru, many people 
have historically formed stable households with individuals from other locations whom they met 
at the mining camp. According to Mayer´s 1969-1971 research, even in Tangor – one of the less 
mining-prone among the Chaupiwaranga Valley communities -  around 1/3 of tangorinos were 
married to individuals from outside the community, and 1/3 of those in turn were “people from 
the mining centers” (Mayer 1977, 62). Meanwhile, Adams also claimed that out of the (non-
representative) sample of 25 muquiyauyinos he interviewed at the Huarón mine in 1949, one-
quarter were unmarried, half were married to women from Muquiyauyo and one-quarter were 
married to women from other places (Adams 1959, 97).  
In both Huayllay and Rancas, there are many cases of people who are married to 
individuals from outside the community. The latter are called yernos and nueras (son-in-law or 
daugher-in law) of the community; although they may initially and for a time later face some 
rejection or derogatory comments, after enough time has passed they are usually accepted 
fully.190 By leading people to move around and encounter individuals from other places, the 
mines simply make these types of unions more likely. 
  
                                                          
190 By contrast, outsiders who do not have an affinal bond to someone from the community normally cannot become 
comuneros or be otherwise accepted as community members. That is the case, for example, for the families of 
shepherds who come from the agricultural quebradas to work tending the flocks.  
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The dynamics of disputes 
So far, I have used the cases from the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz to illustrate the kinds of 
short-term and long-term relationships that existed at the Huarón mine, and to give an idea of 
how the mine brought together individuals from different locations and regions. I will now 
examine the reasons given for the disputes themselves. Many of the cases state “bad treatment” 
(malos tratos or maltrato) or lack of “understanding” (comprensión) as the problem; less often, 
the term “discord” (discordia) is used. These may or may not have been terms that the litigants 
themselves actually used; most likely, they were part of the vocabulary that the Juez or notetaker 
were accustomed to using to denote the types of complaint that they heard most often. The term 
most frequently used, malos tratos, conjures images of domestic violence – a topic which has 
been examined, through judicial documents, by historians like Klubock (1998), Tinsman (2002) 
and Christiansen (2004).  The ubiquity of cases of spousal abuse in any judicial (or police) 
archive should not lead us to overestimate the incidence of violence in any particular location. As 
Christiansen writes in her study of 19th-century Cajamarca,  
Only the most extreme, and hence, by definition, atypical, cases of abuse reached the 
attention of the authorities. The bias in the sources can easily create an illusion of 
prevalent and extreme violence (Christiansen 2004, 65). 
This bias is present both in documents such as the ones used by Christiansen – criminal cases 
from the higher law courts of the departmental capital – and in the documents from the Huayllay 
Juzgado de Paz, a relatively more accessible institution. Yet although the latter archive does 
contain many mentions of malos tratos, it does not provide a great deal of detail. This is of 
course because the cases are much briefer, but also because, as Brandt emphasizes and as was 
discussed above, the Juzgado de Paz is more of a dispute-resolution mechanism than a regular 
law court seeking a prosecution and a sentence. This seems to have been the case in Huayllay in 
the 1940s as well; people went to the Juez de Paz with a particular end in mind, and that, rather 
than the investigation or prosecution of guilt, was what drove each case. Maltrato appears here 
more as a reason or justification for a decision to be made by the Juez de Paz than as something 
to be investigated on its own.  Thus, while the archive can lead one to overestimate the 
prevalence of domestic violence – by the frequency with which it mentions malos tratos – it can 
also lead one to underestimate its seriousness, due to the paucity of details and to the fact that the 
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actual abuse takes a back seat to the resolution being sought, whether that was separation, an 
amelioration of the situation within the relationship, or something else.  
Certainly, some of the Juzgado de Paz cases seem to clearly show instances of domestic 
violence. For example, the case of Balvina Pérez and Dionisio Matos at the Jumasha mining 
camp, discussed in the next section, makes explicit reference to the fact that Matos was 
“accustomed to hitting” his conviviente; for this reason Pérez wanted to separate even without 
obtaining Matos´ consent, though it apparently meant losing the right to alimony for her child. 
Another case involves Urbano Chaupi and Matilde Quiroz, both of whom are described as 
shepherds (pastores) and as analfabetos.191 Quiroz came to the Juzgado requesting her 
“definitive separation” from Chaupi, due to “malos tratos” by the latter. 192 She claimed that her 
conviviente´s pattern of abuse was well-known to the “political and police authority of this 
locality,” for it had occurred “on several occasions.” In a passage that might actually be derived 
from Quiroz´s direct speech (either as quotation or translation), the notetaker wrote that, at their 
previous appearances before the authorities, Chaupi “makes false promises of reconciliation 
(amistad), but then outside continues to hit me whenever he likes and several times I have been 
in bed due to his beatings.”193 For his continued abuse, the Juez de Paz punished Chaupi “with 
corporal punishment” (castigado con la pena corporal) in the public jail cell in Huayllay. 
Afterwards, he reconvened the two parties to the dispute and agreed to Quiroz´s request for 
separation, stating that the two convivientes must refrain from “maintaining marital relations” 
from that day forward. The bienes gananciales (marital property) that they had acquired together 
during their convivencia, namely six sheep, would be split equally between Chaupi and Quiroz. 
Since Quiroz apparently was pregnant, Chaupi was made to promise that he would hand over a 
                                                          
191 Again, it should be remarked that although a large proportion of the individuals in the Juzgado minutes are said 
not to know how to sign their names (in particular, the great majority of the women), only a few individuals are 
described as analfabetos (illiterate). See footnote 41 for my speculation as to whether the term referred to a 
linguistic difference (i.e. inability to speak Spanish) rather than simply to an inability to read and write.  
192 This is one of the few cases we will discuss here that involve individuals without a direct connection to the 
mining camp - the other is that of Josefina Colqui and Manuel Castro, below.  
193 “Pedía su separación definitiva por los malos tratos que este le daba por distintas oportunidades y que de este 
hecho tiene conocimiento la autoridad política y policial de esta localidad, a donde hace promesas fingidas de 
amistad a donde fuera de ella sigue golpeándome como le da la gana que en diversas ocasiones he estado en cama 
por dichos golpes.”  
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monthly pension for the maintenance of the child during the time of lactancia, after which he 
would pick him or her up (for a discussion of the concept of lactancia and child custody, see 
next sub-section). If either of the parties did not fulfill their side of the agreement, they would be 
fined between 50 and 200 soles plus a term in the public jail cell. 
In both of these cases, the end result is separation. However, there are also many cases in 
which the couple agrees to reconcile; the accusation of “bad treatment” brought forth in those 
cases (usually by the woman) seems to be aimed at stopping the abuse, not at ending the 
relationship, at least not yet. For example, in 1941 Nélida García took her conviviente Eloy 
Hernández to the Juez de Paz, accusing him of maltratos. The Juez recorded that the couple 
came to “a mutual accord adopted under my intervention” (un mutuo acuerdo adoptado bajo mi 
intervención). Hernández agreed to the Juzgado´s formulaic statement that he would “from this 
day forward not repeat said maltratos or discordias in his home.”194 As for García, “since this is 
the first instance that the maltratos and offenses occur, she agrees to conciliate and to come to an 
understanding with her conviviente to continue as they have been cohabiting in a harmonious and 
amicable way from now on.”195 If he did not keep his promise, Hernández would be fined 100 
soles and punished with 3 days in the local jail cell. In this case, the Juez de Paz cited the fact 
that this was the first instance of “bad treatment” by Hernández as a reason to seek reconciliation 
rather than separation. This contrasts with the Chaupi/Quiroz case, where the recurrent nature of 
the offense that was brought up by Matilde Quiroz to support her petition for separation.  
 Just as there are cases where reconciliation is sought, there are also cases in which an 
accusation of “bad treatment” leads to an agreement to marry. For example, Efraín Poma, an 
obrero living in the Huarón mining camp and originally from Dos de Mayo Province in 
southwestern Huánuco Department, was accused by his conviviente Sabina Díaz of maltratos, 
which she said she suffered “constantly.” After a “severe admonition” (severa amonestación) 
from the Juez de Paz, the two convivientes came to an agreement, using exactly the same 
language as in the Rodríguez/García case: Poma promised to “from this day forward not repeat 
                                                          
194 “...se compromete de hoy en adelante no repetir dichos maltratos ni discordias en su hogar.”  
195 “...siendo el primer caso acaecido con los maltratos i ofensas, acepta conciliar i ponerse de acuerdo con su 
conviviente a seguir como habían convivido en forma armoniosa i amistosa en lo sucesivo.” 
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said maltratos or discordias in his home,” while Díaz accepted that “since this is the first 
instance that the maltratos and offenses occur, she agrees to conciliate and to come to an 
understanding with her conviviente.” Thus, again, the Juzgado de Paz is used as a recourse for 
stopping maltrato; although Díaz said that the bad treatment occurred “constantly,” this was 
apparently the first time that the couple came before the Juez de Paz, and so the latter gave the 
man a chance to change his behavior. Presumably, if the situation was repeated enough times, 
and if Díaz wanted to leave the relationship, the Juez de Paz would help terminate it, as in the 
Chaupi/Quiroz case above. However, here there is a further element; after agreeing to reconcile, 
Efraín Poma and Sabina Díaz also agree “to marry within six months unfailingly from this date” 
(contraer matrimonio dentro de seis meses indefectiblemente de esta fecha). This leads to the 
question – without denying that the maltrato in this case may have been real, was it the primary 
reason for coming before the Juez de Paz? Or was the main motivation to obtain a formal 
agreement to marry? No other details are provided here, and we do not know whether the 
marriage actually went through.  
 Another case, involving a very young couple, shows a similar complexity: Uldarico 
Fuentes, a criandero196 in his early 20s, came before the Juez de Paz with his 16-year old 
conviviente Alicia Sulca, and recognized “his grave offense” (su grave falta) towards Sulca, 
“committing malos tratos such as abandoning her for months and months without remembering 
her with a single cent for her sustenance, much less remembering her clothing to which she has 
been entitled from the moment that he took her out of her paternal home.”197 After the Juez de 
Paz “severely admonished the parties involved, letting them know the obligations that both 
consorts have of mutual respect in the home,”198 Fuentes and Sulca came to an agreement. 
Fuentes agreed to promise that he would not make the same mistake again, and that he was, in 
                                                          
196 At this time in Huayllay District, the term criandero seems to have referred to people who were engaged 
primarily in the raising of their own animals (mainly sheep) rather than mine work, and who were not shepherds 
(pastores) taking care of someone else´s flock.  
197 “...profiriéndole malos tratos como son abandonándola meses  de meses sin acordarse de ella con un solo 
centavo para su sostenimiento, ni mucho menos de su vestido a que tiene derecho desde el momento que la sacó de 
su casa paterna.” 
198 “...amonestado severamente a las partes haciéndoles conocer las obligaciones que tienen ambos consortes del 
respeto mutuo en el hogar.”  
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the Juzgado´s language, “committing himself to behaving like a gentleman in the home that has 
been formed over a year and a half by both convivientes.”199 Similarly, Sulca was supposed to 
promise that she would “continue to behave as she has up to now, providing his meals and clean 
clothing at the right times.”200 Moreover, they agreed to have a Church wedding within eight 
months.201  Again, here an accusation of malos tratos leads to the drafting of a formal agreement 
to move from convivencia to married status through a formal (and in this case Church) wedding. 
Additionally, this case shows the flexibility of the term malos tratos – “bad treatment” appears 
here not as domestic violence but rather as consisting of abandonment and of a failure on the part 
of the man to fulfill his responsibilities towards his conviviente, who had left the patriarchal 
sphere of her birth home to enter a new one with Fuentes.  
 Terms having to do with sexual crimes, like seduction, rapto, violación and estupro – 
concepts that have been widely analyzed by historians of 19th-century Latin America -  appear 
very seldom in the Juzgado de Paz documents from 1940-42 and later years. Like other 
historians, Christiansen (2004) has argued that in judicial contexts these terms, though 
technically implying some form of deceit or coercion/rape, more often functioned as a 
mechanism for a woman who had been in a consensual relationship to oblige the defendant to 
marry her, or at least to receive monetary compensation for her lost honor. It´s not that rape, in 
the sense of coerced sexual relations, did not occur, but rather that instances of what we would 
call rape were underreported and not usually taken to court. As Christiansen writes in her study 
of 19th-century Cajamarca,  
In reality, only a few of these cases dealt with rape or sexual violence; most transcripts, in 
order to rescue the reputations of the young women concerned, relate tales of consensual 
relationships described as forced intercourse or seduction resulting from deceit 
(Christiansen 2004, 115).  
In the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz cases from 1940-42, it seems that the objectives of ensuring 
marriage or obtaining some form of monetary compensation are usually resolved within the 
                                                          
199 “...comprometiéndose a portarse como un caballero en su hogar formado en un año i medio entre ambos 
convivientes.” 
200 “...seguir portándose como hasta la fecha, prodigándole sus alimentos y ropa limpia a sus horas.”  
201 “...tomar estado católicamente entre el término de ocho meses a partir de la fecha.”  
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language and context of convivencia, abandonment and infidelity, without the need to portray a 
consensual relationship as if it had been forced. Again, this may have to do with the generalized, 
though not necessarily total, acceptance of convivencia in this region and at this time. There is 
one mention of seducción, namely when a 21-year old obrero is accused of committing 
“immoral acts” (actos inmorales) by being the seductor of his female cousin (who was also of 
age) and impregnating her. The accusation is brought forth by the cousin´s father; the young 
people are both punished and the obrero is made to agree that he will provide a monthly pensión 
alimentaria (see next section) of 10 soles when the baby is born. Both then sign promises that 
they will refrain from engaging in “carnal relations” (vida carnal) in the future.  
This kind of language (“immoral acts,” “seduction”) is relatively rare in the 1940-42 
documents. There are a few examples from other years,202 for example in one case from the 
Huayllay Juzgado de Paz from the late 1940s. A worker at the Huarón mine was imprisoned in 
the public jail in Cerro de Pasco after having relations with and impregnating a young woman, 
who is described as being underage. The girl´s family got him to agree to marry her, and the 
marriage took place in jail; but eight days after returning to the Huarón mining camp, he 
abandoned her. According to the girl´s mother, who told the story, the man later offered to 
recognize the child and provide a monthly pension, but never did so; furthermore, he now had 
another conviviente, and was therefore  “committing the crime of adultery” (cometiendo el delito 
de adulterio), so she asked that he be sanctioned. In another case from the early 1950s, a woman 
from one of the neighboring plateau communities came to the Juez de Paz with her daughter; she 
accused a certain individual of committing a “crime against sexual honor” by “seducing” her 
daughter, “offering to marry her, abusing the sexual act three times, and she did not know and he 
is the cause of her perdition.”203 Again, here the focus is on a sexual relationship that does not 
result in marriage and is thus portrayed as seducción. These kinds of cases, which are not too 
different from the 19th-century trials analyzed for Cajamarca and Lima by Christiansen and 
Hunefeldt (2000), are relatively rare in the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz, but they did occasionally 
                                                          
202 Although the 1940-42 cases are the only ones I have analyzed systematically and in their totality, I have 
examined a number of cases from other years.  
203 “...ofreciéndole matrimonio, abusando del uso sexual tres veces; y que ella no sabía y que el es el causante para 
su perdición.”  
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occur. 204 They offer a striking contrast to the majority of convivencia cases which do not 
explicitly privilege premarital virginity and which do not use accusations of seducción to achieve 
aims such as obtaining a commitment for marriage, dissolving a relationship, or ensuring 
financial support.  
Actually, “honor” and “dignity” are terms that are found the 1940-42 cases, namely in 
the 15 or so cases involving slander accusations, but these usually turn on questions of women´s 
fidelity to one partner rather than on the relationship between virginity, sexuality and (formal) 
marriage.205 Indeed, infidelity is one of the most frequent topics in the Juzgado de Paz cases, 
whether as rumor, gossip or as something that is acknowledged and that leads either to a 
separation or to reconciliation. Many of the separation cases, unlike those centered on slander, 
involve infidelity or “abandonment” on the part of men. As we saw previously in the statement 
by the assistant Juez de Paz whom I interviewed in 2010, the perception exists that mining 
attracts men who pretend to be single and who form a relationship at the mine, but who actually 
have a family in their hometown. There certainly are some cases that fit this stereotypical image. 
For example, a case from 1940 involves two people from the Mantaro Valley (ages 33 and 37, 
respectively) who had been living together at the mining camp for twelve months; the woman 
asked to separate “because she came to know that he is a married man with six children.”206 This 
relates again to the whole issue of the unstable, short-term relationships that formed at the 
mining camp; we do not know to what degree the woman in this case really was “deceived” and 
to what degree she may have known about her conviviente´s background.  
However, just as there are cases where an accusation of “bad treatment” is followed by 
reconciliation, there are also cases in which infidelity or temporary abandonment does not result 
in separation. Furthermore, this occurs not only in cases of infidelity by men, but also, though 
                                                          
204 It should be mentioned that there are also two cases in the 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz minutes that appear to be 
accusations of rape in the sense of coercive sexual relations, even if the term “rape” (violación) is not explicitly 
used. 
205 For the sake of brevity, these slander cases (which use phrases like difamación contra el honor and injuria sobre 
la dignidad) cannot be examined in detail in this chapter. Slander cases that have to do with issues of sexuality are 
almost always brought up by women rather than by men. 
206 “...por cuanto llegó a saber que es hombre casado con seis hijos.” 
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more rarely, in instances of infidelity or abandonment by women. For example, Edilberto 
Galarza, an obrero at the mine and originally from a community in the Mantaro valley, went 
before the Juez de Paz to denounce that his wife Irene Tapia had been “seduced” by another 
man, Nicanor Cajahuanca, and the two had attempted to elope together. They had been stopped 
by the security guards at San José, and Tapia had been sent back, while Cajahuanca had 
“escaped.” Unlike in other cases, here the Juez de Paz considered that “this act of adultery was 
proven according to the statements of both parts.”207 Whether the story told here was really 
wholly accurate or not, the fact is that Galarza agreed to “forgive” this act of, as the Juez de Paz 
put it, “adultery” (adulterio). Irene Tapia “understanding her error,” promised not to do it again, 
while her husband “promised to not engage in any bad treatment (maltrato) or disagreements in 
the home.” Again, the wording here is largely formulaic, and likely derives more from Juzgado 
custom than from actual speech, but the point remains. Overall, women´s infidelity was still 
generally treated differently from men´s, as shown by the fact that it was overwhelmingly 
women who had to defend their fidelity and “honor” or “dignity” through slander accusations, 
and as seen in at least one case where an accusation of infidelity was used as an argument to 
attempt to take away a mother´s custody over her child (see next section). But the Galarza/Tapia 
case helps to moderate the perspective that stresses women´s fidelity as central to honor; like 
men´s, women´s infidelity could lead to rupture of the relationship or it could be “forgiven,” at 
least within the formal space of the Juzgado de Paz.  There is at least one other case where a man 
also agrees to “forgive” (perdonará) his wife, though in that case it is not clear whether the 
adulterous act had been proven in the Juez´s eyes or whether it still remained at the level of 
gossip and speculation, as in the slander cases. 
 One last issue must be examined, and it remits us back to the cases of dissolution of 
convivencias that we saw earlier in this chapter. As mentioned previously, out of the 98 cases in 
the 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz documents, 60 are disputes involving convivientes or, less 
commonly, couples married according to the state or Church. Of those 60 cases, 38 involve 
separations that are occurring or that have already occurred. Within those separation cases, there 
are 7 that present a particular type of monetary transaction that the notes call a payment for 
                                                          
207 “...fue comprobado según las declaraciones de ambos este hecho por adulterio.” 
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“services” (servicios), from the man to the woman. This occurs in two of the cases we have 
examined already – namely, Colca/Cuadros and Porras/Huamán – as well as in a case that is 
discussed in the next section, that of Teodoro Yáñez and Catalina Sánchez. It is different from 
payments for child support, which are examined in the next section. Child support was a monthly 
payment, whereas “payment for services” was a one-time settlement; in any case, the two are 
clearly distinguished in each case of the seven cases. For example, in the Colca/Cuadros case, in 
addition to promising to give a monthly pension of 15 soles for the maintenance of their 5-month 
old daughter for the duration of her lactancia, Justino Colca also gave his former conviviente 
Inés Cuadros a one-time payment of 70 soles, for “services in the 3 months that she has had of 
marital life with Justino Colca.”  Similarly, in the Porras/Huamán case, Rosa Huamán does not 
only ask for child support (pensión alimenticia), but also for “payment for my services,” citing 
the fact that “I have been abandoned.”208 In addition to the monthly stipend of 10 soles for their 
son, Reynaldo Porras agrees to “recognize the service period [tiempo de servicios]demanded by 
his convivienta Rosa Huamán, of 15 soles for the three months of convivencia.”209 Finally, in the 
Yáñez/Sánchez case to be discussed in the next section, Catalina Sánchez not only asks for 
support for her child but additionally demands that Teodoro Yáñez “recognize also the five 
months of services that he has had in their union.”210 Yáñez agrees to give Sánchez, in addition 
to the child support, a payment of 22 soles and 50 cents “for the five months of services that they 
have had.”211 
 What the seven “payment for services” cases have in common is that they are all 
convivencias (not legal/Church marriages), and that all explicitly state a direct connection to 
mining, through residence or occupation (usually both) - either to the Huarón mine or, in one 
                                                          
208 “Solicito la pensión alimenticia correspondiente, así como el pago de mis servicios, es así que he sido 
abandonada, así como mi hijo Eleuterio, desde hace ocho meses.” 
209 “...prometiendo al mismo tiempo reconocerle el tiempo de servicios que reclama su convivienta Rosa Huamán de 
quince soles por los tres meses de convivencia.”  
210 “...le reconozca también los cinco meses de servicios que ha tenido en su unión.” 




case, to the neighboring Río Pallanga mine.212 Thus, this may have been a practice that occurred 
only with relationships formed at the mining camp, or some of them anyway. Three of the cases 
involve convivencias claimed to have lasted a few months (3 months in two cases and 5 months 
in one case), whereas three of the cases involve convivencias that had supposedly lasted 3 years 
or slightly longer (one case is unspecified). Four of the cases involve a man and a woman who 
were originally from different regions, while three of the cases involve individuals who are from 
the same location.213 There does not seem to be a clear correlation between the stated duration of 
the relationship and the amount given. In one case, a payment of 70 soles is made for servicios in 
a convivencia that had lasted 3 months, while in another case of the same duration the amount is 
only 15 soles. Similarly, in one case a payment of 150 soles is made for services in a relationship 
that had lasted 3 years and 5 months, while in another the payment is only 30 soles for a 3-year 
long convivencia.  
 Like several other issues that come up in the cases discussed in this chapter, this modality 
of “payment for services” is not mentioned in the Civil Code, and may simply have been part of 
local or regional practice in the Juzgados de Paz. On the one hand, it may simply have been a 
payment designed to ease the former conviviente´s struggles once the household – however 
temporary – had broken up. On the other hand, it may have something to do with the monetary 
compensations that Hunefeldt (189-193) and Christiansen (116) document for the 19th century, 
for cases of seduction, rapto, estupro, or simply those in which a sexual relationship did not lead 
to marriage. It should be mentioned that the 1936 Civil Code, in its Articles 77 and 79, did 
stipulate a compensation payment when a formal promise of marriage (esponsales) went 
unfulfilled. However, the seven convivencia dissolution cases that include “payment for 
services” do not mention any promise of marriage. Inversely, although as we have seen there are 
several cases in the Juzgado de Paz minutes that involve agreements for matrimony, there seems 
                                                          
212 One case lists the man´s occupation as motorista but does not say where he worked or lived; however, it can be 
assumed that he worked at one of the mines, since motorista was a common mine occupation (i.e. the person who 
worked with the rail cars inside the mine – see Rodríguez 2004).  
213 Specifically, two of the cases involve a man from the Lima Highlands and a woman from the Pasco/Junín Plateau 
(not including Huayllay); one case is between a man from the Mantaro Valley and a woman from the Plateau, and 
one is between a man from the Lima Highlands and a woman from Tarma. In one case both individuals are from the 
Mantaro Valley, and in two cases both individuals are from Huayllay itself.  
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to be no connection between those and the “payments for services” in the cases discussed here. 
Alternatively, the “payment for services” could simply represent a form of economic valuation of 
domestic work, and/or an index of its commodification. The fact that I did not analyze these 
cases until after I had completed my field research means that I have not been able to ask people 
in Huayllay, Rancas or Cerro de Pasco about the “payment for services” as well as other issues 
that arise from a careful examination of the documents.   
Child support, custody and the maintenance of children 
 So far our discussion has mostly concerned the household through the lens of marital 
relations and disputes between men and women. However, children were also an important 
component of households, and they do appear in the 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz cases we are 
analyzing. Most of the couples have children, and in most of the cases an arrangement is made 
regarding two intertwined aspects: financial sustenance for the child, and who the child would 
live with in the future.  These issues were part of national law. Although the 1852 and 1936 Civil 
Codes did not formally recognize the existence of any form of union other than marriage in the 
Church and Civil (in the later code) sense, they did extensively regulate the relationship between 
parents and children born both inside and outside of marriage.214 In the codes, this relationship 
revolved both around issues of inheritance and also of alimentos – alimony. According to Article 
439 of the 1936 Code,  
We understand by alimentos everything that is indispensable for the maintenance, shelter, 
clothing and medical assistance according to the social position [posición social] of the 
family. Alimentos comprise also the education of the alimentista and his/her professional 
training when he/she is a minor. 
                                                          
214 The 1852 Civil Code distinguished further within the category of “illegitimate” children. Hijos naturales were 
those whose parents were not married but were eligible to marry – i.e. none of the common impedimentos to 
marriage (such as already-married status, consanguinity, membership in the priesthood) applied to them.  Among the 
children who were not hijos naturales were hijos adulterinos – i.e., those born to a married person and someone 
other than their spouse. The rights and responsibilities outlined in the code are slightly different for these two 
categories of “illegitimate” children. This distinction is no longer found in the 1936 Civil Code, although the broader 
differentiation between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children is still present there. The distinction between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” does not seem to be prominent in the 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz cases from Huayllay, 
although the recognition of children by their fathers is very important there. The legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy 
and the recognized/unrecognized distinction are two very different things: recognizing children did not make them 
“legitimate” according to national law – only marriage between the parents could do that.  
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According to the Civil Code, alimentos were owed not only from parents to children but also 
between spouses and from children to parents who were of old age. In theory the concept 
referred to the everyday sustenance of any family, but in practice it became salient only in cases 
of family rupture or absence. In the Huayllay Juzgado cases, however, the terms alimentos and 
pensión alimenticia are almost always used in the sense of alimony from fathers to children; only 
once is it used to indicate alimony from a man to his former spouse.  
As we saw earlier, there are 60 cases that have to do with marital or sexual disputes 
between men and women;215 of these, 38 cases (62.3%) involve a separation that is occurring or 
that has already taken place. 216 Of these, in turn, 31 cases explicitly mention the presence of 
children, and 26 of those specify that the father will provide alimony payments to his child. 
These monthly payments range from a low of 5 to a high of 20 soles for one child and from 10 to 
30 soles for two children; payments of 10 or 15 soles are by far the most common, however.217 
According to the Civil Code, the amount of alimony was supposed to vary depending on 
perceived ability to pay as well as the recipient´s need. 
There is more to this than a simple monetary payment, however. We saw in the 
Guzmán/Quispe case how the agreement drawn up by the Juez de Paz, in addition to specifying a 
monthly stipend for the two children, also stipulated that the eldest daughter would pass over into 
her father´s custody at the age of 7. A very similar arrangement appears in the López-Soto case, 
where it was decided that the youngest child, who was 6 months old at the time, would be picked 
up by his father when he turned 6 years old. In fact, of the 31 separation/recognition cases that 
explicitly mention children, 14 also mention this arrangement – the child passing into the 
                                                          
215 Again, these 60 cases comprise the majority of the total 98 cases from the 1940-42 book of actas from the 
Huayllay Juzgado de Paz. The other 38 cases involve disputes ranging from physical fights between men to thefts to 
around 15 cases involving insults (many of which involve issues of sexuality as well).  
216 I am not counting here the case of a couple that first drew an acta of separation, making it seem like the 
relationship had ended definitively, and then, a few months later, drew up a new acta agreeing to marry.  
217 To get a sense of how much this was, here are a few other monetary values to be found in the 1940-42 Juzgado 
cases from Huayllay. A man injured in a fight was compensated for 10 days of missed work at the mine with 20 
soles. Other men injured in similar situations were awarded 20 and 50 soles, respectively, for an unspecified number 
of days missed at work. An adult cow together with its calf were valued at 65 soles. A set of four sheep was valued 
at 20 soles. A trunk (cajón) full of cans of milk was valued at 18 soles. A 3-story house in the village of Huaychao 
(certainly one of the “elite” homes in the center of the village) was valued at 800 soles.  
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custody of the father at a specified age. Sometimes, the child was supposed to stay with the 
mother till age 6 or 7; other times, only till age 3 or even less.  
Certainly, from a contemporary perspective, the idea of children leaving their mother´s 
side at such a young age seems strange. However, this pattern makes more sense if we look at it 
in the context of changing Civil Code provisions regarding three main issues: parental authority 
(patria potestad), custody during separation/divorce proceedings, and alimony itself. The cases 
we are examining here occurred not long after the transition from the 1852 Civil Code to the 
1936 Civil Code; thus, it makes sense that the influence of both would be felt (in addition to the 
influence of local and/or regional custom). Regarding the first issue, in its section on patria 
potestad the 1852 Code stated that “children who are legitimate, legitimated, adopted, as well as 
recognized natural children, are subject to the authority of the father, or, in its absence, the 
authority of the mother” (Art. 285).218 A mother´s authority was secondary to that of the father 
and exercised only when the latter was judged to be absent or incapacitated. Furthermore, one of 
the rights of the parent who exercised patria potestad was “to keep the children in their 
possession and to pick them up from the place they are at” (Art. 287). The 1936 Code was more 
moderate in its assertion of male authority over children, but still privileged the father: “Patria 
potestad is exercised by the father and the mother, during matrimony. In cases of disagreement 
the opinion of the father will prevail” (Art. 391). Moreover, Article 394 asserted that patria 
potestad over recognized illegitimate children was likewise exercised by the father. However, the 
1936 Code also added a provision that had been absent in the 1852 version: “The judge can, 
when requested by the mother, grant her patria potestad, or resolve that she may exercise it until 
the child is of a certain age, if the child´s interest requires it” (Art. 391).  
On the issue of custody during separation/divorce proceedings, there was an even clearer 
change from the 1852 to the 1936 Codes, from an emphasis on the father´s custody towards one 
                                                          
218 Legitimate children were those born to married parents; legitimated children were those whose parents married 
after they had been born. “Natural children” (hijos naturales) were those whose parents were at least marriageable 
(i.e. not close relatives, already-married individuals or members of the clergy). Being recognized by the father 
asserted their status as naturales and distinguished them from more stigmatized categories of legitimate children, 
such as hijos adulterinos. 
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that privileged the mother´s.219 Although these particular provisions applied only to marriages 
and not to convivencias, they still would have shaped the social and ideological context in which 
decisions about child custody were made. Not only did the emphasis shift from paternal to 
maternal custody; there was also a change (upwards) in the perception of how old children 
needed to be before leaving their mother´s side, from 3 to 7 years old. Again, however, it seems 
likely that the influence of the 1852 Code, and of the broader societal norms which it shaped and 
in turn reflected, would have lingered for some years after 1936.   
The Civil Code´s changing provisions on alimony also related directly to the issue of 
parental custody. The 1852 Code not only considered the father to be the main provider of 
alimentos for all his children – both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” – but also permitted two 
options for providers: “The person required to give alimentos can fulfill this either by handing 
over the alimony payment (pensión alimenticia), or by receiving and keeping the person who 
receives alimentos at home” (Art. 258). The Code set an age limit to this latter option, however: 
“During the first 3 years of the child´s nursing (lactancia), the father does not have the faculty to 
take the child to his house as a way of fulfilling his obligation to provide alimentos” (Art. 260). 
The 1936 Code, on the other hand, did not explicitly mention the option of taking the child home 
instead of providing an alimony payment, although this possibility is evoked in a more indirect 
way: “The provider can request permission to give alimentos in a form that´s different from 
payment of a pension, when there are special motives that justify such a practice” (Art. 451). 
Thus, according to the 1852 Code, a mother was not really guaranteed an alimony 
payment from their child´s father; the latter could just as easily choose the (probably cheaper) 
option of taking the child with him. In theory at least, not only was a mother´s custody over her 
                                                          
219 Namely, the 1852 Code had stated that “the children of a marriage for which divorce or annulment is being 
sought, will continue, during the proceedings, in the husband´s care, unless the judge decided to commend them to 
their mother, for the sake of their own well-being” (Art. 201). It is not clear whether this applied only to sons or to 
daughters as well. This ambiguity comes from the fact that hijos can refer either to children in general, or to sons 
only; also, other provisions seemed to grant mothers greater custody over their daughters, as well as over children 
under 3 years old. Article 202 of the 1852 code stated: “An honest woman [mujer honesta] cannot be denied the 
right to have her daughters [hijas] with her if it´s the case that she has not given cause for the divorce request; the 
woman, in any case, has the right to keep her hijos [sons or children in general?] until the age of 3.” The 1936 Code, 
on the other hand, gave mothers the right to keep children during divorce proceedings: “The children will continue 
in their mothers´ care during the proceedings, unless the judge, for their own good, decides to commend them to the 
husband... In any case, the woman can keep the children until the age of 7, unless there is some grave motive [for 
this not to occur]” (Art. 285).  
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children limited by the male-centered definition of patria potestad in the 1852 Code, which 
explicitly gave fathers the right to keep their children with them; she also could be faced with a 
choice between handing her child over to the father or renouncing the right to alimony 
altogether, in which case she had to meet all the financial needs of the household on her own. 
Clearly, these provisions had been superseded by the 1936 Civil Code by the time the cases in 
this chapter were aired before the juez de paz. However, their lingering influence is felt not only 
in the fact that there are 14 cases in which the mother agrees to have the father pick up the child 
rather than pay alimony; it also appears in the frequent use of the concept of lactancia - the 
period before the child was old enough to be picked up by his/her father. This term comes from 
the 1852 Code and is completely absent from the 1936 Code, yet it appears in the 1940-42 cases. 
No doubt the Juzgado de Paz was influenced by a confluence of provisions from both the old 
and the new codes. Those cases in which the child is to be picked up at 3 years of age show the 
influence of the 1852 Code´s provisions on lactancia as well as on a mother´s custody during 
divorce proceedings; the cases in which the child is to be handed over at the age of 7 would seem 
to reflect the 1936 Code´s stipulations on mothers´ custody rights during divorce proceedings 
(see footnote 53, above).  
Certainly, it would be wrong to assume that everyday practice always followed the 
Code´s provisions. The agreements drawn up before the juez de paz were no doubt influenced 
also by the immediate, practical concerns affecting the parties, as well as by unwritten local and 
regional norms. Besides, as with many historical documents, the actas we have are only 
snapshots, documents that served a particular purpose for the individuals involved at a particular 
moment in time; we do not know whether they were actually carried out to their full extent. The 
issue of parental custody was tightly linked to that of alimony. In many cases, the mandate for 
mothers to hand over their children to fathers may simply have been a way for the latter to 
excuse themselves from the obligation of handing over alimony payments after a certain age; a 
father could claim that he had been willing to meet his obligation by taking the child with him, 
even if this offer was not accepted by the mother. If so, then this norm would be a force 
constraining the options open to mothers and limiting their access to financial support for their 
children, but would not necessarily be enforced according to the letter of the agreement. 
Additionally, even many of the cases that do not mention the transfer of custody to the father still 
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specify that the latter will provide a pension only till the age of 3, after which time “another 
agreement will be drawn up.” It could be then that these rules were more about limiting the 
financial obligations of fathers than about actually transferring the custody of children.  
On the other hand, it´s also possible that at least some of the children in these 14 cases 
were actually picked up by their fathers, just as others no doubt grew up with other relatives such 
as grandparents, uncles, aunts or others – arrangements that might have escaped any and all 
archival documentation.220 Among the 1940-42 cases, we have only one case in which there is an 
acta that documents the moment in which a mother complies with the agreement to hand over 
her child to the father. Alfredo Gálvez, an obrero at the mine, went to the Juez de Paz in 
Huayllay requesting that he be allowed to pick up his daughter, who was a month away from 
turning 3 years old, and who was still under the care of her mother - Gálvez´s former conviviente 
Paulina Huerta. Gálvez was from the northern part of the highlands of Lima department, and 
lived in the Huarón company camp, working as a hoist operator at the mine. Unlike Gálvez, who 
was listed as unmarried (soltero), Paulina Huerta was listed as a widow, despite her youthful age. 
Gálvez argued that his split from Huerta had been due to her “bad character” and a “supposition 
of infidelity;” he believed that Huerta had a querido (lover). The Juez directly tied this 
accusation to the issue of the child´s future – he called for Gálvez to prove his accusation and 
present his former conviviente´s current lover. If he was unable to do so, he would suffer a heavy 
fine and possibly jail time for “defamation of honor,” and would be unable to pick up his 
daughter, and instead would have to hand over a pension for alimony (derechos de 
alimentación).  
Certainly, this case makes it seem as though the woman´s behavior was used as the basis 
on which to make a decision about custody over the child – either because of Gálvez´s 
accusation of infidelity or because of the fact that she was a widow who had had relationships 
with men after her husband´s death, both things that the Civil Code frowned upon. One legal 
provision that could have influenced a case like this was Article 202 of the 1852 Code, which, as 
we saw earlier (see footnote 53), stated that “honest women” could keep their daughters with 
                                                          
220 For a different region of the Peruvian Andes, Leinaweaver (2008) has analyzed what she calls “the circulation of 
children” - the common arrangements by which children sometimes grow up in a household different from that they 
are born into, without the mediation of any formal adoption bureaucracy.  
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them during separation proceedings unless they had given grounds for separation (and infidelity 
on the part of the wife was certainly listed as legitimate grounds for separation). On the other 
hand, this is the only one, among the fourteen cases involving the hand-over of children to 
fathers, that mentions or even implies issues of marital infidelity as having an impact on who got 
custody over the child. And while infidelity on the part of women would almost certainly have 
been frowned upon locally, in certain cases it was not an impediment to a couple reconciling and 
the man stating that he forgave the woman, as we saw in the previous section. 
Regardless, the next acta for this case, a month later, makes no mention of the accusation 
of infidelity or whether Alfredo Gálvez was able to prove it. It simply shows Paulina Huerta 
handing over her daughter to Alfredo Gálvez and to his brother Ignacio: “I, Paulina Huerta, give 
my daughter Beatriz, of 3 years of age, to her blood uncle (tío carnal) don Ignacio Gálvez so that 
he may supervise and take care of her, both in his custody and in that of the father Alfredo 
Gálvez.” The notes state that Ignacio Gálvez “receives his niece with the greatest affection, since 
he does not have children at his age of 35.”221 The two brothers expressed their commitment to 
give the child food, clothing and education; it was furthermore stipulated that “Alfredo has no 
reason to deny Beatriz´s mother the right to visit her daughter, as many times as she may like, 
just as he should make sure that the girl visits her mother so that she can provide her affection as 
the mother that she is.” 
 Here we have a case that shows some of the complexities of households, child care 
arrangements and informal or semi-formal adoptions – complexities that no doubt were present 
not only at the Huarón mine but in many places in Peru. Certainly, there are many aspects of this 
case that were not recorded and that we cannot know, even if we have tried to give some of the 
legal background as well as the context of other cases from the Juzgado. What were the exact 
reasons that caused Paulina Huerta to hand over her daughter to the child´s father and uncle? 
What role did the sexual accusations play in this? How distant were the two households, and to 
what degree was the child really leaving her home and her mother´s side? 
                                                          
221 “...quien lo recibe a su sobrinita con el mayor cariño ya que el no tiene hijos hasta la edad que tiene 35 años.”  
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 Although the majority of the 14 cases including agreements to allow fathers to pick up 
their children specify an age of either 3 or 7 years old, there are exceptions to this that shed 
further light on the complexities of this issue. In 1941, 27-year old Catalina Sánchez, a native of 
a district of Tarma Province to the southeast, but living in Huarón, came to the Juzgado to place 
a demand against her former conviviente, 26-year old Teodoro Yáñez. Yáñez, a native of one of 
the communities in the upper reaches of the Chancay Valley (Lima Highlands) to the west, was 
working as a timberman (enmaderador) at the Huarón mine. According to Catalina, they had 
“sustained marital relations” during five months, from which union she was now pregnant; 
however, Teodoro now had a new partner, and for that reason Catalina was requesting that he 
recognize the child´s paternity. Yáñez recognized his offspring-to-be, and the notes say that he 
was willing to hand over a pension “for the few months that Catalina keeps the child in her 
power;” however, the mother “insists on the immediate handover of the child,” and so Yáñez 
agreed to pick him/her up immediately after birth.222 Again, here we do not know all of the 
details that would be necessary to interpret the case. What conditions might have compelled 
Catalina Sánchez to want to hand over her child to his/her father, if such was indeed her will? 
Had Sánchez and Yáñez really been convivientes in the sense of cohabitors, or was this a more 
furtive sexual relationship described as convivencia for the juez de paz? What problems might 
having the child with her have created for Sánchez? 
 A somewhat similar case is that of Julia Jara and Tomás Rapri. Jara was from one of the 
communities in the Chaupiwaranga Valley to the north; Rapri was from the same community and 
was listed as living in the Huarón mine, where he worked.  They came to the Juez de Paz so that 
Rapri could recognize Jara´s 8-month-old daughter as his child. While Rapri is listed as “single” 
(soltero), Julia Jara is said to be “married” (casada) to a different man; yet Rapri and Jara are 
said to be convivientes of each other. The Juez certifies that Rapri recognizes the child and that 
he or his relatives will pick her up at some point in the future:  
                                                          
222 “Teodoro reconoce al nuevo infante, a donde se le recojerá tan pronto vea la luz del día según la exigencia de 
Catalina Sánchez para entregárselo tan pronto (illegible word) en este mundo, teniendo o haciendo notar que 
Teodoro está resuelto a pasarle religiosamente por pocos meses que lo retenga en su poder Catalina, a la criatura, 
mas esta se aferra a la entrega inmediata a lo que el acepta gustoso.” 
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He assigns the sum of six soles as a monthly pension for the child Rosa Rapri until the 
family of the father of the child in mention arrives to pick her up, in accordance with the 
agreement by both parties, since the mother of the child suffers from an illness in her 
hands (es enferma de las manos) and cannot keep her in her power during the entire 
period of lactancia, because she could very well fall from her hands. 
We do not know if the stated motive was the real reason why Jara would hand her daughter over 
to Rapri. According to the acta, for Jara this was a relationship outside of her marriage to another 
man, even if the term “infidelity” is not explicitly brought up in this case as it is in the 
Gálvez/Huerta case. What kind of constraints or pressures did this situation create for Jara? The 
1852 Civil Code had a deeply negative view of children born of adulterous relationships, 
particularly on the part of the mother. Again, however, we do not know all of the details that 
would be necessary to really understand the situation presented in this case. 
 On the other hand, as we have pointed out, out of the 32 cases mentioning children, 18 do 
not include the arrangement by which the mother handed the child over to the father; at least it is 
not mentioned explicitly. Moreover, there are also cases in which the mother not only keeps her 
child but also gives up the right to alimony from the father. One such case is that of Dionisio 
Matos and Balvina Pérez – incidentally the only case in the 1940-42 book that involves people 
living in the other mining center in the region, the Vanadium Corp. of America´s camp at 
Jumasha. Pérez, who was five months pregnant, wanted to separate from Matos, her conviviente, 
after a fight that she argued was only the last of several.223 Matos wanted to reconcile and 
promised not to do it again, but Pérez refused. According to the minutes, “Balvina insists on not 
continuing to maintain marital relations anymore with her conviviente, for he is accustomed to 
hitting her, and she will maintain the child that she is to have, through her own abilities and 
work, without having to call on Dionisio Matos.”224 The fact that this was not a separation by 
mutual consent, as most others in the Juzgado de Paz, seemed to make Pérez ineligible for 
alimony in the eyes of the juez. It is not entirely clear on what specific provisions of the Civil 
                                                          
223 The case actually contains more details on this quarrel, which involved some of their family members, but I have 
omitted them since they are not necessary for the purposes of this chapter. 
224 “Justina se aferra a no seguir haciendo vida marital más con su conviviente por cuanto este está acostumbrado 
a golpearla y que el hijo que ha de tener ella sola la mantendrá a sus costos y trabajo sin tener que llamarle la 
atención por este hecho a Dionisio Matos.” 
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Code this argument was based.225 In any case, Pérez was willing to accept this rather than remain 
with Matos. This is emphasized again at the end of the minutes: “Balvina Pérez will not have the 
option from this day forward to claim alimentación, for she renounces marital life.” This case 
shows that although laws and regulations on alimony and custody, combined with the inevitable 
financial pressure that having a child signified, inevitably created significant constraints for 
women, they still sometimes chose to exercise their independence. 
  Similarly, another case, that of Josefina Colqui and Manuel Castro, also shows a refusal 
of financial support.226 In this instance, however, it seems to be intertwined with an issue of 
paternal authority, for it is Josefina´s father, Raúl Colqui, who comes before the Juez de Paz and 
asks him to intervene in the relationship between his daughter and her conviviente. They had 
previously been given a deadline of eight days to settle their disagreements but had been unable 
to do so thus far. Colqui left open the possibility that a reconciliation might occur in the future, 
but in the meantime his daughter was five months pregnant and the future of the child needed to 
be attended to. He stated that he wanted Castro to recognize the child as his own, but not to hand 
over any form of payment for maintenance (expontáneamente no desea recibir ninguna 
subvención de parte de Castro) or for the costs of the birth, unless the two convivientes were to 
live together again (vivir convivencialmente). If the split between them was definitive, then 
Colqui did not want any form of payment for any purpose from his daughter´s conviviente. As 
with the other cases, here the acta provides only a snippet of what must have been a much more 
complex situation. What kind of social obligations would Raúl Colqui be incurring if he and his 
daughter accepted an alimony payment from Manuel Castro? What was the social meaning of 
these payments in everyday life, beyond the stale paper of the Juzgado de Paz and the Civil 
                                                          
225 It may have been influenced by the 1936 Civil Code´s regulations on separation and divorce (which admittedly 
were designed for marriages, not convivencias). The Code allowed separation and divorce either because of “mutual 
dissension,” in which case the agreement of both parties was needed, or because of any one of a series of specific 
reasons. One of these was sevicia (“brutality”), but it may have been difficult for someone like Balvina Pérez to 
prove to the Juez that her conviviente was actually guilty of this. If so, in theory, her “renunciation of marital life” 
could be seen as akin to abandoning the home – and Art. 165 of the Code stipulated that a wife who left the home 
“without just cause” lost the right to receive alimentos from her husband (although her child should still have 
received them).Again, this is speculation since the Civil Code´s provisions were not designed for convivencias 
anyway, but they inevitably helped shape the legal field within which the Juzgado de Paz operated. 
226 This is the second case discussed so far that does not specify a direct connection to work at or residence in the 
mines – the other being that of Urbano Chaupi and Matilde Quiroz, above. 
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Code? Would receiving alimony have been tantamount to accepting that the father would pick up 
the child at a later date? Or was the father trying to make it easier for his daughter to find a new, 
more stable partner by cutting financial ties with the previous conviviente? Answering these 
questions would require a more in-depth study of the interaction between national laws and local 
customary norms regarding these issues in this period of time.  
 
Housing and the world of the mining camp 
Mine housing and living conditions 
Another way to approach the question of the household is to examine the physical space 
of housing and the mining camp, where part of the reproduction of labor power took place, and 
which constituted an important space of negotiation between companies and workers. Mining 
companies often did not have a way to directly influence workers´ family life, but they could 
exert some control over housing, even if here they also had to adapt to people´s demands and 
practices.  
 Throughout the mines of the Central Highlands of Peru in the 20th century, workers´ 
housing units were called campamentos (camps). This was likely a holdover from the world 
mining industry´s past of temporary, makeshift camps built during mining booms. In Peru, some 
makeshift constructions could still be found for many years in a few of the smaller mining 
companies, and today they are found in the informal gold-mining operations in regions such as 
Madre de Dios.227 However, in industrial metal mines during much of the 20th century, the term 
campamentos referred to more permanent adobe, brick or concrete blocks of housing that might 
be occupied by a family for years or even decades. In my area of research, people might say “my 
campamento” to refer to their particular room or apartment within the housing blocks (whether 
when talking about the past, or, in those places that still have workers´ housing, the present). 
                                                          
227 Also, in some of the “modern” mines today, the adoption of Long-Distance commuting or Fly-in/Fly-out labor 
systems (such as 14x7 or 21x7) sometimes leads to the construction of temporary units to house groups of single 
workers. These are made of modern, factory-produced materials, but they resemble the informal “camps” in their 
transient nature. They can range from trailer housing to constructions resembling containers or barns and housing 




Alternatively, the campamento was the whole complex that included not just the workers´ 
housing but also the surrounding installations such as schools, company stores, clinics and soccer 
fields; this living space was adjacent to or near the company installations such as concentrator 
plants, workshops, laboratories or shafts to enter the underground mine. 
 During the 20th century, the construction of workers´ housing has exhibited remarkable 
regularity across Peruvian mines. I will begin by providing a brief overview of these patterns, no 
doubt glossing over many differences between specific regions and companies. Broadly 
speaking, the construction of housing by mining companies can be broken up into 3 main 
periods. The first, which developed gradually from the beginning of the century until the 1950s 
and 60s, with some improvements and modifications along the way, consisted of long rows of 
one-story housing containing single rooms. Each one of these rooms might be occupied by one 
or more single obreros, or, alternatively, by an obrero family. Increasingly, though not always, 
connections were made between adjacent rooms so that a family could have an entire two-room 
(or sometimes larger) unit to itself. Either way, the rooms lacked indoor plumbing, so toilets, 
showers and lavatories were located outside and shared by several families. Empleados usually 
had access to more space, and sometimes to indoor plumbing, while upper-level staff families 
had individual cottages or chalets. The 1970s saw a new generation of housing built for obreros: 
two- or three-story apartment buildings (with separate apartments on each floor) with indoor 
plumbing, even if in many places the supply of water continued to be sparse. Although often 
austere, small and lacking good maintenance, these new designs were not fundamentally 
different in concept from apartments in public housing projects in the developed world. Yet this 
new building style did not replace the former, but rather supplemented it; the near-permanent 
housing shortage at the mines meant that many of the older constructions continued to be used 




Figure 6 – Section of Huarón camp, mid-20th century                                                                
(Photo courtesy of Juan Porras Benavides) 
 
The third and last period in mining housing construction, from the 1990s to the present, is 
characterized by its absence: by and large, permanent workers´ housing is no longer built, and, 
when torn down (as much of it was in the 1990s), it is no longer replaced. In the old mines of 
Pasco Department, workers are increasingly expected to rent a room or house in the nearest 
population centers and commute. Temporary, prefabricated housing might be erected for some – 
though not all - of the single workers who are on the sistemas (Long-Distance Commuting). This 
is more so the case at some of the new mines in other parts of Peru, such as Antamina or Las 
Bambas, where a closed-camp model has taken hold (Salas 2008, 191). At the old mines, many 
of the traditional cottages formerly occupied by upper-level (often foreign) staff have been left in 
place. They had always received better maintenance and so were in better shape anyway, and 
they now make comfortable accommodations for the Peruvian mining engineers and technicians 
who often feel as uncomfortable as their predecessors at the thought of living in the nearby towns 




Figure 7 – 1970s-style mine company housing: 1ero de Mayo complex, Cerro de Pasco 
(Photograph by the author, 2009) 
 
 Returning to the 20th century, the construction of housing by mining companies in Peru 
was shaped by two general conditions: on the one hand, the companies´ need for workers, and on 
the other, the national laws regulating and protecting labor as a vehicle for civilization and 
progress– what Drinot (2011) has called the “labor state.” Regarding the first, mining operations 
in early-20th century Peru, as in many parts of the world, were often located in remote, rural 
areas, where only small villages existed and where little or no housing was available for rental. 
This was the case in Huarón but also in many other mines. Thus, companies had to build some 
form of housing if they wanted workers to come. Even with this imperative, however, there was 
some variation. Sometimes, small settlements or towns did emerge next to the mines (or had 
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already long existed, as in Cerro de Pasco), and companies could then discharge some of their 
responsibility for housing to the surrounding population. Also, the number of workers that could 
be housed together in each room was not set in stone, at least not in practice.  
Regarding national legislation, Law 3019, passed in 1918, mandated that any industrial 
establishment employing more than 50 workers, and whose operations were located more than a 
kilometer away from the nearest population, had to provide free housing for its employees 
(Poblete 1938, 115). This law was passed in the context of growing public preoccupation over 
the low availability and quality of housing for workers in the cities; over the next few decades, 
the government undertook several workers´ housing projects in urban areas, though never 
managing to meet the growing demand. There was a large gap between the word of the law and 
its actual practice, however. Although the regulations of the “labor state” certainly had an impact 
on the ground, many aspects of them were frequently flouted, especially in remote locations like 
the mines and plantations. As we saw in the previous chapter, that was the case for the provisions 
of the Work Accident Law; it was also true for aspects of Law 3019. For example, the law said 
each worker had to have at least 10 square meters of space, and that this surface should increase 
proportionally to the number of family members (Ibid.), but it is clear that this frequently did not 
occur: companies often did not build sufficient housing, so many several workers or entire 
families had to share a single room.  
The obligation of mining companies to provide housing for their workers was ratified by 
later laws such as the Mining Codes of 1950 and 1970. It was only with the new Mining Code of 
1981, and the accompanying Law 025—82-EM/VM, that the legal panorama began to change. 
Although the new law specified better housing conditions that mining companies had to provide 
(with a period of eight years in which to reach compliance), it also introduced the idea that the 
companies located 30 km. or less from populated centers could provide mechanisms to help 
workers purchase or build their own housing there, in which case the obligation to provide 
housing would cease. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, this changed legal framework, 
combined with the decline of the mining unions and the departure of the bulk of the workforce 
from many companies, would lead to the end of the camp housing model that had predominated 
for much of the 20th century. 
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 Descriptions of mining workers´ housing in Peru have typically emphasized its poor 
conditions. In 1919, before being hired at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, B.T. Colley, who later 
became an important officer there, visited the company installations. Later, in his company 
memoirs, he described his impressions of the worker housing: 
The private residences for employees [empleados] were not available for inspection but 
they appeared to be only fair, and the houses for workmen were very poor, much below 
the type installed in Braden and Chuquicamata [Chile] which were also considered as 
inadequate even at that time, forty years ago. The workmen´s houses seen in Morococha 
were really disgraceful, they could hardly be classified as hovels (Colley 1958, 6).  
In his 1938 report written for the International Labor Organization, Poblete Troncoso provides a 
description of housing in the main CPC mines at that time: 
These houses are composed of a group of single rooms, which serve as bedroom and 
kitchen for the whole family, with no consideration as to their number. The houses are 
made of solid materials, but they lack both space and a larger number of rooms per 
family, as well as a few indispensable services: an independent kitchen or one adjacent to 
the home, [as well as] sufficient bathrooms. There are no restrooms. (Poblete 1939, 150) 
Some improvements in housing were made over the following decades, though new 
constructions were never sufficient to meet the growing need. Colley, the CPC official quoted 
above, compared the conditions he had encountered in 1919 with the time of his writing (the 
1950s), highlighting the “great strides the Corporation has taken in recent years as indicated by 
the new workmen´s houses it has lately constructed” (Colley 1958, 6). Some later observers, 
however, were not so impressed. Dirk Kruijt and Menno Vellinga, social scientists who 
conducted a study of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the early 1970s, wrote that although 
housing at the new Cobriza mine (built after 1966) was “satisfactory and sometimes even 
excellent,” it was particularly bad at the company´s camps in La Oroya, Casapalca and 
Morococha. In general, most of the mining camps looked “miserable, almost sinister,” and “more 
like concentration camps than Sierra villages” (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979, 69-72). 
 Of course, these were all outsiders´ descriptions, based on the perceptions of people who 
did not live in the camps and who likely had their own particular priorities and customs. In both 
mining and non-mining contexts in Peru, housing occupies an important place in forming 
individuals´ ideas about wealth and poverty. In my experience, people from urban or middle-
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class backgrounds who travel through the rural Peruvian highlands tend to classify the dwellings 
they see as uniformly poor, and to make housing a focal point for their ideas about Andean 
poverty. Visitors who saw the mining camps as “miserable” likely would have said something 
similar about many houses in the villages where workers came from (as Kruijt and Vellinga 
actually do, see p.71). The workers and their families who lived in the camps probably would 
have interpreted them in the light of their own particular experiences and expectations. On the 
other hand, whether or not people were concerned about the lack of indoor bathrooms or the 
combination of dining and sleeping quarters, some aspects of mining camp did often represent a 
significant change from life in the small towns and villages. One aspect was the overcrowding of 
so many families close together, with a greater population density than would have been the case 
on the outside, even in nucleated agricultural villages. Another was the cold weather – although 
not in every case, on the whole most mining camps were situated significantly higher than most 
of the workers´ regions of origin.  
 At the Huarón mine, company reports document the building of camp housing as early as 
1915-16; these early documents explicitly distinguish between maisons ouvrières and maisons 
d´habitation pour les employés –indicating that at least some of the obrero/empleado division 
was built into the structure of the camp from the very beginning.228 Gerardo Bedoya´s 1939 
report for the Department of Indigenous Affairs, which I quoted from in the previous chapter, 
gives a very positive description of housing and camp facilities at Huarón. He highlights the 
existence of two elementary schools (with 80 students combined), a camp clinic and the 
company store. Moreover, he stated that the campamentos were “comfortable and hygienic,” and 
that each “apartment” varied “depending on the smaller or greater number of relatives of each 
worker.”  Bedoya´s description should be taken with a grain of salt – during his visit, he was 
hosted by the mine superintendent and wrote glowingly of the company in general. While the 
company certainly did have the two small schools, clinic and store already at this time (in 
compliance with national law), his statement about living space being adjusted per size of family 
would have been true only to a limited degree, as shown by other accounts to be examined 
                                                          
228 Compagnie des Mines de Huaron, Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 11 Mai 1917, Exercice 1915-1916, p.3.  
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shortly. His description probably reflects the letter of Law 3019 more than actual reality on the 
ground. 
Already by this time, the Huarón company installations were divided into three parts – a 
structure it would maintain until the 1990s. The highest area, situated at over 4,600 meters above 
sea level, near Lakes Llacsacocha, Lavandera and Naticocha, was Huarón proper (thus, this 
name could refer to the entire mine complex and company, or only to this section). Located next 
to one of the main mine entrances, this was the oldest zone, but it continued to function until the 
1990s, when it was completely demolished and turned into a desolate plain. An elevated area on 
one side of Cerro Corpus separated Huarón from the second section, Francois, located at a 
slightly lower altitude and near a different mine entrance. Francois gained greater importance as 
the concentrator plant was built there; today, it is the location of the main company offices and 
mine entrance, as well as of the few housing blocks that still remain. Until the 1990s, both 
Huarón and Francois contained obrero and empleado housing, and were divided into several 
different “neighborhoods” with names like Huancavelica (the oldest), Lavandera, Favorita, 
Shiusha, Chosica, San Francisco, Alto Perú, Quinientos, Miraflores, San Isidro, Vista Alegre, 
and others.  
The third and final main area, San José, was the “French neighborhood” – although it did 
contain a small amount of obrero and empleado housing on one side, it was best-known for the 
segregated zone where the administrators lived in individual cottages. It was located near 
Huayllay town, at a lower altitude of about 4,300 meters and more protected from the wind by 
the hills near the Stone Forest.  
The theses by engineers working at Huarón, cited in the previous chapter, give some idea 
of the state of housing at the mine around mid-century. Both Sotomarino (1949) and Hoyos 
(1954) describe a situation of shortage similar to that of many Peruvian mines. Hoyos writes that 
“as regards housing, one has to lament the great discomforts (incomodidades) that the workforce 
currently goes through;” he recommends the construction of new housing as well as a new 
hospital as a way of “ensuring the welfare of the workforce and, consequently, their greater 
permanence in the mines” (Hoyos 1954, 154, 171). Writing five years earlier, Sotomarino 
detailed three main types of housing: 1) one-room dwellings for single workers; 2) two-room 
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apartments (which he calls “little houses”) for obreros with families, “but generally in an 
insufficient number;” and 3) “very comfortable” houses for engineers and empleados, of four or 
more rooms, with hot water and electric heating, located in San José. This conflation of engineer 
and empleado housing is probably an error. However, in another section Sotomarino gives more 
precise figures: in Francois there were 21 housing blocks for obreros and 24 “two-room 
apartments,” while in Huarón there were 30 blocks of 2-room units and 18 blocks of one-room 
units. This did not include the Huancavelica sub-section (technically its own camp, though in 
reality part of Huarón), which had 10 blocks, apparently made up of 1-room units. It is only for 
Huancavelica that the number of rooms is mentioned - 138 rooms for the 10 blocks or an average 
of 13.8 rooms per block. If we assume that that held across the whole camp, this would mean 
that, in 1949, the two main areas of Huarón and Francois combined had about 1,000 rooms, 
broken up into both one- and two-room units.229 Sotomarino emphasized that more housing was 
needed, and that it was being built but “at a very slow pace” (con enorme lentitud). From these 
accounts it appears that the ideal was to have unmarried workers in single rooms and families in 
two-room units (in compliance with the spirit of Law 3019), but that in actual practice the 
construction of housing could not keep up with workers´ need to bring their families with them. 
The result was that a number of families were housed in single rooms originally meant for 
unmarried workers.  
 My interviews with people who grew up in Huarón provide varying descriptions of living 
quarters, depending on each individual´s particular experience or what they heard at home. 
According to Desiderio Roque, his father, who began working in the mine around 1955, told him 
how at that time it was common for two or three workers or an entire family to occupy one room. 
Another of my interviewees, Raúl Alejos (born in the 1970s), also told me how, according to his 
father, “in the beginning... the camps were small,” but then they had grown larger over time, so 
that workers eventually came to have more comodidad (comfort). Domingo Soto, who began 
work at Huarón in 1968, explained to me that starting workers were given a single room – “there 
you cooked, there you slept, there you ate lunch.” After a year or two at the mine, you could 
                                                          
229 This does not include the engineers´ and administrators´ cottages at San José, or the small number of obrero and 
empleado housing that existed in that latter area and in the small auxiliary camps of Santo Domingo (the company´s 
coal mine) and Shelby (the railway station).  
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apply to be moved to slightly larger quarters, but you had to earn merits (hacer méritos) on a 
point system. Don Domingo felt that his children had grown up in a cramped space. He pointed 
to the more comfortable quarters enjoyed by empleados as well as some older obreros who had 
been around long enough to earn more merits and gain access to better housing. Another of my 
interviewees, Elma Pablo, whose father, from the community of Huaychao, worked at Huarón 
from the 1950s to the 1980s, was more positive in her description of the camp quarters – she 
described units of 2, 3 rooms and larger, depending on the size of one´s family. All four of these 
individuals, as well as most of my interviewees, lived in the camps at the time when the new, 
apartment-style housing was being built (in the 1970s), but only some of them had access to 
these more modern quarters.  
 Although the main focus here is on Huarón, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger 
picture of Peruvian mining, in housing as in other matters. As mentioned earlier, there was 
remarkable regularity in terms of general housing designs and styles across Peruvian mines. 
However, there were also significant variations, both in terms of the services provided and in the 
number of rooms that were made available to each family. I already made some reference to 
housing at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation; it is also described briefly in Kruijt and Vellinga 
(1979) and DeWind (1987). Although conditions at the CPC and Huarón were certainly austere 
and crowded, they were better than at many other mines. Bustos and Murillo (1971) provide a 
description of housing at Caudalosa, a small-to-medium mine owned by Corporación Minera 
Castrovirreyna and employing around 379 workers in the south-central department of 
Huancavelica. They had been hired by the company in 1969 to start a Social Service office in the 
camp, which housed around 1,200 people including both workers and family members. 
According to their initial survey, there were 229 single-room units that were shared among 279 
workers with families and 68 single workers.230 The consequence of this obvious shortage was 
that some rooms (which ranged in area from 9m² to 16m²) had to house more than one family, or 
a family plus a single worker, resulting in concentrations of up to 14 people in certain cases. 
There was a program underway to build 43 additional dwellings, but it was slow in coming, and 
in any case would fall short of the 73 rooms that Bustos and Murillo calculated would be 
                                                          
230 This does not include the 30 workers with families who had the privilege of living in units of two, three or more 
rooms – all combined, these 30 workers occupied a total of 80 rooms (Bustos and Murillo 1971, 32-33).  
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necessary to have one per family, let alone the 647 rooms that would be needed to achieve what 
they saw as the ideal (for “mental and physical development”) of three rooms per family (Bustos 
and Murillo 1971, 32-34).  
 Thede (1982) provides a description of some of the camps closer to Huarón both in style 
and in geographical location. At the time of her visit in the early-to-mid 1970s, the Milpo mine 
(located northeast of Cerro de Pasco) had long adobe blocks with rooms that were 16 m² in area; 
the restrooms, showers, faucets and washbasins were located on the outside and shared by the 
inhabitants of each block. As in other mines at that time, newer, better housing was in the 
process of being built. On the other hand, the temporary workers (still a minority at that time) 
lived in worse conditions – wooden barracks with 9 m² rooms and no facilities to wash or shower 
(Thede 1982, 1.2.3).  At Atacocha, another medium-scale mine in Pasco Department, permanent-
worker housing was similar to Milpo, but Thede stresses the frequent cuts in water and electric 
services, as well as the fact that the housing shortage had led to some of the permanent workers 
and their families living in the wooden barracks originally designed for temporary workers 
(Ibid., 2.2.3). At the small mine of Machcan, located nearby and employing only about 87 
workers, rooms were similar in size to the other mines, but there were no facilities like running 
water (even outside), restrooms or electricity; many workers actually preferred to live in the 
nearby village (Ibid., 3.2.3). On the other hand, Thede, like Kruijt and Vellinga before her, 
recognized that the Cobriza mine, owned by the state company Centromín (formerly the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation), had “much more agreeable” housing, representing the new model of two- 
and three-story apartment buildings for both obreros and empleados (Thede 1980, 59). Thus, 
beyond the broad regularities, there was by this time a variety of housing and living conditions in 
Peruvian mines.  
Conflicts and tensions over space 
 Housing and camp life were important sites of contestation and negotiation in 20th-
century Peruvian mining. Even if companies generally did not directly attempt to shape workers´ 
intimate life and relationships, they did have an indirect effect on them through the control of 
housing. Inversely, workers and their families often made the camps their own and resisted or 
adapted to company attempts to determine how they lived. After they began to be established in 
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a permanent way in the mid-1940s, the mining workers´ unions also constituted important spaces 
for collective struggle over housing and living conditions. Additionally, housing was a site for 
contestations over notions of civilization and cultural and educational hierarchies. 
 Earlier I looked at some negative assessments of mine company housing made by 
observers at different points in the century. While such observers may have criticized the poor 
conditions provided by companies, many of them also cast a negative and demeaning light on the 
habits and practices of mining workers and their families. Using language derived from the 
discourse of public health and hygiene that was common at the time, a 1908 article in the 
Bulletin of the Peruvian Mining Engineers´ Corps described the state of the workers´ rooms in 
the mining district of Morococha: 
Uncleanliness [desaseo] reigns in all of them, as does the promiscuity of their occupants. 
The rooms serve simultaneously to house an entire family, with various classes of 
animals, and even to satisfy urgent needs. This absolute lack of hygiene is no doubt a 
powerful factor in the transmission of diseases (Boletín del Cuerpo de Ingenieros de 
Minas – “La Industria Minera de Morococha,” 66).  
DeWind (1987, 176) quotes similar accounts from Cerro de Pasco from 1916. Critiques of 
companies mixed freely with criticisms of workers´ habits, as was no doubt common in 
journalistic accounts of working-class life around the world in the early 20th century. However, 
in Peruvian mining at least this discourse did not disappear later in the century, rather it became a 
recurring theme in the conflicts between companies and workers. As we saw earlier, there was an 
ongoing problem of housing shortage not only at Huarón and the CPC but also at many other 
mines, which resulted in working families either having to crowd into small, cramped quarters, 
or, alternatively, having to look for housing in nearby settlements and towns when those were 
present. Although their priorities and assessments may have differed in some respects from those 
of outside observers – i.e. they may not necessarily have agreed that the camps looked “sinister” 
or similar to “concentration camps” – workers did seek to gain access to more and better-quality 
company-provided housing. They needed the camps in order to avoid having to pay rent 
somewhere else; they also desired the greater comforts provided by the larger as opposed to the 
smaller rooms in the camp. This aim developed as an individual struggle and, after the 
legalization and recognition of the mining workers´ unions in the mid-1940s, as a collective 
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endeavor also. Workers´ complaints about insufficient housing were often countered by the 
discourse of hygiene and the critique of “rural” habits.  
 An example of that comes from 1948, near the end of the 3-year period of political 
openness during which both the formerly-proscribed APRA party and the mining unions had 
been legalized. In July of that year, prompted by the new unions´ complaints about high living 
costs, low wages and poor conditions at the mining camps, the Ministry of Labor appointed a 
special commission to investigate the matter, under the chairmanship of Dr. Pedro Erasmo Roca, 
an economist from the University of San Marcos. In addition to visiting several of the mining 
camps of the Central Highlands, the commission requested written information from the 
companies on the subject of work and living conditions. On October 9, 1948, the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation submitted its reply, in which it answered many of the complaints made by the 
workers. According to Enrique Góngora Perea, the head of the company´s newly-created 
Department of Industrial Relations, although the CPC had not yet been able to build housing for 
all its workers, it was meeting its obligations under a strict interpretation of national law (Law 
3019). The unions´ demands for more housing were not justified, because workers were not 
making good use of existing housing:  
The Unions demand more accommodations [facilidades]. In effect, they practically ask 
for the urbanization of the main operating centers, which may be the result of a real 
desire to improve their standard of living, or of an excessive zeal in their union duties, for 
it is well-known that among the working population of this region, only a small fraction 
knows how to make use of the accommodations provided. A possible explanation of this 
phenomenon is the fact that, with some exceptions, the true industrial worker does not yet 
exist. The great majority consists of a population of rudimentary agrarian and pastoral 
customs. The destruction of property [that goes on] is truly alarming (Roca 1950, 32; my 
translation). 
Here Góngora expressed a practical concern over the wear-and-tear that the company-owned 
camps supposedly suffered as a result of the workers´ “rudimentary customs.” However, his 
complaint went beyond that practical aspect, using the discourse of hygiene to disparage the 
everyday practices of working families: 
One of the most serious problems is that the workers, in spite of the norms that are in 
place in this regard, insist on raising all manner of animals, even in the home itself. The 
most undesirable aspect, and which seems to have the greatest acceptance among the 
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workers, is the raising of pigs. The result is that there are sections which no longer look 
like a campamento, but rather like real pigsties... It is thus incongruous that the very same 
Unions should demand that the Company make improvements, while such unhygienic 
practices subsist (Ibid.).  
In his report, the head of the commission, Dr. Roca, stressed the housing shortage as one of the 
central problems facing mining workers, for it led to situations such as “families of four 
members or more, residing in a single room of 3m. x 3m.” (Roca 1949, 16). Additionally, he 
attributed the “extremely dangerous unhealthy conditions prevailing in the homes of the mining 
workers” in part to deficiencies on the part of the company – especially the small number of 
toilets and showers per block, which formed part of the unions’ complaints (Ibid., 18, 22). But he 
also echoed the company discourse in apportioning part of the blame to the workers and their 
families, focusing on the specific issue of the raising of animals in the camps. Roca furthermore 
made explicit what he saw as the ethnic dimension of the workers’ practices:231 
This general unhealthiness has its origins first in the absence or scarcity of adequate and 
sufficient water, sewage and garbage collection services in the camps; second, in the lack 
of knowledge and habits of personal and domestic hygiene on the part of the mining 
workers... As far as the personal habits of the mining workers are concerned, we must 
remember that the great majority are Indians [indígenas] and native to the surrounding 
highlands, accustomed to the inferior, rustic level of life, who then move to the mining 
camp [and] convert their room into a storage space for the provisions they accumulate, 
and even into a corral for the domestic animals with which they live (Ibid., 17-18). 
 The strategy of criticizing mining workers’ practices in the home as a way of deflecting 
union and worker demands, as evidenced in the previous quote by the head of Industrial 
Relations of the CPC, was not limited to this one instance. One of my interviewees, Aníbal Pérez 
Antonio, told me about how this occurred in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s mine at Cobriza 
(Department of Huancavelica), when he worked there for a few years in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Aníbal, who was originally from the community of Muquiyauyo in the Mantaro Valley 
(see Chapter 1), lived in the single worker barracks at Cobriza – long, military-style 
constructions made of corrugated tin (calamina) where large groups of workers slept on bunk 
                                                          
231 At the time of Roca’s writing, the terms indígena and indio were still common in official Peruvian discourse. But 
this would soon change, as the use of these words gave way in the 1950s and 60s to the class term campesino 
(peasant) as a way of referring to rural Andean peoples, including their cultural aspects. This shift in terminology 
was later consolidated by the renaming of the comunidades indígenas of the highlands as comundiades campesinas 
in 1969, during the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, but it was already underway before that act.  
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beds. However, he was a dirigente (officer) in the union, so he was involved in negotiations over 
living conditions that involved the obreros with families as well. The latter lived in a different 
area of the camp, entirely segregated from the single workers as well as from the empleados and 
the upper staff (the other two groups in the mining complex´s four-way division of space). The 
housing for workers with families at Cobriza was said to be among the best of any mine – since 
Cobriza had only recently started (in 1967), it featured the new, apartment-style housing (for 
families, not for single workers), with private, indoor bathrooms, that became more common in 
other mines in the 1970s. Still, the union had to pressure for more housing and better services in 
the camps. In response to my question about what these negotiations were like, Aníbal told me 
about the arguments that were made at the weekly meetings between the union and the Industrial 
Relations office:  
So then the topic of housing, for example, had already motivated a coordinated effort 
[gestión] by the union, in the strike, so then we discussed with the company, “When will 
it be implemented? How will it be implemented?” They complained, I remember very 
well, as an anecdote: “But, what do you all want housing for if you don’t know how to 
use it?” “What do you mean?” we asked him. “Look, here’s the social worker [asistenta 
social]. Look, we’ve given you a bathroom, a living room, two bedrooms so that you can 
sleep there, so that you can live there with your family. But we found out that you are 
using the bathroom as a storage space [depósito]. You take care of your needs in the 
living room. You don’t know how to use [the space].”  
As mentioned earlier, Aníbal was from Muquiyauyo, one of the more developed 
communities in the Central Highlands; in our interview, he had a clear sense of belonging to a 
generation of muquiyauyinos who differed from their parents’ and grandparents’ generation of 
peasant-miners in that they were completing high school and, in many cases, pursuing higher 
education or professional studies.232 He himself had begun studies at the University of 
Huamanga (Ayacucho) but went to work in Cobriza because he was not doing well in his classes 
and in any case needed to save up money to be able to continue studying; after a few years at the 
mine, he would return to the university and complete his degree in chemical engineering (though 
he would never be hired as an engineer, due to his past in union work and his political activism 
with the New-Left Vanguardia Revolucionaria party). In Cobriza, however, Aníbal worked side-
                                                          
232 As he said, “We are not the peasant-workers [obreros campesinos] of the previous [time], we are peasant-
workers who in some way have already finished high school, in the majority of cases, or, some of us have been able 
to be in the university.”  
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by-side with a diverse group of workers - not just from the Mantaro Valley like himself but also, 
most prominently, from Huancavelica and Puno in the south. In addition to geographic and 
cultural diversity, there was educational and occupational variability as well, particularly in 
terms of how close people were to the rural world. In his response to the company official quoted 
above, Aníbal attempted to speak on behalf of the more rural migrant: 
So then I said to them, “It’s because our compañeros are campesinos, it´s the first time 
they see bathroom fixtures [baño de loza], first time they see a cool living room, first 
time they will sleep on a bed. They don´t know. Wait, instead, we should do a course, a 
training so that they will know how to use the living quarters.” That´s what we proposed.  
 The discourse of company representatives in Aníbal´s narrative thus focused on what 
they saw as the workers´ incorrect use of space. This theme was also present in Roca´s 1948 
report as well as in CPC Industrial Relations´ reply to Roca´s questions, both cited earlier; they 
criticized the use of bathrooms to store provisions (rather than for their intended purpose) as well 
as the keeping of animals in the camps. Although Aníbal´s account of the discussion with 
company representatives does not explicitly mention the issue of animals, I then asked him about 
this point, to which he replied, “Oh, of course, it was not permitted.” Company efforts to clamp 
down on the raising of animals were common in all the CPC camps, and they were often resisted 
by the workers´ families. It was often the social workers at the company who were charged with 
enforcing these rules. One of them, who was employed at several of the Centromín (the CPC’s 
new name after nationalization in 1974) camps during the 1980s and 90s, explained to me that 
company policy was that people could have dogs, to keep away thieves, but no other animals. 
During her periodic home visits she would give people a deadline by which to get rid of their 
guinea pigs (cuy), rabbits, hens, sheep, etc. She described to me a particular incident that 
involved an argument over the keeping of animals as well as a misunderstanding based on 
linguistic difference. Once, when she had just arrived in Cerro de Pasco, she went into a home 
where a woman was keeping a lamb as well as guinea pigs and rabbits. People in Pasco, as in 
many parts of the Central Highlands, often use an affectionate term for their lambs – pacho or 
pachito – but the social worker did not know this. She was not from the area, and had been living 
in Lima before starting on the job; for her a sheep was a carnero, i.e. the standard Spanish term.  
When she told the woman that she had to get rid of her animals, the latter asked if she could keep 
her pachito, to which the social worker gave her approval.  
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I thought that pachito was what they called something else. I mean, the use of language is 
also different, isn’t it? And it turned out pachito was the sheep. Then the lady was saying 
that I had given her permission to keep her pachito. So I then told her “Look, it was a 
language problem.” For me the carnero is carnero, if the lady calls it pacho, that’s her 
problem. But she had told me that she only had one pachito and I didn’t understand what 
she was saying. “Your pachito is fine,” I had said, “but you can’t have the guinea pigs 
and rabbits there.” I thought pachito was the name of her little dog or something like that, 
never in my life would it have occurred to me that it was the sheep that she was asking 
permission for. [So then I said] “if it’s the sheep, then it must go.”  
 Clearly, the company was selective about which animals could be kept in the camp 
housing – dogs were seen as an appropriate domestic animal, but sheep were not. Furthermore, in 
this case there was a clear cultural distance between the newly-arrived social worker and the 
camp residents, as she herself recognized – anyone who has spent time among people in Cerro 
and surrounding areas would know that a pachito is a lamb.  Additionally, the difference in 
terminology was clearly an asymmetrical relationship – the highlands speaker had to adapt to the 
coastal standard, not least because the speakers of the latter were in a position of power.  
 People did have ways of evading company prohibitions on animals at the mining camp. 
According to Lucila Cornejo, who lived in the workers’ housing in Cerro de Pasco, most of her 
neighbors kept animals of some kind; she herself kept turkeys and hens. Her mother, who lived 
in the empleado housing section, raised guinea pigs. When the social worker was coming around, 
she would use the opportunity to feed the cuyes so they would not be noticed– they make 
frequent chirping noises, except when they are eating.  
 The conflicts over animals in the mining camps, and over the use of space more 
generally, were symptomatic of the differences in priorities between the companies and the 
workers. Although these no doubt varied greatly, they can be sketched in broad terms. As we 
saw earlier, company officials were worried about the wear and tear on the housing blocks that 
they had invested money in, and that required periodic maintenance. More importantly, however, 
they shared the common urban and elite view of rural practices as unhygienic and harmful to the 
health of the individual and the social body. That social body happened to be their workforce, 
which they needed to be in a state conducive to the success of operations; it also included the rest 
of the population of the camps, for which they could be held to some degree responsible. Yet the 
mining companies for the most part were reluctant and ambivalent modernizers. The priorities 
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just mentioned were only part of the story; another element that was equally if not more 
important was holding costs down. As we saw earlier, for much of the 20th century, company 
housing in Peruvian mines was generally cramped, austere and insufficient in quantity – not in 
every case, but on average. Moreover, the concern over the domestic practices and social life of 
mining workers´ families did not spring fully-formed; it developed and changed over the course 
of the century, under the influence of evolving transnational industrial practices, changes in local 
society and expectations, and Peruvian state policies and interventions. As we shall see, the 
interventions into workers´ lives discussed in these pages did not only originate with the 
companies – they were also determined by the development and outlook of the Social Work 
profession in Peru, as well as by the government norms that regulated this professional practice.  
 From the perspective of the workers, if we can momentarily make a very broad 
generalization, raising animals in the mining camp was simply a continuation of one of the most 
basic aspects of the domestic economy in rural areas, villages and even (though to a lesser 
degree) in cities like Cerro de Pasco. Chickens, rabbits and guinea pigs were a normal part of 
many yards and kitchens, and were sources of protein. Among other things, sheep and pigs were 
a resource that could be saved for special occasions when they could be used for a feast or sold 
for cash. As we have already seen, although both men and women could participate in the raising 
of animals, it was a task that often fell more under women´s purview. The infrastructure of the 
mining camps placed constraints on the sustainability of these everyday practices. While in many 
cases the housing block rooms in the mining camps might not have been too different in size 
from the one-room houses where many (though by no means all) of the more rural families slept 
in their home areas, the space surrounding the main area was markedly different. Even in the 
most nucleated, agricultural villages, people would usually have had some sort of yard, open area 
or corral (if not the open countryside) where they could keep animals and conduct other 
activities; this stood in stark contrast to the cramped, densely populated housing blocks of the 
mining camps, with nothing but a wall separating families.  This is a crucial dimension that was 
often ignored by outside observers who remarked that, although mine company housing was 
generally bleak, it was no worse, or actually better than, living conditions in villages of origin.  
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Working families´ attempts to keep animals in the mining camp rooms were not 
“rudimentary” or “rustic” customs, but rather an attempt to maintain a central component of the 
domestic economy – something that was all the more crucial when salaries were modest in 
relation to family needs. If the close cohabitation of people and animals created unhygienic 
conditions, this was as much due to the companies attempting to bring large numbers of workers 
together at little cost to themselves as it was to the workers´ “rural practices.” Even at the better, 
more modern camps built in the 1960s and especially the 70s, such as Cobriza, the new 
apartment buildings, though more comfortable in some senses, were not designed to 
accommodate a component of the household economy as crucial as the raising of animals.  
 That general picture aside, however, it should not be assumed that all families had the 
same practices when it came to the use of space. Aníbal Pérez´s comments about his compañeros 
(see above) should not necessarily be taken literally as applying equally to all workers; for 
example, by his time, many workers at the mines (though by no means all) would have had 
experience sleeping in beds. As mentioned before, different workers´ families had different 
degrees of proximity to the rural world and to agrarian and/or herding work. Nor was it a 
straightforward matter of degrees of proximity or distance. Even families that did know perfectly 
well what use was expected of a living room or a bathroom according to urban standards, might 
still have “failed” the company imperative to not keep animals in the camp housing, just because 
of how widespread the latter practice was. The type of animals kept might have varied, though – 
i.e. sheep and pigs would likely have been seen as more out of place according to urban 
standards than chickens or guinea pigs.   
 These restrictions on the keeping of animals, and more generally on the proper use of 
space, were in place not only at the CPC/Centromín mines, but also at Huarón.  In the previous 
chapter I mentioned one of my interviewees, the wife of a Huarón worker who had a somewhat 
negative view of people from the quebradas of southwest Huánuco Department – as she put it, 
“those people who have chacras (plots of land), who have animals, cattle,” i.e. who were closer 
to what she saw as the rural lifestyle. She mentioned this in the context of a discussion of her role 
as supervisor (fiscal) of her housing block, in which capacity she had to work together with the 
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company´s social workers, doing periodic inspections of people´s campamentos (rooms or 
apartments in the camp):  
Every twelve days, I checked on the campamentos. They weren´t allowed to have any 
animal inside of the campamento. And, the children should sleep in one little room, the 
parents in another room. Because, sometimes, people who ignore a lot of things [que 
ignoran muchas cosas], sometimes they come home drunk, and the children are always 
curious. I explained all of that to them. And most of all that they should not get all filled 
up with children [para que no se llenen de hijos], most of all that they keep the 
campamento clean. That the bed should be here, the kitchen items should be there, [the 
items] of the living room here, like that. And that they should keep the gutter [acequia] 
clean. And, to not hang clothes inside of the room, because humidity is bad for a person.  
Several themes are highlighted in this account. Besides the restrictions on the presence of 
animals in the camp, there is the ever-present concern with the organization of space and with 
having people and objects in their proper places. There are concerns about health and hygiene, 
but also an emphasis on “ignorance” as an explanatory factor. An anxiety over the mixing of 
adults and children, and over the latter’s “curiosity,” is also present. Finally, the narrative 
reproduces a discourse, common in Peru in the second half of the 20th century, that emphasizes 
overpopulation and traces it to the supposed bad habits of rural and working-class people: para 
que no se llenen de hijos. In this case, the speaker’s point of view should not be taken as 
embodying an external or overbearing, repressive force. She was a camp resident and a worker’s 
wife herself. As she told me, her role as supervisor of her block had come about because on one 
occasion, one of the social workers came to inspect her campamento and was suffering from 
stomach pain (cólicos). She gave her some “home remedies” (remeditos caseros) which made 
her feel better, and the two became friends; the social worker then asked her if she wanted to be 
supervisor.  To some degree, in our interview she was just expressing the company’s policies and 
the point of view of the social workers, even if she did seem to have internalized these 
perspectives in part, and saw herself as less rural than some of her fellow camp residents 
(especially those from the quebradas of Huánuco). In a different sort of interaction, say with a 
company official or a middle-class visitor, she might herself have been seen under the same light 
that she projected onto the camp residents whose homes she inspected.  
 Thus, the restrictions and negative views on working families’ use of space were not just 
propagated by the company and the social workers, but also found resonance in, or had an 
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influence upon, the ways in which at least some camp residents viewed and interacted with one 
another. A brief case from the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz highlights this for the specific issue of 
the raising of animals in the mining camps. In 1975, 28-year old Rosario Lara,233 a married 
woman originally from Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley, came to the Juzgado to lodge a 
complaint (denuncia) against her neighbor who had “offended” her (le ofendió).234 Rosario lived 
in the housing blocks of the Chosica neighborhood in the Huarón company´s Francois camp. She 
had been setting up a pigpen (chiquero) when her neighbor came up to her, called her “ignorant” 
and said “Why are you doing this in my yard? If you keep doing that you will see what happens 
to you” (Ignorante por qué haces esto en mi patio? Si sigues haciendo ya sabrás lo que te va a 
pasar). This case is interesting because it shows that the company´s prohibition on animals at the 
camp – as stated in the block supervisor´s account in the previous paragraph – was either not in 
place at all times or was not rigidly enforced: Rosario was setting up a pigpen in full view and, 
furthermore, defended her right to do so against her neighbor´s criticisms. It is likely that the 
dispute was really about something else and that the pigpen was only an excuse – the notes from 
the case also mention an earlier argument over the use of shared clotheslines, as well as frequent 
insults uttered by Rosario´s neighbor. Still, the use of the word “ignorant” in reference to the 
setting up of the pigpen shows that the practice of keeping animals at the camp could be a 
legitimate target for the repertoire of insults that drew on educational hierarchies to express 
disdain. Rosario´s neighbor may not actually have had any negative feelings towards the raising 
of animals, and may even have kept some herself, but the fact that she chose to use that specific 
insult to attack this particular practice is still significant.  
 We should also not assume that the adoption of the ideas about hygiene and organization 
of space promoted by the social workers necessarily went hand-in-hand with a negative or 
derogatory view of the workers and their families. This is seen in the response of Estela Páucar, 
the former staff member of the union at Huarón whose life story I included in the previous 
chapter, when I asked her what aspect of life in the mining camp she remembered the most: 
                                                          
233 Pseudonym 
234 Libro de Juzgado de Paz de Huayllay, 1975-1976, p.42. 
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The hygiene. The hygiene, and [a] complete [sense of] organization. A lot of respect. 
Hygiene. The neighborly commitments, we were very united, we were also very good at 
the social labor efforts with the Social Service personnel. They also taught us well, the 
Social Service personnel.  
Unlike the block supervisor discussed above, Estela had a critical view of the company, 
or at least some aspects of it; as someone who had been actively involved with the union in the 
1980s, she maintained some elements of a discourse of proletarian unity. During our interview, 
she did not voice (at least not explicitly) any disdain for her fellow mine camp residents, other 
than those who she sees as having betrayed the union in the early 1990. Yet she upholds the idea 
of hygiene as a positive aspect of life in the old mining camp, and lumps it together with other 
features such as “respect,” neighborliness and unity. Furthermore, she highlights the ways in 
which the camp population and company staff such as the social workers collaborated together. 
She mentioned to me that each year the women´s committees (comités de damas) that were 
organized by the union would give the company´s social workers a list of classes and workshops 
that they wanted to see taught at the camp: things like handicrafts (manualidades), confectionary 
(repostería), sewing, dressmaking, etc. Estela´s account placed the social workers and their ideas 
about hygiene within a context in which the practices of the old mining company compared 
favorably with those of the present. The old company may have exploited workers, but at least 
there was an organized, unionized workforce, as well as a variety of services in the camp and a 
concern for the well-being of workers´ families.235 
 Domingo Soto, whose story was also told in the previous chapter, expressed a somewhat 
similar view. In his account, the social workers (which he brought up in our interview without 
my asking about them) appear not as a repressive force brought by the company against the 
workers but rather as a service obtained from the company by the union´s efforts: 
Over there in Huarón the mine had, we requested it through the union, that there should 
be a certain person who gives classes on how to keep the campamento tidy, very clean. A 
social assistant [asistenta social] was hired. The social assistant would go and verify what 
state you were living in. That came from the company, the company was concerned over 
the state in which one lived, in everything related to cleanliness [aseo]. That is what the 
                                                          
235 As she put it, “With the company we worked in harmony. It´s just that we would misunderstand each other a little 
bit when we wanted a bit of a raise” (Con la empresa trabajábamos en harmonía. Sino que un poquito nos 
desconocíamos cuando queríamos un poco de aumento).  
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union did, what it managed to get.... The social assistants give classes on cleanliness, on 
how to raise your child, what state [your child] is going to be in. That is what the social 
assistant did, and there was more cleanliness, everything was clean.  
Like Estela Páucar, Domingo Soto was critical of many aspects of the old mining 
company but still compared the old order favorably to the present – in part no doubt due to the 
near-inevitability of nostalgia, but also for specific reasons like the greater labor stability that 
existed back then. I do not yet know for sure if it was really the union that requested the presence 
of the social workers at Huarón, but it is entirely plausible. At many medium-scale (mediana 
minería) mines like Huarón, the Social Service offices were created in the 1960s, following the 
Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s own Social Service Section, created in 1955. According to Bustos 
and Murillo, at the Caudalosa mine in Huancavelica it was the union´s insistence that led to the 
creation of the Social Service Office in 1969. In his account, Domingo Soto highlighted 
cleanliness as one of the positive features of the system that the union had forged together with 
the company. He said people were “more hygienic” then than in the present-day companies like 
Volcan in Cerro de Pasco (where he lives now), and claimed that Volcan no longer hired social 
workers. In a sense, then, social workers and their emphasis on hygiene appear here as an 
element from the past, as part of a vanished order. 
 While it could be argued that perspectives such as Domingo Soto´s and Estela Páucar´s 
are colored by the particularities of a smaller and especially paternalistic mine, we can find some 
similar opinions for the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. One such is the view expressed by Flor 
Dávila,236 a mining worker´s wife who was living in the mining company housing in the city of 
Cerro de Pasco when I interviewed her there in 2008 (in Cerro, unlike in the more rural mines 
like Huarón, there was still substantial company housing when I began my research). She told 
me about what things were like when she was growing up as the daughter of a worker in the La 
Oroya camps in the 1970s and later when she moved to Cerro with her husband in the early 
1990s. In response to my question about differences in practices between the CPC (nationalized 
as Centromín in 1974) and the current company (Volcan) that bought the Cerro de Pasco unit 
when Centromín was re-privatized in the 1990s, she highlighted the role of the asistentas in the 
camps:  




Centromín seemed more organized to me, starting with its people, its social service 
personnel was connected to the worker´s family... In other words the asistentas came, 
maybe they saw problems the worker had in the family, which they don´t do now. It 
doesn´t matter to them, they are more a part of the company... Before, the asistentas were 
ladies who really were dedicated to the life of the worker, to the family, to getting ahead, 
to teaching things that the ladies needed in order to keep going. Embroidery, sewing, 
confectionary, there was everything, but now they don´t do it anymore. If they do it, it´s 
only for a small sector – two, three mothers, maybe ten, but they don´t invite everyone. 
 Flor Dávila´s account is accurate insofar as the Social Work department at the Cerro de 
Pasco mine still exists, but is diminished. As a part of a system of social inclusion and 
governmentality based around labor, social workers at mining centers reached their apex in the 
1960s, 70s and 80s and have since declined. Flor´s perspective, like that of Domingo Soto and 
Estela Páucar, is one that emphasizes the positive aspects of social workers in the past as a way 
of criticizing the current company for the reduced importance they give to their labor force.  
Of course, this is only part of the story. Other individuals have a less positive recollection 
of the social work personnel and their interventions. Ernestina Lázaro is the wife of a former 
mining worker and was a leader of the women´s committees of the union in Cerro de Pasco, and 
regionally, in the 1980s; she was also the daughter of a mining worker (who was originally from 
Huánuco) and grew up in the camps in Cerro. In her case, I asked her explicitly about the social 
workers, and she replied in this way: 
They, well... since the company has always liked to have the compañeras in a backward 
state (en el atraso), without ever awakening (que no despierten nunca), they had them 
there in their office doing small things, dedicated to household tasks, but did not give 
them a good training... for example for setting up a small business (empresa). 
 She thus criticizes the company´s social programs, trainings and courses for reproducing 
conventional gender roles that kept women in the home and limited them to domestic work – i.e. 
the embroidery, sewing, confectionary mentioned in the other accounts - rather than allowing 
them to gain other skills that could be put to wider use. It´s also true that, unlike Flor Dávila, 
Ernestina Lázaro is less able to compare the past organization of the camps to the present, since 




 Another of my interviewees from the CPC/Centromín had criticisms of the social workers 
that were somewhat similar. Raúl Rivadeneyra is a former metallurgical worker from the 
company´s smelting complex at La Oroya. He is originally from a comunidad in the district of 
Ulcumayo in Junín, but does not maintain a strong relationship with his home community; rather, 
he spent years as an obrero in La Oroya and as an important leader in the union and in the 
Centromín Workers´ Federation, before he left the company in the early 1990s. In our discussion 
of life in the company housing, he criticized the social workers for “assistentialism” 
(asistencialismo) – a term that was already common in Peru in the 1980s. He did acknowledge 
that they “in some way did help a bit, no matter what.” However, like Ernestina Lázaro, he saw 
the social workers as dedicated to teaching workers´ wives things like “sewing, how to make 
their flower pots, how to prepare the milk bottle, to make clothes for their children,” but not 
“how to improve their condition of life, not inside the company but also with a perspective 
towards the outside.” They “tried to make sure that [people] kept their house clean, that they 
painted the walls correctly, but nothing for their future – all for the day-to-day livelihood.” 
Furthermore, he articulated a view of the social workers as people who, by virtue of their work 
visiting people´s houses, could act as a kind of spy for the company:  
There were even some individuals who were practically utilized by the company as a way 
to have a report on how, on the thinking, the attitude of the husband, the wife. So then the 
company had, through the asistentas sociales, a real knowledge of what the husband 
thought, how he acted... Something like, an informant. 
He did not blame this on the social workers as individuals, but rather on their structural position 
within the company: “The social workers, in reality, since they [were] employees of the 
company, they practically could not do anything that didn’t come from [the company’s] 
judgment [criterio] – they acted under a work plan that was demanded of them by the company.”  
 The social workers were not unaware that this view of them existed. As the main agents 
of the company who visited people’s homes with some regularity, they were naturally subject to 
the suspicion that they reported to their superiors on what they saw. In fact, two of the former 
Centromín social workers whom I interviewed, Alina Véliz and Ruth Alvarado, made it clear 
that this wasn’t just a suspicion – the company actually expected them to do this, although they 
tried to resist it as best they could. As Ruth Alvarado put it, “when you did the visits, the 
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company wanted you to be – at least I did not accept it – to be the neighborhood gossip [la 
chismosa del barrio]”. This could be about seemingly trivial things. For example, for many years 
workers were given supplies of firewood and/or kerosene to cook with; the only electricity they 
were supposed to use was for lighting, yet some workers who had learned electrical skills at 
work would improvise a connection to supply an electric stove that they had bought. The 
company thus wanted to find out that sort of information about families. Ruth would avoid 
reporting people for things like this. Yet to some degree this kind of thing was a structural part of 
the social worker’s job. For the workers and their families, living in the mining camp – which 
was the company’s property – meant being subject to both expected and unexpected inspections 
and, inevitably, some measure of invasion of privacy.237  
 
Interventions into “the social”: The practice of Social Work at Centromín in the 1980s 
 All throughout this discussion of housing and the politics of space in the mining camps, 
the central role of social workers and Social Service departments in the second half of the 20th 
century has become clear. Without a doubt, they constituted one of the primary sites of 
interaction between mining companies and the everyday life of workers and their families. For 
that reason, I will now examine some aspects of the practice of social work itself, as it pertained 
to the mines. I will do this first through a brief overview, and then through the life history and 
perspective of one social worker in the state mining company Centromín (former CPC).  
 Although social workers were among the primary agents of company intervention into 
the lives of workers and their families, their presence in the mines was as much a product of the 
Peruvian state´s policies, and of transnational currents of thought and practice, as it was a 
creation of the companies. As mentioned earlier, Drinot (2011) has used the term “labor state” to 
refer to the complex of labor legislation, bureaucracy and technologies of government that 
emerged in the first half of the 20th century in Peru – though it persisted and continued to 
                                                          
237 In the 1980s, when many of the mining camps were placed under State of Emergency in response to the armed 
conflict, a new kind of invasion of the home space was added, especially at the Centromín camps - military 
personnel would enter homes to conduct searches and look for presumed terrorists, sometimes acting together with 
company security officers. 
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develop until the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s began undoing some of its features. 
Although the provisions of the labor state would eventually play a crucial role in the mines of the 
Central Highlands, especially in the second half of the 20th century, this did not happen 
overnight. As we saw in the previous chapter for the issue of work accident compensation, many 
decades had to pass before labor laws and institutions were enforced in the mining camps with 
the same force that they had for the urban, coastal workers on whom Drinot primarily focuses. 
Even in the center of state power (Lima), the labor state developed as a gradual process over 
many decades. On the surface at least, three dates are of primary significance in relation to the 
development of social work in the mines: 1937, when the National Social Work School of Peru 
was created by the government of General Oscar R. Benavides, along with the official 
professional title of asistente social; 1955, when the first Social Service office was created at the 
Cerro de Pasco Corporation, and; 1965, when a law was passed mandating that all enterprises 
employing more than 100 workers should have at least one professional social worker on staff. 
Yet the importance of these specific dates should not be overemphasized. As Maguiña 
(1979) makes clear in his history of Social Work in Peru, there were several antecedents or 
“proto-forms and prefigurations” (106) of the profession in the years prior to 1937.238 Moreover, 
even when the first professional social workers began emerging after that date, this did not have 
immediate relevance to the mines, since the radius of action of the profession in the first few 
years was overwhelmingly urban and primarily focused on the working-class neighborhoods and 
hospitals of Lima. Similarly, the 1955 date of the creation of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s 
Social Service Section (Sección de Servicio Social) does not mean that there were no activities 
akin to Social Work taking place in the years before. Nor does it mean that professional social 
workers took over on that date; for several years, non-professional auxiliares continued to staff 
the Social Service at many of the camps, and they continued to work alongside the professional 
social workers as more of the latter started to arrive in the 1970s.    
                                                          
238 According to Maguiña, these antecedents included religious charity as well as institutions such as the Sociedades 
de Beneficiencia Pública (Public Aid Societies), founded in the major cities shortly after independence and in the 
19th century, and Juana Alarco de Dammert´s Sociedad Auxiliadora de la Infancia (Children´s Aid Society), founded 
in 1897. The latter organization in turn spearheaded the process that led to the founding, in the late 1920s, of the 
National Children´s Institute (Instituto Nacional del Niño - INN) and Children´s Hospital. Within the INN, the first 
school for visitadoras sociales – as the first social workers were called - was created in 1931. This school and 
profession constituted an antecedent to the asistentes sociales trained at the ESSP after 1937.  
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The founding of the National Social Work School (ESSP) in 1937 had been promoted by 
Catholic and aristocratic circles close to President Benavides´ wife; it also developed under the 
tutelage of Belgian Social Work institutions and on the model of a similar school created in Chile 
twelve years earlier, in 1925. By the 1960s, not only were other schools being created in some of 
the universities of the interior, but the social composition of the profession was also changing. 
As Maguiña writes, the new students were being recruited “evermore from the intermediate 
layers of the female student population, with a decided professional vocation, in the sense of 
expressing the need to enter the labor market, and no longer so much from the oligarchic strata, 
interested more in mere enlightenment or in volunteer work than in receiving remuneration” 
(1979, 162; my translation). Together with this change, the new currents of thought and politics 
sweeping the universities in the 1960s began to enter the Social Work profession, especially after 
the incorporation of the ESSP into San Marcos, Peru´s oldest and most important public 
university, first in 1964 and more fully in 1970.   
 Throughout this period, several enterprises and institutions outside of Lima had already 
been training their own non-professional social workers; such was the case in the Larco family´s 
Chiclín Estate in northern Peru (Ibid., 106), and, after 1955, in the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation.239 In 1965, as mentioned earlier, Law D.S. 009-65-TR created the requirement that 
companies with 100 workers or more employ at least one professional social worker. At the 
CPC, the number of professional asistentes sociales began to increase, so that by 1980 there 
were 22 asistentes and 52 non-professional auxiliares.240 The smaller, medium-scale mines of 
the Central Highlands also started hiring asistentes sociales around these years, for example in 
the Atacocha mine in Pasco (1965) and, as mentioned earlier, in the Caudalosa mine in 
Huancavelica (1969). The first social workers were also hired at Huarón around this time, so that 
by the 1970s and 80s there were some 7 asistentes employed by the company. 
                                                          
239 In the CPC, the Social Service Section created in 1955 formed part of the Department of Industrial Relations, 
which had in turn been created in 1948 (Roca 1949, 29-30). In the early decades of the 20th century, the area of work 
later known as Industrial Relations had been grouped under the name “Welfare” (Colley 1958, 4).  
240 Centromín-Perú, Gerencia de Relaciones Industriales – Dirección de Bienestar y Servicios, Servicio Social en 
Centromín-Perú. 1980, p.6.  
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 After this brief summary of the origins and development of the Social Work profession in 
Peru, I will conclude this section by delving more deeply into some of the tensions and 
contradictions that surrounded the interventions into workers´ lives in the mines of the Central 
Highlands, in the last few years before the structural reforms of the 1990s. This is meant to 
complement the discussion of conflicts and tensions over space in the camps in the previous 
section. I do this by means of the life history of one particular social worker at Centromín – the 
state-owned mining company created through the nationalization of the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation. Thus, while much of this chapter (and the previous one) has been more focused on 
the medium-scale mine of Huarón and only secondarily on the CPC/Centromín, I conclude with 
material from the latter company.  
It is important to highlight this shift in emphasis, for the practice of Social Work no doubt 
looked different at a large, complex company like Centromín as opposed to a mediana minería 
camp like Huarón. Furthermore, Alina Véliz´s perspective should not be taken as representative 
of all social workers even at Centromín; in fact, it is rather unusual - as she herself is aware – 
though probably not unique. Nevertheless, I choose to focus on it because I think it highlights 
some of the tensions and ambiguities in the relationship between mining companies at workers in 
the mines, and thus serves to forestall a simplistic “workers vs. company” dichotomy. Moreover, 
as with the stories of Huarón workers presented in the previous chapter, I think life histories 
offer a useful complement to other methodologies and ways of presenting information and 
analysis, because they allow for a more subjective perspective on events. As with the other life 
histories, here it must not be forgotten that this is based on one person´s point of view, based on 
what they remember and how they choose to enunciate it. Additionally, the account presented 
here is mediated by my own process of selection and elaboration.241  
 Alina Véliz grew up in La Oroya, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s smelting center, 
where her father was a skilled empleado in the offices; though he started working as a gasoline 
attendant (grifero), towards the end of his career he ended up working with IBM information 
                                                          
241 The account in this section is based on an initial three-hour recorded interview with Alina Véliz, and a 
subsequent two-and-a-half hour recorded conversation with her together with some of her former fellow social 
workers from the company. Elizabeth Lino Cornejo was present on both occasions and helped me to ask questions 
and subsequently to reflect on the material.  
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systems. The family was originally from San Jerónimo de Tunán, a town very close to the city of 
Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley. She got her primary education at the CPC schools, but then 
moved to Lima, where she did secondary school at one of the large unidades escolares. Her 
father had always encouraged his children to study, and upon finishing high school Alina thought 
about becoming a nurse, but her sister, who worked in a clinic in Lima, discouraged her from 
doing so. So she tried to think about what other career options were available to her at the time, 
and remembered the auxiliares of the CPC Social Service whom she had known in the La Oroya 
campamentos growing up. So she decided to study Social Work. This was in the late 1960s, 
when the National Social Work School (ESSP) – mentioned earlier – was already formally 
incorporated into San Marcos University but still maintained a separate institutional structure and 
location. The students had to do two years of general studies at the university before moving 
back to the ESSP. Alina still remembers the trauma of this transition from the politically 
effervescent climate of Peru´s most prestigious university to the more parochial, conservative 
environment of the ESSP; at the latter, she says, the staff still checked the students to see if their 
fingernails were clean and if they carried a white handkerchief in their pocket.  
Yet as Maguiña (1979) also describes, even at the ESSP things were already changing. 
What Alina calls the process of “reconceptualization” of the profession had begun, under the 
influence not only of the universities in Peru but also of new Social Work currents coming in 
from Chile, Argentina, Brazil and other countries. As she says, “the training in the [ESSP] was 
no longer appropriate to the social problem of the country; we couldn’t keep doing 
asistencialismo when there were massive populations living in extreme misery.” As part of this 
process, the students staged a toma (building occupation) with the support of the federation of 
students at San Marcos. The result of all this was that the ESSN was fully incorporated into San 
Marcos, within the social sciences. Although this was a welcome move to Alina, she also says 
that the (mostly female) Social Work students “suffered from the prejudice” of the (mostly male) 
social science students towards them, because they “always saw us as the domestic servants of 
the house.”  Nevertheless, she was glad to study with sociologists, anthropologists and historians; 
one of her professors was Dirk Kruijt, a Dutch social scientist who later wrote a book about the 
Cerro de Pasco Corporation (Kruijt and Vellinga 1979). She felt close to the anthropologists 
because like social workers, they also went out into the field. Her own fieldwork practices took 
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place in some of the new neighborhoods of Lima that were the product of invasiones (land 
takeovers), like Cerro San Pedro and Ermitaño. These experiences convinced her that “I should 
be a social worker [trabajadora social] and fight against that very silly, traditional, conventional 
idea of the asistenta social – we are not social assistants, I said ‘I don’t assist anyone, if they 
need assistance I give it to them, but I am a trabajadora social;’ the work is something else.” 
After graduating, she worked for several years teaching at some of the new Social Work 
departments in the universities in the interior of the country, where she helped them in their own 
process of reconceptualización of the practice. Finally, in 1979 there was an opening in the state-
owned mining company Centromín, the former CPC, and she was hired.  
Alina describes what Social Work at the CPC/Centromín had looked like in previous 
years, since the creation of the Social Service Section in 1955. When she was growing up in La 
Oroya, there was an agreement that the daughters of company workers who had a high school 
diploma or were at least in the third year of secondary school could get work with the company, 
and the area they were most often sent to was the Social Service: “We always knew the asistenta 
in the mining world, that she was the lady who went and did the campaigns to kill stray dogs, to 
make the stray pigs disappear, to give an orientation to the women on how to cook the chicken 
better, all domestic things for private consumption.” Echoing the critiques by Ernestina Lázaro 
and Raúl Rivadeneyra cited earlier, Alina also points out that many of the workers´ wives who 
attended the Social Service trainings would end up making large amounts of knitwear that they 
simply stored up at home, because they were never properly taught the idea that they could do 
something else with it, like sell it. To some degree, throughout our conversations, Alina defined 
herself against these non-professional auxiliares, who became less dominant as time went on but 
who continued to work under the supervision of the professionals like her. She portrays some of 
the auxiliares not only as immersed in traditional asistencialismo and conventional gender roles, 
but also as more conservative and more subject to manipulation by the company bosses and 
engineers, who often sought to use them to spy on the workers.  
An even greater educational (and, to some degree, class) divide is described for the small 
Caudalosa mine in Huancavelica by Bustos and Murillo (1971), who had been hired to organize 
the company´s first professional Social Service office in 1969: 
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In previous years, these functions were performed by a local woman, with good 
intentions but without any professional training, without even a high school education. 
Her work was limited to resolving certain family disputes, to giving sewing classes to a 
group of six local women, and to demanding greater hygiene in the homes. The position 
had been given to her because of her compadrazgo ties with the Superintendent back 
then. 
Thus, at the same time that the Social Work profession was becoming more class-diverse and 
moving away from its elitist, Lima-based roots (Maguiña 1979, 162), in many of the mining 
camps a division or hierarchy persisted between those new professionals and the non-
professionals who had been performing some of the same functions, in a formal or informal way, 
until then.  
 The situation of the Social Service department at CPC/Centromín around the time Alina 
arrived was also one marked by the inequalities of what she calls “the masculine, patriarchal 
world” of the mine. This was embodied in long-term practices and traditions at the company. For 
example, until 1969, only single women could be asistentas or auxiliares; if one of them became 
pregnant, they were immediately fired. This is also mentioned by Maguiña (1979, 174), who 
points out that it was only the labor stability laws put in place by the government of General Juan 
Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) that brought an end to dismissals for this reason (and others) at 
the CPC. Still, Alina pointed out to me, the lingering effects of this old policy were still felt, so 
that young asistentas or auxiliares who became pregnant were still subject to suspicion and 
“defamation” on the part of the managers and engineers. Another old practice had been that at 
the end of the year the Social Service personnel would be rotated among the different company 
operations; the managers would come and personally choose the asistentas that they wanted, and 
according to Alina this decision was often made on the basis of looks. She was part of the effort 
to replace this method of selection, which she calls “offensive,” with a rotation made through 
matching professional qualifications with the needs of each site. Other similar practices seem to 
have lasted longer, however. Both Alina and another social worker from around the same time, 
Ruth Alvarado, told me of instances in which, when the cooking staff was on strike alongside 
other workers, the social workers would be sent to the kitchen to cook for the engineers and 
managers. For them, ending these practices was part of the process of gaining respect not only 
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for their gender but also for their profession and work, in a context in which many in the 
company saw the Social Service as merely a legal requirement with which they had to comply. 
 I will briefly trace the outline of Alina´s career at the mining company, before delving 
more deeply into certain specific issues she highlights in her own practice of Social Work and in 
her relationship to the workers and their families. For several years, she worked in the camp of 
the Yauricocha mine, one of the nine operating units that Centromín had inherited from the Cerro 
de Pasco Corporation.242  An old colonial mine originally acquired by the CPC in 1927 and 
brought into large-scale production in 1948 (DeWind 1987, 34-38), Yauricocha was seen as a 
remote, high-altitude mine, located in the Western Cordillera but accessible only from Junín 
Department to the east. There were workers there from Ayacucho, Huancavelica, as well as 
Junín Department. In 1983, Alina had her first experience of being dismissed from the company, 
which she attributes to the resentment that her perceived closeness to the unions had generated 
among the administrative staff.243 After a year and a half, she was able to get rehired; the 
Minister of Labor had been sympathetic to her case due to the fact that they were both 
sanmarquinos (San Marcos graduates) and that his driver was Alina´s cousin. Upon returning, 
she worked another two years in Yauricocha, then received a scholarship to travel to 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras (with the company´s permission) to do a Master´s program at the Latin 
American Social Work Center (CELATS). In 1988 she returned to Peru and was named 
Assistant Director of the Social Service Department, and finally in 1990 became Director, 
supervising all nine operating units (with a total of about 15,000 workers, plus their families) 
from the company headquarters in La Oroya. In this capacity, Alina attempted to put into 
practice some of the ideas and techniques that she had learned in her Master´s Program. In 
particular, she sought to ground the practice of Social Work on a firmer footing of research and 
also to integrate it more closely with Operations. Out of these concerns came an effort known as 
Proyecto Julián, which was an attempt to conduct confidential interviews with a broad cross-
                                                          
242 Not to be confused with San Esteban de Yauricocha, the original name of the city of Cerro de Pasco.  
243  Specifically, it involved an incident in which she helped secure a pension and a job for the widow of a mineral 
transport railway worker who had died in an accident; this meant going taking on the Accounting office, which had 
already ruled against the widow. This then caused her to become close to the union local to which the worker had 
belonged (the Pachacayo railway workers, one of the many Centromín unions), which began asking her to 
participate in their negotiations with the company. This in turn led to her dismissal. 
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section of workers to get their perspectives on workplace as well as family issues. She believes 
that this work made many of the managers and engineers uncomfortable and led to her second 
and definitive termination from the company, which came in 1995.  
From her years in the mines, particularly in the remote Yauricocha camp, Alina recalls 
many of the same issues that are highlighted in other accounts and evidence of mining camp life 
in Peru, and that were the product the overcrowding (hacinamiento) and the difficult living and 
working conditions: problems like gossip, infidelity (real and imagined) and domestic violence, 
as well as disputes over the use of shared spaces. She remembers being called upon to play 
“lawyer, priest and policeman” in many of these conflicts. On the other hand, in her account she 
emphasizes not just the everyday conflicts but also the solidarity that could be felt in the mining 
camp during difficult moments such as accidents, or during the violence of the 1980s: 
Faced with problems, faced with the crisis, there really was solidarity among people. 
Sometimes they were enemies every day but when faced with death, then they were all 
together in sorrow. Or if something happened, for example during the time of 
terrorism,244 you went out to walk around the camps, and found individuals shot, dead, on 
the sidewalks. So then the neighbors [vecinas] would go out and ask ‘Who? Who is it?’ 
‘It’s Teresa’s husband, do you remember?’...They had been in [that person’s ] party, or 
baptism. So then they all went to Teresa’s, and they picked up the body and, well, there 
was that whole situation, they sympathized, you know? The pain, they did really feel it.245  
 One of the most striking aspects in Alina´s account of her work is the way in which the 
object of the Social Service´s interventions was defined as completely external to the productive 
activity of the mine. The asistentes and auxiliares were basically expected to enforce hygiene in 
the camps and to organize activities for the families, not to have anything to do with the world of 
work in the mine, concentrator plant or foundry. As she says,  
                                                          
244 In Peru, the term terrorismo became the dominant way of describing the actions of Sendero Luminoso during its 
“People’s War” that began in 1980. Moreover, people often say “the time of terrorism” (la época del terrorismo) to 
refer to all of the violence of the period, even when they acknowledge that state and parastate actors were also 
responsible for a part of that violence. In intellectual and left-wing circles, on the other hand, it is more common to 
say “the internal conflict” or “the armed conflict.”  
245 “Pero si había también mucha solidaridad. Frente al problema, frente a la crisis, si había solidaridad entre las 
personas. A veces eran enemigas todos los días pero frente a la muerte, allí todas estaban en el dolor. O pasaba 
alguna cosa, por ejemplo en la época del terrorismo, tú salías a caminar por los campamentos, y encontrabas 
baleados, muertos, en las veredas. Y entonces las vecinas salían ´¿Quién, quién es?´ ´No, es el esposo de la Teresa, 
mira que si te acuerdas´...habían estado en la fiesta, en el bautizo. Entonces todas iban en Teresa, y, recogían el 
cadáver, y bueno había toda esa situación, que compadecían, ¿no? El dolor, y lo sentían de verdad.” 
240 
 
The doors of the operations were always closed to the social workers; our entry into 
operations was prohibited... The asistentas were for the outside, the engineers were for 
the inside. And there was one engineer after another who had a big social problem, but 
they were untouchable [intocable, i.e. beyond criticism]. 
This is of course one specific instance of industrial capitalism´s separation of the home and 
workplace. It is also similar to the manner in which mining companies in Peru today tend to 
define Community Relations – which has largely replaced Social Work and Industrial Relations 
as the most important vehicle for the mining industry´s interventions into society – as external to 
and entirely separate from issues of mine operation and environmental impact. In both cases, I 
believe this has to do with companies´ need to shelter the “technical” productive sphere from 
intromission by social and political questions. Interventions into society, in addition to being 
mandated by law, gained through struggle or diffused through transnational professional and 
technocratic circuits, are meant to obtain “social peace” for companies and thus keep the social 
world at bay. Although they also have the function of assisting either the reproduction of the 
labor force (in the case of Social Work) or the access to land and minerals (in the case of 
Community Relations), the importance of this role is often downplayed both by engineers who 
want to stick to their technical criteria and managers who would rather portray social 
interventions as generous gifts from the corporation to the society. This thus results in the 
marginalization often felt by the professionals in charge of social issues, whether it be social 
workers (as in Alina’s case) or Community Relations specialists today.  
 Although the company attempted to maintain this separation, evidence of the 
interconnection between the sphere of work and the sphere of the home was not hard to find. As 
Alina says,  
The company establishes that the focus of your attention is the family, but the family 
where the father does not exist – Why? Because the worker – and here there is a double 
error – the head of the family is the worker, but the company assumes that the worker is 
its property and so takes the worker away for the operations and leaves the family 
without its head. But then for the family problems that you confront you need the head of 
the family – so then where do you find him? He’s not there, and the company does not 
want to understand that.  
 Not only were the workers separated from their family during their shift, but, in many 
cases, workers had their families living in towns such as Huancayo, Jauja or Tarma; although 
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this arrangement was not as widespread as it is today, it was already present back then. This 
naturally created stress in the relationship between the worker and the family whom he saw only 
once every two weeks or so. It also led not only to infidelity but also to instances of workers 
who, as Alina put it, were “abandoned” by their families, with the latter only caring about 
receiving their share of the paycheck every 15 days. The social worker would then come to the 
campamento expecting to find a family, only to find a sick worker lying in bed with no one to 
care for him. It would then turn out that the worker´s supervisor was sanctioning him for not 
coming to work, without bothering to go and check in his home. All of these things made it clear 
that the sphere of work and the sphere of the home were interconnected. Furthermore, Alina tried 
to make this connection more explicit by teaching the workers´ wives about the world of the 
mine – a world she herself was never allowed to enter (as a woman and as a non-operations 
person) during all her years in the company:  
I even taught them what the mine was like, through slides – back then people used slides 
right? I showed them that, so they´d be able to see the work conditions that their 
husbands have in the mine, that it´s a hard, ugly job, that for eight, ten hours, it´s sunny 
[outside] and you don’t know if it’s day or night, because you’re down below, inside the 
hole, and those conditions change people’s mood [humor], their frame of mind [estado de 
ánimo], how tired they are, etc. So then, ‘You, being on the outside, what is it that you 
need to give to your husband? Good nourishment, a sizeable bottle of liquid,’ because 
they would send them a little glass, ‘No, you have to send two, three liters of water, 
because inside they are perspiring, they get tired.’ So all that information, that was 
always prohibited, I liberated it and began to give it to the women, because they have to 
know where [their husband] is. 
Although this discourse may seem to reinforce an ideology of domesticity that would help the 
company by creating a healthier, more productive workforce, in Alina’s narration the company 
appears more interested in “prohibiting” access to its operations; it is she who “liberates” 
information about the workplace and transmits it to workers’ wives. In general, her account - 
which is obviously only one perspective into the company’s functioning – paints a picture of a 
world driven less by social engineering and more by inefficiency and lack of interest in workers’  
lives, a world in which the successful reproduction of the labor force was always less than 
secure. Some of this has to do not only with Alina´s overall critical perspective on management 
but also with the situation of economic crisis and overall chaos in which the country as a whole 
found itself during much of the 1980s and early 90s. However, I believe some of the same 
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features were found, in a more muted form, for earlier years as well – in the Peruvian mining 
industry (even in the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), the drive towards social engineering never 
fully won out over the imperative to contain costs.   
As mentioned earlier, after becoming Director of the Social Service Alina attempted to 
bridge this gap between her own work and that of Operations through Proyecto Julián, an effort 
named after a worker who had gained recognition for his long term of service at the company. 
The project consisted of obtaining workers´ input (through confidential interviews) into their 
work conditions and into what they wanted to see changed; more broadly it meant bringing 
criteria from those areas of the company considered to be part of Welfare (Bienestar) with those 
that were part of production, as a way to raise productivity: 
I proposed that Operations and Welfare become a real work unit that would provoke, that 
would help raise the productivity index. Because if you have the worker doing jobs that 
involve 8 hours of work but with a doubled shift it becomes 16 hours of work, and they 
have bad housing [vivienda de mala muerte], many of them were boarders [so] nobody 
even brought lunch for them; in work conditions with high temperatures... with 
dehydration or with lead poisoning,246 when the first characteristic or symptom of lead 
poisoning is the sexual impotence of the worker, then, what are we talking about? We are 
not then talking about welfare... So I sell that idea, that the company has a Social Work 
unit that looks after the welfare of the worker and the family and that that will help to 
raise his productivity, insofar as the operations also offer safe working conditions and 
training for the worker. 
This effort had some success at the copper, lead and zinc foundries, as well as in some of 
the mining units like Casapalca; according to Alina, workers and engineers would be reluctant to 
come in for the 20-minute interview, but then they would stay talking for two hours, relieved that 
someone was finally listening to their personal and workplace problems. However, the 
difficulties arose when some of the summaries she prepared quoted employees who called for the 
replacement of the Human Resources staff; the latter felt attacked and she believes that this 
initiated the process that led to her downfall and dismissal from the company in 1995. This 
process also involved the bola (rumor) that she was a terrorista and a subversiva (i.e. a member 
of Sendero Luminoso), an accusation that was rather common at the time. By then, in any case, 
                                                          
246 I believe here Alina is referring particularly to workers in the company’s Lead Foundry that is part of the La 
Oroya metallurgical complex.  
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the piecemeal privatization of the company had begun, and people were being laid off or asked 
to resign for many different reasons. 
Another aspect that comes through in Alina´s account of the practice of Social Work in 
the mining company is the fraught, ambiguous relationship that the social workers had with the 
working population and in particular with the unions. On the one hand, Alina´s background as a 
Social Sciences student - in the radicalized environment of San Marcos University in the 1970s – 
made her more sympathetic to union demands than the engineers (or also, in her opinion, the 
non-professional auxilaries of the Social Service) would have been. She discusses her 
conversations with fellow social workers on one specific occasion in which she tried to tell them 
to be wary of company requests to help perform the tasks of striking workers – particularly in the 
kitchen – during the unions’ work actions: 
All of us who had a university education [de nivel universitario] realized that these are 
union struggles [luchas sindicales] that, whether they are right or wrong, are means that 
the workers have to exert their force [medidas de fuerza de los trabajadores], and 
whether they get it right or wrong it’s something that they have to resolve as an 
organization, face-to-face with the company. So then, as a social worker, what are you 
going to do?247 
On that occasion, she says, the obrero union saw the social workers as “class enemies,” 
due to the fact that some of them were working during the strike. So Alina and a few other social 
workers drafted a manifesto in support of the strike, which was read in the assembly of the 
obrero union and which “saved our image in the eyes of the working masses [masa 
trabajadora].” This caused some problems with management, but as she says, “What good is it 
to get along with the chief of [Industrial] Relations if the service you provide is not for the chief 
of [Industrial] Relations but rather for the working masses?” At another time, as mentioned 
earlier, she developed a good relationship with one of the union locals at the Yauricocha mine 
because she used what she knew of Law (from some of her courses at San Marcos) to help a 
widow get a job and a pension; according to Alina, “in the union they would say, ‘the señorita is 
zurda [leftist], because she does understand the conflict, she does understand the worker. ’” 
                                                          
247 “Todas las de nivel universitario nos damos cuenta que son luchas sindicales con razón o sin razón son medidas 
de fuerza de los trabajadores y si lo aciertan o lo equivocan son algo que ellos lo resuelven como organización 
frente a la empresa. Entonces tú como trabajadora social ¿qué vas a hacer?” 
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On the other hand, the position of social workers was always complicated by the fact that 
a large part of their job consisted in entering people’s houses, and, as mentioned earlier, the 
managers often expected the asistentas to report to them on what they saw. Although they did 
not all comply, it was enough that some of them did to create the potential for a soured 
relationship with the workers and the unions. When this and other factors combined to generate a 
confrontation between the asistentas sociales and the workers, the resentment could be expressed 
in highly gendered and/or sexualized derogatory language.  For example, when Alina first 
arrived at the Yauricocha mine, where she was to take over as the resident asistenta, she found 
her entry into the camp blocked by four union leaders (dirigentes). They had had a conflict with 
the previous social worker, and did not want any more like her; they referred to the asistentas 
sociales as asistentas sexuales. This language equated them to the sexual workers who were 
brought to Yauricocha and the other isolated mining camps (like Cobriza) in special company 
buses every few weeks. Alina believes this comparison was due to the fact that there had 
effectively been a few cases in the past of engineers and managers who had affairs with the 
(often single) asistentas sociales, especially in the isolated mines. The four union leaders’ 
language thus drew on the discourse of sexual shame and stigma in order to voice their 
grievances against social workers. On this occasion, however, Alina managed to convince them 
that not all social workers were like that and that she should be given a chance, after which they 
let her enter.  
Even in the absence of such sexualized imagery, social workers like Alina could 
encounter as much sexism in their interaction with the workers as they did in their relationship 
with the engineers and managers. For example, on one occasion in the mid-1980s, she ran for 
office in the comunidad minera, as the comunidades industriales were known in the mining 
centers. These were the profit-sharing and worker participation arrangements created by the 
Velasco government in 1970, and which lasted, although in diminished form, until the early 
1990s. In every company, workers and employees held internal elections for their comunidad 
minera; professionals like Alina were included in the same comunidad as the obreros. According 
to her account, she was the frontrunner in the campaign, and actually had the support of the 
professionals. But then the opposing candidate, a mining worker, began to say “`But, how can 
you think that a woman is going to govern us?’” and with that argument he won the election. 
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Although of course we don’t know all the details of what happened, from Alina’s account we can 
thus see how gender relations at the mine could be intertwined with class or educational divides 
(i.e. between professionals and workers).  
Alina’s story shows some of the complexities and ambiguities inherent to the position of 
social workers at the mines: they were supposed to provide a service for the workers’ families, 
whom they often got to know closely, but they were also in a sense part of management, and 
were expected to assist the company (particularly Industrial Relations) in the handling of the 
workforce and in keeping a lid on its demands. Moreover, they were an overwhelmingly female 
sector in a male-dominated space, with all the tensions and difficulties that that involved. In 
Alina’s case, there was the added factor of her critical, to some degree contrarian attitude, shaped 
in part by her experience in the politicized student environment of the early 1970s; this added 
further layers of contradiction to her relationship with her profession, with the workers and with 
the company. In a sense, her sojourn through the mines was part of a period that can be seen as 
the culmination of the labor-centered paradigm (of which Drinot’s “labor state” was a part) that 
had shaped public policy and techniques of governmentality in Peru, as in much of the world, 
since the early 1900s. Social work arrived from abroad and gradually grew in importance as part 
of the labor-centered system; it reached its climax in the 1970s and 80s, which were also the 
decades of greatest labor stability, union strength and political radicalism in the country, all in 
the context of the post-1973 economic readjustment that was directed from the North but that led 
to crisis in Latin America and Africa. The techniques and systems that were part of the labor 
paradigm did not disappear in the 1990s – nor did work itself disappear, of course - but they 
certainly stopped developing, and certain key aspects of them went into decline or vanished 
altogether.  
Social Work is one such area of intervention that has declined, though not entirely 
disappeared, in mining companies today. Alina sees the practice of Social Work in the mines as 
having undergone a process of involution in the last few years: “I think it has been fifty years of 
regression [retroceso], history has been erased with one stroke [de un solo plumazo].” Based on 
what she has heard from colleagues, and from her own encounters with mining company 
programs in later jobs that she´s done, she feels that the proactive, critical professional 
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perspective that at least some social workers had begun to develop in the mines towards the 
1980s and early 90s has been cut short. Companies hire social workers when required by law, but 
do not take their work seriously.248 Social workers are given meaningless office tasks while the 
new work of Community Relations is given to mechanics, architects, engineers people who do 
not understand social issues. Alina describes and analyzes her conversations with colleagues who 
still work in mining companies: 
‘So then what things are you doing?’ ‘No, I’m just, all paper, a report about this, a report 
about that.’ So then they confine you to a little office and to your computer, then you are 
a data entry person, you are not a social worker. All that which today has to do with 
[maintaining] harmonious relations with the community, with welfare, and which we 
used to do, is no longer done by the social workers, now there is an architect, there is a 
mechanic. What do these guys know about the social [lo social]? ...So then I think that 
the social workers lost some ground, or abandoned a space, one that belonged to us by 
right and by our work. But unfortunately this is a good and clear example of the fact that 
the company does not give a damn about the social [lo social le importa un pepino]. 
Alina´s comments convey her sense that the social professionals lost the unequal battle 
they had been trying to wage against the engineers and managers and their purely technical 
concerns; the latter thus reign supreme. Certainly, in the mid-to-late 1990s and early 2000s, it 
was common for engineers to be in charge of the emerging field of Community Relations. This is 
often still the case (especially in the old mines of the Central Highlands), though now there are 
also cases of mining companies hiring anthropologists and sociologists and developing a more 
explicit focus on “the social” – now defined as “the local community”  rather than the workforce.  
However, Alina sees a lack of connection between this new focus and the work that she and at 
least some of her colleagues used to do.  
Recently, she was invited to present at an event on Corporate Social Responsibility 
organized by a prominent Peruvian mining and energy industry publication, Minas y Petróleo. A 
federation to which Alina belongs had proposed her to the event organizers. She agreed to go and 
do a presentation together with a former colleague, because as she put it, “I consider that 
Proyecto Julián was a Social Responsibility project, with an internal focus [con partida 
                                                          
248 Although less emphatic than Alina, her colleague Ruth Alvarado, who stayed at the company until shortly after it 
was privatized, agreed with her on this point: “There´s been a return to the figure of the social worker as a way to 
comply with a law or simply for whatever the boss wants, asks or needs.” 
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interna].” But she felt that no one was interested – “nobody gave it any importance.” When they 
were finished with their panel, the organizers of the event approached them and said, “Come 
with us to the auditorium, now we are going to have a ceremony.” This was a presentation about 
Social Responsibility projects by corporations like Yanacocha, Petro Perú, gas companies - “all 
the big companies;” they had brought community leaders all the way from the Amazon to be 
present at the ceremony. Alina felt offended by the emphasis on the word now and the 
implication that her panel had not been important – as she told the friends who had proposed her 
to the organizers, “Don´t invite me ever again for Minas y Petróleo!” This anecdote reflects the 
shift in emphasis from the “internal” work that social workers like Alina used to do, and the 
“external” focus now in vogue among the extractive industries in Peru. This shift is connected to 























CRISIS AND THE “UNMAKING OF THE WORKING CLASS” 
 
Introduction 
In the first three chapters of this dissertation, I have reexamined the social history of 
mining workers in the Central Highlands of Peru. Using both primary and secondary sources, I 
have maintained both a regional perspective as well as a specific local focus on the Huarón mine, 
and secondarily on the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. In Chapter 1 I provided some historical 
background on the Huayllay area but also traced the general dynamics of labor and migration 
over the course of the 20th century, arguing that there was a gradual shift from a situation of labor 
shortage towards one of labor surplus. In Chapter 2, I focused on the work of mining families, 
both inside the mine and outside, as well as on the relationship between productive and 
reproductive work at the level of theory. In Chapter 3, I examined issues of everyday life in the 
mining camps, focusing on three main topics: marital and family relations in the Huarón mine 
camp in the 1940s, the politics of mining housing, and the place of social workers in the camps 
during a period of greater company intervention into family life.  
The world of the mining camps described in these chapters came to an end in the 1980s 
and 90s. During these years, thousands of workers and their families left the camps as a result of 
mine closures and workforce downsizing. This occurred as part of a generalized crisis in the 
Peruvian mining sector in the 1980s, which was in turn part of a broader economic, social and 
political crisis in the country as a whole.  Although mining is an industry well-known for its 
alternating periods of boom and bust, the crisis of the 1980s is significant because it was not just 
a period of recession and low production; it was also a turning point in the organization of 
mining life. Mining in Peru would pick up slowly in the mid-1990s, and especially after 2003, 
when the upturn in metal prices would allow the re-opening of medium and small mines that in 
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the 1980s had become unprofitable. But the world of the mining camp would not return in the 
1990s or 2000s, nor did the strong labor unions, or the company schools, stores and hospitals.  
The crisis and transformation in the case of the mining industry occurred not only in 
Huarón and Cerro de Pasco, but throughout Peruvian mines. Around 1979-1980, Peruvian 
anthropologist Carmen Salazar-Soler had conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Buenaventura 
Company´s Julcani mine in Huancavelica (South-Central Peru), focusing on migration from rural 
communities to the mine and the impact that this transition had on traditional belief systems and 
rituals. Twenty years later, around the turn of the century (before the latest upswing in prices), 
she returned for a brief visit which she summarized in an epilogue to her (2006) book: 
If in the years in which I conducted the work that I have presented throughout these 
pages, I had the impression of being present at what E.P. Thompson called “the making 
of the working class,” now I had the sensation that I was observing the opposite: a 
process of “the unmaking of the working class.” What was left of the mining center that I 
had known and of the worker whom I had studied? (Salazar-Soler 2006, 232). 
Salazar-Soler found the mine in a process of closure, with a much reduced workforce, a large 
part of which was working through contractors.  
 Furthermore, the crisis and displacement of mining workers in the 1980s was not 
confined to the Peruvian mines. In Bolivia, where a large state-owned mining sector was focused 
largely around one metal, tin, the economic crisis of the 1980s led the government to close all the 
important mines in 1985. This was part of Decree 21060, a structural adjustment program 
implemented by Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the same politician who three decades earlier had been 
one of the leaders of the 1952 Revolution that nationalized the mines, and who now was advised 
by a team of economists led by Jeffrey Sachs. This move led to the dismissal of the great 
majority of the tin mining workforce (Gill 2002). In her 1993 preface to the new edition of her 
1979 book study of tin miners in Oruro, Bolivia, June Nash wrote about the process of 
displacement that she observed on her return visit in 1985, shortly after Decree 21060: 
What distinguished this episode in Bolivia’s long history as the poorest country in South 
America was the extraordinary dislocation of families and communities that took place... 
With more than twenty thousand laid off from the mines and thousands more left without 
employment in agriculture or the factories, the destruction was far greater than anything 
experienced in the past (Nash 1993 [1979], xxiii-xxiv). 
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 Similarly, in his “ethnography of decline” based on fieldwork carried out in Zambia in 
the mid-to-late 1980s, James Ferguson (1999) describes how the crisis of the copper industry at 
that time raised the prospect of a return migration to the land that reversed earlier narratives  of 
progressive modernization: 
Old linearities here seem strangely reversed. Urbanization has given way to “counter-
urbanization.” Industrialization has been replaced by “de-industrialization.” The 
apparently inevitable processes of rural-urban migration and proletarianization are now 
replaced by mass lay-offs and “back to the land” exercises (Ferguson 1999, 11). 
 These simultaneous displacements and dislocations in the different traditional mining 
countries were all connected and all bore many similarities to one another. These nations were all 
affected by the late-20th century decline in metal prices, which began in the mid-70s and was 
interrupted by a brief late-70s boom only to result in an even bigger collapse in the early 1980s. 
This occurred at the same time as the Debt Crisis that affected virtually all Latin American and 
African countries in general. However, there were also national differences. Not only did Peru 
have a more diversified mining sector than Bolivia, with an important production of copper, 
silver, lead and zinc, but the process there also dragged out over more years and occurred in a 
more complex, layered way. By and large, in Peru the smaller mines closed, and the medium and 
large mines massively reduced their workforces and restructured the remaining part. The mine 
closures took place in two waves, first in the early 1980s and then in the late 80s and early 90s. 
In the mines that did not completely close, companies began pressuring workers to leave through 
a variety of methods. By the start of the 1990s, changes in the orientation of the government and 
in the labor laws made this process easier for companies, and in the case of the state-owned 
company special government decrees were also used to dismiss workers. This occurred during a 
period of political violence and, up to about 1989, heightened union militancy. As a result of 
these various processes, the largest numbers of workers left the mines in the early 1990s.  
 In this chapter, I examine the process that Salazar-Soler called “the unmaking of the 
working class” in the mines as a particular historical moment, one that I believe has relevance 
not just for mining contexts around the world but also for thinking about broader shifts in global 
capitalism. Although the mines had their own specific characteristics, the decline of formerly 
strong unions and the restructuring of labor was a wider phenomenon, as was the global 
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recession of the 1970s and the resulting crisis in Africa, Latin America and many other parts of 
the Global South in the last quarter of the 20th century. In this chapter I alternate between several 
contexts, all of which are interrelated: the global political economy, the national economic and 
political crisis, and the specific events in the mines of Huarón and Cerro de Pasco and to some 
degree the rest of the Peruvian mining sector. In terms of the third, more local level, I focus most 
on the very early years of the 1990s, when most of the workers left the Huarón mine, as they did 
in other medium-scale mines and also in the state-owned company Centromín. I also maintain a 
focus on the longer mining crisis that had lasted for much of the 1980s. I use oral history 
interviews and also union meeting minutes from the specific moments in which workers were 
discussing the possibility of leaving the mine. Later in the chapter, I broaden the focus of the 
document analysis by examining union meeting minutes from a smaller mine that was Huarón’s 
“sister local” at the time, since it was owned by the same Hochschild group that had bought 
Huarón from the French in 1987. The reason for this momentary excursion away from the Pasco 
region and from the highlands (Mina Raúl was located on the coast, although its workforce came 
mostly from the highlands) is to zoom in on the specific moment of the dismantling of the 
workers’ camps, rather than the broader process of displacement in general, and also to show that 
the events described here were common to many if not all the mines in Peru. Throughout the 
chapter I also keep a secondary focus on the state-owned Centromín (the former Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation), especially its Cerro de Pasco unit, though I do not use union meeting minutes from 
there. Importantly, in the middle section of this chapter I move away from the local and regional 
levels towards the national and global, to try to understand the broader crisis not just in mining 
but in other sectors of the economy as well as in politics and social life in general.  
 
Narratives of Crisis and Departure 
I will begin by introducing some of the ways in which this period of crisis and 
displacement is remembered by people locally. Some of has already been discussed elsewhere in 
this dissertation, especially in the life histories included in Chapter 2. Here I want to focus on 
certain themes that come up in people’s accounts. One is a sense of deceptive permanence – the 
idea that people living in the camps had made them their home and had become used to living 
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there, and did not foresee that a change was about to come. This was evident in my conversation 
with Ernesto Blanco, who grew up in the Huarón camps. Ernesto was the son of a mechanic who 
died in an accident at the Huarón mine, and other members of his family also worked at the 
company in various capacities. He later studied and at the time of my research was working in a 
drugstore in Cerro de Pasco, where I interviewed him. 
I was a witness to the exodus from Huarón. [The company] declared itself in crisis, and 
many people were leaving. We saw how the trucks left daily. There were people who had 
been born there, had grown up there and had gone to work there, they had never left, and 
they had to go. There were some who felt like they were huayllinos. There were people 
from Huánuco, an area very far from here. So then some of them didn´t go back there, 
they stayed around here in Pasco [the department where Huayllay and Huarón are 
located]. Some went to Huancayo, others Lima, Tarma, Huánuco. When I travel around 
those places I always meet people from Huarón. 
 Blanco’s account recalls how people had migrated to Huarón, as to other mines, from 
many different places in the Central Highlands. In the second half of the 20th century, and 
especially in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, a certain stability had developed, in terms of workers 
staying at the company for several decades, and many of them also bringing their families to the 
camp. In that way, there were people who had grown up there and who had come to think of 
Huarón and the Huayllay area as their home, and had not expected to have to leave.  
A similar dynamic is present in the account of Máximo Roque, a huayllino who worked 
as an empleado at the Huarón company from the 1950s to the 80s. I mentioned Don Máximo 
earlier in Chapter 1, where I quoted his account both of the old exchange system and of seasonal 
mine labor in his father’s time in the early 20th century.  During my time in Huayllay, I 
conversed several times with Don Máximo at his hardware store, which doubled as a 
photography studio – before the advent of digital and cell phone cameras in the last few years, it 
was one of the few places in the area where people could get photos taken for IDs and other uses. 
He had taught himself the craft of photography since the 1950s, when, he says, he would sell 
souvenir photographs of the Huayllay Stone Forest to the French and other European engineers 
who came to work for periods of time at the company. Before our first interview, after I had 
mentioned my interest in the history of the mine and the area, he insisted on writing a small text 
ahead of time; he said his memory was failing him, and in any case he wanted to make sure he 
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got things correctly. Among other things, his two-page account mentions the departure of the 
workers from the camps:  
In the month of March of 1991, the hour came for the workers to retire from the 
company, the motive being that, according to the managers, the price of the minerals 
went down. The company stops its activities and those who decide to retire need to 
present their letter of voluntary retirement and they will be paid their benefits 
immediately according to the years worked, with a deadline of seven business days to 
present their retirement in writing.  
Don Máximo differentiates between the older workers, for whom retirement made sense, 
and the younger generation, who also got worried that they would lose the chance to receive their 
benefits and rushed to accept the company’s pressures to retire: 
So then the workers who had done 35 to 40 years of service, some of them lived alone, 
their wives and children in other places. In other words, in their towns – such as Jauja, 
Huancayo, Tarma, Huánuco. They presented their letter of voluntary retirement. Those 
who had 5 to 10 to 15 years of service also became worried (se acomplejaron), thinking 
that the time of service was going to be well remunerated. In the end it was a failure for 
these workers, even though the company gave them transportation. They also went to 
other places. [These were] merely naive pretensions [pretenciones tontas], since they 
didn´t have a house, they arrived to rent some corralones [courtyards] so as to later buy a 
plot of land or a house. But it was all a failure... So then off to work again in anything 
that comes up so as to meet some of the expenses in the household.  
Don Máximo’s text points out that some of the older workers had made plans and 
established their families outside of the camp, whereas many of the younger workers had not 
made the appropriate previsions: 
Some workers did not think that the hour to leave the company would come, all was 
bonanza on pay days...All this should serve as experience for the workers, in that they 
should worry first about a house in a place of their choosing. 
This is a frequently repeated image - the worker who thought that things would go on as 
they had for a long time. Another former Huarón worker told me of how people in the 1980s 
took care of their camp housing “like their house” – the implication being that it wasn´t really 
their house, as would later become clear. It is common for people to contrast the figure of the 
savvy, responsible worker who did not remain dependent on the company but rather built his 
house – a group in which Don Máximo positions himself – with the stories of “failure.” The 
latter concern the families that had to struggle all of a sudden to build a house in the midst of 
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economic crisis and an insufficient retirement settlement to which they had agreed under 
pressure. Don Máximo for one had made sure to maintain his own house in the town of 
Huayllay. As he told me when we spoke, “I have not lived in the camps, thanks to Divine 
Providence, and to my own effort.” Thus the old camp, which for some people is the object of 
nostalgia, is here conceptualized as a space of dangerous dependence and an ultimately deceptive 
sense of permanence. This kind of discourse about dependence and housing is not exclusive to 
Huarón. Juan, a worker who was laid off from the Cerro de Pasco mine in the early 1990s, told 
an interviewer in 1995 that “I am glad I didn’t live a single day in the mining camp, compound, 
but built my own house and today this is not a house just for myself but also for my children” 
(Mountain Voices/Panos Oral Testimony Programme, Testimony No. 1).249  
 Returning to Huarón, one of the workers who felt pressured to resign was Octavio 
Domínguez.  Don Octavio, for whom I provided a brief life history in Chapter 2, was the son of 
shepherds who had worked in a nearby estate, back in the days of the haciendas. He himself 
worked at the Huarón mine for nearly 20 years. He recalls how the smaller mines in the region 
had already closed, and how this made the workers fear that the same thing would happen at 
Huarón, and that they might lose their severance pay if they waited too long:  
[The union] called, to a general assembly, all the obreros, workers, so then there they 
said that the company is bankrupt right now. For those who leave now there is money, 
but for those who stay till the end there is no money, nothing. So then I thought about 
that, and I said damn, now what do we do? Just like it happened in these small 
companies, for example close to here is Carhuacayán, there was the Santander mine. I 
think up to now they still have not fixed their severance pay (tiempo de servicio), what 
they have worked. So then I also thought, if the company doesn´t pay, now what do we 
do without money? So I talked with my wife, let´s see what we do, it´s better if I leave 
then.  
Don Octavio’s account highlights how the departure of the workers from the mines at this time 
was a process that involved not just layoffs and mine closures but also decisions made by the 
workers (and their wives) under pressure and uncertainty in the face of rumor and crisis. 
                                                          
249 This is a person whom I myself interviewed later, and I quote from those interviews elsewhere in this 
dissertation. However, the quote above comes from the oral history project conducted by the London-based PANOS 
together with the Peruvian organization IPEMIN in the mid-1990s. 
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 A different account is provided by Emilia Flores, whom I already quoted in Chapter 2 in 
my discussion of women’s economic activities in the mining camp. The wife of a mineworker 
who had started at the company in the late 1960s, Doña Emilia had her own income from giving 
board to single workers at the camp throughout the many years she lived there. When I visited 
her in the house where she now lives in Cerro de Pasco, I mentioned that I was interested in the 
history of the mining camp. Like Máximo Roque, she insisted on writing a brief text on a piece 
of paper before beginning the interview.250 In that text she discusses more broadly the nature of 
life in the old camp and what she sees as the reasons why it came to an end: 
In those days life was very peaceful and the union made sure to get respect [in regard to] 
all the anomalies [anomalías] that the company did with its workers at Huarón.251 In the 
first place they gave us housing, electricity, water, charcoal, firewood and the company 
store (mercantil), the kerosene we did buy but at a low price.  
This account recalls some important features of the old camp system, in particular the in-kind 
provisions that the union negotiated with the company. The union here is posited as a guarantor 
of this system that kept the company in line when the latter committed “anomalies” by not 
fulfilling the accords. In spite of this mention of anomalies, however, the company is also 
presented in a positive light: 
All of that which was in abundance would have been in the year 1967 until 1989. 
Because the Huarón company was very good and [we,] all of us, are the ones who have 
ruined that. And also on Christmas they gave us good toys, good panetones to the 
children of the obreros and to the children of the empleados it was much better. 252  They 
also gave us sweets. 
Here we see an idealized portrait of the company that needs to be understood as part of a 
widespread discourse of nostalgia for the old world of the camps and the old (often foreign) 
administrators. This positive portrayal is manifested in the reference to token things like the 
panetones, toys and sweets, but also to a more general sense of “abundance.” The blame for 
bringing about the end of this system is placed with the workers: 
                                                          
250 During my research, several other interviewees also mentioned their concern with “getting things right” and 
focusing their memories before the interview. However, Máximo Roque and Emilia Flores were the only two who 
actually wrote texts. 
251 “...el sindicato hacía respetar todas las anomalías que hacía la empresa con sus trabajadores de Huarón.” 
252 Panetón is an Italian sweet bread (Panetonne) that is popular in Peru around Christmas time. It is an item that is 
commonly given by employers to their employees during that season. 
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After a while all that began to be ruined because the workers themselves went on strike 
for anything even for a piece of wiping cloth (huaype) because of that it started to 
decay... The unionists did a strike and then the French began to wall everything up and 
then the Republican Guard came too and all the people became bitter until they did a 
marcha de sacrificio... 253  And from all that the French got mad and began to close their 
doors firing their workers giving them retirement notices and then it all ended. Now it´s 
all subcontracted (ahora todo es contrata). 
Here Doña Emilia seems to give a broader account that combines different events and 
tendencies from those years: the high union demands and increased frequency of strikes, the 
soured relation with the company, the latter´s move to reduce their operations and workforce, 
and the presence of security forces in and around the camp. This is a very particular view in 
terms of the vehemence with which it criticizes the workers – in this sense it echoes the ways in 
which mining industry officials tend to portray those years, as a time of excessive, unreasonable 
and chaotic union activity. Nevertheless, this is a legitimate view and useful insofar as it 
highlights the political dimension of the crisis of that time; it is also interesting because of the 
sense of change and temporality that it presents. A “peaceful” past is evoked, followed by a 
period of conflict and crisis, after which doors began to be closed and “it all came to an end.” 
Her assertion that “now it’s all subcontracted” echoes the way in which other people from 
Huarón and Huayllay also tend to contrast a past of “all payroll” (puro planilla) to a present of 
“all contracting” (puro contrata). 
 If oral history accounts vary in terms of what they highlight and what perspective they 
take on similar events, another dimension altogether is provided by written documents such as 
the minutes from the assemblies of the obrero union at the Huarón mine. Here I will examine the 
assembly minutes from 1990-1991, when one of the largest mass resignation of workers 
occurred. Unlike the minutes from Mina Raúl examined towards the end of this chapter, the 
Huarón union minutes were not part of the archiving project undertaken by the National Mining 
Federation in the early-to-mid 1990s. Rather, they are documents that I was able to access during 
the course of my fieldwork. Since this is material from not very long ago, all of the names used 
in the quotations from union minutes are pseudonyms. 
                                                          
253 The Republican Guard (Guardia Republicana) was a national security force which in the late 1980s was merged 
with the National Police. 
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These handwritten minutes (actas) are multi-layered documents. Unlike pamphlets and 
communiqués from the National Mining Federation - which tend to speak with one voice and 
generally attempt to elicit support from member unions and from the general public - meeting 
minutes from the local unions record a wider variety of voices; these sometimes criticize the 
leadership of the union or one another. These voices are certainly not unmediated – they are 
recorded by the Secretary of Minutes and Archives, who probably summarized a great deal of 
what people said and/or left some out altogether. They follow a standard format, one which was 
common to many of the mining unions of the Central Highlands in the second half of the 20th 
century and which formed part of a regional union culture. After the Secretary General opens the 
meeting by announcing the number of members in attendance, a discussion facilitator (director 
de debates) is named. Correspondence received is read out loud and members make requests to 
discuss specific points; the officers of the union then give reports, after which the floor is opened 
up for comments from members. These comments from the floor are often recorded in a mix of 
first and third person. 
Although the leaders of the women´s committees sometimes make an appearance in 
meeting minutes from other mining unions of the central region, the voices recorded in the 1990-
1991 minutes from Huarón are exclusively male. Furthermore, it is natural to assume that these 
documents tend to privilege the voices of those workers most involved in the union, who not 
only attended the assemblies but also were more prone to speaking from the floor. Nevertheless, 
it is important to point out that the union at the time was an organization that was central, not 
marginal, to the experience of workers at the mine. Founded in 1945, the Huarón obrero union 
(as in most mines, there was a separate union for empleados) included the totality of the stable, 
direct workforce, which at the time still constituted the majority of workers, even if contractors 
were already beginning to play an increasing role. Additionally, the assemblies were reasonably 
well-attended. At the beginning of the period under discussion, in 1990, attendance fluctuated 
between 680 and 750, out of a total obrero membership of around 980; by late March 1991, after 
a number of workers had resigned, attendance would drop to 415.  
In terms of the general situation at that moment, the minutes show how changes that 
would become permanent and institutionalized after the crisis were already present as emerging 
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tendencies during this time. One of the principal complaints from the floor was the presence of 
contracting companies within the operations. In their comments in the assembly, union members 
demanded that the union put pressure on the company to get rid of the contractors, which 
according to the secretary general had a total of 405 workers laboring at Huarón in 1990.254 They 
were said to be working in the areas of transportation, security and even in the concentrator 
plant. At one point, a fight had broken out between union leaders and one of the contracting 
companies, which according to the union had “provoked” the women’s committee of the union. 
Another trend that emerges from the minutes is the crisis-induced erosion of the system of in-
kind provisions by the company to workers – things like firewood, kerosene, work clothes, 
which were late in arriving – as well as the deterioration of living conditions in the camp itself, 
expressed through power outages, water shortages, and a lack of medicines in the health post.  
In late 1990, conflicts emerged between the union and the company over the payment of 
the “9th month readjustment” – a bonus was supposed to partially compensate for the 
hyperinflation that was rampant at the time – as well as over management’s attempts to decrease 
the lunch period and establish what was called a “continuous workday” policy within what was 
still at the time an 8-hour workday. Furthermore, union members argued that the company was 
attempting to convince individual workers to accept monetary incentives in exchange for 
circumventing collective pacts. On 8 Nov., 1990, a delegate from one of the mine sections said in 
the assembly that “we have been surprised by the incentives and at no point have the majority of 
us accepted and now the company is intimidating my compañeros with changes of assignments 
to those who don´t accept the incentives.” Apparently, those who accepted these incentives 
tended to be the younger workers; as one of the older workers said on December 21st: 
Compañero Roberto Quispe [says that] we have thought that our young people should 
have been something better than us the old people, yet they have fallen for the simple 
game of the incentives, and he asks that all the young people reconsider, [so] that later 
tomorrow they not lament this, and at the same time also that the company put its hand to 
its breast (se ponga la mano al pecho) and have conscience. 
 
                                                          
254 The contracting system already existed in modest numbers in the mines of central Peru in the 70s and 80s; the 
change in the 1990s was not that contractors emerged out of nowhere, but rather that they went from being a 
minority to being the majority of the workforce. 
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Quispe’s intervention on the floor – “we have thought that our young people should have 
been something better than us” would have resonated with a popular myth of progress – a 
powerful view of social advancement and improvement based around education above all. Here 
this idea is used to shame the young workers away from falling for a company strategy, or 
perhaps simply expresses surprise that they have done so in spite of supposedly being “better” 
than the elders.   
Incidentally, this age dynamic was also brought up by Estela Páucar, whose life history I 
included in Chapter 2. The daughter of a worker who spent over 30 years at Huarón, Estela was 
hired as the secretary of the Huarón obrero union and spent many years in that position. As she 
told me, 
 The young people in reality were not like, well, like our parents, illiterate, rather they had 
at least high school. And it [the company] begins to use them. How does it use them? 
They take them into their trust [les toma como personal de confianza]... That’s when they 
begin to desist, a group of 14 young people from different sections disaffiliate from the 
union. They disaffiliate, begin to do campaigns, [to the effect that] the union leader isn´t 
good for anything, that they are enough... [One of them] was taking the oldest ones to the 
company, to have them present themselves voluntarily to resign from the company. That 
is how the union fell, otherwise the union would not have fallen, because it was well 
formed, it had a good foundation [cimiento], rather it’s our youth that ruin it.  
 
Doña Estela’s statement that the older generation was “illiterate” should not be taken 
literally, but rather as meant to highlight the contrast between the generations in terms of level of 
schooling. According to information provided by the company in 1986 and listed by Sulmont 
and Valcárcel (1993, 43), among the Huarón obreros 99% had done at least some elementary 
school, 65% had finished elementary school, 36% had done at least some high school, and 18% 
had finished high school (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993 43). But young people would certainly 
have been overrepresented among the group that had finished high school, and even more so 
within the smaller group that had attended at least some courses at the university or technical 
institute in Cerro de Pasco. The high school in Huayllay had been created in 1961; before that, 
people in the district who sought to continue beyond the elementary school level had to travel to 
Cerro de Pasco to study. The mining company provided its own elementary school, as mandated 
by law; in the early 1980s, the union had led a campaign to get the company to build a high 
school for workers’ children right in the mining camp itself, so they wouldn’t have to travel 
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down to Huayllay each morning. This high school would function for only a few years before the 
dismantling of the camp. Before that, in the 1960s, the different mining unions of Pasco 
Department had also been active in the campaign for the creation of a university in Cerro de 
Pasco (the UNDAC). 
In Doña Estela´s account, the educational advancement of youth appears to explain their 
disregard for the authority of elders. This does not mean that she disregards the educational idea 
itself – she herself studied accounting at the university in Cerro de Pasco while working at the 
union. But just like elsewhere in our conversation she expressed ambiguous sentiments towards 
the old, stable order of the camp – there were established rights such as retiring workers 
obtaining employment for their children at the mine, but this in her view sometimes led to a 
neglect of children’s education – here she voices an ambiguous perspective on education itself: it 
was the more educated youth, not the elders, who were responsible for the decline of the union. 
On the other hand, the age dynamic brought up by Doña Estela and by Roberto Quispe was 
likely only part of the story – no doubt there were older workers who were more acquiescent to 
the company´s demands, as well as younger workers who were less compromising and more 
combative. In fact, in many of the other mining unions of the Central Highlands twenty years 
earlier, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it had often been the younger workers who had led the 
move away from the moderate stance promoted by the APRA party towards the more radical 
position advocated by those connected to the radical left.  
Beyond just the educational and age issue, discourses of unity and division were both 
present at this time in the Huarón union. In terms of unity, at one assembly a worker named 
Demetrio Ortiz held the view “that the incentives should be for everyone in general and he 
supports the idea of the leadership and we should prepare for a struggle [lucha reivindicativa] to 
obtain the bread for our children.” “Bread for our children” was one of the phrases that were part 
of general mining union culture and discourse at the time, like “having conscience” (tomar 
conciencia – literally, to gain awareness).255 After Ortiz spoke, another union member agreed 
and stated that “we should have conscience because silence will only make it so that we don´t 
even take bread home for our children.” Similarly, although some obreros complained about 
                                                          
255 On the first phrase, see, for example, Elizabeth Ann Bauch´s 1988 dissertation: We shall not lose the bread of our 
children: Strikes at a U.S. copper company in southern Peru. 
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empleados joining with contractors to take over their jobs, as the threat of mine closure became 
evident another obrero argued that “now is when we will solve our problem without distinctions 
between empleados and obreros.” In fact, in January 1991 an alliance was signed with the 
empleados, and the following assemblies were held jointly between the two unions. In another 
assembly, a member argued that “we should not fight amongst ourselves, and if something 
comes up then all of us should show our faces and we should not give credit to the company.”  
On the other hand, at the same assembly the note taker recorded that “compañero 
Vilcachagua criticizes the leaders and manifests that it is the leaders who support the company so 
that it can do what it wants.” Appeals to unity could also be based on divisive accusations: at one 
meeting, a union official “reads the names of 23 compañeros who gave up the work implements 
[work clothes, shoes, etc.], calling them traitors.” At the same assembly, another official 
criticized “those compañeros who in exchange for a pittance [por una miseria] are selling out the 
sacrifice of many compañeros, and they are the ones who talk the most here.” Appeals to unity 
and solidarity thus co-existed with a culture of accusation and rumor, especially under the 
pressure of crisis. 
 The crisis appears directly in the union assembly minutes. On December 21, 1990, the 
union´s Secretary for Defense informed the assembly that the company had said it was “in total 
crisis.” Two months later, on February 13, the assembly discussed the fact that workers´ salaries 
had only been paid at 60% - two fifths were missing, with the company saying that it could no 
longer get any more loans from the banks and that the remaining salary would be paid once a 
certain batch of concentrates could be sold. It was also reported that one of the top engineers in 
the company, Ing. González, had said that the company was seeking to close the mine for six 
months due to the low price of silver. One union member from the floor added to the general 
sense of worry by reporting that another engineer had said that there would be a mine closure or 
personnel reduction. Another member pejoratively called engineer González a “salesman” 
(vendedor) who “wants to copy the example of Carhuacayán” - a mine that had recently closed. 
But another worker, Edmundo Sulca, had a different view: 
He [Sulca] clarifies that in reality so many mines are already closing and many of the 
compañeros of the miner class are in the streets. And he says let us think and put our 
hands to our breast and analyze the comments made in newspapers, radio stations or TV. 
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Engineer González is just another member of the Huarón family... We must be optimists 
and not pessimists. And to show that the working class of Huarón is ready for any type of 
work that presents itself if we are able to do it. And one more time to show that there is 
already too much breach of the contract agreements on the part of the company. We 
should work one Sunday for free on behalf of the company.  
 
In this comment, Sulca, a frequent speaker from the floor in the union assemblies (though 
not part of the leadership at this time), was attempting to articulate a vision of the mine as a 
“family” that united both workers and management in the effort to survive the crisis. The next to 
last sentence in the quoted passage seems to contradict this, by switching to a criticism of the 
company – either some of the speech was not recorded, or it simply shows that the two 
arguments were not mutually exclusive. At the same time, by saying that they were “ready for 
any type of work that presents itself if we are able to do it,” Sulca was building on a common 
discourse in the region emphasizing the importance and inevitability of work.256  
Sulca´s proposal to work one Sunday per month for free received the support of other 
speakers, and it was approved by the assembly (the offer would later be increased to two free 
Sundays of work per month). A commission was formed to travel to a company shareholders´ 
board meeting in Lima to assess the situation and present the union´s proposals.257 At the 
assembly a week later, the commission reported on the meeting: 
We made it known through a memorandum to the shareholders to work a Sunday each 
month for free... on finding out about the contents of the memo Engineer Néstor Rivas, 
vice-president of that body [the shareholders’ board], felt very pained [apenado] and told 
us that during his professional career he had not lived through such a flattering 
[halagadora] attitude from the working masses. 
 
According to the secretary general of the empleados´union, who had formed part of the 
commission, Engineer Rivas and other company officials had met with the union officers 
afterwards and given them their explanation of the crisis: profits had been good in 1986 and 1987 
and the company had made large investments, not expecting the 100 days of the national strike in 
1988, in which year they did not get any profits. This downward trend had continued the 
                                                          
256 As people often say, “one has to work, if not then how?” “Hay que trabajar, ¿sino cómo?”  
257 The workers had access to shareholders´ meetings through the comunidad minera, a profit-sharing and worker 
participation arrangement created by the left-leaning Velasco regime in 1970 (outside of the mining industry it was 
called the comunidad laboral in general). The comunidad minera had its own president as well as a “worker-
director;” they were present at all union meetings. This institution was abolished in the early 1990s. 
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following year because of worker absenteeism and the wearing out of machinery, resulting in an 
accumulation of debts to the banks. In the words of the empleado secretary, “Engineer Rivas has 
good intentions of improving and continuing to operate and asks us all, the working masses, if 
we have some ideas of how to make it through.” Yet Rivas had later given them two “final 
alternatives:” the “liquidation of everyone in general” or to continue operating and receive a 
“minimum mining wage;” he had also supposedly told the workers´ commission that “the old 
people [los antiguos] should be making decisions already so that they do not lose their legal 
benefits.”  
After this was reported to the assembly, someone asked about the minimum mining 
wage, but the leadership responded that they had talked about this with the Industrial 
Communities’ Office (OCLA), which had told them that only new employees entering the 
company for the first time were eligible for this special wage.258 Referring to the estimates the 
company had given them for how much each worker would receive (depending on the number of 
years worked and the particular law that applied to the time when they started), one union 
member said that the group administering the company “has driven us to failure and they should 
be judged first... that miserable compensation for time of service that they´ve calculated we do 
not accept, they should at least take us into account [nos consideren] knowing that we´ve left our 
entire youth behind.”  
 These accounts within accounts give a sense of the confusion that surrounded people´s 
views on the nature of and reasons for the crisis, the possibilities open to workers and the 
motivations behind both company officials and union leaders. As shown in the above quotes, the 
word “crisis” appears in the voices in the documents themselves, as something that was 
apparently affecting the company and the mine, and that threatened people´s jobs and their 
options for the immediate future - although, as will be seen later, the veracity of this threat was 
also doubted by some, for it seemed to contradict the continued physical presence of the mineral. 
The broader crisis of the mining sector - because of which “many of the compañeros of the 
miner class [were] in the streets” – is also articulated explicitly. Beyond this, for a few years 
people had no doubt been hearing about – and witnessing - the larger crisis of the national 
                                                          
258 The OCLA was the government agency that supervised the comunidades laborales. 
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economy and society, beyond just mining: the hyperinflation, shortages, recession, adjustment 
packages, political violence, etc. In the few sections, I examine the crisis at both the national and 
global levels, and both in the world of mining and in the wider society and economy. 
 
Global and national crises 
The mine closures and workforce reductions of the 1980s and early 90s were part of a 
severe crisis in the Peruvian mining industry. The immediate trigger for this crisis was a decline 
in international metal prices, which in turn was connected to the global economic slowdown that 
began in the early-to-mid 1970s. However, the mining crisis was part of a broader economic 
decline in Peru as a whole, similar to that which occurred in much of Latin America and 
elsewhere in the Global South at this time, and which was also related to structural shifts in the 
world economy. In this section I will first briefly examine the movement of metal prices, before 
discussing the broader crisis in Peruvian economy and society during this period as well as the 
global shifts and long-term structural tendencies in the world economy. 
Metal prices and external shocks 
 Latin American nations, like many of those in other world regions grouped within the 
“developing world” or “Global South,” tend to be “nature-exporting societies,” that is, dependent 
on ground rents or land-based revenues derived from the production of primary commodities 
(Coronil 1997, 6-7). Within this broad pattern, there are four Latin American and Caribbean 
nations that depended on metal mining (rather than, say, agricultural exports or oil) over the 
course of the 20th century: Chile, Bolivia, Peru and, in the second half of the century, Jamaica. 
Yet whereas Chile, Bolivia and Jamaica were each dependent on a single metal (copper, tin and 
bauxite, respectively), Peru had a more diversified mining sector, in which copper, zinc, lead and 
silver all played important roles. Moreover, barring short-term fluctuations, over the course of 
the 20th century metal mining accounted for around half of Peru´s exports and foreign exchange 
earnings (as continues to be the case today). While still characteristic of a primary commodity-
dependent society, this figure was less than that for the other Latin American metal exporters 
(Auty 1993, 38). In general, for analysts like Auty, out of the four metal exporters Peru seemed 
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least vulnerable to the effects of mineral price drops at the start of the 1970s (42, 45). Yet the 
decline in metal prices in the1970s and 80s was systemic enough and severe enough that it 
affected Peru as well. In fact, as Auty himself remarks, Peru would experience the most severe 
economic deterioration out of the four countries mentioned (Ibid., 8). Although this was by no 
means due solely to metal prices, the latter did play an important role, and they are especially 
important to the subject matter of this dissertation; for that reason, they merit some discussion.259  
 Over the course of the 20th century, as a long-term trend, primary commodities (often 
called simply “commodities” in contemporary economic parlance) tended to decline in price in 
relation to manufactured goods, contrary to the expectations of the classical economists 
(Radetzki 2008, 64-66). This gradual trend (measured before the dramatic post-2003 rise in 
primary commodity prices) was more pronounced for metal prices, as opposed to certain food 
products like coffee, tea and cocoa which tended to rise in price over the long run (Ibid.). Yet it 
is also a well-known fact that, within these long-term trends, the prices of primary commodities 
are subject to more volatile, short-term variations than those of manufactured goods.  For metal 
prices in particular, one moment of increase that stands out within the post-World War II era is 
the period of the Korean War (Ibid., 67). In Peru, the strong wartime demand for metals provided 
strong economic support to the conservative military dictatorship of Manuel A. Odría (1948-
1956), particularly in its early years. Metal prices fell in the mid-to-late 1950s, though without 
erasing all of their previous gains. During the 1960s they twice rose again and twice fell again, 
exhibiting an erratic behavior that contrasted strongly with that of oil prices, which remained 
stable and at a relatively low level throughout this period. This variation in metal prices in the 
1960s did not yet depart significantly from the general range set in the 1950s. At the start of the 
1970s there was yet another brief rise in metal prices, just as oil was beginning its fast upward 
climb with the “oil shock” of 1973-74.  
Yet whereas oil maintained and continued to increase its price, the prices of metals soon 
collapsed, as a result of the worldwide recession precipitated by the oil shock (though resulting 
also from deeper structural causes in the advanced capitalist countries, as will be seen shortly). 
                                                          
259 In this section, it is real, rather than nominal prices that are under discussion. Real price figures, adjusted for 
inflation, are given by Radetzki (2008) and other sources.  
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This price collapse of the mid-1970s was particularly acute in the case of copper, but silver and 
gold prices declined as well. For metal exporters, this moment was felt as an “external shock” 
(Auty 1993, 48), for it combined a decrease in export revenue with an increase in the price that 
needed to be paid for imports of oil; to this would soon be added the increase in the interest 
charged on foreign debt by the banks of the developed world. In Peru, this set off a recession and 
a period of economic decline, which occurred around the time of the transition from the left-
leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) towards the more 
conservative military government of Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980).  
 Metal prices rose again briefly but sharply at the very end of the 1970s, especially silver 
(as a result of speculation by the Hunt Brothers) and gold (as a result of widespread fears of 
inflation and geopolitical instability after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan). However, they quickly collapsed again just as dramatically, leading to a period of 
depressed metal prices in the 1980s; taken together, metals fell to pre-Korean War price levels 
(this time, unlike in the 1970s, they were joined by oil, which also fell). In Peru, the price 
collapse of the early 1980s set off a first wave of mine closures which affected the small mines in 
particular. Furthermore, according to Auty, the price rises of 1979-80 had led Peruvian 
policymakers to make unrealistic predictions regarding future revenues, leading them to delay 
needed stabilization measures, which had a negative impact on the economy once the prices 
collapsed again (Auty 97). At the end of the 1980s, the global prices of certain metals would 
experience a brief and modest increase; however, by this time the chaotic economic and political 
situation in Peru prevented the country from taking advantage of this price rise, and so the 
national mining crisis continued. Peruvian mining began to recover in the 1990s, due to the 
generous incentives and privileges granted to foreign investors by the government of Alberto 
Fujimori (1990-2000), which brought an influx of foreign capital to the country. A modest 
recovery in metal prices during the middle of the decade collapsed again as a result of the Asian 
crisis of 1997-98. It was only in 2003 that a new period of sustained, large-scale increases in 
metal prices began, this time spurred above all by the industrialization of China. This trend was 
interrupted by the financial crisis of 2008, but has since managed to rebound. 
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 Thus, to sum up, the period from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s can be seen as one 
long era of depressed metal prices, interrupted by a sharp but illusory rise in 1979-80 and by 
modest and short-lived increases in the late 1980s and mid-1990s, until a new era of high prices 
began in 2003 (as it did for primary commodities in general). Obviously, world mining did not 
disappear during the 30-year period of low prices, but it went through a process of restructuring 
and transformation. In Peru, the 1980s in particular were the period of “mining crisis” (crisis 
minera), in which small mines closed and medium- and large-scale mines eventually laid off or 
retired most of their workers, setting the stage for the restructuring of the 1990s.  
Crisis and the Global South 
While the trajectory of metal prices is an important part of the story traced here, it is not 
the whole story. Like other prices in the capitalist market, metal prices are both the expression 
and the proximate cause (i.e. the conduit) of structural forces in the world economy. As we saw, 
the first drop in metal prices in the mid-1970s was the immediate result of a recession in the 
industrialized world. Although the recession was precipitated by the OPEC-instigated “oil 
shock” of 1973-74, this only accelerated a process of deceleration of economic growth and of 
structural shifts in the world economic order that had begun at the end of the 1960s.260 The U.S. 
abandonment of the gold standard, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates, the “oil shock,” the U.S. “stagflation” of the 1970s and the shift from Keynesian to 
neoliberal economic policy across much of the world were all key moments in this 
transformation. They marked the end of what Hobsbawm (1994) called the “Golden Age”: the 
period of high, sustained growth in the industrialized capitalist nations (and, coincidentally, also 
in the Soviet Union) that lasted from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1970s. The 
last quarter of the 20th century would see a continued increase in world wealth, but growth would 
be slower than before, and it would be punctuated by repeated recessions and by structural shifts 
such as financialization, labor restructuring and a heightened dominance by capital and market 
forces across the world.  
                                                          
260 Kliman (2012, 59) argues that the OPEC oil shock was motivated not only by the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 but 
also by a desire to reverse the decline in oil revenues in terms of gold that had resulted from the rapid depreciation 
of the dollar relative to that metal in the late 1960s and early 70s. By contrast, Coronil (1997) sees the policies of 
OPEC states in the late 1960s and early 70s as related rather “to their political consolidation as sovereign states in 
the domestic and international arenas and to the development of specific state capacities” (55).  
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 It is important to note, however, that the history of crises and booms of the last century 
looks different from the perspective of Latin America and other parts of the “developing world” 
than it does from the vantage point of North America and Europe. In the United States, the 
“Great Recession” that began with the financial crisis of 2008 is commonly described as the 
worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The late 20th century, by 
comparison, yields a more mixed record, characterized by the recessions of the mid-1970s, early 
1980s and early 1990s, as well as by phenomena such as deindustrialization and the rise of the 
“Rust Belt,” but also by the recovery of the mid-1980s and the long expansion and dot-com 
bubble of the 1990s. Vast sectors of the U.S. economy expanded during these decades, 
particularly finance, information technologies and defense; this to some degree neutralizes the 
memory of the economic dislocations of the 1970s, by contrast with the generalized sense of 
gloom that has taken hold after 2008. Similarly, the post-2008 crisis has affected Europe 
profoundly, even if it is the relatively weaker economies in the continent (i.e. Greece, Spain, etc.) 
that have been hardest hit. 
 By contrast, in most of Latin America it is the “lost decade” of the 1980s that stand out as 
the moment of the worst economic and social crisis in recent historical memory. The Great 
Depression of the 1930s, which so affected North America and Europe, did have a significant 
impact on Latin America, both economically and politically, but it was not as traumatic as the 
1980s. The contrast between South and North is even greater when it comes to the post-2008 
crisis, which has caused only a temporary halt to the Latin American economic growth that has 
been ongoing since the early-to-mid 2000s. As large parts of Europe have stagnated, Latin 
America has boomed, on the basis of primary commodity exports to the ascendant Chinese 
economy. Under the tutelage of mostly left-of-center, and a few right-of-center governments, 
Latin American GDP per capita has climbed in the last few years, reversing the (economic) 
losses of the 1980s, although without yet catching up to the crisis-ridden countries of Europe, let 
alone the United States.   
 Thus, it is important historically to zoom in on the late 1970s and 80s as a period not just 
of global restructuring, but also, for Latin America, as a moment of economic and social crisis 
comparable perhaps to the impact that the Great Depression had on the industrialized world. This 
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came at the same time as a similar, even more catastrophic crisis in Africa (a much poorer region 
to begin with, in monetary terms) – what Leys, Arrighi and others have called the “African 
Tragedy” (Arrighi 2002, 5). These simultaneous declines in Latin America and Africa led to a 
widening of the North-South divide at the time and to a crisis in the post-World War II 
development paradigm, even as one “Third World” region, East Asia, was actually improving 
economically. As Arrighi writes about the years from 1975 to 1990,  
In this period a sharp bifurcation developed between the deteriorating performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and to a lesser extent the Middle East and North 
Africa, on the one hand, and the improving performance of East and South Asia on the 
other. The African collapse was a particularly extreme manifestation of this divergence 
(Arrighi 2002, 16). 
Just like the decline in metal and other primary commodity prices (except oil) in the mid-
1970s was a direct consequence of the economic recession in the industrialized world, the 
generalized crisis in Latin America and Africa in the late 1970s and 80s was also linked to the 
economic slowdown at the heart of the capitalist system. Falling commodity prices were one 
immediate reason for the decline of these countries, since they tended to be heavily dependent on 
primary exports. Another link that became increasingly important after 1979 was the fact that the 
United States responded to the economic slowdown and inflation of the 1970s by adopting 
monetarist policies and raising interest rates – i.e. the “Volcker shock,” after Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul Volcker (Harvey 2005, 23). As is widely known, this triggered the Latin 
American and African Debt Crises, affecting two regions that, unlike Asia, had become heavily 
dependent on foreign borrowing in the 1960s and 70s. The interest payments owed by Latin 
American and African countries increased dramatically, during a period in which their export 
incomes were diminishing, thus pushing them towards insolvency. 
The rise in interest rates was a response to inflation, but, as Arrighi argues, its effect was 
also to attract capital towards the United States and away from the rest of the world. Thus the 
U.S. went from being an important source of foreign direct investment to becoming “the world´s 
main debtor nation” (Arrighi 2003, 21). Debt was used to underwrite a trade and current account 
deficit and reinvigorate domestic demand; it financed the import of manufactured goods that 
were no longer profitable to produce in the U.S. Unlike Third World debtor nations, the size, 
power and prestige of the U.S. economy meant that the magnitude of its debts would not cause 
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its status as a safe borrower to be questioned, and capital would continue to flow in. As Arrighi 
writes, the shift in capital flows towards the United States was likely “the single most important 
determinant of the contemporaneous [positive] reversal in the economic fortunes of North 
America and the bifurcation of the economic fortunes of Third World regions” (Ibid., 22). For 
historical reasons that he explores, East Asian countries were best positioned to become labor-
intensive manufacturers for the U.S. market in the 1980s (producing what the U.S. used to 
produce), while Africa (and Latin America) was simply left bereft of capital, saddled with high 
interest payments and low export earnings. In a sense, it can be said that, through the mechanism 
of monetarist policy, the U.S. externalized part of the crisis of the 1970s towards Latin America 
and Africa. 
The origins of capitalist crises 
If falling commodity prices and the new monetarist policy formed a causal link that led 
from the crisis at the core of the capitalist system to the decline of Latin America and Africa 
during this period, the reasons for the capitalist crisis itself remain to be addressed. The “oil 
shock” of 1973 was only the most immediate cause of the mid-1970s recession. As Harvey 
(2005) argues, monetarism and neoliberalism more broadly were a response to the increasing 
inability of Keynesian policy to deal with the emerging crisis of capitalist accumulation that had 
become evident by the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s. To recognize that neoliberalism was 
a highly skewed response, one which served to ensure a “restoration of class power” (rather than, 
say, a revolutionary solution), should not lead us to ignore the fact that the crisis was real, and 
that, as Harvey argues, “Keynesian policies were no longer working” (Harvey 2005, 12).  
Analyzing the source of economic crises has been a central concern of Marxist theory. It 
is not my purpose here to conduct a full review of the literature on the origins of crises, but rather 
only to point out what I find to be the most relevant and significant points. One of the most 
important, but also most controversial elements in Marx´s analysis of capitalism was his belief in 
a “progressive tendency for the general rate of profit to fall” (Marx 1991, 319). The Law of the 
Tendential Fall in the Rate of Profit (LTFRP), as it came to be known, was a necessary 
consequence of Marx´s theory of value and of the fact that capitalism tended towards the 
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replacement of labor by machines through technological advance. For this reason, I will briefly 
explain both the theory of value and the effects of technological change on the rate of profit.  
Marx adopted the labor theory of value from Smith and Ricardo, who had sought to direct 
attention to human work and effort, not land or the hoarding of bullion (as with the physiocrats 
and early mercantilists, respectively), as the most important source of wealth (Foley 2006, 12). 
Marx modified their theory by drawing a distinction between value and wealth (with only the 
former coming solely from labor, and from the most abstract aspects of labor at that), and by 
circumscribing the applicability of the labor theory of value to the capitalist mode of production 
only, rather than human society in general.261 Other factors besides labor (like, say, machines or 
raw materials) may embody, store and transmit value, but they cannot create new value. They 
may indirectly shape the production of new value (by increasing labor productivity and thus the 
amount of relative surplus-value produced), but labor must be directly present at the moment of 
production for new value to be generated. In other words, only labor can directly turn into 
surplus-value, and thus into profit and capital; to participate in the production and reproduction 
of capital, other factors have to be mediated by labor.  
However, all this is true only in an abstract and aggregate sense. In the short run, and in 
any one specific case, it is possible to generate higher profits, or to fight the tendency towards 
the lowering of profits, by cutting costs and boosting productivity through the replacement of 
labor by machinery -which is why technological change is pursued. Yet soon enough, all firms 
adopt the new technological innovation, and they compete with one another to cut prices, which 
they can do since they now produce each item more cheaply. In this way, the same amount of 
value is now spread out over a larger number of cheaper goods, erasing the original gains as far 
as value is concerned. Yet the proportion of constant capital (i.e. capital spent on machinery and 
raw materials) to labor has risen, raising costs without increasing surplus value produced, thus 
putting a squeeze on profits.262 In more concrete terms, we can say that, although technical 
                                                          
261 The distinction between value and wealth has often been forgotten or neglected by both proponents and critics of 
Marxist theory. For an account that clearly maintains and dwells on this distinction, see Coronil (1997).  
262 Actually, technological change resulting in the mass production of cheap goods can lead to an increase in surplus 
value, in the sense that surplus labor increases in relation to necessary labor. Although the worker may have many 
more goods than before, the fact that those goods are cheap means that the reproduction of the worker now 
represents a smaller proportion of the total effort (i.e. value) of the society. A higher proportion of that effort is now 
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change may increase profits in the short-run, the resulting fall in the prices of the products 
cancels out those early benefits, while the high cost incurred for machinery must be accounted 
for.263 The result is a tendency for the rate of profit to decrease. In other words, capitalism 
contains a contradiction: it encourages technological progress, but this displaces labor which is 
ultimately the source of value, surplus-value, profit and capital itself. The result is the proclivity 
of capitalism to recurring crises. 
Marx´s LTFRP is thus in a sense based on the tension between the short-run and the long-
term, between the individual and the systemic, and between the aid that technology initially 
provides to profit-making, and the high cost of that technology. It is important to remark, 
however, that Marx did not argue that profits are constantly falling. There is a tendency for them 
to do so assuming all else is equal, but capital finds ways to fight this through a variety of 
“counteracting factors,” including such things as innovations to reduce the cost of raw materials 
and machinery, a more intense exploitation of labor, or foreign trade, among others. But the very 
fact that new methods must be constantly sought is an indication of the LTFRP at work, and their 
pursuit drives much of the course of the capitalist economy.  
This theory has not found complete acceptance even among Marxist theorists. Both value 
theory and the LTFRP based on it have been among the areas of Marx´s work that have come 
under the heaviest attack from mainstream economics (which accused them of internal 
inconsistencies), and they are the issues on which Marxists have tended to cede the most ground. 
Certainly, Marxists have been interested in accounting for economic crises, but they have tended 
to place more emphasis on explanations like overproduction and underconsumption, which may 
be related to the LTFRP but are not the same thing. In recent years, a new group of Marxist 
economists, such as Kliman (2007), have sought to reassert the validity and consistency of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
surplus-value and can thus turn in to profit. This is the theory of relative surplus value (as opposed to absolute 
surplus value which is the lengthening of the working day), another central component of Marx´s analysis, and one 
that helps to explain the relative disempowerment of workers in society even as their material wealth increases. 
However, relative surplus value does not lead to an increase in the total amount of value produced in relation to the 
capital invested in machinery and raw materials. In fact, it is predicated on a decrease of capital invested in labor 
and thus in the production of new value (v) relative to capital invested in machinery which transmits a fixed amount 
of value but does not create new value – in other words, the LTFRP, which thus reasserts itself in the long term.  
263 On this specific point, I am influenced by the Temporal Single System Interpretation (TSSI) discussed in Kliman 
(2007) – see below.  
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Marx´s value theory and the LFTRP, through what they call the Temporal Single-System 
Interpretation (TSSI).264 In a later book, Kliman (2012) has shifted to an empirical analysis of 
profit rates and economic crises in the U.S., with a focus on the underlying causes of the Great 
Recession of 2008, but also extending back to the decades immediately following World War II. 
His work is in part a polemic against what he calls “the conventional Left account,” with its 
focus on neoliberalism, financialization and rising inequality rather than on what he sees as the 
more important story: the “frailty of capitalist production” (Kliman 2012, 2) and the tendency of 
the profit rate to decline.  
Kliman argues, following Marx, that one of the main ways in which the LTFRP can be 
reversed is through a decline in capital values (or, sometimes, the destruction of physical assets 
themselves); such destruction of value may cause great suffering, but it paradoxically serves to 
restore profitability and set the stage for a new boom (Ibid., 3). This would have been what 
happened after the large-scale destruction of capital value during the Great Depression and the 
destruction of physical assets during World War II, both of which led to increased profit rates 
and the great boom of the quarter-century after the war. Profit rates remained high through the 
middle of the 1950s and then began to decline, though the consequences of this for economic 
growth would not become evident till the 1970s. When the economic troubles of the 1970s hit, 
however, monetary and fiscal policies prevented a large-scale destruction of capital value in the 
U.S. such as had occurred during the Great Depression. The result was that the rate of profit 
never really recovered, and thus no new boom occurred, the dot-com and real-estate bubbles of 
the 1990s and 2000s notwithstanding. This frail state of capitalist production eventually led to 
                                                          
264 The TSSI proposes that the charges of inconsistency were based on a failure to note two key, interrelated aspects 
of Marx´s theory: 1) the prices of inputs, not their values, enter into the determination of a product´s value. The 
value that inputs transfer to the product is not the labor-time required to produce them (i.e. their value), but rather 
the labor-time required to produce the money with which to buy them. In other words, price and value, though often 
at variance with one another, are tightly interconnected, rather than existing on two different planes; prices go into 
the determination of commodities´ value and surplus-value. 2) From this it follows that what matters when 
determining the rate of profit is not the replacement cost of inputs at the time of production, but rather their original 
replacement cost at the time they were purchased. The value of an input may go down over time (because value is 
socially, not individually determined), but the value that input transfers to the product is equal to the value originally 
laid out in its purchase. TSSI proponents such as Kliman (2007) argue that Marx himself agreed with these two 
points and included them as part of his theory (if one reads correctly), and that recognizing them eliminates the 
supposed internal inconsistencies in his theory of value and in the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit. 
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the Great Recession of 2008 and subsequently to the “new normal,” i.e. the state of “not-quite 
recession” that the U.S. is now going through (Ibid., 2). 
 More important to the subject matter of this chapter, however, is the cause of the decline 
in the profit rate which led to the economic troubles of the 1970s (and to the subsequent frail 
state of capitalist production). Kliman believes that the data are consistent with Marx´s argument 
that cost-reducing technical change exerts downward pressure on the profit rate. Based on his 
various quantitative analyses, he concludes that around 89% of the decline in the profit rate 
observed between the end of World War II and the Great Recession of 2008 was due to the rise 
in the value composition of capital (i.e. the ratio of capital invested in machinery and raw 
materials to capital invested in the hiring of labor) (Ibid., 130). 
 On the other hand, Harvey (2010) critiques those who seek to find “one dominant 
explanation” for capitalist crises. He acknowledges the substance of Marx´s LTFRP, but seems 
to regard it as too abstract, given that Marx himself listed a whole series of factors that are 
brought into play to counteract the negative impact of technological change on the profit rate: 
“this list is so long that it renders the neat explanation for a solid `law’ of falling profits as a 
mechanical response to labor-saving technological innovation a little moot” (Harvey 2010, 94). 
Rather, Harvey sees a whole set of potential limits or barriers to capital: 
Money capital scarcities, labor problems, disproportionalities between sectors, natural 
limits, unbalanced technological and organizational changes (including competition 
versus monopoly), indiscipline in the labor process and lack of effective demand head up 
the list. Any one of these circumstances can slow down or disrupt the continuity of 
capital flow and so produce a crisis that results in the devaluation or loss of capital (Ibid., 
17). 
 When one of these limits is overcome, capital eventually encounters a new one; the 
solution to crisis in one generation often becomes the source of crisis in the next. In fact, for 
Harvey “crises are, in short, as necessary to the evolution of capitalism as money, labor power 
and capital itself” (Ibid.). In terms for accounting historically for the specific crisis of the 1970s, 
in his recent writings Harvey has been much more interested in analyzing the response that 
resulted from this crisis (neoliberalism) rather than the origins of the decline itself. One area on 
which he tends to dwell is the significant power and clout of organized labor in the industrialized 
275 
 
world by the 1960s and early 70s, and the way in which it posed a barrier to profits and capital 
accumulation that was eventually overcome through the attack on unions and the “restoration of 
class power” that neoliberalism entailed.  
  Whichever viewpoint we adopt, it is clear that by the 1970s, the crisis-prone nature of 
capitalism had manifested itself in the industrialized world, leading not just to the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system but also to a particular vulnerability to an external trigger like the oil 
shock of 1973. The resulting recession led to a decline in commodity prices (other than oil), and 
the phenomenon of stagflation led the U.S. to adopt monetarist policies and raise interest rates, 
triggering a debt crisis in the Global South and drawing capital back towards the North. These 
developments resulted in a simultaneous crisis across most Latin American and African 
countries. I do not mean to imply that the trajectories of these countries during these years were 
purely a function of forces emanating from the industrialized world; they were not. Rather, I 
think it is important to counter the silencing of the global that tends to occur in countries like 
Peru, where social phenomena are almost always explained in terms of strictly national factors, 
ignoring the fact that similar situations are found across much of Latin America and even other 
continents. Besides, it is true that during these years countries of the Global South were subject 
to frequent external shocks – whether shifting commodity prices, changing interest rates, and 
IMF-mandated austerity and structural adjustment packages that were presented as a solution to 
the crisis. That said, it is important to remark that the different conditions of each country, as 
well as the ways in which they responded to the new conjuncture, shaped their respective 
outcomes. For that reason, I now turn to an examination of the economic, social and political 
crisis of the 1970s and 80s from the national perspective of Peru. 
Crisis at the national level 
 The post-World War II economic trajectory of Peru was different from that of many other 
South American countries, which at the time were pursuing policies of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), protecting their economies to encourage the growth of national industry. 
Peru, by contrast, had a liberal, laissez-faire, export-led orientation, renewed and reinforced 
under the conservative military government of Manuel A. Odría (1948-1956). As Thorp and 
Bertram (1978) write, in their authoritative study, the two decades following Odría’s ascension 
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to power in 1948 were “a remarkable twenty-year period of total integration into the international 
system, with complete commitment to the rules of the game” (205). The aristocratic civilian 
president who succeeded Odría, Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1956-1962) maintained these policies. 
The country grew rapidly during these years through the export of metals, sugar, cotton and 
fishmeal (and, to a lesser degree, oil), with GNP expanding 4.7% a year from 1950 to 1959, 
8.8% per year from 1960 to 1962, and 3.9% per year from 1963 to 1968 (Ibid., 205).  By the late 
1960s, however, balance-of-payment difficulties (and the resulting problems of deficit and 
inflation) had developed, and structural bottlenecks had begun to appear in the economy. Export 
sectors like fishing, sugar and cotton had reached their maximum productive capacity and begun 
to stagnate, while only mining – which was largely in the hands of foreign capital – seemed 
capable of expansion. As Thorp and Bertram argue, “Peru, after nearly a century as one of the 
most diversified export economies in the continent, showed signs of becoming a virtual mono-
export economy, dependent upon the mining sector” (Ibid., 287).   
More seriously, the deeply unequal distribution of resources, wealth and power in the 
country were creating significant social problems. Peru was not completely devoid of 
progressive tendencies; it had had a relatively advanced social legislation and a system of rights 
and protections for workers in the formal sector – what Drinot (2011) has called the “labor state” 
– since the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, as De la Cadena (2000) has shown, the 
Peruvian state had a discourse of protectionism, however shallow, towards the country´s 
indigenous population (as opposed to a discourse of mestizaje and assimilation found in some 
Latin American countries). But the country also had a deeply conservative ruling oligarchy and a 
society plagued by severe racism and profoundly hierarchical, often caste-like relations. The 
distribution of the benefits derived from export-led economic growth was highly skewed; 
furthermore, a significant share of those benefits accrued to foreign investors who held sway 
over some of the most profitable sectors of the national economy. The largest anti-oligarchic and 
anti-imperialist (though explicitly non-Marxist) party in Peru, the APRA (American Popular 
Revolutionary Alliance), had suffered ferocious persecution under several conservative 
governments (Sánchez Cerro, Benavides, Odría) from the 1930s through the 1950s. A 3-year 
period of greater political opening under José Bustamante y Rivero (1945-48), who governed in 
an uneasy alliance with the APRA, had ended with Odría´s 1948 coup. APRA leadership finally 
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shifted towards a more conservative stance around the middle of the 1950s. Yet as late as 1962, 
the military had conducted a coup and assumed power for one year so as to cancel a presidential 
election in which the APRA, with which it had a particularly bad relationship, had won the 
highest number of votes.  
Table 1 – Peruvian Heads of State, 1919-2013 
1919-1930 Augusto B. Leguía 
1930-1931 Junta presided by Lt. Colonel Luis Sánchez Cerro 
1931-1933 Lt. Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro 
1933-1939 General Óscar R. Benavides 
1939-1945 Manuel Prado Ugarteche 
1945-1948 José Luis Bustamante y Rivero 
1948-1956 General Manuel A. Odría 
1956-1962 Manuel Prado Ugarteche (2nd term) 
1962-1963 Junta presided by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy 
1963-1968 Fernando Belaúnde Terry 
1968-1975 General Juan Velasco Alvarado (Revolutionary Government of the Armed 
Forces) 
1975-1980 General Francisco Morales Bermúdez 
1980-1985 Fernando Belaúnde Terry (2nd term) 
1985-1990 Alan García Pérez 
1990-2000 Alberto Fujimori (“self-coup” and suspension of constitutional order in 1992) 
2000-2001 Valentín Paniagua (provisional government) 
2001-2006 Alejandro Toledo Manrique 
2006-2011 Alan García Pérez (2nd term) 
2011-present Ollanta Humala Tasso 
 
In the countryside, conflicts increasingly pitted hacienda owners both against their 
workers and the surrounding communities that claimed the same land. Although studies 
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conducted in the 1960s may have overestimated the degree of land concentration, particularly in 
the highlands, there is little doubt that both land distribution and working conditions on the 
estates had become explosive social issues in several parts of the country. At the end of the 
1950s and beginning of the 1960s, separate peasant movements and land recuperation campaigns 
in the southern highlands (Cuzco) and the central highlands (Pasco and Junín) brought the issue 
of land to the forefront of the national agenda. In the country as a whole, the ruling elite, long 
accustomed to a cheap workforce and to hierarchical, deferential social relations, was unwilling 
to accept the new expectations of popular and peasant sectors – expectations that sometimes 
were the consequence of modernization and capitalist development itself. 
The 1963 presidential elections brought to power Fernando Belaúnde, a centrist reformist 
sympathetic to John F. Kennedy´s Alliance for Progress. Belaúnde had promised an Agrarian 
Reform, and was famous for having traveled over all of Peru, gaining significant support in the 
countryside. But his reforms were thwarted by the staunch opposition of the congressional 
majority, composed of a strange alliance between the formerly revolutionary APRA and its old 
persecutor, the UNO party of former dictator Odría, which represented the interests of the landed 
oligarchy. Frustration grew with the slow pace of the reforms and with the emerging economic 
problems mentioned earlier. World events also made their influence felt, with the Cuban 
Revolution inspiring short-lived guerrilla movements in Peru in 1963 and 1965, and with 
revolutionary and leftist ideas on the rise worldwide. Under these conditions, the military 
overthrew Belaúnde in a bloodless coup in 1968. 
The 1968 coup has been variously interpreted as driven by the army´s desire to thwart a 
possible APRA victory in the presidential elections programmed for 1969, or as motivated by the 
desire to speed up the anti-oligarchic structural reforms that the country needed if it was to avoid 
an all-out revolution. Others point to the emerging nationalist and radical orientation of a new 
generation of military officers. Whatever the case, the leader of the coup, General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado, surprised the country by adopting a radical rhetoric and program, making his 
government a rare case in Latin America of a left-leaning military regime. Famously declaring 
“Peasant, the landlord will no longer eat your poverty!” Velasco set about expropriating large 
estates around the whole country and conducting what has sometimes been described as the most 
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radical agrarian reform in Latin America outside of Cuba, even if significant problems arose 
around the question of how to distribute the expropriated lands.  
In the industrial, mine and fishing sectors, Velasco created the “industrial communities” 
(comunidades laborales or comunidades industriales), mechanisms by which workers in medium 
and large enterprises would share in the profits as well as in management, and would 
progressively acquire more of the company´s capital until they became co-owners.  He also 
reinforced the labor stability regime, making it very difficult to fire workers, thus aiding 
unionization efforts. During this time, the government pursued policies encouraging import-
substitution industrialization (ISI), which had begun more tentatively under Belaúnde, and which 
encouraged the formation of national industries and limited imports of finished goods. Such 
policies were similar to those that other Latin American countries had been implementing for 
some time, with the aim of breaking with the region´s traditional role as an exporter of raw 
materials, with its attendant problems of deteriorating terms of trade, vulnerability to commodity 
price fluctuations, and a general lack of development. Furthermore, Velasco nationalized several 
of the largest foreign companies in Peru, such as the International Petroleum Company (a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil), the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Marcona Mining Company 
(Peru´s sole iron producer). The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, as the Velasco 
regime was known, adopted as a symbol the figure of the 18th-century indigenous rebel leader 
Túpac Amaru II, and made Quechua and Aymara official languages, at least on paper.  
Although not repressive in the same sense as the right-wing military dictatorships that 
emerged elsewhere in Latin America during the 1970s, Velasco´s government was top-down and 
bureaucratic. Though it promoted the growth of popular organizations, it also sought to control 
them through mechanisms such as SINAMOS (National System of Social Mobilization), and it 
placed military men in most cabinet positions. The former landed oligarchy despised Velasco for 
having broken their power, but some sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie benefitted from his 
challenge to foreign capital and his promotion of national industry, and actually cooperated with 
the regime. The APRA party, which had had bad relations with the military ever since a 1932 
uprising, resented Velasco for copying much of their original anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist 
program, and for keeping them out of power once again. Many of the parties of the Marxist left, 
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which were undergoing a period of growth and radicalization at this time, were ambivalent 
towards if not deeply suspicious of Velasco and his military regime, labeling it variously as 
“corporatist” or even “fascist.” Only the Moscow-aligned branch of the Peruvian Communist 
Party (PC-Unidad) openly supported the government. The labor, peasant and popular movements 
supported the general aim of Velasco´s reforms, but also sought their own autonomy against the 
bureaucratic control of the military regime, and sometimes clashed with the latter, for example in 
a 1971 strike at the Cobriza copper mine which left five workers dead.   
Its bureaucratic and authoritarian methods notwithstanding, the Velasco regime had 
sought to implement structural reforms that had been widely perceived as necessary, and to break 
with the country´s oligarchic tradition and bring greater equality and national autonomy. Yet in 
so doing, it risked clashing with criteria of economic efficiency, the autonomy and supremacy of 
which was about to be asserted with greater force than ever before around the world. Most of 
Velasco´s government was not yet felt as a time of economic crisis, as world commodity prices 
were on the rise until 1974, and as foreign banks continued to lend the country large sums of 
money, encouraged by the excess liquidity generated by the oil boom (i.e. oil nations deposited 
their petrodollars in foreign banks that then loaned them out to governments). But like elsewhere 
in Latin America, in the short run import-substitution industrialization policies actually generated 
a greater dependence on imports, namely imports of industrial inputs and capital goods to be 
used in the new industries. Since exports did not grow at the same rate, this generated a current-
account deficit that, like the fiscal deficit brought on by the growth in government bureaucracy, 
was settled through the acquisition of more loans from the foreign banks (Parodi 2008, 132-135). 
All this had already begun occurring somewhat under Belaúnde´s more modest reforms, but it 
accelerated under Velasco.  
The economic inefficiencies of this period became more evident when the mid-1970s 
recession in the industrialized world brought down copper and other metal prices, reducing 
export income that was already stretched thin. As Auty writes, “the mid-1970s mineral price 
decline forced the Peruvian military government to retreat from its role as the motor of the 
economy” (Auty 1993, 94).  Yet this also required the political change that occurred when, in 
August 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez overthrew General Velasco. The latter had 
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previously been weakened by illness and by the police strike and street riots of February 5, 1975. 
Also, ideological fissures had been developing within the military, not all of which agreed with 
the leftward direction of Velasco´s reforms. Although Morales Bermúdez had been Velasco´s 
minister, and although he called his government the “Second Phase” of the revolution, he 
actually halted the further development of the reforms that had been underway. Morales 
Bermúdez altered the regime of industrial communities, crippling their growth, and halted the 
redistribution of land (although some land seizures continued independently, under the direction 
of peasant organizations and the radical Left).  
Furthermore, the new government sought to address the balance-of-payment and fiscal 
deficit problems through structural adjustment, a type of policy then being promoted by the IMF 
that sought to stabilize economies by reducing domestic demand to cut inflation and fiscal 
deficits (effectively causing a recession) and by devaluing currencies to promote exports and 
reduce imports. At the time, these “orthodox” policies, as they were also called, were being 
implemented in Chile by the Pinochet dictatorship. In Peru, regime raised gasoline prices, 
reduced food subsidies (essentially raising food prices) and set limits on wage increases. At first, 
the adjustment policies in Peru were a lot milder than those of Chile, as the government sought 
intermediate solutions through negotiations over new loan/adjustment packages through private 
banks rather than the IMF (Parodi 2008, 141-146). By 1978, however, as these initial austerity 
packages failed to deliver results, the Peruvian government would sign an agreement with the 
IMF to implement further measures under its direction. 
Even the early adjustment packages provoked deep opposition from the unions and the 
Left, both of which had expanded during the Velasco years. From the perspective of the Morales 
Bermúdez government, the austerity measures were a necessity imposed by the realities of deficit 
and inflation and by conditions set by foreign lenders. From the perspective of the Left, which 
still had socialism as a goal on the horizon, the adjustment packages were further evidence of 
capitalism´s attack on workers and the poor.  Thus, from a position of ambivalence towards 
Velasco, the Left parties passed into one of unambiguous opposition to Morales Bermúdez´s 
government, as the latter abandoned the earlier reforms. Moreover, the latter half of the 1970s 
became the period of greatest strike activity in the country´s history, as the unions reacted to 
282 
 
declining real wages and the austerity measures in general. On June 10, 1977, the Finance 
Minister, a well-known businessman appointed by the military government, announced further 
rises in gasoline and food prices and a devaluation of the currency. The response came in the 
form of a series of mobilizations and disturbances around the country and finally the massive 
General Strike of July 19, 1977, the largest strike in Peruvian history up to that time, with the 
participation not only of the different workers´ centrals but also of university students, popular 
and regional organizations, and poor neighborhoods in the cities (Valladares 2007). The 
government retaliated by issuing a special decree authorizing the dismissal of workers who had 
led and participated in the action, leading to the firing of 5,000 workers, many of them key union 
leaders and activists. Yet the strike had weakened the government politically, and so Morales 
Bermúdez felt compelled to announce elections for a new Constituent Assembly as well as the 
handing over of power to a civilian government in 1980. Another large general strike occurred 
on May 22-23, 1978; similarly, that year, the teachers and the mining workers both staged the 
largest strikes in their history up to that time (Sulmont 1979, 31-32).  
Although it waned somewhat after 1979, the strike wave of the late 1970s had placed 
some limits on the intensity of the austerity measures that could be applied. While there was 
certainly repression in Peru under Morales Bermúdez, the government´s hold over society was 
nowhere near as total as in Pinochet´s Chile. From a perspective that emphasizes economic 
orthodoxy above all, this meant that austerity measures were not at the level needed to reduce the 
structural imbalances in the economy in the long run. However, it wasn´t only social pressure 
that complicated the imposition of economic rationality. It was also the brief but sharp 1979-
1980 commodity price rise (which had resulted from global political events as well as 
speculation on the world market), as well as contradictions within the orthodox, liberal position 
itself. Policymakers were concerned above all with controlling the inflation that they believed 
would stem from the mineral price climb, so they pegged the Peruvian sol to the U.S. dollar from 
1979 to 1982. When the dollar appreciated during the early years of the Reagan presidency, this 
accelerated “Dutch disease” in the non-mining sectors, more than would likely have been the 
case otherwise (Auty 1993, 98). At the same time, the government pursued a program of trade 
liberalization, reducing import quotas and lowering tariffs. As Auty writes, the “optimistic 
interlude” in mineral prices “lasted long enough to encourage a lethal combination of a pegged 
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exchange rate and more outward-oriented policies” (Ibid.). This combination would ruin the 
nascent Peruvian manufacturing sector in the early 1980s, which could no longer compete with 
foreign imports, much less compete on the world market.  
By this time, power had been transferred back to civilian hands, with Fernando 
Belaúnde´s AP (Acción Popular) party winning the 1980 elections. A moderate reformist during 
his first term in the 1960s, Belaúnde retained significant popularity. By now, however, he had 
grown more conservative, and he formed a coalition with the PPC (Christian Popular Party), a 
conservative middle-class party. Yet although he continued the orthodox policies of the Morales 
Bermúdez period in terms of trade liberalization and the removal of subsidies, he also boosted 
public spending on infrastructure and other projects, in the belief that the high metal prices of 
1979-1980 would continue. When prices collapsed, the trade deficit rose again, as did the fiscal 
deficit and the foreign debt (which had to finance government spending). This occurred just as 
interest rates were increasing due to U.S. Federal Reserve policy. Thus, after 1983 Peru could no 
longer pay all of the interest it owed, limiting further lending from the foreign private banks 
although not yet from the IMF, which made more loans on the condition of new austerity 
packages. The middle of the Belaúnde period, around 1982-83, was a time of recession and 
economic trouble. Towards the end of his presidency in 1985, some macroeconomic indicators 
had improved, but by then per capita incomes were below 1972 levels, half the workforce was 
officially underemployed and inflation was approaching 200% (Ibid., 103).  This served to 
discredit the center-right (Belaúnde´s AP) and right (his governing partner the PPC), and paved 
the way for the APRA and the Marxist left (grouped in the Izquierda Unida or United Left 
coalition) to dispute the 1985 elections. 
From its origins as a persecuted revolutionary and anti-oligarchic party in the 1930s and 
40s, the APRA had swung towards the center and even the center-right after the mid-1950s, 
allying itself with Odría´s conservative UNO party in the 1960s. Yet by the late 1970s it had 
swung again towards the center –left, this time aligning itself ideologically with European Social 
Democracy. Since the party´s historic leader Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had died in 1979, the 
candidate in 1985 was the young Alan García, a charismatic politician and gifted orator. After 
defeating the candidate of the Marxist left, the mayor of Lima Alfonso Barrantes, García 
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embarked on a “heterodox” program away from the “orthodox” neoliberal policies encouraged 
by the IMF, and towards structuralist and pro-growth remedies. This is not surprising given not 
only the APRA´s anti-oligarchic roots but also the fact that neoliberalism and orthodoxy had 
become discredited in Peru after years of austerity measures had failed to control inflation or 
reactivate the economy, while reducing the real income of much of the population. García´s team 
attributed inflation to cost push factors and inflationary expectations rather than to fiscal deficits 
(Parodi 2008, 206-207, Auty 2003, 103). Thus, they sought to reduce inflationary expectations 
by freezing prices, while raising wages and lowering indirect taxes to increase demand, which 
would not only stimulate growth but also mop up unused capacity and reduce cost push pressures 
(Auty, 103). At the same time, García attacked the IMF and capped debt interest payments at 
10% of export income; this was supposed to free up more resources to finance the economic 
stimulus, but it also alienated the IMF, which declared Peru ineligible for future loans.  
For the first year and a half, the government´s policies yielded an increase in GDP and in 
real incomes. Yet it soon became clear that the fiscal deficit was growing, due to increased 
subsidies and reduced indirect taxes; the current account deficit was also increasing, due to the 
increased domestic demand for imports which resulted from the economic stimulus, and which 
was not balanced by an increase in exports. Since foreign loans were no longer an option, the 
government increasingly had to rely on the consumption of the country´s foreign currency 
reserves and on the printing of more money. García attempted to address these problems by 
coordinating a program of investment and production with the heads of national business groups 
(known as the Twelve Apostles), so as to give real economic substance to his stimulus. But the 
Peruvian business class by and large preferred to send their profits overseas rather than invest 
them in unstable Peru, and so García gradually moved into a position of open confrontation with 
the national bourgeoisie. This political conflict was partly shaped by García´s erratic governing 
style. In July 1987, he decreed the nationalization of the banks, so that the government would be 
able to manage the country´s financial resources and facilitate credit to productive sectors of the 
economy. Neither the Left (a potential ally in this case) nor the members of his own party had 
been alerted to this sudden and radical move, generating confusion and doubt. The bankers and 
the Right, on the other hand, responded in a well-organized fashion and took to the streets. Led 
by Mario Vargas Llosa, Peru´s most famous writer and a man of strongly free-market views, the 
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movement against the nationalization of the banks initiated a new era of neoliberal ideological 
ascendancy in the country that in a sense continues to this day.265 In the face of this challenge, 
the García government had to backtrack on the nationalization of the banks.  
Similarly, in light of the growing deficit, rising inflation and the imbalances in the 
economy, by the end of 1997 García had accepted that a return to austerity measures was 
inevitable. Thus, in 1988, the government issued three separate adjustment packages, each of 
which raised the prices of gasoline, electricity, rice and other foodstuffs by a much larger margin 
than salary increases, effectively cutting real wages. Due to their limited nature, as well as to the 
increasingly violent situation in the country, these austerity measures did not succeed in cutting 
inflation and increasing government revenue; as Parodi writes, it was an “adjustment without 
stabilization” (Parodi, 220). The heterodox experiment of 1985-87 ended in a crash: GDP fell by 
9% in 1988 and 10% in 1989 (Auty 2003, 106). Between 1987 and 1989, the average real 
income in Lima fell by two-thirds; for the country as a whole, between 1988 and 1990 GDP per 
capita fell by a third, returning to levels from 30 years earlier (Verdera 2007). Hyperinflation 
took hold between September 1988 and April 1989, just as the impact of the austerity measures, 
including the real wage cuts, was being felt. The result was a massive increase in poverty. 
According to one study, the poverty rate rose from 43.1% in 1986 to 59% in 1991, while 
“extreme poverty” rose from 18.4% to 24.2% in the same period. In the rural highlands, 
“extreme poverty” rose by 22 percentage points, from 32.3 % to 54.5% (Verdera 2007, 113-116). 
These figures would not be significantly reduced until after the new period of economic growth 
that began in 2003.  
The latter years of the García government would thus be remembered as a time of 
particularly acute economic crisis and general social breakdown, within the longer arc of the 
crisis that had begun in the mid-1970s and that was common to most of Latin America (and, as 
we saw earlier, Africa). By the early 1990s, malnutrition in Peru had risen to one of the highest 
levels in Latin America (Ibid., 183-184), and some social indicators were beginning to approach 
the levels of traditionally poorer countries like Nicaragua or Haiti. A large cholera outbreak in 
                                                          
265 Although this movement would be unable to win the 1990 elections, its program would be adopted by the 
Fujimori regime that took power that year.  
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early 1991, whether related to declining socioeconomic conditions or not, added to the overall 
sense of despondency. This general situation set the stage for the renewed imposition of 
neoliberal, market-oriented policies – this time without ambivalences or restraints – by the 
Fujimori government in the 1990s. However, the crisis was not just economic. Central to the 
sense of social breakdown in the 1980s was the conflict between the Peruvian state and two 
armed insurgencies, of which the largest by far was the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path).  
Crisis and violence 
Sendero Luminoso was a group that had its roots in a 1964 split in the Peruvian 
Communist Party (PCP), the organization founded as the Socialist Party by José Carlos 
Mariátegui (the founder of Peruvian Marxism) in 1929 but which had changed its name soon 
after the latter´s death in 1930.266 In the early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split generated a division 
between those who sought to maintain the party´s alignment with Moscow, and those who were 
more inspired by Mao Tse-Tung´s brand of communism. The Moscow-oriented camp became 
the PCP-Unidad, and under the leadership of Jorge Del Prado followed a moderate line aimed at 
a peaceful transition to socialism. The Maoist camp, of roughly equal size, became the PCP-
Bandera Roja (Red Flag), under the leadership of Saturnino Paredes, a lawyer from the Ancash 
region who had worked defending peasant communities against the haciendas since the 1940s. 
Not long after the 1964 split, however, the majority of Bandera Roja´s youth membership 
abandoned the party to form the PCP-Patria Roja (Red Fatherland), a party which would gain 
great influence over the national teachers´ union, the SUTEP. Like the PCP-Unidad, in the 1980s 
Patria Roja would come together with other leftist parties to form the United Left coalition (IU), 
which won the Lima mayoral elections in 1983 and became a serious contender for the 
presidency before dividing again in 1989. 
One of those who did not yet abandon Paredes’ Bandera Roja in the mid-1960s, however, 
was Abimael Guzmán, a young professor of philosophy at the University of Huamanga in 
Ayacucho. Guzmán was deeply fascinated with Maoism and went on an extended trip to China 
                                                          
266 The discussion of Sendero Luminoso in the next few pages is based on different sources, but above all on 
Degregori (1990 and 2011). 
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in the mid-to-late 1960s. Within Bandera Roja, Guzmán cultivated his own “Red Fraction” 
(Fracción Roja) in the city of Ayacucho (Huamanga); his followers played a role in, and in turn 
capitalized on, a massive 1969 struggle of peasants and students in the cities of Huanta and 
Ayacucho for the gratuity of secondary education, which appeared to be under threat from the 
government. Saturnino Paredes, who had come to see Guzmán as a rival, purged him and his 
followers around that time, though the latter would claim that it was them who had purged 
Paredes. After this final split, Guzmán´s group cloistered itself in the University of Huamanga, 
building organizational strength and above all ideological cohesion. Other groups on the 
Peruvian Left began referring to them as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), after one of their 
slogans: “On the shining path of José Carlos Mariátegui” (Por el sendero luminoso de José 
Carlos Mariátegui). Fiercely sectarian, the party controlled much of the university, though it was 
also challenged by other parties of the Left, resulting in sometimes violent clashes.  
In Degregori´s (1990, 2011) view, Sendero at this time was composed of two main 
demographics in Ayacucho: radicalized intellectuals from the provincial elite and middle class 
(like Guzmán himself), and young people of peasant origin who in the 1970s were accessing the 
university for the first time. Ayacucho was one of the poorest regions of Peru; during the 20th 
century it had never attracted significant amounts of capital, and was negatively affected by 
capitalist development in other regions of Peru, with inflows of cheap foodstuffs and goods 
damaging local production (Degregori 1990). It also had some of the most abusive, feudal-like 
conditions on the haciendas. This seemed to give credence to Sendero´s thesis that Peru was 
“semi-feudal” and needed a revolution modeled on that of China; Guzmán´s followers would 
continue to voice variants of this view even after Velasco´s Agrarian Reform (which they saw as 
“fascist”) abolished most of the haciendas in the 1970s.   
Unlike other Left parties, Sendero did not participate in the late-1970s strikes and protests 
against the Morales Bermúdez regime and its austerity measures. However, that period of 
turmoil helped to convince Guzmán that the time was ripe for revolution. On May 17, 1980, on 
the eve of the elections that marked the transition from military rule to representative democracy, 
and while other Left parties were integrating themselves into electoral politics, Sendero launched 
its “People´s War” by burning ballot boxes in the village of Chuschi, Ayacucho. Slowly at first, 
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over the next couple of years the insurgency spread across rural northern Ayacucho, as Sendero 
militants entered communities and either convinced or forced villagers to take their side. In late 
1981, President Belaúnde handed control of the region over to the army, which began torturing 
and killing people suspected of being terroristas, as Sendero militants quickly became known.  
Rural Ayacucho was an overwhelmingly Quechua-speaking society, and racism helped to 
shape the conduct of many military officers, soldiers and the State. Government forces 
committed several large massacres of peasant villagers, at sites like Soccos, Putis and 
Accomarca. Sendero´s own reputation for cruelty became established in the first few years of the 
insurgency. One event that would eventually become symbolic of Sendero brutality occurred on 
April 3rd, 1983, when militants acting on orders from Abimael Guzmán (by his own later 
admission) massacred 69 men, women and children in Lucanamarca, as punishment for that 
village´s earlier execution of a Sendero commander. Sendero also spread its operations to the 
neighboring departments of Apurímac and Huancavelica, as well as to the Central Highlands 
(Junín and Pasco). In particular, the party was interested in raiding the mines of Huancavelica, 
Junín and Pasco. Disrupting production in the mines, which were central to the national 
economy, aided Sendero´s goal of demolishing the “old order”; additionally, the mines became 
important sources of explosives for Sendero actions around the country. The government 
responded by militarizing the mining camps, giving the army the authority to enter and raid 
workers´ homes.  
Sendero furthermore targeted local authorities such as district and provincial mayors, 
members of Acción Popular (Belaúnde´s party), the APRA and in some cases the United Left; as 
participants in the “Old State,” they were asked to resign, and assassinated when they refused to 
do so. To “conquer power in the entire country” (conquistar el poder en todo el país) became 
Sendero´s slogan and goal. Ideologically, the party maintained a hard line against those whom it 
called “revisionists,” and whom Guzmán described as “a colossal pile of garbage;” most 
prominent among these were the Marxist parties of the United Left. At a global level, even a 
hardliner like Albania´s Enver Hoxha was labeled a “revisionist” by Guzmán. Sendero received 
ideological support and allegiance from the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, a global 
coalition of small, hard-line Maoist parties that had formed in reaction to China´s abandonment 
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of Mao´s legacy after the ascension of Deng Xiaoping. By the end of the 1980s, Sendero was 
actually losing the war in rural Ayacucho, as more communities turned against them. However, it 
used this as an opportunity to move more of their operations into the capital, Lima, threatening 
the very center of national power through a campaign of car bombings, attacks on police stations 
and “armed blockades” (paros armados). In spite of their violence, some young people joined 
Sendero’s ranks; they were attracted by their seeming fulfillment of the idea of revolution that 
other groups had only talked about, and felt compelled to take sides in this context. Besides, the 
severe social and economic crisis of the 1980s appeared to give credence to the idea that the 
poverty and injustice of the “old order” justified radical change.  
The other, smaller armed insurgent group was the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement (MRTA), formed in 1984. Unlike Sendero, the MRTA drew its ideology not from 
hard-line Maoism but rather from the tradition of Latin American guerrilla movements since the 
Cuban Revolution. Indeed, one of the main organizations that formed the MRTA was a branch of 
the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement). That group had launched a short-lived Cuban-inspired 
insurgency in 1965, and had originally been founded by left-wing militants of the APRA who 
were disappointed after that party abandoned its original anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialist 
stance in the late 1950s. The MRTA decided to launch its insurgency in 1984 as a fulfillment of 
the perceived need for revolution (common to many of the Left parties in the 1970s, before their 
entry into electoral politics in 1980) and as a response to the generalized misery that had been 
heightened by the economic crisis. They were also concerned about leaving the field of armed 
struggle to a possible Sendero victory. The MRTA was less dogmatic than Sendero, and did not 
target civilians on a large scale in the same way. However, towards the end of the 1980s it began 
carrying out kidnappings of businessmen as well as some targeted assassinations and executions, 
adding to the general sense of crisis and social breakdown. Certainly, the state also responded to 
the insurgent groups and to other perceived threats not just with army actions but also with 
paramilitary forces such as the “Rodrigo Franco Command,” an execution squad rumored to be 





Crisis and the mining unions 
One important set of social actors that were affected by the crisis, and in turn responded 
to it, were the mining workers’ unions (sindicatos mineros), such as the union at the Huarón 
mine whose assembly minutes were examined in the first part of this chapter. Though never as 
central to national politics as their Bolivian counterparts had been - due to Peruvian miners’ 
greater isolation and fragmentation as well as Peru´s more diversified economy (Damonte 2005, 
63) - the mining unions had nevertheless become an important political actor by the second half 
of the 20th century.  
Although there were strikes and labor conflicts in the mines of the Central Highlands in 
the early 20th century, these took place in an almost spontaenous fashion and did not involve the 
building of stable organizations (Flores Galindo 1993 [1974]). While it is likely that the anarcho-
syndicalist labor agitation of the urban areas in the 1910s and 20s would have had some effect in 
the mines, this seems to have been quite limited. The widespread use of the enganche and 
contrata systems at the time, as well as the unstable nature of mining employment, would have 
made labor organizing difficult in any case – not to mention the ability of the mining companies, 
especially the Cerro de Pasco Corporation, to call on police forces when there were disturbances. 
The first systematic attempt to organize labor unions in the mines came around the start of the 
Great Depression. José Carlos Mariátegui, the founder of Peruvian Marxism, had taken a keen 
interest in the problems faced by mining workers and the possibilities for organizing them. His 
contact with the mining camps of the Central Highlands increased after the cave-in at the CPC´s 
Morococha mine on December 5 1928, in which at least 28 workers died, and which 
Mariátegui´s biweekly paper Labor covered extensively. Mariátegui was interested in the mining 
workers not only out of a Marxist concern for a working class confronted with big capital, but 
also precisely because of their difference from the supposed “classic” model of the English 
proletariat: they were an incomplete, transitional working class with deep connections to the 
rural world. Mariátegui believed strongly in an articulation of workers with the indigenous 
peasants who constituted the majority of the population at the time. Mining workers, who went 
back and forth between employment at the mines and their rural villages, were naturally suited 
for such an alliance (Flores Galindo 1974, 159; Manrique 2010, 23). Mariátegui died in early 
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1930. Yet the work begun by cadres from the Socialist Party which he founded (and which was 
soon renamed Communist Party and aligned with the Comintern), like Jorge del Prado, together 
with activists from the Central Highlands like Gamaniel Blanco and Adrián Sovero, led later that 
year to the first large-scale attempt at organizing unions and federations in the mines.  
This short-lived Communist-led attempt collapsed after the government and the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation violently repressed the workers, most prominently at the Malpaso massacre of 
November 12, 1930, in which 23 workers were killed (Del Prado et al. 2010; Flores Galindo 
1974). For the next 15 years, labor activities at the mines were suppressed, with few strikes and 
no unions operating openly. From 1945 to 1948 there was a brief political opening in the 
country, as the centrist lawyer José Bustamante y Rivero presided a diverse but fragile coalition 
of parties ranging from the center and center-right to the APRA and the Communists. His 
government legalized the latter two parties, and the APRA, which had grown faster than the 
Communists, began a period of intense political activity. Its platform was still anti-oligarchic and 
anti-imperialist (though explicitly non-Marxist), and it had significant following among workers 
on the coast. Between 1945 and 1947, 264 labor unions were legally recognized in the country 
(Contreras and Cueto 2007, 289). Among other things, APRA militants dedicated themselves to 
organizing unions in the mining centers of the Central Highlands.  
It was during this period that the basic form of the mining unions was set – how the 
assemblies would be run, how the minutes would be recorded. The sindicato at Cerro de Pasco 
was founded on September 16, 1945, and the one at Huarón on October 28; other mining unions 
(Casapalca, Morococha, Atacocha, etc.) were also founded around the same time. This period of 
political opening came to an end in 1948, when part of the APRA instigated a last attempt at an 
insurrection in Lima, and the military responded with Odría’s coup. Although the APRA was 
again persecuted, the mining unions did not disappear during this period as they had before. 
After the restoration of civilian rule in 1956, and the APRA leadership’s increasingly 
conservative turn, that party became a force that sought to moderate and limit union demands.  
Although there were tensions earlier, it was at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1970s that the mining unions turned definitively away from the APRA and towards more 
radical positions that brought them into contact with the Marxist Left. One by one, union officers 
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seen as aligned with the APRA were deposed at union assemblies. An important moment in this 
process was the strike at the Cerro de Pasco Corporation on September 1969, when the local 
unions at La Oroya and Cobriza rejected an agreement signed by the other, APRA-aligned 
unions, and staged a long marcha de sacrificio (“sacrifice march”) to Lima, after which they won 
a higher wage increase. This increased the prestige of the radical position and helped to de-
legitimize the APRA-aligned faction. Another important antecedent had been the 1967 strike and 
march of the workers at the Atacocha mine in Pasco, regarded by some as the first time that the 
mining workers used the term marcha de sacrificio. Yet another important milestone was the 
founding of the National Mining Workers’ Federation (FNTMMSP), in La Oroya in 1969. Led 
by Víctor Cuadros Paredes, a worker from the Southern Peru Copper Corporation, the Federation 
espoused an explicitly clasista line (see below). 
Several factors led to the radicalization of the mining workers after the late 1960s. 
DeWind (1987), who was doing his fieldwork at the time these changes were taking place, 
argues that technical change and the resulting stabilization of the workforce had pulled workers 
further away from their connection with the rural areas, which meant that they were now fully 
dependent on their mining wages. But these wages had not risen to a level high enough to fully 
support a family; the resulting contradiction led to increased radicalization. No doubt this was 
one of the factors at work. Additionally, some of the workers in regions like Pasco had been in 
contact with and even participated in the land recuperation movement of the 1960s. This was the 
case for example of Teófilo Rímac Capcha, from the community of Ticlacayán and one of the 
leaders of the 1967 Atacocha strike and an important figure in Pasco in the following years. 
Also, importantly, this was a time when, unlike in the past, some mining workers were beginning 
to access higher education. Many times, they attended the universities and technical institutes for 
short periods, without finishing their studies, due to economic and other pressures; but during 
this time they were exposed to the radical political currents that responded to world events such 
as the Cuban Revolution, Maoism, and others. 
All this mirrored what was happening elsewhere in the Peruvian labor movement, where 
obrero unions were rejecting the APRA and adopting the perspective of clasismo, which became 
dominant in the 1970s. Clasismo was defined in opposition to the APRA above all, but it was 
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also a term that was used to define the speaker against other Left-aligned unions that were 
deemed too conciliatory. In the mines, the weakening of the APRA position at the end of the 
1960s initially led to a strengthening of the influence of the Moscow-aligned PC-Unidad and its 
allied labor central the CGTP. However, this was limited and short-lived, as other, more radical 
Marxist parties began organizing in the mines. One of these was the technically Maoist PC-Patria 
Roja, which gained some following in certain locals; another was Vanguardia Revolucionaria, a 
“New Left” party inspired in part by the Cuban Revolution. Vanguardia split into several 
factions early on, but some of them would come together again in later years, forming an 
important matrix or current for a large sector of the Peruvian Left. Initially composed mostly of 
radicalized middle-class university students, over time the Vanguardia factions made significant 
inroads into the popular, peasant and labor movements. By the time they coalesced into the PUM 
(Partido Unificado Mariateguista) in the mid-1980s, as part of the electoral United Left 
Coalition, they were the most significant Left force within both the National Peasant 
Confederation (the CCP) and the National Mining Federation (the FNTMMSP). Vanguardia’s 
connections with the mines had begun in the very early 1970s, at the initiative of one of the 
party’s founders, whose cousin was the secretary general of the union at one of the Pasco mines. 
As an internal party document stated in 1971,   
If, additionally, it is understood that the mining proletariat maintains organic ties with the 
peasantry, for various reasons that range from the location of the camps to the origins of 
the mining proletarians, we then find renewed arguments for the task of the Marxist-
Leninist Party, given that here we have an organic link between the two fundamental 
sectors of the people [pueblo] (El proletariado minero..., 11). 
 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that although the radical Left position was dominant 
within the mining unions in the 1970s and 80s, no single party had complete hegemony or 
control. The political culture of the mining unions, like that of the Left parties, was very 
fractious, even as a discourse of solidarity and unity was also frequently invoked.  Besides, none 
of the Marxist parties in Peru really developed a solid, organic culture and social structure like 
that which the APRA party had had in some of the coastal cities, or that which the Communists 
in Chile had perhaps developed at one time.  
 More importantly, it is not that the rank-and-file of the unions were ideologically 
Marxist; they were not. Direct engagement with Marxist ideas was often limited to the leadership 
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and the most politicized workers at some of the larger unions like La Oroya, Cerro de Pasco and 
Cobriza. The point, rather, is that the radical position of those leaders (not necessarily the 
specific individuals themselves) commanded legitimacy in many of the mining camps during this 
period; people were willing to participate in frequent strikes and marches and to enforce norms 
of solidarity and militancy. This was reinforced by the crowded, intimate setting of the mining 
camps, and by the fact that the workforce was more stable than it had ever been before, with 
large numbers of families, women and children. As Kruijt and Vellinga wrote in 1979:  
A social movement had sprung up in the camps; every work stoppage, every work-to-
rules action and every strike begun to function as a collective ritual that reinforced the 
movement’s internal integration and further increased her momentum (Kruijt and 
Vellinga 1979, 127).  
These were the years of the marchas de sacrificio, the ollas comunes (“common pots”) 
and other ritualized performances and forms of protest. This shared union culture provided a 
common form to struggles that were often about very local issues of pay, employment and living 
conditions such as camp housing.   
This movement also began making its presence increasingly known in Lima. Mining 
workers from across the country participated in the General Strike of 1977, against the austerity 
measures of Morales Bermúdez (with the exception of the Centromín workers’ federation, which 
was controlled by a faction that believed the strike was led by “revisionist” elements). The next 
year, the mining unions carried out the largest strike in their sector up to that time; foremost 
among their demands was the reposition of the leaders who had been fired by government decree 
after the General Strike of the previous year. On that occasion, thousands of mining workers 
marched to Lima, and were hosted by the students of San Marcos University at the School of 
Medicine. This strike was only defeated when the police broke into the university in the middle 
of the night, rounded up the miners, packed them into trains and sent them back to the Central 
Highlands. The drop in metal prices in the early 1980s precipitated a first wave of mine closures, 
which affected small mines above all; there, the workers began doing marches to save their 
workplaces from the owners who wanted to close them. Such was the case of the Canaria mine in 
Ayacucho, where the workers staged two marchas de sacrificio to Lima, in 1982-83 and again in 
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1985, that achieved national notoriety, as the workers’ families camped in the middle of the city 
and boarded buses to tell their story.  
However, the mining unions began to be affected by the climate of political violence that 
was then increasing in the country. As mentioned earlier, the center of the fighting was rural 
Ayacucho, but from there Sendero began to spread out its activities towards the neighboring 
departments and north towards the Central Highlands. Raids on mines in the middle of the night 
became increasingly common, as Sendero militants sought to steal dynamite and disrupt 
production. Particularly affected were the mines in Huancavelica, but the climate of insecurity 
spread north to Pasco and Junín as well. Sendero also sought to gain the allegiance of the miners 
themselves, as with workers in other sectors, through its front organization the Movimiento 
Obrero de Trabajadores Clasistas (MOTC).  
Although the mining companies would often accuse the unions of being sympathetic to if 
not complicit with Sendero, mining workers by and large were not supportive of that group’s 
aims or methods. There were doubtless a few who did lend their support to Sendero, at least 
initially. As early as 1979, well-known Sendero militant Luis Kawata Makabe had traveled to 
Pasco, together with other cadres, to begin organizing work there, both in the countryside and in 
the mines. There they joined forces with one radical, breakaway faction of Vanguardia that was 
already established in Pasco. On the basis of those first efforts, Sendero would eventually gain 
some strength in a few of the quebrada communities of northern Pasco and southern Huánuco 
Department. According to one account, however, Kawata had been completely unsuccessful at 
convincing the miners, who constituted Sendero’s “Achilles’ Heel;” this experience had 
supposedly led him to re-think the viability of the coming People’s War, leading to his break 
with Abimael Guzmán in 1980 (González 1986). On the other hand, one of my sources who 
lived through that time told me that there was a small group of mining workers among those who 
joined Kawata and Sendero in 1979, after a heated debate in the university in Cerro. Regardless, 
such workers were a minority faction; most of the union leaders and activists were aligned with 
the other Marxist parties, which were then entering electoral politics, not armed struggle: the 
PUM, UNIR (Patria Roja), FOCEP and PCP-Unidad (all part of the United Left). 
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In Pasco the conflict was not quite as violent as in Ayacucho, which was truly ravaged by 
the fighting and killings. However, in Pasco the fighting was fierce in those quebrada 
communities where Sendero had gained a significant foothold, and where the army thus focused 
its attention. In the rest of the department, Sendero undertook an extensive campaign of 
assassinations of mayors and other elected officials (when they refused to resign), seeking to 
decapitate the “old state.” The provincial mayor of Cerro de Pasco, Víctor Arias Vicuña, of 
Belaúnde’s Acción Popular party, was murdered in November 1983. The mayor of Yanacancha 
(one of the three urban districts in Cerro), Luis Aguilar Cajahuamán, of the APRA party, was 
assassinated in May 1985. The mayor of Huayllay, Luis Oropeza de la Cruz, also of the APRA, 
was murdered in October 1989. 
The violence extended to the mining unions also. In March 1986, Tomás Miranda, a 
leader of the union in Cerro de Pasco, was shot dead in the middle of a march through the streets 
of the city; the miners apprehended the assassin, who admitted to being with Sendero. Later that 
year, an army unit kidnapped and murdered Teófilo Rímac Capcha, a former mining union 
leader, peasant organizer and teacher in the university in Cerro, who had been involved in the 
movement against the haciendas in the 1960s and in the 1967 Atacocha miners’ strike and 
marcha de sacrificio. Since he was originally from the community of Ticlacayán, where there 
had been a significant Sendero presence, he was accused of being a senderista himself. On 
March 2nd, 1989, gunmen broke into the miners’ union hall in Cerro de Pasco, in the midst of a 
general assembly, and shot dead the secretary general of the union, Seferino Requis. Similar 
things occurred in other mining centers outside of Pasco; on May 7 1989, the secretary general of 
the union in Morococha (Junín Department), Antonio Cajachagua Leiva, was assassinated by 
gunmen believed to be from Sendero.  
A sense of the pressure on union leaders can be gleaned from the discourse contained in a 
threatening letter sent to Juan Santiago Atencio and which he shared with me during my 
research. Santiago, who was originally from the community of Rancas, and was aligned with the 
United Left parties, was the secretary general of the Cerro de Pasco union in 1990. At the time, 
there were attempts to launch a new national mining strike (see below). Although Sendero did 
not lead or organize the strikes, it sought to make use of them for its own purposes, namely 
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furthering the People’s War. The authors of the letter thus warned Santiago of what would 
happen if he did not support the strike: 
Today our people and proletarian class finds itself on war footing principally, 
undertaking the People´s War, and the struggle to conquer power in the whole country; 
but, part of that being the lucha reivindicativa [labor struggle or struggle for rights] it also 
continues to undertake it in a vigorous way, carrying forward the class struggle... For that 
reason the struggle of the workers of the mining proletariat serves that purpose; who have 
today posed an indefinite strike for the defense and conquest of their rights, benefits and 
liberties, which is most just and correct, but it is propelling this in a heavy struggle to 
unmask, repudiate and crush the revisionism and opportunism of any stripe that has 
always sold out and betrayed the struggle of the workers, and which plans to do the same 
with this strike, negating and stepping on the class struggle, negating the general crisis of 
this old society which falls to pieces through the actions of the People´s War, and putting 
itself at the service of the exploiters, as so many others have done like Requis, Miranda, 
Cajachagua, Damián, etc. Who were executed [ajusticiados] in their due time.  
 
 The authors of the letter furthermore warned Juan Santiago that if he did not do as they 
said, the “working masses” and the “People’s Guerrilla Army” would take the necessary 
measures “like they did with other revisionist, trafficking, worker-selling traitors.” Threats, 
rumors and accusations permeated politics and social relations at that time. A union leader could 
be accused of being a “terrorist,” a “revisionist,” an “informant” or a “yellow” collaborator, or 
simply of being corrupt. Nor was it always entirely clear who was responsible for particular 
assassinations; some are still debated to this day.  
 In spite of this situation of violence at the local level, the mining unions still attempted to 
pursue an agenda of unity during the 1980s. In the middle of the decade, the longtime leader of 
the National Mining Federation, Víctor Cuadros, had been replaced by Saúl Cantoral Huamaní, a 
worker from the Marcona iron mine on the coast and originally from the highlands of Ayacucho. 
Under Cantoral’s tenure, the FNTMMSP would wage a campaign for what was known as the 
Pliego Nacional, i.e. industry-wide bargaining, in other words a system where the Mining 
Federation would negotiate with the mining companies for a single contract for all workers in the 
sector. This proposal was inspired on similar systems that existed in the mining sectors of other 
countries, especially in Europe and North America. The idea was not that all mining workers 
would receive exactly the same pay and benefits, since small mines could not afford the same 
expenditure on labor as large mines; rather, the Pliego Nacional would provide a basic floor 
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level of salaries and benefits, above which workers at larger mines could then bargain for more. 
The project sought to go beyond the division that had long existed between the workers at the 
small mines, who were often badly paid and endured very bad housing and living conditions, and 
the relatively privileged workers at the large, more modern mines. Over the course of many 
months, Cantoral visited virtually all the mining camps of Peru to build support for the strike. 
The first National Mining Strike for the Pliego Nacional began on July 18, 1988, and it was a 
resounding success; workers went out on strike in the great majority of the mines in the country. 
The government of Alan García agreed to support the petition of industry-wide bargaining, but it 
was unable to bring the Mining Society (SNMPE), the association of mining companies, to the 
table. A second National Mining Strike began in October 1988 and also brought out a very large 
number of workers, lasting almost two months. 
 The project of the Pliego Nacional and the National Mining Strikes had been aimed at 
transcending the self-centered focus of many of the mining unions and achieving a higher 
standard of living for all the workers and their families, even those at small mines. However, the 
strikes also hurt the acquisition of foreign exchange at a time when the economy was already in 
crisis. And although Mining Federation leaders were by no means allied with Sendero, and, in 
line with the pragmatism of most mining workers, were quite willing to end the strikes if their 
central demand of industry-wide bargaining was accepted, the strikes could be seen by some as 
contributing to the Sendero’s purpose of paralyzing the “old society.” This point was exploited 
by the mining companies, as can be seen in this full-page ad published by the National Mining 
Society in the national daily La República on December 13, 1988, around the time of the second 
national strike: 
WE DIALOGUE WITH OUR WORKERS, NOT WITH A POLITICIZED FEDERATION 
The mining workers have always dialogued with their companies, arriving at agreements 
that are satisfactory for both, in a direct and peaceful way. 
If this has yielded results until now, what purpose is driving the leadership of the 
Federation to name a sole “Permanent Secretary” who will decide for all? 
Why should there be an intermediary, who besides not knowing the reality of each mine, 
is moved by political interests? What is it that they really seek with this strike? Is it 




On February 13, 1989, Saúl Cantoral was found assassinated in a park in Lima, alongside 
Consuelo García, the national organizer of the mining women’s committees, who had also been 
killed. At the time, the government blamed the murder on Sendero, but it is widely believed that 
the actual culprit was the Rodrigo Franco Command, a paramilitary group linked to Alan 
García’s Interior Minister Agustín Mantilla. Cantoral’s murder greatly weakened the Mining 
Federation; when a Third National Mining Strike was launched after his death, in August 1989, 
the attempt ended in failure. The strikes had managed to wrest certain concessions from the 
government, such as a new retirement law for mining workers, but they did not accomplish the 
central aim of industry-wide bargaining. Furthermore, they bled the mining unions, which were 
simultaneously weakened by the violence and tension at the local level. 
Thus, the mining unions found themselves in a weakened position when the companies 
began stepping up pressures for workers to retire in the early 1990s. Beyond just the mining 
unions, social and labor movements in general were worn out from the violence and economic 
crisis at the end of the 1980s. In 1990, novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, who had led the protests 
against García’s nationalization of the banks in 1987, proposed adopting a radical “shock” 
program to address the economic crisis. He was widely expected to win, but instead the majority 
voted for Alberto Fujimori, an unknown engineer who promised he would avoid a shock. 
Nevertheless, soon after assuming office, Fujimori accepted IMF conditions and implemented a 
dramatic shock program (known locally as the “Fujishock”), raising the prices of foodstuffs and 
other products overnight. Although this was not what people had voted for, there was no mass 
rioting as in Venezuela in 1989, nor was there an organized political response; much of the 
country was under state of emergency anyway, and besides the social and political movements 
were weakened and the population worn out.  
Fujimori not only imposed an economic shock, but also set about implementing radical 
changes in labor and other laws that cut back at rights and benefits gained decades earlier. His 
position was strengthened after the “self-coup” of April 5, 1992, when he closed down the 
parliament and judiciary and assumed dictatorial powers together with the army. One leader who 
did attempt to organize large marches and demonstrations against Fujimori’s structural reforms 
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was Pedro Huilca Tecse, the former head of the Construction Workers’ Federation and the 
current Secretary General of the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), the largest 
union central in the country. He was assassinated in December 1992, just as his confrontation 
with Fujimori was escalating. As always, the government accused Sendero of the murder, but it 
is widely believed to have been carried out by the Colina Group, an execution squad connected 
to Fujimori’s intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos.  
 The leader of Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán, was captured in October 1992, and 
after that the group began a dramatic decline, which raised Fujimori’s popularity and the image 
of order that his government projected. His structural reforms halted hyperinflation and brought 
new capital and investment to Peru, after a couple of years in which the IMF and other lenders 
had shunned the country in the late 1980s. The mid-1990s saw some modest growth as well as 
the arrival of new commodities in the cities and new mining projects in the countryside. Yet 
social indicators like poverty rates did not improve; in any case, any gains that might have been 
made were then wiped out by the effects of the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s. It would not be 
until 2003 that a new period of rapid growth would resume and living standards would begin to 
recuperate, albeit within the new patterns and frameworks developed in the aftermath of the 
crisis of the 1980s.  
 With these national and global contexts in mind, I will now return to the specific situation 
of crisis at Huarón and other mines of the region at the start of the 1990s, keeping a focus on the 
options and constraints faced by workers and their families as they debated whether and under 
what conditions to leave the mines and the camps.  
 
The departure of workers from the mines  
As we saw earlier, at Huarón, the idea that a crisis was affecting the company, and that a 
mine closure was imminent, putting legally-mandated severance payments at risk, motivated 
many of the workers to resign.267  On March 17, it was announced at the union assembly that, 
                                                          
267 The legally-mandated severance pay in question was the Compensación por Tiempo de Servicio (CTS), which is 
calculated based on the number of years worked and the pay received during those years. It’s not clear that these 
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according to the latest shareholders´ meeting, 440 people had resigned from the company to date: 
44 engineers, 107 empleados and 289 obreros. Arguments began over whether the union 
leadership should focus on protecting the jobs of the workers who were left or ensuring the 
payment of benefits to those who had resigned. One worker criticized the leadership for allowing 
rumor and misinformation to rule:  
There is something fishy here (hay un gato encerrado), from the beginning we are falling 
into a game of old wives´ tales (cuentos de comadres), we have become used to 
blackmail and we don´t have a formal role, the company makes us fall into the trap and I 
criticize our commission, the leader is there to lead the masses and not the masses to lead 
the leaders. 
 
Two other speakers from the floor, on the other hand, blamed not the union leadership 
but the engineers for “surprising” the workers, gathering them in the cellars inside the mine and 
encouraging them to resign.268 At a later assembly, one of the union officers would repeat this 
charge against the engineers, arguing that the latter´s resignations had been fake, that “they had 
made a deal with the company for two months and are now coming back.” Yet he also blamed 
certain union leaders (other than himself), “who were paid off, I don´t want to say more, because 
I do not want their children to talk badly about their parents.” Yet at the March 17 assembly 
other speakers from the floor also said that “the only thing we have left is to fight like one man” 
and that “here we are looking for the culprit, but that´s not how it is, and the [leadership] should 
name a commission for those who are leaving and nobody should go down [to the company 
office] to get their money, we should fight for everyone.” 269 On March 24, another worker stated 
that “we the workers do not blame anyone, those of us who leave, or those of us who stay; rather 
the issue is that they are not paying those of us who are going, like they should.”  
 By that date, attendance at the assembly had dropped down to 415 obreros, and some of 
the leadership positions had to be filled with new people since some of the officers had resigned 
from the company. Efforts now centered on trying to keep the mine open. At an earlier assembly 
one worker had proposed offering to take three months´ vacation without pay “so as to not kill 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
payments were at risk legally, but they certainly were in people’s perceptions, according to my interviews and the 
union minutes. 
268 “To surprise” (sorprender) in this context means not just to do something unexpected but also to deceive. 
269 “That’s not how it is,” in Spanish: No es así – a common phrase that means “this is not how things should be.”  
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our union;” this offer, together with the proposal of working for free two Sundays out of every 
month for three months, was now sent in a letter to the shareholders.  
The union did consider other, more confrontational strategies. In April, the union 
organized a “common pot” (olla común) because a representative of the regional government 
was supposed to come together with a TV channel (they did not come in the end). Like the 
“march of sacrifice,” the “common pot” was part of the repertoire of popular political 
performance and of the general mining union culture of the 1970s and 80s. It was supposed to 
signify both communal solidarity and the sacrifice and deprivation that families underwent 
during strikes. Strikes always included an olla común, and people ate there even if they had food 
at home. As the union secretary for organization put it, the purpose of the olla común was “so 
that they would see the reality that we are going through in our sector.”  
In addition, repeated invocations were made to the workers to “struggle together with the 
wives´ committee” (April 7 1991). The traditional weapon of the strike itself could not be 
exercised, since it could play into the company´s hands and give the government reason to issue 
a resolution allowing for a mine closure, as had happened in the Raura mine to the north (this 
example was mentioned at one of the assemblies). At a March 3 assembly, someone had 
suggested organizing a protest against the government for refusing to do more to help mines like 
Huarón to stay open. Another union member stated that “the only way to do any kind of protest 
against the current government is to block the Central Highway.” The secretary general of the 
union replied that “knowing that we are already in a state of emergency, there is nothing that can 
be done regarding that request.” On March 24, another worker asked “what would happen when 
we go to do demonstrations and protests in Lima, the first ones that would be arrested would be 
the union leaders, accused of being terrorists.”  
Leaving the mine and questioning the crisis 
Thus, under these pressures and given the lack of available options, a large part of the 
workforce left around this time. Yet unlike in many of the smaller mines, Huarón did not actually 
close at this time. Rather, it continued to produce for seven more years, with a reduced 
workforce and limited operations, as more and more of the older workers were persuaded to 
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leave. Finally in 1998 a catastrophic flood led to the complete closure of both Huarón and 
neighboring Animón/Chungar (killing six Animón workers); the mine then remained closed for 
three years, until it reopened under new, Canadian ownership in 2001. The fact that the mine 
remained open after the mass resignations of the early 1990s encouraged the belief that the crisis 
of the company had been made up as a strategy to get rid of the unionized, stable workforce. 
Even before it became apparent that the mine was not really going to close, some people had 
already voiced the opinion that the company was hiding something. Responding from the floor to 
the commission´s report on the shareholders´ meeting on February 21, one union member, 
Justino Cárdenas, argued that “the company is lying because we know that it is hiding the copper 
in large quantities, therefore a careful investigation should be made.”  
At the time, while the mining industry argued that the crisis of the sector was due to the 
government’s protectionist exchange-rate and fiscal policy as well as to labor indiscipline and 
strikes, the discourse of the Mining Workers’ Federation and its labor allies was that the crisis of 
the sector was due to the “bad management” or “bad administration” on the part of mining 
companies. This latter view held that the crisis was “not of production” but rather either about 
“bad administration” or outright fraud. Thus, on March 24 a representative of an NGO that 
worked on labor issues came to the assembly and was recorded in the minutes as saying that:  
[He] also invokes [the workers] to keep struggling forward and on a national level 
because the mining crisis is not [a crisis] of production, rather it is provoked by the 
businessmen themselves and even more the current government in complicity with them. 
And the companies are amassing fortunes in dollars. 
 
Similarly, as Justino Cárdenas´ comment above – “it is hiding the copper” - indicates, at the local 
level this critique of management sometimes took the form of a belief that administrators were 
actually hiding mineral concentrate or stealing it. Estela Páucar made a similar point in our 
interview: 
Within that group [that administered the company] there were people that did not have a 
great [sense of] responsibility, or they cared little about the future of the miners and their 
families, so they wanted, they began, to steal, in other words, the minerals. The 
concentrate would go out, and it got lost on the way, it didn’t make it, some vehicles 
didn’t make it. But each vehicle carried 40 tons of mineral. Imagine that each month 3 or 




Other people also cited stories of engineers and managers hiding or stealing mineral. Similarly, 
in the union assemblies people frequently argued that the crisis of the company could not be 
“real” – as one speaker from the floor put it, “Huarón has enough reserves to produce and only 
wants to take advantage of this panic that we are living [through].”  
These disagreements on the reality of the crisis point to the more general fact that around 
the country (and beyond) the physical substance of the ore remained the same as before, and yet 
global factors pertaining to the world of value nevertheless seemed to render the mines 
unviable.270 If the mine had enough mineral reserves, and if the miners were all willing to work, 
why couldn’t they continue to produce and make a living? In his discussion of Thucydides’ 
application of the Greek medical concept of crisis to the field of society and history, Randolph 
Starn writes that, “as much as key points in processes of change, crisis situations became 
moments of truth where the significance of men and events was brought to light” (Starn 1971, 4). 
In this case, the crisis highlighted the difference between use-value and exchange-value; it 
brought to light the special significance of the fact that the physical qualities of the mine were 
not enough to guarantee its survival. People obviously knew that before, but it had not been as 
crucial a factor as it was now. To the degree that it was hard to accept, explanations were sought 
that involved the actual “stealing” or “hiding” of the physical body of the metal.   
The assertion that the crisis had not been “real” is also evident in the account of Octavio 
Domínguez, whom I quoted earlier in this chapter regarding his decision to leave the mine: 
Well, sometimes, the companies give a little something to the leaders and the leaders 
work on their people... But it´s only been a ruse (artimaña) by the company... The union 
leaders have worked on us (nos han trabajado a nosotros). Six hundred of us left that 
year. And 600 stayed. But back to normal. It wasn´t in crisis, no. 
 
Here, the veracity of the crisis is thrown into doubt, and the assertion is made that it was all just a 
“ruse” on the part of the company. In addition, the union leaders are blamed for playing a role in 
this. Don Octavio’s comments should be understood as part of a very common discourse in Peru 
that sees corruption and under-the-table deals as central features of most political and social 
                                                          
270 Of course, non-renewable resources like minerals do by definition decrease over time (though “running out” is 
always relative to the social world of value, including political factors); but this obviously would not have explained 
the simultaneous state of crisis at all the mines in Peru and beyond. 
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institutions. Also, as mediators between the company and the workers, the union leaders 
naturally became subject to suspicions of corruption and duplicity.  
  The role of rumors and interpersonal relations in prompting the decision to leave the 
mine is also apparent in the account of Emilia Flores, when she told me about her and her 
husband’s departure from the mine: 
So then, the company, there were several people in the union, among them was my 
marriage godson (ahijado de matrimonio). And you know what he tells my husband – he 
says, the mine is closing, so you are not going to get anything, nothing, nothing of your 
compensation for years worked [CTS]. So then my husband, listening to his advice, his 
son-in-law, and his son was also working there in the mine, they have presented their 
resignation letter, and my husband from working 25 years they gave him only 2,800. 
[Having worked] in the mine!271 
 
Here there is also some hint of blame placed on the union; more importantly, the mention of 
Doña Emilia´s marriage godson is important. In Peru, as in much of Latin America, godparent-
godchild relations mediate not just birth but other important life events such as baptisms and 
weddings. Such relationships are supposed to facilitate trust and reciprocity; here Doña Emilia´s 
husband follows his marriage godson´s advice and ends up making a bad decision, leaving the 
mine with a measly severance payment when he could presumably have gotten more if he had 
held out longer. The worker who retired under pressure and received inadequate compensation 
for many years worked in the mine, or who did not qualify for a pension due to the fact that he 
was not yet at retirement age, is a common figure in people´s stories about that time. Over the 
next few years, the mine continued to pressure its workers to leave, offering them additional 
incentives; those who managed to hold on the longest managed to get a better deal.  
 One such case was that of Desiderio Roque, whose life history I presented in Chapter 2. 
In his account, he describes how the company had sought to have him fired for his union activity, 
but he managed to win the legal case; the company then gave him the choice to return to work or 
accept a special severance payment: 
So then I was in a fight with the Huarón company, with Hochschild, 17 months of a legal 
process with Huarón, through which I managed to get something. That is where we sat on 
the table to discuss... I was living with my wife, we had been living together for six 
                                                          
271 Meaning, underground rather than in the surface – the former being seen as harder work. 
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months. So then she tells me, “leave the company” (liquídate). Because otherwise, maybe 
I would have been working up to this moment.  
 
Like several other accounts, Don Desiderio’s emphasizes how the decision to leave the mine was 
made jointly with his wife. He also reaffirms the continuing importance of collective struggle: 
But for me, if I had gone back to work, my pride would have been to take my 
compañeros at work and by then we would have paralyzed the mass liquidations, there 
would not have been the mass liquidations. So my pride was to fight against all that, and 
to do a 15-day strike against Huarón to recover all those things that had been lost. That 
was my objective.  
 
Since he accepted the severance payment and left the mine, this collective struggle to “recover 
all those things that had been lost” never took place. But he’s still proud of his individual 
struggle, through which he got more money than other workers: 
The weakness was that I took the chance to retire... But I am proud to say that I did a 
struggle with Huarón, which never believed in me, I fought with them (le hice lucha). On 
the other hand [my] compañeros did leave [earlier] because Huarón offered to give them 
3 months’ pay, 4 months, 5 or 6 months.’ And I am the only person to whom they gave 
12 months’ pay.272 
 
In a sense, this part of Don Desiderio’s narrative can be said to highlight the shift from 
collective to individual struggle that several commentators have pointed out as having taken 
place in Peru as a result of the neoliberal solution to the crisis in the early 1990s. His account 
points to the unequal and individualized outcomes of the process of leaving the mines. Things 
like compensation for labor time (CTS), special monetary incentives and, in the case of older 
workers, retirement pensions, were seen as the foundation on which to construct a house, put up 
a small store or workshop and otherwise build a life outside the camp. Legal fights to ensure the 
payment of CTS and, when applicable, retirement pensions, sometimes became long and costly. 
In a smaller way, families tried to take different parts and implements from the mining camp – 
such as ovens, roofs and work tools – to use in their new locations. For example, Emilia Flores 
complained that the camp administrator, who never liked her, did not allow her to take the 
chimney or the oven, only an iron slab for cooking with charcoal.  
                                                          
272 These were special incentives in addition to the legally-mandated compensation for labor time (CTS). 
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An hour away in Cerro de Pasco – one of the 14 production units of the state-owned 
mining company Centromín, the old Cerro de Pasco Corporation – the process of departure from 
the mine was somewhat different. This company was also in crisis, though in this case the 
emerging liberal consensus attributed the troubles to the supposed inherent inefficiency of state 
enterprises. After Alberto Fujimori took office in 1990 and undertook a sudden and sharp shift to 
a full Washington Consensus model (as opposed to the partial structural adjustment packages of 
the late 1970s and 1980s), Centromín officials started to focus their efforts on making the 
company more efficient so as to render it more attractive to investors and thus amenable to 
privatization. Between 1990 and 1993, 5,329 people left the company – 3,748 obreros, 1,313 
empleados, and 268 administrative staff – out of a workforce that at its height in early 1990 had 
numbered 17,168. Some of the smaller Centromín mines were closed; the larger ones, like Cerro 
de Pasco (which included both an underground and an open-pit mine) continued to operate but 
under a stringent rationalization and reorganization program. This included the shedding of its 
large infrastructure of company schools and health centers, which were handed over to 
government ministries and are now part of the public education and health sectors, disconnected 
from the private companies that now own the old Centromín mines. It also involved changes in 
the work process and the large-scale reduction in the workforce.  
This reduction took place in a number of ways. According to a study conducted at the 
time, about one half of the 5,329 workers had resigned voluntarily out of fear of not being able to 
get their CTS severance payments; one quarter had qualified for old-age retirement, and one 
quarter had been involuntarily removed from the company. 273 As in Huarón, the “voluntary” 
resignations had taken place under a climate of rumor and worry. Word had spread that the CTS 
would soon start to be paid in government bonuses rather than cash, setting off a panic. Thus, a 
later announcement that the company had secured a loan to pay the CTS in cash, so long as 
people left immediately, provoked massive resignations.  
The “involuntary” departures at Centromín took the form of a list, drafted in late 1990, of 
728 names of individual workers who were declared “surplus [excedente] personnel” and 
                                                          
273 This was a study of the characteristics and perspectives of workers who had left Centromín. It was commissioned 
by the company and conducted by Walter Twanama and Denis Sulmont, a sociologist at Peru´s Catholic University 
who had for many years collaborated with the mining unions and wrote a history of the Peruvian labor movement.  
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included in a “collective termination” (cese colectivo). The general belief was that this was a list 
of the workers who had been most active in the unions. One of the “surplus” workers in the 
Cerro de Pasco unit, Juan Santiago Atencio, argues that this termination included all union 
officers from the previous ten years:  
At that time we were saying that, no matter what government enters in, be it left or right, 
be it communist or socialist or whatever, we  the people [pueblo], more than anything the 
workers, be they miners or not miners, we have to subsist from, to live from, our labor 
power. And we don´t care about anything else. But, this did not happen...nobody knew 
anything, how it was going to begin. We thought that it would start in a different way, but 
what happened was something unprecedented [insólito], incredible, to go back, or to go 
retroactively, to fire the workers, who in previous years were the ex-leaders, ex-delegates, 
[members of] commissions, who occupied [these roles] from the year 80 to the year 90.   
 
In the 1970s and 80s, the mining unions had often gone on strike even when very small 
numbers of workers were fired, demanding their reinstatement. But now the new laws and the 
continued climate of political violence made that more difficult. Although the “surplus” workers 
formed a defense front, this was limited to legal and judiciary channels: 
All legal actions and public denunciations, communiqués, a series of things. To do 
actions like, demonstrations, marches, etc., well, people were extremely scared, the rest 
did not want to join, they did not want to support us.... And besides, they were labeled, 
whoever did any instigation, or any demonstration, whoever brings the people out, well 
they were typified as apology of subversion, apology of terrorism.  
 
Apología del terrorismo was the legal name given to the crime of defending subversive activities 
even at the level of discourse, let alone demonstrations. As in the case of Huarón, Juan 
Santiago’s discussion of the events at Centromín shows how, although the crisis in itself was an 
“economic” phenomenon, the climate of political violence helped pave the way for the 
“neoliberal solution” by closing off all possible avenues of resistance from workers. 
 Santiago’s account also shows how the dismissal of hundreds of workers at one time, 
and, more importantly, the lack of effective resistance to this, were seen as a novel and 
significant departure from previous practice. Under the labor laws reinforced by the Velasco 
government (1968-1975), it had become almost impossible to fire workers; additionally, job 
stability (estabilidad laboral) was one of the values most zealously defended by the unions.  The 
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labor reforms of the early 1990s changed this, making it possible to dismiss workers who 
supposedly did not perform satisfactorily and to undertake “collective terminations” of part of 
the workforce in special cases like that of the state-owned Centromín.  
In most cases, however, unless a mine closed altogether, it wasn´t always possible to 
simply expel entire communities of workers and their families. The power of the mining unions, 
though much weakened, could not simply be eliminated overnight. It was here that rumor, 
uncertainty and the context of economic crisis and political violence played a central role. Once 
the stable, unionized workers had left, their places could now be filled with subcontracted 
workers. Moreover, the departure of enough workers meant the automatic decline of the union – 
that´s why at Huarón the offer to take three months´ unpaid vacation and therefore keep the mine 
active had been framed as an effort “to not kill our union.” The union was not an abstract form of 
organization, and the working class was just not an abstract category; both were substantiated in 
specific families and individuals in the camps. Once this group scattered, and was not replaced 
by others constituted within the same framework, the continuity that had characterized the camps 
for several decades would prove hard to reproduce.  
Life and economy after the mines 
As in the rest of Peru during the crisis, families that left employment at the mines had to 
resort to a variety of strategies to make ends meet. In people´s narratives from that time, two 
aspects stand out in relation to this. One is the setting up of comedores populares (people´s 
dining halls) during the crisis. The comedores were a well-known form of social organization 
throughout Peru, especially in working-class urban neighborhoods; they were organized by 
groups of women through arrangements with a government office (today the PRONAA). At the 
Milpo mine (close to Cerro de Pasco), the miners´ wives committee created one such comedor in 
the early 90s; at Huarón one was created when the mine flooded in 1998 – there may have been 
one during the initial departure of workers in 1991 as well. In cases like these, many families that 
saw their incomes suddenly reduced had to rely on these women-run institutions. At Milpo, the 
former head of the miners´ wives committee had to literally fight with local authorities to obtain 
a space for the comedor.   
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Another strategy that was even more important was the greater reliance on petty 
commerce and what is sometimes labeled the “informal” sector. This was not a new 
phenomenon; in the mining camps women had often taken on boarders, washed clothes for pay 
and set up small stores and restaurants – both in the camp housing per se and in the small 
informal neighborhoods that grew up around them. When men left employment in the mine, their 
families often had to rely on commercial skills to a greater degree than before. In those families 
in which the father had been living alone in the camp after moving the family to an urban area, 
women had had greater opportunities to develop their skills in the realm of petty commerce. 
After leaving the mines, most men entered the world of petty commodity production as well, 
either through commerce or through different kinds of trades, whether carpentry, car repair, 
welding or tailoring. This represented an end to their status as formal-sector workers, which in 
the case of miners had often meant higher pay and benefits but also greater labor exactions and 
risks.  
Though a large percentage of mining workers at this time still came from rural 
backgrounds, during the time at the mine they had often developed urban orientations. Although 
in Huarón a number of workers stayed in the adjacent comunidad campesina of Huayllay, 
becoming comuneros, most moved to regional urban centers like Huancayo or Huánuco, or to 
Lima, settling in working-class neighborhoods on the urban periphery. Among those who left the 
more urban mining centers owned by Centromín, like Cerro de Pasco or the metallurgical 
complex in La Oroya, even fewer went “back to the land.” Among those former Centromín 
workers sampled by Sulmont and Twanama in 1993, 25.3% were working in small retail 
commerce, 11.8% were working in transport, 7.6% had set up some sort of small workshop 
(mechanical, electrical or carpentry), 5.9% in agriculture, 4.3% in construction, and 44.6% were 
either unemployed or retired. The overwhelming majority of those working did so either alone or 
with family members (rather than with non-relatives). To the degree that the world of petty 
commerce was less segmented in terms of gender than the mining camp had been, there was a 
partial convergence between the activities of men and those of women. 
Here it is worth quoting the narrative of Raúl Rivadeneyra, a former worker and leftist 
union leader at Centromín’s metallurgical complex in La Oroya. Originally from an agricultural 
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community near Paucartambo, Pasco, Don Raúl did not return to his village after leaving the 
company, but rather moved to the city of Huancayo in the Mantaro Valley. In the 1980s, he had 
participated in a land occupation on the outskirts of the city, to found an asentamiento humano – 
as self-built working-class neighborhoods are usually known in Peru – where he lives now and 
where I visited him on a couple of occasions. As a former leader, he applied his union and 
political experience to organizing the new neighborhood and creating workshops and small 
enterprises on the basis of the skills that his former fellow company employees possessed: 
Since I retired from the company, I had to work here in Huancayo for the sustenance of 
my home; I had two children studying, my wife who helped me in work, who had a 
business, but no matter what I had to work, no? So then, since I had experience from 
work, in the neighborhood where I live, which is an asentamiento humano, since I had 
the experience of being a leader, I began to be a leader here in the asentamiento 
humano... So then we have organized ourselves, and we have made a microenterprise, 
workshops, we have unified, seeing which ones are builders, which ones are mechanics, 
which ones are electricians.  
 
Don Raúl’s narrative is influenced by his experience both as an organizer and as someone who 
has significant familiarity with the world of NGOs and the discourse of “microenterprises” that 
became common in the 1990s: 
The women, the compañeras, my wife for example, directed the women here, the ones 
that live here, they put their textile business, their microenterprise, 30 women would get 
together, each would put their sewing machine that they had, they began to look for 
financing, a market, they organized, and now they had income. Because my wife was also 
treasurer of the union, [and] president of the mining women´s committee. In other words, 
she also transferred that over here. Just like I organize with the miners. 
 
 Here references to unionism mix freely with the discourse then being promoted by 
government agencies, financial institutions and many NGOs: microentrepreneurship, 
competitiveness and markets. This should not be surprising. The opposition between 
“proletarian” identity, on the one hand, and petty commodity production and commerce, on the 
other, may have existed in certain intellectual ideologies, on both the right and the left, but it was 
not found in the experience or the discourse of most working-class people at the time. 274 
However, Don Raúl does not idealize the world of petty commodity production either; he told 
                                                          




me how the sewing business started by his wife and other women was cheated when a distributor 
from Villa El Salvador (a large working-class neighborhood in Lima) received a large order from 
them and then failed to pay them.  
Subcontracting and the dismantling of camps 
 At Huarón, the full closure of the mine did finally occur on April 23, 1998, when a large 
lake collapsed into the adjacent Animón mine, completely flooding Huarón as well. Of the 200 
to 400 workers who had still been on the company’s payroll at the time, many stayed to take care 
of the installations after the company left, waiting to see whether the mine would reopen. A new 
transnational company bought the mine two years later, cleaned it and restarted production in 
2001, settling with all but twelve of the old workers. Those twelve continue to work to this day, 
but lost the legal battle to maintain recognition for the old union, since it no longer had the 
minimum number of required members. An attempt was made in 2007 to revive that union to 
include both the old and the new workers. However, most of the new workers were on temporary 
3- and 6-month contracts, the company simply chose not to renew the contracts of those workers 
who joined the unionization effort (the company subsequently created a separate, dependent 
union for the non-permanent direct workers). Today, during the new mining boom that started in 
2003-2004, as many people work at Huarón as in its best days, but the great majority are either 
on temporary contracts with the company or subcontracted altogether. The subcontracting system 
has become dominant at virtually all the similar-sized mines of the region and central Peru more 
broadly. This system is not brand-new; it had always been present in limited numbers alongside 
the direct workforce, the change was that it went from encompassing a minority to a majority of 
the workforce. This process of labor flexibilization was not so much a devious strategy on the 
part of individual managers as a worldwide trend that companies were increasingly expected to 
adjust to in order to stay afloat. Although it couldn’t fully be implemented until the 1990s, 
companies had been making plans in this direction since the 1980s. As a report commissioned by 
the state mining company had said then: 
The transfer of services to third parties would have undeniable advantages: it would 
decrease the permanent personnel and its passive load (carga pasiva) of fringe benefits 
and other services; it would lower the reserves needed for compensation packages and 
other costs; it would allow us to keep [only] housing that was strictly necessary... it 
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would allow for all our technical and economic efforts to center on exploring, producing 
and refining minerals and giving them more value added. The advantages would be so 
many that we omit pointing them out in this part of the work entrusted to us so as to not 
make it unnecessarily long. 
The consolidation of this system has also meant that the mining labor force is now more 
differentiated than before in terms of wages and conditions.275  
Besides the contracting system, another change was the demolition of the majority of the 
workers´ camps. This happened at Huarón and also in most of the other mining centers in Peru in 
the 1990s. As Estela Páucar told me, 
They begin to demolish all the camps... This was planned by the National Mining 
Society, in Lima. And Huarón was still not complying. So they began to demand, the 
other mines began to demand, because, this was already happening in Milpo, it was 
happening in Atacocha, even in Cerro de Pasco itself. 
At the Milpo mine, about 30 minutes from Cerro de Pasco, the remaining workers began 
moving to the outlying neighborhoods of the city, from where they now commute. In Cerro de 
Pasco itself, Centromín and its successor Volcan did not immediately demolish most of its 
camps, since they were part of the city landscape, but allowed them to gradually deteriorate; in 
the last few years they have finally been demolishing most of the older camp housing in Cerro. 
Thus, besides the departure of workers from the mining companies, there was a second departure 
of the remaining workers and their families not from employment itself but from the life of the 
mining camp. 
I do not have union assembly minutes from the moment when this occurred in Huarón; in 
any case the union may not have been meeting regularly by that time anymore. However, since 
this was a process that occurred at mines throughout the country, we can gain further insight by 
examining the dismantling of the camps at one of Huarón’s “sister” mines, Mina Raúl, owned by 
the same company at the time. The union minutes from Mina Raúl record the discussions over 
the end of the camp system and what was perceived to be at stake in that change. 
                                                          
275 On average, direct workers earn around twice as much as subcontracted workers. Subcontracted workers´ wages 
are usually between $11 and $16 a day, which results in a monthly wage above the national minimum - otherwise 
people would not agree to work in the mines, given the long hours, risk of accidents and limited possibilities for 




“We are not renters, we are workers:” The politics of space at Mina Raúl 
Mina Raúl, a much smaller mine than Huarón, was located on Peru´s coast, near the town 
of Mala a few hours south of Lima. In the years 1986 to 1998, Huarón and Mina Raúl – together 
with the Caylloma mine in Arequipa - were owned by the same company. Thus, at Mina Raúl 
union meetings workers referred to Huarón and Caylloma as the “sister locals” (hermana base). 
Officers from these unions traveled to each other´s assemblies with some frequency in order to 
coordinate strikes and pacts. Located on the coast and closer to Lima, Mina Raúl´s workers 
would have had stronger urban orientations and would have been seen as immersed in a more 
“modern” milieu. However, the mine drew its workers mostly from the highlands. The union’s 
founding document from 1960 gives some idea of this by recording the birthplaces of union 
affiliates. Among those workers who were present at the union’s founding, a significant number 
came from the area around Puquio in southern Ayacucho Department. Another important 
contingent came from Pataz Province in La Libertad Department in the north, as well as from 
different parts of Ancash Department (Recuay, Huari, Pomabamba). Small numbers also came 
from other parts of the country, as well as from the mine’s immediate surroundings in Mala.276  
According to a 1974 survey, 45% of Mina Raúl workers who were questioned identified as 
children of agriculturalists or cattle-raisers; 36% said they had themselves been dedicated to 
agriculture or herding before becoming miners (Sulmont and Valcárcel 1993).  
In the early 1990s, the Mina Raúl union was faced with a scenario of crisis similar to 
Huarón´s – both the economic crisis of the company and the weakening of the union. In 1998 the 
union had participated in the first National Miners’ Strike, but by the time of the III National 
Strike in 1989, workers at the assembly complained of exhaustion and did not participate. In 
1990 and 1991 the company began pressuring the workers to leave. Whereas in 1988 and 1989 
there were around 235 affiliates to the union and assemblies had regular attendance of between 
150 and 190 members, by early 1994 there were around 76 unionized workers left and 
attendance at meetings ranged between 30 and 60. Like at Huarón, the mine did not close down 
completely until about a decade later, but in the early 1990s, faced with crisis, it reduced costs 
and massively reduced its workforce.  
                                                          
276 This information comes from the union´s 1960 founding document and from Sulmont and Valcárcel´s (1993) 
data from 1985. 
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At union meetings in early 1994 workers complained not only of sometimes being made 
to go into areas of the mine on their own rather than in pairs, as had previously been mandated 
by collective bargaining agreements, but also, as one worker put it, of being made to produce the 
same amount of mineral as in previous years but with half the workforce. Already the previous 
year the union had been compelled to accept a thoroughgoing revision of benefits and pacts 
agreed upon since 1960. Now, the most intense discussions at union assemblies were over the 
interrelated issues of the camp elementary school and of the camp housing itself. 277  On 12 
January, 1994, the secretary general, Víctor Yépez, mentioned at assembly that the company had 
informed that the school would no longer function at the camp and that instead they would 
provide transportation for the children to attend the school in the towns of Mala and San 
Antonio. The attendees at the assembly expressed their rejection of the offer, and one said that 
there were no longer spots in the school in Mala so special arrangements would have to be made 
with the school district. The minutes quote another worker in attendance: “Elías Robles says that 
it is not possible that the school pass over to Mala, when they have committed by law to give this 
benefits to the workers. And he also says that the company has not lost, rather it has gained, 
because more than 100 workers have already left and for that very reason they are saving 
money.”  
Three weeks later, on February 2, Yépez communicated that the company offered to give 
500 soles, as an advance on the workers´ wages, to those who would leave the camp, and in 
addition would provide them with transportation so they could move to the nearby towns of 
Mala, Flores and San Antonio and Asia. One member after another then spoke from the floor, 
urging rejection of the company´s offer. As the secretary of notes and archives recorded, 
Compañero Eusebio Ramos says that this is an abuse by the company and he totally 
rejects the company´s proposals... if we accept we would lose so many benefits 
conquered through struggle like school supplies, company store (mercantil), comunidad 
minera, union, all that would be lost if we agree to leave the camp. 
 
                                                          
277 Before the new Mining Code of the early 1990s, mining companies had been required by law to provide 
elementary schools for the children of their workers, even if, as at Mina Raúl in 1961, the union had had to enforce 
this provision at the bargaining table (See Sulmong and Valcárcel 1993). Small mines like Mina Raúl only had an 
elementary school inside the camp. 
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Ramos’ statement explicitly linked the camp with a whole complex of arrangements and 
institutions. Some of these, like the school supplies and the union itself, actually were the 
product of long-term struggle; others, like the comunidad minera, had been imposed from above 
(by the Velasco government) but had subsequently become a part of the institutional life of the 
mining camp. Ramos repeated this argument in an assembly a week later: 
The purpose of the company is to eliminate the camp and therefore the school, the 
hospital, and meanwhile also the workers’ organizations [organizaciones gremiales] like 
the union and the comunidad [minera] and therefore it is a political position on the part of 
the company, and not only the company, rather it’s an agreement from the National 
Mining Society for all the mining centers.  
The Mining Society was and is the central organization of mining companies in Peru; in 
the late 1980s it had defeated its primary antagonist at the time, the National Mining Workers’ 
Federation, which had waged three national strikes attempting to establish a unified bargaining 
framework for all the mining workers in the country. Another worker linked the elimination of 
the camps to national policy, but added a chauvinistic tinge, blaming “the Japanese who occupy 
the ministries” (a reference to President Alberto Fujimori and some of his ministers).  
Although at Mina Raúl (like at Huarón) the mining union minutes are also populated 
overwhelmingly by men´s voices, at this meeting the head of Micaela Bastidas, the workers’ 
wives committee (comité de amas de casa), also spoke:  
The president of Micaela Bastidas asks for the unity of the workers and the wives, and 
says that it seems like some workers have no conscience and that the price of a house is 
above 16,000 soles and we should unite and if they kick us out they should kick us all 
out, she says. 
 
The idea of unity, and of finding a single solution for all, was still a prominent and 
commonly voiced ideal in the internal rhetoric of the mining unions. Of course, it was an ideal, 
not necessarily a reality. Its opposite was also a mainstay of union discourse: the figure of the 
union leader who makes a separate deal with the company, who “negotiates” and betrays the rest. 
This opposition of unity vs. individual, backroom negotiation was part of the rhetorical 
performance of union meetings. As one worker said at a later meeting, “It could be that some 
workers are going to negotiate with the company and why do they not speak up in the assembly, 
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why do they go to the company?”  Eusebio Ramos, while arguing that “the camp will be 
eliminated no matter what,” also claimed that “there are some compañeros who want to negotiate 
(negociar), and he recommends that no compañero should make a deal until the leadership 
reaches an agreement. And that all of us united will make the company retreat.”  
At the following meeting, on February 17, Elías Robles proclaimed that “the leadership 
should say to the company that the workers want a camp and that we are not renters, we are 
workers.” The idea of being a worker was still linked to stability and benefits like housing; 
furthermore, the worker was a relevant social category and a part of the organic entity that was 
the company, and thus could not simply be evicted like a renter. The link between the 
community of workers´ families, its proximity to the mine and its ability to make demands on the 
company was explicitly voiced. As Eusebio Ramos said at the same meeting: 
The purpose of the company is to throw us out of here, because as long as we stay here 
we will always be making our claims and that is the heart of the matter (la madre del 
cordero), if we leave, for the company all those problems will be over. 
 
 The week before, the secretary general Víctor Yépez had used a term – neoliberalism - 
that was common in publications of the Mining Federation and its leftist allies, but that, unlike 
more popular terms like “conscience” or “struggle,” was not frequent in rank-and-file 
pronouncements at local union assemblies: 
The National Mining Society together with the government are applying the neoliberal 
policy in other words that the businessmen should just earn money on its own (ganar 
líquido) without spending on camps, on medicines, on schools, on everything that is 
expenditure, and that the worker collect the envelope only with their salary without any 
benefits... if the company wants us to leave they should build another camp, that is the 
position of the leadership. 
 
At the next assembly, Yépez reported that the company was willing to raise the compensation to 
1,500 soles as a loan whose terms of repayment would later be discussed. In addition, 
If people do not want to leave the camp, the company will not provide any kind of 
maintenance, it will not paint the rooms, there will be no [help in] relocating, people will 
stay where they´re at and in the shape they´re in, there will be no fumigation and the 




 Thus, the implied threat was that if the workers did not at this time take the offer of the 
loan and the transportation for leaving the camp, they would lose both and afterward they would 
get nothing. Though there wouldn’t necessarily be a forced eviction from the camps, the 
company would cease providing the services it previously had and the camp would become less 
livable as time went on.   
In an assembly a few days later, the bargaining commission informed the union members 
that the company had given a deadline of February 28 to accept its offer of 2,000 soles “plus the 
fiber cement roofing, the wood, doors, toilets, etc;” after that date the offer would no longer hold 
and the outcome would be uncertain. A series of statements by union members followed, vowing 
not to leave the camp and emphasizing that if the company wanted them to leave they would 
have to pay the real cost of a house. Yet at the next assembly, when a vote was taken, this time 
the difference between those who wanted to maintain the commitment to not leave the camp and 
those who were willing to consider otherwise was only 17 to 14. Finally, on March 29, Secretary 
General Yépez informed the assembly that the company had given the union a list of 24 workers 
who had agreed to leave the camp, among whom were 3 union officers. In light of that fact, the 
bargaining commission had decided to reach an agreement with the company on the subject of 
the camps; the compensation would be raised to 2,500 soles, and it would be made a donation 
rather than a loan. The union´s official position thus changed from staying in the camps to 
encouraging the remaining workers to leave. Immediately, Elías Robles spoke: 
Elías Robles criticized the action taken by the leadership, there is something fishy going 
on here (aquí hay gato encerrado), if possible the entire leadership must be removed, 
they are the direct culprits, they should have let those 24 compañeros go, because they 
did not have the authorization to negotiate, this is treason and the leadership should be 
changed immediately... He said that this is treason to the workers and that, even though 
he has a plot in [the nearby town of] Mala, he will not leave the camp. 
 
Robles´ stated position should not be taken as necessarily representing a more principled 
stance than that of the leadership; people often changed sides, or did things for personal or 
unstated reasons rather than for what is recorded in the transcript. Factionalism and infighting 
were as much a part of mining union culture as were the ideal and performance of unity and 
solidarity. Divisions increased under the impact of the economic crisis, the weakening of the 
unions and the pressure from the company. Nevertheless, these documents show the way in 
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which leaving the mining camp was seen as a significant change – although part of the larger 
cycle of the crisis and weakening of the union – that would have an impact on the way in which 
the collectivity of workers would continue to exist as a unit and on the kinds of demands and 
struggles that would be articulated. The worker as a relevant social category would undergo a 
transformation due to this particular production (and destruction) of space: the dismantling of the 
unit of laboring families working for one company and living together in close proximity to the 
workplace. 
The end of the mining camp model 
The dismantling of the camps was the result of the adoption by mining companies in Peru 
of a practice that had grown worldwide in the 1970s and 80s: that of replacing the traditional 
mining town with a model labeled either Long-Distance Commuting (LDC) or Fly-in/Fly-out 
(FIFO). This scheme meant that workers would be brought in to work for a certain number of 
days and then returned to their places of origin to spend a period of rest with their families. LDC 
built on the tradition of labor migration associated with extractive industries – as Storey and 
Shrimpton (1988) argue, the scheme is “a new variant on the old theme of going away to work in 
the resource sector” (Storey and Shrimpton 1988, vii). Yet it was also a new departure, one that 
initially began to take root in the oil sector in Australia and Canada in the 1960s. In mining, the 
Asbestos Hill mine in Canada was one of the first to use LDC in 1972 (ibid. vii), but at this time 
the traditional mining camp model was still in full swing – between 1960 and 1975, some 25 new 
mining settlements had been built in Australia. By 1991, however, at least 41 mining operations 
in that country were using LDC. 
In Peru, mining workers´ housing was still being built all over the country in the 1970s; a 
new generation of camp buildings, with two stories, indoor plumbing and a more modern 
appearance, was emerging alongside the single-story adobe rows, with outdoor shared faucets 
and bathrooms, left over from the 1940s. In 1977, the Buenaventura mining company published 
a plan to build a whole new town for its workers, with 1,200 dwelling units (Buenaventura 
1977). Pressures to reverse this trend began to be felt in the 1980s, but it wasn´t until the 1990s 




Figure 8 – Last remaining blocks of workers’s housing, Huarón mine (Francois section), 
with settlement of La Hueca below. Many of the former family apartments have been split up 
into rooms for single workers on the 14x7 system. In the back are some of the foundations of 
demolished housing blocks. Photograph by the author, November 2008 
 
In Australia and Canada, many of the mining companies using LDC were remote 
operations in arid or frigid areas; there commuting literally took the form of “fly-in/fly-out.” In 
Peru, a pattern would develop where a portion of the workforce – especially administrators, 
engineers and higher-skilled workers – would be brought in by car from the cities for their days 
of work, while the less-paid and subcontracted workers would simply move to the nearest town 
and build their houses.278  The traditional white bungalows for administrative staff were for the 
most part not touched in the 1990s, and still form closed compounds where administrators and 
                                                          
278 Although, at some of the larger and relatively more remote mines in Peru, upper-level administrators do literally 
fly in and fly out, by helicopter. 
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some specialized workers and engineers stay during work. This physical permanence of the 
administrators´ compound contrasts strongly with the near-disappearance of the workers´ 
housing. 
The abandonment of the mines and the workers’ camps can be seen as an ambiguous 
process. In people’s accounts, it appears as a loss of benefits (schools, health centers, etc.) and a 
betrayal of company obligations, but also as a process of overcoming dependence and opening to 
new horizons. Another effect, though, was the increase in the spatial separation of the spheres of 
production and reproduction of the labor force, the removal of large numbers of women from the 
immediate vicinity of the mines and a resulting re-masculinization of the productive sphere, as 
was noted at the time by activists from NGOs that had been working with mining women in the 
1980s (Amat y León 1990s).279 In the 1980s, the mining wives´ committees (CACs) had been 
active in the camps during the strikes as well as, to a lesser degree, in the organization of 
everyday life. Furthermore, a discourse had begun to emerge in the leadership of some unions, 
and especially among the NGOs that were working with them, about recognizing women´s 
unpaid labor as part of the productive process. Aquilina Robles, a leader of the women´s 
committee at the Milpo mine, told me how during a protest in Lima, when the company refused 
to recognize the committee, she had been encouraged by a member of the NGO Filomena 
Tomaira Pacsi:280  
She told me, ´Why? Why won´t they recognize you? You wash the overalls, you send the lunch, 
you dry the boots, you knit the socks, without a salary. If they didn´t have you, the company 
would do all that, and how much more would they then spend? ´ 
This discourse, and the social formation of the mining camp itself, served to highlight the 
role of women as part of the productive process of the mine, and was the foundation of the 
visible and active role of the mining women´s committees at the local and national levels. Such a 
close connection would be lost as the sphere of reproduction of the mining workforce spread 
from its formerly concentrated location near the mine into the broader society. At the same time, 
it cannot be denied that this had been a role that was politically subordinated to the male-
dominated union, and that furthermore was based on a rather strict division of labor. 
                                                          
279 This spatial transformation was noted at the time in documents of Filomena Tomaira Pacsi, the main NGO that 
worked with mining women. 
280 This NGO was named after a young woman who died giving birth during the Minas Canaria march of sacrifice. 
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Among the families that remained in mining or that entered it anew during the new boom 
that began in 2003-2004, the division of labor between men and women has mostly continued as 
in older times, with the difference that most of the women are now farther away from the mine. 
At Huarón, only a few workers´ camp buildings are left - at the neighboring mine of Animón 
there are none. Workers from Huayllay live in the town with their families and commute every 
day. Among those from other areas, some rent a room together with their spouses in Huayllay, 
while others have their families elsewhere and only come to work their fourteen 12-hour days 
and return to their towns on the seven off-days. In Huayllay, thus, the mining camp has to some 
degree fused with the town, which in this case is also a comunidad campesina.   
As Lefebvre has argued, “every society produces a space, its own space... A revolution 
that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it 
has not changed life itself” (Lefebvre 1991, 53-4). The fusing of mining camp and town 
constitutes a clear example of the way in which transformations in physical and social space are 
part and parcel – as both mechanism and effect – of social transformations. Indeed, the very 
model on which the demolition of the camps was premised – the long-distance commuting or 
fly-in/fly-out model – implies a strong element of the tearing down of spatial barriers or 
“annihilation of space through time” (Harvey 1991; 205). This occurs as high-skilled workers 
and administrators are brought in from their different spheres of reproduction into the productive 
sphere of the mine. The “accumulated time” systems of 14x7 (or other variants) allow for this, as 
they also allow contractors to do the same with their workers.  
At the same time, however, this annihilation of space is accompanied by the preservation 
of distance in other dimensions in social space. At Huarón, the high-end employees who live in 
the company compound are as isolated from the families living in the town/comunidad of 
Huayllay (most of which are families of people who work at the mine) as ever before. This was 
brought home to me in a conversation with a high-level company administrator, who tried to 
convince me and a colleague to stay in the company compound rather than in Huayllay, arguing 
that conditions in the town were not proper to stay in. He told us about the one time during his 
years of work at the mine that he had arrived late and had been forced to seek lodging in the 
town, and shuddered as he reminisced about the cold, lack of water, and overall discomfort. In 
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general, the people who live in the compound are not seen walking around the town or other 
parts of the comunidad except on official business. Similarly, company officials and employees 
live at the compound without their families, since they come only for limited periods and then 
return.281 Furthermore, whereas before there was a sharp 3-way division between obreros, 
empleados and staff, now the separation between the first two categories has lost much of its old 
force. Yet the division between those outside and those inside the company compound (the latter 
heirs to the staff of old) has remained or perhaps increased. In the town itself, the 
payroll/subcontracted division produces a significant split in terms of pay, benefits and the 
possibility for organized action.  
At the same time, however, we should not imagine that capital has unlimited power to 
remake space according to its own designs. In the first place, if the departure of thousands of 
workers from the mines in the early 1990s did respond to the needs and interests of capital at the 
time, this dynamic also built on the pre-existing spatial practices of the workers and their 
families. When workers left under the threat of mine closure, as at Huarón, or were directly fired, 
as was the case for some at Centromín, their decisions as to where to go and what to do were 
based on certain accustomed trajectories that had developed in the mining culture of central Peru. 
Mining work had been seen as something with a finite time span – not necessarily a short-term 
seasonal migration, as in the early 20th century, but finite nevertheless. People generally did not 
grow old in the mining camps. The ideal was to work a sufficient number of years to be able to 
educate one´s children and build up savings with which to return to one´s town or, increasingly, 
move to the cities. In Cerro de Pasco, moving to the warmer climate of the city of Huánuco and 
its surroundings has been a longstanding cultural ideal among retired mining workers. And, 
although people´s narratives emphasize the figure of the worker who did not foresee leaving the 
                                                          
281 It must also be mentioned that, although this and many other present-day mines are owned by foreign companies, 
all administrators and engineers on the ground are Peruvian. Also, some of the younger mining engineers in present-
day Peru are children of mining workers from the Central Highlands, unlike the older and more established core of 
engineers who are of middle-class or upper-class roots. On average, however, the direct payroll, fly-in/fly-out 
contingents at closed company compounds are still somewhat lighter-skinned, more urban and culturally different 
from the local populations.The foreign communities of U.S. and European administrators and their families at 
Huarón and Cerro de Pasco have disappeared altogether. 
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camp, it is clear from my interviews that building a house outside the camp was a cultural ideal 
among mining workers and their families even before the crisis.282  
The difference that the crisis made was that people had to leave earlier than they had 
planned, maybe before they had been able to build a house. Furthermore, those who were close 
to but not quite at retirement age saw their chance of getting a retirement pension slip away, even 
if they had worked a good number of years. The sudden reduction in income and the uncertainty 
with which the future presented itself made previously predictable life trajectories suddenly 
unstable, and reversed expectations of progress that had been in the process of establishing 
themselves. This was emphasized by one of my interviewees, the wife of a former Centromín 
worker at Cerro de Pasco, who said that if her husband had not been fired, “maybe my children 
would also have been much better; only one of them is an engineer, the rest, well they also 
wanted to be engineers.” Also, once the mines began hiring large numbers of people again, 
former workers who had stayed in mining areas like Huayllay often saw their sons going to work 
through subcontractors - with the implications that had in terms of pay and benefits – rather than 
through direct payroll as they themselves had worked.  
However, not only did capital have to find ways to make its own spatial strategies 
coincide at least partly with those of workers´ families, but there were also other spatial practices 
at play that did not necessarily mesh so well with the needs of capital. As examined in the next 
two chapters, one such spatial development during the 20th century has been the growth and 
empowerment of comunidades campesinas – the landholding institutions that by the 1990s 
owned much of the surface land in Peru. These communities have been able to set some 
conditions on the mining companies operating on their land; one of the most common of these 
conditions is the demand for direct rather than subcontracted jobs. This places some limits on the 
tendency of the LDC system to “annihilate space” and bypass the local population when hiring 
personnel.  Furthermore, although spatial strategies such as the communities’ recuperation of 
                                                          
282 People in the region often tried to establish or maintain a foothold in different spaces: their comunidad of origin, 
the mining camp, the city of Cerro de Pasco (where their children could more easily access higher education), and 
lower-elevation valley cities such as Huánuco and Tarma where the climate is better for health. In the case of 
families with slightly more resources, spatial trajectories could extend to cities like Lima and Huancayo. The 
particular mix of spaces accessed varies depending on the individual family, however. I have met former mining 
workers who did not maintain close ties with their comunidad. Similarly, there were many who did not have a firm 
foothold in Lima (though almost everyone had a close relative there).  
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their lands may be located within the world economy dominated by capital, they are not part of 
the logic of capital, and are not directly controlled by it. Rather, they flow from parallel historical 
processes, which are intertwined with but not always dominated by capital (Chakrabarty 2000). 
Even in the realm of labor, capital’s power to remake social relations is not unlimited. 
Though the growth of subcontracting and the changes in the labor laws (in particular the end of 
labor stability) have served to make permanent the weakening of the mining unions that occurred 
in the context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, some past conventions and regulations do 
remain and serve to place limits on the erosion of labor rights. The Ministry of Labor still 
conducts inspections at mining sites. Some of the excessively long work periods that begun to 
emerge in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as 21x7 systems, have since been standardized 
into the 14x7 system, even if the latter does still represent a greater exaction of labor than in the 
past. Discontent over the subcontracting system, however muted by the decline of labor politics, 
was strong enough during the 2006 elections to motivate presidential candidate Alan García (the 
former president) to promise its end. Although he did not fulfill this proclamation after becoming 
president, his government did have to place some regulations on contractors. And the Mining 
Federation still exists, even if it now represents a minority rather than a majority of mining 
workers. As in Huarón, there have been several protracted struggles by subcontracted workers to 
obtain union recognition - most notoriously at Casapalca in 2006 – though mostly without 
success. Finally, as in all of the above dynamics, the ability of retired and laid-off mining 
workers to ensure the payment of retirement benefits, severance pay and pensions has rested on 
past political processes, which thus have not been completely erased from the present.283 
 
                                                          
283 To give a concrete example of this: in 1989 the APRA government was compelled to issue a new retirement law 
for mining workers, in response to the strength shown by the National Mining Strikes and as a consolation prize 
given the government´s inability to force the National Mining Society to agree to the Mining Federation´s foremost 
demand of industry-wide bargaining. The new retirement law made it possible for underground mining workers to 
retire and receive a pension at age 45 (if they had worked at least 20 years, 10 of them underground), and at age 50 
for open-pit workers and 55 for other surface workers (if they had worked at least 25 or 30 years, respectively). 
Before, the retirement age had been 60, an age which many underground workers reached in ill health or not at all. 
Although some of the provisions of the new law were eliminated by the Fujimori regime in the 1990s, several others 
remained. In general, the law provided the context within which many workers who were over 45 at the time of their 
departure were able to get pensions, even if this often required a long legal process.   
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CHAPTER V  
COMMUNITY, LAND AND WORK 
 
 In their 2003 review of the new anthropology of mining, cited at the beginning of this 
dissertation, Ballard and Banks write that, since the 1980s, “local communities” have “swiftly 
assumed a pivotal position in the politics and analyses of the wider global mining community” 
(288), complementing earlier attention paid to actors such as the state, corporations and labor. 
They trace this development to the late 1970s expansion of the mining industry into remote 
“greenfield” areas of the Asia-Pacific region, that were new to mining and that often were 
inhabited by tribal or indigenous populations. That experience, and the conflicts to which it gave 
rise, led to a new industry and academic focus on the local community as a central actor in world 
mining. In mining countries such as Peru, the “local community” has since the 1990s become a 
key category in public discussions of mining and in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programs undertaken by mining corporations.  
Though the centrality of “community” to the mining industry may be relatively new, 
however, in broader discourse the category itself is course much older and has long encompassed 
a range of both academic and everyday meanings, ranging from social cohesion and cooperation 
to simply a shared connection to a local space. In the specific case of Peru, moreover, the term 
comunidad (literally, “community”) has a particular history. Since 1920, the state has recognized 
the institution of the comunidad indígena (indigenous community), on the basis of older 
colonial-era institutions that had lost legal standing after independence in the 19th century. 
Comunidades indígenas in the highlands were in turn renamed comunidades campesinas 
(peasant communities) in 1969, and they retain that designation today.284 Although comunidades 
                                                          
284 For the Amazonian region of Peru, the equivalent legal category is comunidad nativa (native community).  
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vary greatly in terms of their actual functioning, in theory at least they are collections of 
households that hold a single property title to a territory (though usufruct is generally household-
based rather than collective); and that possess a political structure dictated both by state 
guidelines and by local custom.  After the peasant movements and Agrarian Reform of the 1960s 
and 70s eliminated the old hacienda system, the comunidades campesinas were left owning 
much of the rural land in highland Peru – nominally in some cases, effectively in others. By the 
1990s, there were over 5,680 comunidades campesinas, occupying – according to different 
estimates – somewhere between 40 and 56% of the productive land in the country, both 
agricultural and pasture land (Burneo 2007, 157-158). This moment of greatest territorial control 
by comunidades and by highland peasant populations in general has thus coincided with the new 
mining boom that began in Peru in 1993-1997 and that took on renewed force after 2003 – 
motivated by interrelated factors such as investment-friendly policies, world economic 
restructuring, high metal prices and, increasingly in recent years, the industrialization of China.  
 In this chapter and the next, I begin an examination of the topic of mine-community 
relations by focusing on Huayllay and Rancas - two comunidades in Pasco Department, a 
traditional mining region. I conducted ethnographic and oral history research in these two 
communities (as well as in the nearby city of Cerro de Pasco) beginning in 2008 and especially 
in 2009 and 2010. My aim is to contribute to the growing literature on mine-community relations 
in Peru and other countries that has emerged since the 1990s. Here it is important to note the 
specificity of the context described in this chapter and the next. While much of the mining 
expansion of the last two decades in Peru has been characterized by the predominance of large-
scale, open-pit methods, mining in Pasco Department is still primarily underground, though there 
are two open-pit mines (Cerro de Pasco and Brocal). While some of the most important open-pit 
mines in Peru today are either primarily copper (Antamina, Tintaya, Southern Peru Copper 
Corporation) or gold (Yanacocha), in the Central Highlands region of which Pasco Department is 
part the primary products are silver, lead and zinc, though copper is also present. And, most 
importantly, while some of the mining conflicts in the last few years – in Peru and elsewhere - 
have involved community protests that seek to prevent the building of new mines (i.e. 
Tambogrande, Majaz, Tía María, Conga, Cañariaco, etc.), the region discussed here is a historic 
mining area in which there is an established relationship between the local population and the 
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mining industry. Nevertheless, this relationship is neither static nor free of conflict, nor is it 
devoid of the struggles over territory and land that characterize mining conflicts in other parts of 
Peru and the world.  In Pasco, since most mining operations take place on communal lands that 
are not bought or sold, they require formal mine-comunidad agreements that must be 
renegotiated periodically. These agreements or convenios exchange the use of land for a 
combination of monetary compensation, local development programs and, importantly, work 
opportunities at the mine. 
 In the next chapter I will develop an argument about the role of land and landownership 
in the mine-community relationship, as well as about the shift in the “social burden” in the 
particular case of Huayllay, as indicative of broader shifts that may not be as visible elsewhere. 
In this chapter, however, I lay out the basic background on the nature and functioning of the 
communities of Huayllay and Rancas, in particular the use of land. I also focus on the 
relationship between the traditional work on the land – in this case the raising of livestock – and 
mining work, as well as other activities. I try to keep in mind the different, overlapping senses of 
“community”: a specific legal entity encompassing a group of people and a territory; a broader, 
less rigidly-defined local space and its resident population; and, finally, an object of intervention 
and action by mining companies.  
 
The regional space 
Rancas and Huayllay are both located in Pasco Province, which along with Daniel 
Alcides Carrión (D.A.C.) and Oxapampa Provinces make up Pasco Department. While D.A.C. 
Province more or less corresponds to the agricultural Quebrada (intermontane valley) of 
Chaupiwaranga, and while Oxapampa is entirely located within the eastern rainforest region, 
Pasco Province is composed of both agricultural quebrada (to the east) and, to the west, 
livestock-raising plateau or puna lands. It is on the plateau that Rancas and Huayllay sit (as does 
the city of Cerro de Pasco), although they have historically had close relations with the quebrada 
communities. As mentioned earlier, there are slightly over 40 officially recognized comunidades 
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in Pasco Province.285 Some, like Rancas, Huayllay, Huaychao, Vicco, Racco, Huaraucaca, 
Ninacaca and Villa de Pasco, are entirely or primarily plateau, livestock-raising communities. 
Others, like Ticlacayán, Yarusyacán, Huachón and Quiparacra, are primarily quebrada, 
agricultural communities, though most of them also possess some puna (high-altitude grassland) 
lands. Beyond Pasco Province, the agricultural communities of D.A.C. Province (Chaupiwaranga 
Valley), such as Tusi, Rocco, Vilcabamba and Chacayán, are also very much a part of the region 
centered around Cerro de Pasco, even if they also have their own separate identity and sub-
regional space.  
These references to discrete comunidades refer to the legally constituted entities that own 
the majority of the land and that group most of the families that live on it. There are other ways 
to describe the regional space. One is the Peruvian state´s division of abstract space into different 
political jurisdictions. I have already mentioned the division into departments (now also called 
regions), which are in turn divided into provinces; the latter, in turn, are made up of districts. 
Each district has a mayor (alcalde), who has authority over both the urban and rural parts of the 
district; there is also a mayor for the whole province. The authority for the entire 
department/region, on the other hand, is called not a mayor but rather a regional president 
(presidente regional). Thus, Pasco Province (located in Pasco Department) is divided into 13 
districts; Huayllay is located in the district of the same name while Rancas belongs to Simón 
Bolívar District. In both cases, the central village of each comunidad is also the district seat; 
there are also villages that are not district seats but rather have the lower jurisdictional status of 
anexo or centro poblado menor. Historically in Peru, the creation of new districts and provinces 
has been a way for formerly peripheral but rising population centers to assert their independence 
from a local or regional center. With the new mining boom and the novel mechanism of the 
canon minero that has gone into effect in the last decade – by which 50% of profit taxes paid by 
mining companies return to the regions of operations – the importance of district, provincial and 
departmental/regional authorities has grown even more, since it is they (rather than, say, private 
entities like the comunidades) that receive the rents generated by mining.  
                                                          
285 Specifically, the 1998 listing produced by the Ministry of Agriculture´s Special Land Titling Program (PETT) 
names a total of 43 comunidades in the province.   
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Another way to describe the region is to focus on the actual settlement patterns and use of 
space. I will do that more thoroughly for Huayllay and Rancas later in this section. For now, 
however, it is important to point out that the existence of forty-odd comunidades in Pasco 
Province does not imply an exactly equal number of settlements or population clusters. It is true 
that most of the older, historic communities, like Huayllay and Rancas, are associated with 
particular villages that were the product of the 16th-century reducción program. However, the 
ecological conditions of a high-altitude pastoral environment have long implied a spread-out 
settlement pattern, with shepherds´ houses located all along the plateau. Thus the pueblos de 
indios, as the reducción towns were often called in colonial days, may have functioned as 
ceremonial or political centers, but most of the population spent more time in smaller, spread-out 
dwellings. As the mining economy and other activities, such as commerce, intensified, more 
dense settlements could be supported, and the towns grew in importance. Although this process 
certainly started earlier, it accelerated in the 20th century.  
Today, the spread-out rural settlements – often no more than two or three dwellings 
clustered together - are called estancias, and they form the rural counterpart to the towns. While 
from the perspective of urban Peru the term comunidad is associated unambiguously with the 
rural world, in a relatively developed region like Pasco many of the comunidades are actually 
made up of a town-country pairing, with the “country” (campo) consisting of the estancias. Yet 
while the towns of the larger comunidades, like Huayllay and Rancas, really stand in the middle 
ground between the rural and the urban, the smaller, more peripheral comunidades are more 
wholly rural, even in their central towns or settlements. Moreover, in some cases, clusters of 
estancias may grow into a small village, which is then usually called a caserío (hamlet). Or the 
estancias may remain spaced apart but be organized into a zone or sector, with a central location 
and their own authorities that are subordinate to those of the comunidad. Actually, what is called 
a caserío in one community may be called a sector in another. While in many communities these 
formations remain within the comunidad, in some of the larger comunidades there may be 
caseríos or sectores that attempt to assert their independence as a separate comunidad, as was 
happening in the community of Yarusyacán during the time of my research. 
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In any case, the comunidades are not, for the most part, units of production.  As Diez 
(2007) argues, the comunidades campesinas in Peru today can be seen as “political, rather than 
economic, institutions and spaces” – meaning that their primary functions are “the organization, 
regulation and solution of conflicts among their members, the relationship with the outside and 
external agents, and the defense of territorial integrity” (Diez 2007, 119). This perspective 
contrasts with the early 20th-century views of indigenista intellectuals, who were interested in the 
comunidades as economic spaces of cooperation if not socialism. It also contrasts with the 
tendency of the last two decades – among many anthropologists as well as other observers in 
Peru – to downplay the importance of the comunidades altogether. Although Diez´s argument is 
meant as a hypothesis for Peru as a whole, glossing over the great variation among different 
regions, I do find it helpful for the comunidades of Pasco. There, the comunidad is an important 
political institution, connected above all to the defense of territory, which usually cannot be 
bought or sold. For the most part, however, the estancias operate independently, and are in the 
possession (not legal ownership) of individual families. The latter may pasture their own animals 
on their estancia, or, as often happens nowadays, they may hire a shepherd who will work either 
through the al partir system, for a money wage, or a combination of the two. In theory, 
communal authorities can take away an estancia and give it to someone else, but more often they 
are simply passed from parents to children.  
Moreover, estancias are not simply shepherds´ dwellings – they are specific places, with 
a name and a character of their own. People often feel a great emotional attachment to the 
estancia that has been associated with their family for several generations, even if they 
themselves no longer live there. Importantly, there are also other, more collective units of 
production besides the estancias. A comunidad may itself own and directly administer a number 
of animals, for which it sets aside a small section of the communal territory; such is the case in 
Huayllay. These are the small “communal farms” (granjas comunales) that arose in many 
communities in the 1940s, as a way to provide the communal institution with its own income; 
each comunero had to donate a small number of animals for this purpose. Also, there are the 
much larger Communal Cooperatives that exists within many of the comunidades; these are the 
product of the Agrarian Reform of the 1960s and 70s, and are usually set up on at least part of 
the lands of the old haciendas. For the most part, however, livestock production consists of the 
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aggregate of estancias that operate independently. Beyond the world of livestock, other 
economic activities (commerce, transport, etc.) are also not determined by the boundaries of a 
comunidad campesina (except in the case of the communal companies) though they are strongly 
influenced by the ties of kinship and locality that can be said to constitute “community” in the 
broader sense.  
I have already provided historical background on Huayllay in the first chapter of this 
dissertation. Here I will merely summarize it, before moving on to a brief discussion of the 
history of Rancas. As discussed in the earlier chapter, Huayllay was a late-16th century 
reducción, as was its most proximate neighbor, Huaychao (Degregori and Golte 1973, 3). Both 
villages are mentioned in the 1601-1603 records of the third Visita of Santo Toribio de 
Mogrovejo (Benito 2006, 180, 208, 264).286 During the colonial and 19th-century periods, the 
local economy of Huayllay turned on both herding and small-scale mining. The pottery craft and 
regional barter system that existed in the early 20th century was no doubt already present in 
earlier times as well. The village of Huayllay became the center of its own district in 1857, 
during the government of Ramón Castilla. In 1912, a French mining company acquired the rights 
to the silver and copper deposits of Huarón, in Huayllay District, and began industrial-scale 
production in 1918, dominating the local economy for much of the 20th century. After the 1920 
Constitution recognized comunidades indígenas for the first time since Independence, the 
comunidad of Huayllay obtained official recognition in 1929, followed by neighboring 
Huaychao in 1933. In 1962, in the midst of the peasant land recuperation movement in Peru – of 
which the department of Pasco was one of the centers – the comuneros of Huayllay and 
Huaychao occupied the local haciendas that were owned by the Fernandini sheep-raising empire. 
After the end of the hacienda system, their lands eventually passed into the hands of Huayllay, 
Huaychao and other neighboring comunidades. The 1990s saw the closure of the mining camps, 
which had formerly constituted the demographic center of the district. With the new rise in 
                                                          
286 Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo was an Archbishop of Lima who traveled through much of central and northern Peru 
in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. In Benito´s (2006) transcription of his visita records, Huayllay appears 
alternately as “San Juan de Huaylac”, “S. Joan” and “San Juan de Guailas,” while Huaychao appears as either “San 
Agustín Guachao” or simply “San Agustín.” The modern names of the two towns are San Juan de Huayllay and San 
Agustín de Huaychao, respectively. This, combined with the geographical order in which they appear in the visita 
records (next to the neighboring towns of Pari and Ondores) leave little doubt that it is Huayllay and Huaychao that 
are being referenced.  
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global metal prices after 2002, the formerly small town of Huayllay began a period of rapid 
growth, as it fulfilled the functions that the mining camps had once performed. 
 Like Huayllay, Rancas can also trace its history to the early colonial period. It is listed in 
Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo´s visita records from 1601-1603 (Benito 2006, 208, 262-263).287 
Moreover, public discourse in the community locates the official recognition of communal lands, 
and the enshrinement of this recognition in a document known as the garashipo, in early colonial 
days. The date most often given for that in communal publications is 1585. However, haciendas 
also formed on territory claimed by Rancas; most important of these was Hacienda Paria, which 
would maintain a land feud with the community that would last until the peasant land 
recuperation campaign of the 1960s. It was also in or very near the community´s lands that the 
mining settlement of Cerro de Pasco began, with the initial name of San Esteban de Yauricocha. 
According to regional tradition, this occurred around the year 1630. Thus, from early on, the 
community of Rancas, the Hacienda Paria and the mining operations of Cerro de Pasco all 
bordered each other and competed for what was in a sense the same local space. Small, artisanal 
mineral processing mills dotted the landscape and, together with the mines themselves, employed 
labor from many of the nearby communities.  
The 20th-century history of Rancas is inextricably tied to the history of land recuperation 
and Agrarian Reform. By the middle of the century, the comuneros of Rancas, like those of other 
nearby communities, felt hemmed in by the haciendas; on one side was Paria, which had been 
purchased by the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (which managed it as part of its Livestock 
Division), and on the other was Hacienda Pacoyán, which had been purchased by the Lercari 
Hermanos firm.288 Although the wave of land recuperations in Pasco can be said to have begun 
                                                          
287 Benito´s transcription of the visita record uses the names “San Antonio de Caranca,” “Yarancas” and “Arancar,” 
alternatively. Based on their similarity to the official name of San Antonio de Rancas, and on where they appear in 
relation to other towns (such as Vico, Yanamate and Pasco), I believe these names refer to the modern town and 
community of Rancas. 
288 As Martínez-Alier (1973) has described for the cattle-raising haciendas of the Central Highlands, haciendas and 
communities often claimed the same space, with their corresponding land documents; conflicts waxed and waned 
depending on how vigorously the haciendas decided to enforce what they claimed to be their boundaries. In the 20 th 
century, the modernization of the haciendas along capitalist lines demanded a more stringent enforcement and the 
erection of fences where none had existed before, as well as the termination of longstanding huacchilla 
arrangements by which local people could pasture their own sheep alongside the hacienda´s. The comuneros saw 
this process of boundary enforcement as an encroachment into spaces that they considered to be rightfully theirs. 
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with the neighboring community of Yanacancha, which in late 1959 attempted to enter the lands 
of the CPC´s Hacienda Paria, it was Rancas´ standoff with the same hacienda a few months later 
that attracted the most attention and galvanized the movement. On April 29, 1960, after months 
of planning, the comuneros of Rancas occupied a field known as Huayllacancha, which had been 
fenced in by Hacienda Paria but which they claimed as theirs. On May 2nd, the Prado government 
in Lima sent a large police detachment to evict the ranqueños, but the latter resisted, and in the 
ensuing clash three comuneros were killed, including the president of the comunidad, while 
many were wounded. The ranqueños had the support of nearby communities as well as the 
mining unions and the leftist mayor of Cerro de Pasco, Genaro Ledesma; after the events of May 
2nd, their resistance elicited the sympathy and solidarity of other groups around the country. 
Other communities in Pasco (such as Huayllay and Huaychao, in 1962) began seizing hacienda 
lands that they claimed were ancestrally theirs, at the same time as a parallel, unconnected 
peasant movement was taking place in the southern department of Cuzco. The government 
violently repressed the comuneros, and several pitched battles were fought between the Pasco 
communities – often acting in a coordinated fashion – and the police.  
In spite of the repression, the movement spread from Pasco to Junín Department, while 
the land takeovers also increased all over Cuzco Department. By some estimates, there were 
between 350 and 400 land seizures, involving around 300,000 peasants (Handelman 1975, 121). 
As Handelman writes, “the peasant mobilization of the early 1960s was unquestionably one of 
the largest peasant movements in Latin American history” (Ibid.). This movement forced the 
question of land distribution upon the Peruvian state in a much more forceful way than before, so 
that in 1963 the centrist reformist Fernando Belaúnde was elected president with a platform of 
land reform. Several of the largest haciendas in Pasco were dissolved during this period, while 
Belaúnde´s Reform proceeded much more slowly in other parts of the country. In 1968 a coup 
brought to power the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado, who decreed a 
much more radical Agrarian Reform. By the mid-1970s, the power of the old landowning class 
had been broken nationwide, and the hacienda system was basically over.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Another factor which played a role in the land recuperation movement of the early 1960s was the workforce 
reduction that took place in the CPC mines in the 1950s, after which mining work began to absorb less of the 
community´s surplus labor force than had been the case in the past (Handelman 1975, 66-67). 
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 As Lino (2012) argues, the role played by Rancas as one of the first communities to 
recover lands from the haciendas has become a defining factor in the construction of its identity 
in the years since. Every year on the anniversary of “the massacre of Huayllacancha,” as the 
clash of May 2, 1960 is known locally, the community conducts a pilgrimage to the spot, in 
honor of the memory of its three martyrs – Alfonso Rivera, Teófilo Huamán and Silveria Tufino. 
In public, official as well as everyday discourse, ranqueños articulate a sense of themselves as 
inheritors to a tradition of courage and determination in the struggle against the haciendas. This 
self-awareness is not entirely unconnected from knowledge of the notoriety gained by Manuel 
Scorza´s magical-realist novel about the events, Redoble por Rancas, which was published in 
1970 and translated into more than twenty languages.289 The existence of the novel has meant 
that many Peruvians, and a few people in other countries, have heard the name Rancas, even if 
they do not know it is a real place. In Rancas itself, however, although the existence of the novel 
has contributed to the community´s sense of its own importance, the work of memory has 
developed quite independently, with frequent and conflicting narrations of the events of 1960 by 
those who participated (Lino 2008, 2012). Also, to a much greater degree than in Huayllay, there 
are local publications produced by ranqueños that tell the history of the community and above all 
of the land recuperation campaign. 
 Today, Huayllay and Rancas are towns, district capitals and comunidades campesinas. 
They are both former comunidades indígenas, and, like most of the inhabitants of highland Peru 
today, generally consider themselves to be the descendants of the local pre-Conquest population. 
However, according to a common type of categorization, they would be described as mestizo 
rather than Indian. I am referring to the term mestizo not as used in the relational sense of being 
opposed to or differentiated from a local Indian population (as in the runa/misti division 
described in ethnographies of Southern Peru from the 1970s and 80s). Rather, in this usage it 
refers to people´s longstanding adoption of certain key cultural markers such as Spanish 
language and Western dress, and more generally in their relative integration into national 
                                                          
289 Manuel Scorza was a Peruvian writer who collaborated with the communal movement in Pasco and with Genaro 
Ledesma in the 1960s. Redoble por Rancas forms the first installment of a series of five novels about the land 
conflicts in Pasco called La Guerra Silenciosa (“The Silent War”). He died in a plane crash in Spain in 1983.  
336 
 
society.290 However, as De la Cadena (2000) has argued for other parts of Peru, such selective 
adoption of Western cultural traits, as well as the shedding of those characteristics that are 
deemed most “Indian,” in no way implies the loss of all local cultural traditions or the loss of 
identity (as outside observers have often believed). Here it is useful to reference Romero´s 
(2004) discussion of mestizaje in the Mantaro Valley, which he sees as “the gradual 
appropriation of modernity by indigenous Andean peasants” (45). At the same time, it must be 
remembered that this appropriation was not a straightforward or easy process, because dominant 
notions of “modernity” in Peru traditionally excluded indigenous culture; according to them, you 
could be modern or indigenous, but hardly both. Elements of a new modernity did emerge in 
Peru over the course of the 20th century, but this transformation was beset by contradictions and 
difficulties. For Huayllay and Rancas, some of this painful process is captured in a statement I 
often heard made by middle-aged people in both locations– that their fathers “forbade” their 
mothers to speak to them in Quechua, so that they would not learn the language.  
 Even though they are both comunidades campesinas (peasant communities), today most 
of the inhabitants of Huayllay and Rancas are not “peasants” in the original sense of the term. 
Although, as we shall see, many of them maintain a strong relationship to the land and to herding 
work, that “traditional” sector no longer serves as the main source of livelihood for the majority 
of the people. Instead, many ranqueños and huayllinos work in mining or other occupations, 
while some have entered the professions or commerce. Many complement these activities with 
the possession of animals, while a minority is dedicated to livestock primarily or exclusively. 
This distribution varies with time, however; during periods when mining production decreases, 
more comuneros work directly with the animals on the land. Thus, while the name comunidad 
campesina is officially retained in both places, Huayllay and Rancas are as much working-class, 
                                                          
290 Personally, I am not particularly interested in labeling people as either mestizo, Indian or indigenous, and would 
rather leave issues of identity for the individuals and communities in question to define themselves. In Peru today, 
identities are fluid and more often implicit rather than explicit. In this part of the Central highlands in particular, 
there are social inequalities and hierarchies today, but they are not as profound as either the runa/misti division 
referred to above, or the costeño/serrano division found on the coast. Yet it is important to emphasize that 
communities like Huayllay and Rancas, which switched to Spanish over the course of the 20th century, have often 
been labeled mestizo, unlike the Quechua-speaking communities of the south. Actually, another term that was 
frequently used in social science in the 1960s and 70s, was cholo, an originally derogatory term which in social 
science usage was supposed to denote a “transitional class” between Indians and mestizos. Thus, in his 1975 study 
Handelman wrote that “most of Pasco´s comuneros, then, were cholos rather than Indians.”  
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semi-proletarian communities – and semi-urban at that - as they are “peasant communities.” The 
term “peasant-miner,” used by some of the social scientists who studied the Central Highlands of 
Peru in the 1970s and 80s, still applies today, even if the relationship between the two elements 
in this binary has changed.  
 That said, the land is still important, not only because it complements mining work and 
other activities, but also because the relationship between the mining companies and the 
comunidades often turns on issues of land. For that reason, I will now examine the use of land 
today, as well as the political functioning of the comunidad - which is intimately connected, if 
not to everyday production on the estancias, then to the access to the land itself, both historically 
and in the present day.  
 
Comunidades and the use of land 
 As mentioned before, Rancas and Huayllay are both relatively large communities, both in 
terms of population and territory. Some numbers will help to give an idea of the relative 
populations of the comunidades as well as of the surrounding areas. One way to examine the size 
of each comunidad is to look at the number of comuneros titulares – i.e. registered community 
members; they are the ones who can vote at communal assemblies and who act as the link 
between their households and the comunidad as a whole. In each comunero household, either the 
husband or the wife can be a titular, but not both, and it´s usually the husband; adult children 
living at home can also become titulares themselves. In Rancas, in 2006 there were around 378 
comuneros titulares registered; by 2008, this had increased to 545, of whom around 70% were 
men and 30% women. The number of registered comuneros has likely continued to increase, 
though I do not have more recent figures. In terms of the total number of people living within the 
boundaries of the comunidad (including both the town and the estancias), in 2009 I calculated 
this to be around 1,300 individuals, based on the survey I conducted in the community that year. 
Of the individuals surveyed, 72% would be found in the town, and 28% in the estancias (granted, 
many people go back and forth). In terms of households, we managed to survey 292 households 
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(the vast majority) within the communal boundaries. Around 82% were comunero households 
and 18% were non-comunero households (the latter mostly migrant shepherds).  
According to the most recent national population Census, that of 2007, in that year 913 
people were counted in the town of Rancas – this does not include the estancias on the 
community´s lands, since the national Census does not use the comunidad as a unit of analysis 
(i.e., all the rural lands in the different comunidades in the district are lumped together). The total 
population of the district of Simón Bolívar, of which Rancas is part, is much larger (13,681 in 
2007), since it includes some urban neighborhoods of the city of Cerro de Pasco. 
 By contrast, in 2007, the much larger town of Huayllay was counted as having 6,736 
people, out of a district total of 10,617; the population has almost certainly increased since then. 
The larger size compared to Rancas is not only because the comunidad of Huayllay is larger, but 
also because the town functions as the nearest population center (and thus surrogate mining 
camp) to the mines of Huarón and Animón. Thus, unlike in Rancas, which is basically home to 
ranqueños plus some migrant shepherds, the town of Huayllay attracts large numbers of migrants 
due to mining and commerce (whereas in Rancas the nearby city of Cerro de Pasco plays this 
role).  
If we focus only on the comunidad of Huayllay, at the time of my research the number of 
comuneros titulares had recently increased sharply, from around 800 to about 1,500. According 
to the comments of local people, the increase was due to the greater benefits that being a 
community member entailed in relation to mining activity, especially after the renegotiation of 
the mine-community agreements in 2006-2008. In particular, being a comunero helped to get 
work at the mine, either directly or through the communal company. As a result, children of 
comuneros who in the past had migrated elsewhere or just did not have interest in the communal 
institution or the communal lands, were now eager to formally join the comunidad. In terms of 
the entire communal population of the comunidad of Huayllay (i.e. titulares plus their family 
members), a rough estimation would place this figure at somewhere around 3,500 in 2009-2010.  
In terms of territory, Rancas possesses a total of around 16,000 hectares of land, while 
Huayllay owns around 34,000 hectares. While these extensions of land may seem very large, it is 
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important to remember that they are situated almost entirely in a high-altitude grassland region 
(puna). At 4,300 meters above sea level, large amounts of land are needed to support a relatively 
small population. For example, Mayer (2009, 46) argues, citing Caballero (1981), that in the 
Andes 51.6 hectares of high-altitude grasslands can be considered roughly equivalent to one 
hectare of irrigated agricultural land at under 3,000 meters of altitude.  
The landscape of this area is inevitably shaped by its high altitude. Not only are there no 
trees, but there is also an absence of the sharp, steep slopes that are characteristic of many 
Andean communities, especially in the quebradas and valleys. Yet Rancas and Huayllay are not 
on the flattest portion of the Pasco/Junín plateau, where, for example, the community of Vicco is 
located. Rather, the landscape is one of rolling, gentle hills, broken by the occasional jaggy 
outcrops of rock (which in one section of Huayllay turn into a dense rock formation known as 
the Stone Forest).  The snowcapped peaks of the Western and Eastern Cordilleras can be seen at 
a distance. The highest areas around the two communities are home to several lakes, the largest 
of which are Lake Alcacocha in Rancas and Lake Huarón in Huayllay, though there are other 
smaller ones. People have traditionally obtained water not only from these lakes but also from 
the occasional puquiales (freshwater springs). It is only in the easternmost section of the 
communal lands of Rancas that the high-altitude region ends and the ground gives way to the 
quebradas; here, potatoes and other crops can be grown, the slopes become steeper, and bushes 
and a few trees begin to appear.  
In pre-colonial days, before the arrival of sheep from Europe, the high-altitude grasslands 
of Pasco and Junín were a land dedicated to the raising of llamas and alpacas and, in some parts, 
to the cultivation of maca.291 Today, it is sheep country above all, with alpacas in second place 
and bovine cattle in third. Llamas, the Andean pack animals par excellence, were also very 
important up until the early 20th century. In the 19th century, the raising of llamas was tightly 
interconnected to the mining economy, for they were virtually the primary way to transport 
minerals. Some haciendas were devoted primarily to raising llamas, since they could charge high 
rates for their use and earn substantial profits. This came to an end in the early 1900s when the 
                                                          
291 Some aspects of the early colonial period in this area (i.e. the Province of Chinchaycocha), including the raising 
of animals, are described in the 1603 chronicle reproduced by Duviols (1974). 
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new foreign mining companies (such as Huarón and the much larger Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation) built railroads to transport their minerals. Llamas continued to be used in the 
peasant economy, for example for the exchange trips to the quebradas, but later in the 20th 
century the arrival of automobiles (and the decline of long-distance barter) put an end to this too. 
Sheep and alpacas have also been connected to mining insofar as they were sometimes explicitly 
raised for the purpose of feeding mining workers at cheaper rates than if their food were to be 
bought on the market in the mining towns.  
Today, sheep are raised for their meat, hides and wool, while alpacas are raised above all 
for their highly valued fleece, and secondarily for their meat. As a general rule, it can be said that 
the sheep and alpacas kept in the areas of family usufruct (i.e. the estancias) are raised either for 
consumption of their meat by the households themselves or for sale to butchers and other buyers 
in the most local markets (i.e. the town of Huayllay itself, or Cerro de Pasco in the case of 
Rancas). The communal cooperatives, on the other hand, sell meat and hides in larger quantities 
and attract buyers from more distant markets such as Huánuco or even Lima. This is especially 
the case with the alpaca fleece, which is largely not for local consumption but rather is sold to 
companies from elsewhere in Peru. The cooperatives also periodically send some of their 
members to other parts of the country to purchase new breeding stock to improve their herds, and 
these can be quite expensive. Bovine cattle – Brown Swiss to be precise – are also kept in limited 
numbers. For example, at the time of my research the Communal Cooperative of Huayllay had 
one of its three units devoted to bovine cattle, with around 600 head of cattle. In the estancias of 
Rancas, taken as a whole, I estimated the ratio of cows to sheep to be around 1:16 – in other 
words, one cow for every 16 sheep (although there were many estancias that had no bovine cattle 
at all). 
The fact that this is a region devoted to animal husbandry rather than agriculture has 
important consequences for countless aspects of local society – not just the extensive nature of 
land use, but also the relative integrity of communal territories. Although as noted earlier, the 
estancias are managed by individual families, they generally do not build fences or enforce a 
strict separation of pastureland between neighboring estancias. Moreover, they recognize that the 
land ultimately belongs to the community, and that it is only usufruct that is household-based. 
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While it is true that this is due in part to national legislation that made communal lands 
unalienable (from the 1920s to the 1990s), in other, more agricultural regions there has often 
been, in practice, a stronger tendency towards parcelization and the division of communal lands. 
The relative weakness of this phenomenon in the high-altitude areas of Pasco is consistent with 
Burneo´s analysis – based on the work of several Peruvian anthropologists – that sees increasing 
collective control as one moves upwards away from agricultural zones and towards high-altitude 
pasture lands (Burneo 2007, 166-167).  
The land the communities possess today includes both that which they had managed to 
register as comunidades indígenas (from the 1920s to the 1950s), and the land that they gained 
during the Agrarian Reform – the latter in turn a result of the land recuperation campaigns of the 
early 1960s. Scholars like Caballero (1981) have criticized the tendency of observers in the 
1950s and 60s to exaggerate the predominance of large estates in highland Peru, when actually 
small producers occupied a wider area. However, in this particular region, there actually was a 
process of concentration of haciendas during the course of the 20th century, so that they did 
comprise a small number of very large cattle-raising estates: the 308,000 hectare Algolán 
(Fernandini), the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s Ganadera Division, and Lercari Brothers. 
Although their roots lay in colonial-era estates, by the 1950s these haciendas were also 
attempting to modernize along capitalist lines.  
Because the land recuperation movement had been particularly strong in Pasco, and 
because of the high-profile, relatively modern haciendas that existed here, the expropriation of 
the estates took place earlier than in other parts of Peru. In other words, it got underway during 
President Belaunde´s moderate and piecemeal Agrarian Reform program (1964-1968), rather 
than during President Velasco´s more radical reform (1968-1975) as in much of the rest of the 
country. In Pasco, Belaunde´s Reform began to divide up much of the Algolán and CPC estate 
lands among the surrounding communities, instructing them to create cattle-raising “communal 
enterprises” on their portions of the expropriated land (these enterprises became new spaces of 
coordinated production, in addition to the small “communal farms” that had been formed by 
many of the communities in the 1940s).The communities had to pay for the land they received 
under the Agrarian Reform, and thus acquired substantial debts. Other portions of the 
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expropriated estates were turned over to the former hacienda workers in the form of “agrarian 
cooperatives.” When Velasco came to power in 1968, his Agrarian Reform conducted further 
adjudications and additionally converted most of the “communal enterprises” into “communal 
cooperatives,” as they are known to this day. Thus, by the 1970s, Rancas had recovered land 
from the CPC (Hacienda Paria) and Lercari (Hacienda Pacoyán), while Huayllay had 
gained/recovered land from both Algolán and Lercari.292 A final adjustment occurred in the 
1980s, when comunidades like Huayllay and Rancas recovered some additional land from the 
“agrarian cooperatives” of the former hacienda workers. On their remaining land, most of the 
cooperativas agrarias then constituted themselves as new comunidades in their own right. 
Thus, in Huayllay´s case, the land recuperation and Agrarian Reform processes legally 
added some 17,000 hectares to the initial 17,000 that had been legally registered by the 
comunidad indígena in 1931. However, a duality is still maintained between the two portions of 
territory. The original lands are where the families´ estancias (here also called majadas) are 
located, whereas the new lands for the most part comprise Huayllay´s Communal Cooperative 
(Cooperativa Comunal No.16). This duality in space correlates with a duality in production 
techniques: whereas the cooperative is conceptualized as a sphere of technical, managed animal 
husbandry, the estancias are the space of the huacchilla animals, cattle raised following 
traditional techniques.  
In the case of Rancas, on the other hand, the community had been more hemmed in by 
the haciendas, and seems to have been in the possession of no more than 3,000 hectares (possibly 
less) at the start of the land recuperation and Agrarian Reform. In the latter process, the 
community legally added around 13,000 hectares of land (much of which had long been claimed 
by the community as theirs).293 Unlike in Huayllay, only a portion of the recovered land became 
                                                          
292 The comunidades had long considered the land to be theirs; nevertheless, the blueprint for knowing what land 
should belong to what community was not entirely clear. The decisions were initially made by Belaunde´s Agrarian 
Reform officials, on the basis of criteria like the population of each community as well as the latter´s claims. Later 
officials from the Velasco era would criticize the way the unequal way in which the allotments had been made in the 
1960s (SINAMOS 1973). In this sense, the Agrarian Reform was as much a reinvention of communal territorial 
boundaries as it was a recuperation of land by the comunidades as a whole. 
293 It is important to emphasize that the land areas given in this paragraph refer to official figures, which still 
maintain the distinction between the lands registered by the comunidades indígenas and those adjudicated by the 
Agrarian Reform. In the case of Rancas especially, people assert the unity of the communal territory rather than this 
343 
 
part of Rancas´ Communal Cooperative; the rest became estancia territory or was dedicated to 
other communal uses to be described shortly. 
In both Rancas and Huayllay, the term estancia refers to both the shepherd´s dwelling 
and the physical space that surrounds it and in which the animals are pastured. Estancias are 
particular places with individual names that are widely known; for the people who grew up in 
them, they may provide a source of spatial identity as significant as the larger comunidad to 
which the estancia is attached. Additionally, the term majada, especially in Huayllay, can refer to 
either the physical territory of the pasturing grounds, and the flocks that are pastured in them.  
The estancias typically consist of small clusters of two or three small houses or huts, each 
usually containing a single room. Sometimes, one such cluster is set off alone in the middle of 
the plain or on the side of a hill; often, though, several such clusters are located quite close to one 
another and can be thought of as one unit that is in turn set off from the rest of the estancias. In 
those cases, it is often siblings or other close relatives who have stayed on their parents´ land 
while other siblings have gone to reside in the town or the cities. The estancias typically have 
earthen walls (tapial); in the past, some of them were also built out of champa, i.e. the blocks of 
sod that are also used for cooking. In the last few decades, corrugated tin has mostly, though not 
entirely, replaced the former straw roofs. Other ad hoc building materials may also serve as 
supplements. The estancias are clearly distinguished from the houses in the towns of Huayllay 
and Rancas by their lack of running water or electricity.  
In Rancas, the estancias are organized into two sectores or areas, on the western and 
eastern halves of the territory, respectively. Each of the sectores has its own organization, with 
its own president, communal hall and rules and obligations, in addition to also being part of the 
larger communal organization. Much of this land is territory that was recovered from the 
haciendas Paria and Pacoyán in the 1960s.There is also a third area of estancias, located closer to 
the town of Rancas; although it is sometimes referred to as a third sector, it does not have a 
formal sector organization. Taking all of these areas together, there are between 110 and 120 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
separation. Also, it is important to remember that before the Agrarian Reform, boundaries were often fluid, and were 
subject to contestation as peasants and haciendas came into conflict over whose animals could pasture where and in 
exchange for what kinds of labor. 
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estancias within the communal boundaries. This figure, from our 2009 survey, refers to the 
individual units that people in each area tended to identify as separate estancias. Some of them 
were located close to one another – sometimes they belonged to close relatives, sometimes not. If 
we instead count the separate areas of pasture land that have individual names – parajes or 
canchas, each sometimes containing more than one estancia - the figure is closer to 60. The 
estancia pastures are generally not fenced off from one another, though people usually know 
where one begins and one ends. In my own visits to the estancias I found one case where there 
seemed to be strong tensions between two neighboring estancias over pasture lands, though there 
may be others that I did not become aware of.  
In addition to the estancia lands of individual family usufruct, which comprise the 
majority of the communal territory, there are a couple of areas that fall under special regimes. 
One such is the commons area situated on the slopes behind the town of Rancas, separating it 
from the Occroyoc tailings deposit to the east and from the Communal Cooperative to the north. 
This land is meant for families in the town that do not have access to an estancia but want to 
keep a small flock of sheep or alpacas in their backyard; they can send a family member to 
pasture them during the day or in the afternoon and return home before night. Similarly, there is 
an area on the other side of the town where comuneros can extract champa sod, the main biofuel 
used in the area.294 Any comunero can extract champa free of charge here, though they have to 
pay whoever cuts and transports it for them (this is usually done once a year).  
Another special area is the Communal Cooperative, which sits on part of the former lands 
of Hacienda Paria and functions in the old hacienda buildings (including one built in 1880). 
Officially founded as a cooperative in 1968, the cooperative fused with the older “communal 
farm” (granja comunal), which had originated in 1948. The cooperative lands are fenced off 
from the rest of the communal lands; as an institution it constitutes a separate legal entity 
(persona jurídica), though in practice still a part of the community, on whose lands it sits. Not all 
comuneros of Rancas are members (socios) of the cooperative, but all socios must be comuneros.  
                                                          
294 Champa is almost the sole fuel used in the estancias; in the town, it is often used alongside gas stoves, but is a 
lower-cost fuel than gas. 
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Finally, there is the special, fenced-off area set aside for the community´s vicuñas. 
Vicuñas are the undomesticated relatives of the llama and alpaca; once close to extinction in the 
Peruvian Andes, they have increased in recent years thanks to government repopulation 
programs. In the late 1990s, the community of Rancas applied to such a program and received 
around 100 vicuñas, which by 2008 had multiplied tenfold. These animals are owned directly by 
the comunidad as an institution and managed by a special committee known as the Comité 
Conservacionista de Vicuñas. Twice a year, the community organizes a faena (communal work 
day) known as the chaco de vicuñas, in which community members form a gigantic circle and 
use a very long net to round up the vicuñas and place them in a special enclosure, in which they 
are sheared, given medicine and released again.295 The vicuña wool (fibra), highly prized today, 
is then sold by the community.  
Returning to the estancias, when we surveyed them in May 2009, around half were found 
to have a hired shepherd that was taking care of the flocks, while the other 50% were at that 
moment under the care of the comuneros themselves. If we examine the comunero households 
found in the community as a whole, around 22% had estancias under the care of hired shepherds, 
while some 30% had estancias without hired shepherds – i.e. someone from the household or 
from a sibling household took care of the animals. The other half of comunero households did 
not have access to estancias – of these, around a third reported keeping flocks in town that they 
pastured in the common area. The rest (i.e. around a third of the total number of comunero 
households found in the community) claimed not to have animals at all; they were solely and 
completely devoted to other pursuits, whether mining work, commerce or a profession.296 Two 
things must be kept in mind, however. One is that this is a snapshot of an inherently fluid and 
ever-changing reality, and is meant to give only a very general idea. The other is that these 
percentages refer to comunero households that were found in the community at that moment. 
Some comuneros do not reside permanently in the community but rather in the city of Cerro de 
Pasco or even in Lima or Huancayo. So long as they come often and fulfill their obligations, they 
remain comuneros. Between 20 and 30% of comuneros titulares fell into this category at the 
                                                          
295 I participated in the chaco de vicuñas in late 2008. 
296 The data on households is based mostly on self-reporting, whereas the figure for the estancias (i.e. hired 
shepherds vs. not) also contains an element of observation. 
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time; while I do not have a precise sense of their direct connection to the world of the estancias 
and the animals, I suspect it is weaker, and therefore if included it would lower the percentage of 
comunero households involved in this traditional activity. However, it is also important to note 
that even those comuneros who are not at present involved in the raising of animals consider this 
activity to be part of their cultural heritage, something that they did as children or which they 
may occasionally revisit by going to a sibling´s or cousin´s estancia. 
In Huayllay, the groupings of estancias are called not sectores but rather caseríos. There 
are seven caseríos in all; as with the sectores in Rancas, each caserío has its own president, 
communal hall and faena obligations. Most of the caseríos are entirely rural and are simply 
collections of estancias, while some have begun to coalesce into small hamlets. Within the 
caseríos, the pasturing grounds available to each family are called estancias but more often 
majadas. Although I visited some of these spaces, I did not conduct a systematic survey as in 
Rancas; however, a communal publication from 1987 indicates that there were 89 majadas in all. 
These areas of family usufruct are largely situated on the lands that had formed part of the 
community since the comunidad indígena period (i.e. after 1929 but before the Agrarian 
Reform), unlike in Rancas which had had much less land at that time. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
local memory in Huayllay recalls the formation of the comunidad indígena - which occurred in 
1929, though this precise date is not usually remembered by people - as a process by which 
individual property or possession in land gave way to communal property (if such a process 
occurred in Rancas, it is not talked about in that way).297 
By contrast, the lands gained by the community during the Agrarian Reform mostly 
comprise the Communal Cooperative, which was founded in 1966 as a “communal enterprise” 
(empresa comunal) and became a cooperative in 1972 during the Velasco years. Unlike in 
                                                          
297 This does not mean that the comunidad indígena of Huayllay that emerged in 1929 was entirely new and that 
there was no continuity between it and the old pueblo de indios or común de indios of Huayllay. Such continuities 
are asserted by some huayllinos, even if they are less important for others. Rather, it simply means that local 
historical memory highlights the moment in which individual possessors came together to register the communal 
land title (thus abandoning any  pretension to an individual title), whereas in Rancas the comunidad is more often 
spoken of as a unified historical subject that is projected back over the centuries. The actual history of the formation 
of the comunidades in the 20th century, their processes of “communal hegemony” (Mallon 1995), and their 
continuities and ruptures in relation to older communal institutions, are not clear for most communities in Peru; this 
is a little-studied topic in Peruvian historiography.  
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Rancas, where the Cooperative forms a smaller, contiguous territory, in Huayllay it is composed 
of three separate units (Gaya, Rumichaca and Cajoncancha) situated on the lands of the different 
former haciendas of the district. One is dedicated to sheep, another to bovine cattle (as well as a 
small trout farm) and the other to alpacas and llamas. All together, the units cover some 14,000 
hectares of land. As in Rancas, not all comuneros of Huayllay are members of the cooperative, 
but all members must be comuneros; the cooperative is thus a subset of the community but with 
its own, separate legal status. To become eligible for membership, the comuneros must have 
successfully completed two cargos (positions of authority or sponsorship of feasts) in the 
community, in addition to making a payment. At the time of my research, according to the 
president of the cooperative, it had around 480 socios – i.e. comuneros of Huayllay who had also 
become cooperative members. All socios owe faena (work party) obligations to the cooperative, 
which takes them to the fields occasionally, but other than that most of them are not directly 
involved in the day-to-day activities. Rather, the cooperative has a staff of around 42 employees, 
including shepherds, technicians and administrators. At the time of my research, most of the 
cooperative´s shepherds were not from Huayllay (and thus not eligible for membership 
themselves), but rather from neighboring communities; the cooperative president explained this 
was because huayllinos were more engaged in mining work. 
 Unlike in Rancas, where the earlier, smaller granja comunal (communal farm) from the 
1940s merged with the cooperative, in Huayllay it has maintained a separate status, as an area of 
land that is managed directly by the comunidad, through a special committee. Like the other 
granjas comunales in the region, it was formed in the 1940s, when each comunero donated a 
small number of animals so that the comunidad would have an institutional income. In the past, 
the comuneros in Huayllay took turns pasturing these animals and received no salary (Chang 
1970, 136); today, there are around 9 hired shepherds, who receive the monthly minimum salary. 
Unlike in the cooperative and in some of the estancias, however, the hired shepherds in the 
granja comunal are not migrants from outside the community, but rather are almost all 
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huayllinos.298 The granja comunal has sheep, alpacas and bovine cattle, but in much smaller 
numbers than the Communal Cooperative.  
In both Huayllay and Rancas, the communal institutions described so far today coexist 
with a new kind of entity: the Communal Companies (empresas comunales) that operate as 
contractors for the mines and that have been formed as a way to create jobs for comuneros and 
their children. In their organizational structure and in the role they play within the community 
they bear some similarity to the cooperatives and the communal institution itself. But, unlike the 
latter, the Communal Companies do not occupy the land, for they do not engage in cattle-raising 
but rather in the operation of heavy machinery, construction, landscaping and other activities 
related to the world of the mining companies. 
In both Rancas and Huayllay, the phenomenon of migrant shepherds merits some 
examination. Shepherding arrangements in the Andes have always been complex; shepherds take 
care not just of their own animals but also of those belonging to other people, often relatives to 
whom they are tied by webs of reciprocity and obligation. This is even more so the case in a 
region like Pasco, where families often have had one foot in the countryside and one foot in the 
mining camps, leaving their estancias in charge of relatives or, sometimes, hiring shepherds to 
whom they are not related. My research took place while the post-2003 mining boom was still 
ongoing (the slight dip in 2008-2009 notwithstanding); thus, this tendency was heightened, as 
people in Rancas and Huayllay were well aware. The demand of metals from China had, since 
2003, led to increased mining production, with all the traditional underground mines of Pasco 
working at full capacity, and some previously abandoned mines re-opening. Together with the 
new mechanism of the mining canon (i.e. the redistribution of 50% of mining companies´ taxes 
to the municipal and regional governments in their areas of operation), this led to a new 
dynamism in the regional economy. Thus, there were more job opportunities in the mines, in 
construction companies contracting with the now-wealthy municipal governments, and in the 
public sector. Combined with the prejudice against shepherding as a low-status occupation 
without prospects, this led to fewer ranqueños and huayllinos being willing to stay in the 
                                                          
298 The description in this paragraph is based on my own interviews. However, it mostly matches that found in 
Gonzáles et al. (2002).  
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estancias and look after the animals. In Rancas, as mentioned already, in 2009 around half of the 
estancias were under the care of comunero families – either the owners of the animals or a close 
relative. The other half were under the care of non-comunero, non-ranqueño shepherd families, 
with the comuneros who employed them coming frequently to check on them.  
Thus, in Rancas I estimated that around 14% of households living within the communal 
boundaries were composed of hired shepherds; of these, we managed to survey 41 households 
(the great majority). Some of these “households” were composed of a single shepherd on the 
estancia, while in other cases an entire family lived there. Of the shepherd households, 35 were 
working on the family-owned estancias, while 6 were employed on the Communal Cooperative´s 
pastures. These figures do not include most cases where a relative took care of a family´s 
animals, since in those cases the family did not usually refer to them as a “hired shepherd” 
(pastor contratado). Thus, most of the “hired shepherds” (some 38 out of 41) were neither 
comuneros nor ranqueños. Of 33 such shepherd households for whom I have information on area 
of origin, only 2 were from other plateau, high-altitude communities, while 31 were from the 
quebradas, the steep intermontane valleys to the north, northwest and northeast of Rancas. 
Specifically, 11 were from Huánuco, 15 were from the Chaupiwaranga Valley (Chacayán, 
Yanauanca, Tusi), and 2 were from other quebradas in Pasco Department (i.e. Ticlacayán and 
Huariaca). Although these numbers provide only a static and somewhat simplistic picture (some 
households maybe from several places at once, or they may have distant kinship links to 
ranqueño families), they give some idea of the dynamic by which people from the quebrada 
agricultural communities travel to the high-altitude plateau area to work as shepherds. They take 
over from the traditionally livestock-raising ranqueños, more of whom are now working in the 
mines. Insofar as this occurs, there is, as one ranqueño explained to me, a movement by which 
“the agriculturalists have become shepherds and the shepherds have become miners.” 
Although I do not have precise figures for the hired shepherds in Huayllay, my interviews 
and observations indicate that a similar dynamic is at play there, though Huayllay may have 
slightly more migrant shepherds who come from other plateau communities, not just from the 
quebradas. It should be emphasized again that in Pasco there is a reversal of the dynamic found 
elsewhere in Peru, where higher altitude is associated with lower socioeconomic status as well as 
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with a lower level of modernity (the ideological coast vs. highlands opposition being the most 
extreme variant of this). In Pasco, the lower-altitude quebradas (situated at under 3,800 meters 
above sea level) are seen as being less modern, more “traditional,” and more Quechua-speaking 
than the communities of the highland, plateau region (4,200-4,400 meters above sea level). This 
ideological division is to some degree based on a real social difference between livestock-raising 
and agriculture, and most importantly between communities closest to the mines (and to foreign 
capital in the 20th century) and those a bit further away. The difference should not be 
exaggerated, either in socioeconomic status or in ideology; it is not nearly as dramatic as the 
coast vs. highlands opposition in Peru as a whole, for example. Many links have historically 
united the plateau and quebrada communities, and continue to do so today, in the sphere of 
kinship, commerce and work. And it is important to also remark that the more “traditional” 
image of the quebradas to the north and northeast (Huánuco, Chaupiwaranga, etc.) does not 
seem to extend to the quebradas to the west, where the Andes descend towards the coast. This 
area, with which Huayllay (much more so than Rancas) has historically had close ties, is if 
anything seen as more “modern” than the plateau, due to its proximity to the coast and its higher 
degree of commercial development. 
The relations between hired shepherds and the comuneros who employ them are marked 
by both monetary and non-monetary transactions. Historically, in this area, people have taken 
care of flocks belonging to the owner of a pasture in return for the right to keep some of their 
own animals there. That was the nature of the relationship between the huacchilleros and the 
haciendas in former times; landed property had as much to do with control over labor as it did 
with control over land (Martínez-Alier 1973). Additionally, there is the widespread al partir 
arrangement, whereby a person takes care of someone else´s flock in return for half of the 
offspring as well as the products obtained from the animals. Al partir may mediate relations 
among comunero families as well as between them and hired shepherds. In addition, hired 
shepherds today are often paid a wage; that is the case in many of the estancias in Rancas and 
Huayllay. However, these wages are usually low – 250 or 300 soles per month, i.e. less than half 
the national minimum wage. That is because these wages are usually complemented by al partir 
arrangements, as well as by more complex forms of in-kind exchange between shepherds and 
those who hire them. Comuneros who possess estancias and own flocks are expected to bring 
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their shepherds food, warm clothing and other products. For example, one family in Rancas 
would bring rations of milk to their shepherd every week.299 By contrast, the shepherds 
employed by the Communal Cooperatives receive only a monetary wage – in the case of 
Huayllay´s Cooperative, it was the minimum wage. 
 Although in the figures for “hired shepherds” given above I have abstracted this category 
to make it more visible (based on how people in Rancas themselves used the term), in reality 
there are also many different shepherding arrangements among comunero families themselves. 
The hired shepherds stand out insofar as they are not comuneros and find it difficult to become 
so. In both Rancas and Huayllay, the comunidad is defined by kinship as much as by territory; 
comuneros are people who have acquired their status either by virtue of having been born to 
other comuneros, or by marrying into the community. The latter case is very common, as the 
communities are not endogamous. Many ranqueños and huayllinos are married to people from 
outside, both from plateau and quebrada communities. These individuals are known collectively 
as the “in-laws” (yernos or nueras); although they may face some suspicion or rejection at first, 
if they fulfill their responsibilities they are eventually treated like any other comunero. But 
outsiders who do not marry into the community cannot become comuneros, even if they spend 
time there as do the hired shepherds. That is certainly the case in Rancas. In Huayllay, I was told 
that outsiders could become comuneros if they did enough feast sponsorship cargos, even 
without marriage, but I didn´t actually meet anyone who fell into this category. In any case, as 
the president of the community of Huayllay explained to me, this would not help shepherds, 
since they do not usually have the financial resources required to successfully sponsor a feast. In 
this sense, the hired shepherds can be said to constitute an excluded class, who tend flocks 
without gaining access to the benefits of being community members. At the same time, some 
hired shepherds may be relatives of yernos or nueras who come from the quebradas, thus 
blurring the line between inclusion and exclusion somewhat. 
 
                                                          
299 These exchanges can go the other way too. For the quebrada communities of Pasco, Mendoza (2006) writes 
about an arrangement “whereby the female shepherds, besides taking care of the livestock, are expected to gather 
and carry firewood, spin wool or knit an item of clothing, if they do not carry out these activities they are subject to 
strong criticism by the relatives” (71).  
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Mining work and the community 
 As discussed earlier, Rancas and Huayllay are landowning comunidades campesinas 
(peasant communities), and at the same time spaces that include a varied population dedicated to 
multiple occupations beyond just the work on the land. To some degree, the term “peasant-
miner” used by an earlier generation of researchers still applies, though without the implications 
of linear change that many of them saw (as in DeWind´s 1987 title, “Peasants into Miners”). The 
nature of what it means to be a campesino and what it means to be a “miner” has changed. And 
other occupations have arisen in between these two. Small-scale commerce is among the most 
common; construction work on municipal projects undertaken with the new canon minero funds 
since 2002 is another. In addition, Huayllay and Rancas also both have a few young and middle-
aged professionals, most of who graduated from the university or the public technical institute in 
Cerro de Pasco. This is especially the case in Rancas, which is closer to Cerro de Pasco and has 
historically been less confined to mining work. These young professionals include nurses, 
teachers, animal science specialists, accountants, and a few others. Most of them do not stay to 
live in the community, but some maintain a strong connection and visit often. The pursuit of 
higher education by young people from the mining camps and, secondarily, the comunidades of 
Pasco began with the founding of the University of Cerro de Pasco (the UNDAC) in the 1960s, 
and increased in later decades. These students often rent small, cold rooms around the university 
and the technical institute in the neighborhood of San Juan Pampa, or they may stay with 
relatives in the city. They face obstacles as a result of the traditional neglect by the Peruvian state 
towards public universities, especially those in the highlands. The arrival of canon minero funds 
(a small fraction of which are meant to go to public universities near the mines) since 2002 has 
not been able to solve the serious institutional and academic problems that beset the UNDAC. 
Furthermore, young professionals with degrees from Cerro de Pasco have a hard time obtaining 
jobs when competing with graduates from larger, more established institutions, such as the 
universities in Lima.  
 Returning to mining, it is still one of the most significant sources of employment in both 
Rancas and Huayllay, though much more so in the latter. Some quantitative data may help give 
us at least a partial idea of this. In Huayllay District, the 2007 National Census indicated that 
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57% of the Economically Active Population (PEA) living in the town of Huayllay was working 
at jobs related to the “exploitation of mines and quarries.”300 In other words, 1,357 people out of 
a total PEA of 2,355 and a total town population of 5,782 (which admittedly includes not only 
comuneros but also migrant workers from elsewhere who rent rooms in the town). The bulk of 
these individuals were no doubt employed at the Huarón and Animón mines.301 Here, the 
community has merged with the mining camp to a great degree, as discussed later in this chapter. 
In the town of Rancas, some 18% were engaged in the “exploitation of mines and quarries,” with 
another 18% in construction and 11% in transport. These numbers certainly fluctuate each year 
and should only be taken as a very general illustration.  
 In Huayllay especially, there is a sense that mining work historically has led people to 
neglect, and lose proficiency in, the work on the land, i.e. the raising of livestock (as well as 
other activities like craft production). This discourse is less present in Rancas, where the 
dominant narrative focuses rather on land recuperation, even though a history of mining work 
has also been present since the early 20th century and even before. In both communities, 
however, there is a belief that the current mining boom is discouraging young people from 
studying and pursuing training or higher education, by offering them money and apparent 
financial solvency in the short run. I encountered this view spontaneously in several of my 
interviews. For example, a native and resident of Rancas who happens to be a professional and 
was working at the district municipality at the time of my research gave me this account: 
The young people leave the schools, they apply to the universities or the technical 
institutes, they don’t get in, and the only source of work is to go work for the contratas 
[subcontractors]. So then they enter the service of the mining company. So then these 
young people who, when they were students, did not receive any money, and now that 
they are workers they work longer than 12 hours, some of them, they do not make good 
use of their youth. And, since they have money, suddenly, they earn more than 700 [soles 
per month], up to 1200 soles, then they don’t know what to do with the money. So then 
what they do is spend it in the clubs [discotecas], spend it on those kinds of amusements 
that unfortunately have a negative impact on their formation. And very few decide to 
                                                          
300 In the neighboring town of Huaychao, the percentage engaged in mining was less – around 39.81%. In the small 
community of Los Andes de Pucará (a former hacienda whose inhabitants are almost entirely dedicated to livestock 
raising), also in the district, the percentage dedicated to mining is negligible. For the district as a whole, the 
percentage dedicated to “mines and quarries” is 60%.  
301 There are some people who can be said to work in “quarrying”, but this is negligible. 
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continue studying... So we run the risk that 5 years from now, Rancas will not have 
professionals, because the majority will become miners.  
Here we see the specter of a crisis in what we could call the “myth of professionalization” 
– a subset of the broader “myth of progress” that has been analyzed for Peru’s Andean 
populations (Degregori 1986) and which is in turn one particular version of a much larger, global 
assortment of ideologies of progress. The “myth” in question is of course not a myth in the sense 
of being false but rather of serving as a powerful mobilizing ideology. In Rancas, Huayllay and 
much of Peru today, having one’s children obtain professional degrees is a central hope for many 
parents, so much so that the term profesional acquires a powerful, almost sacrosanct quality. In 
Rancas in particular, this hope has been realized to a greater degree than in many other 
communities. Ranqueños largely see themselves today as a community of livestock raisers, small 
traders and professionals (as well as defenders of a communal patrimony in land). While mining 
work was important in the first half of the 20th century, it decreased as a source of employment 
for ranqueños after the 1950s. This was not only because of the mechanization underway in the 
mines at the time, but also because the community´s occupation of the mining company´s 
Hacienda Paria in 1960 – which eventually brought about the expropriation of all the CPC´s 
haciendas – led the company to discriminate against the hiring of new ranqueño workers for 
several years. With much more pasturing land now available, and with the new university in 
Cerro de Pasco nearby, the community expanded in the direction of both livestock and higher 
education/technical training. In any case, most of those ranqueños who did work in the mines 
retired during the period of workforce reduction in the early 1990s.  But in the last decade, 
several factors are increasing mining work opportunities for young people: the increased activity 
of existing mines in the area (Cerro de Pasco, Brocal, etc.) as well as the opening of a few new 
small, nearby mines (Chancadora Centauro, Aurex), both the result of increased metal prices. 
Another important factor is the formation of Rancas´ communal company, formed in 1990 with 
the capital received as compensation for tailings disposal on one of its pastures (see next 
section). This phenomenon of a renewed shift towards mining work among youth is what 
explains the concern brought up by the ranqueño professional quoted above.  
 In Huayllay, although the link to mining work has historically been stronger and more 
continuous (and more central to local identity), and although the access to higher education since 
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the 1960s has been less than in Rancas, the “myth of professionalization” is also present, as a 
hope for many and reality for some. And people also seem to see the renewed increase in mining 
work in recent years as discouraging young people from studying. This came up in a 
conversation with the mothers in the local Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) committee in 
Huayllay.302 I had asked them if they wanted their children to work in mining, to which they 
answered “yes, but as an engineer” and “as professionals”: “I would not like them to work as a 
miner, working with the shovel [tirando lampa], so to speak.”303 One of them elaborated on this: 
This is the desire of the mothers, of all women, that your child succeed, no? Not to be the 
same as the father, but to improve. That is the vision of the women, here in the town 
[pueblo], that’s why they make sacrifices as much as possible so that their children can 
study.  
But, one of them added, there is a parallel tendency or current that is undermining the pursuit of 
progress through education: 
Although, now the women are saying, there is talk [habladuría], “Why do the children 
work so hard in the university [para qué tanto se matan los hijos en la universidad] for 5 
or 6 years, and there is no jobs for what they’ve studied, for example doctors are looking 
for jobs. So then it’s better to work in the mine and then they are earning their money.” 
So then there is conformism [conformismo] from that side. Perhaps we don’t all think the 
same, there are people who think a bit like that, “I want my son to start earning money, 
with his money he can make his house, he can look to build his home, he can set up his 
store [negocio] and that’s it.” 
Another one of the mothers nodded in agreement, describing a belief that she doesn´t see herself 
as sharing: 
The opinion of the greater part of the people is, “I put my son through high school [le 
hice terminar el colegio], if after that he wants to study he can study on his own means, 
otherwise he can look to start a family [que busque su familia] and there is the company 
and the mine, go work with the shovel [a lampear].”  
                                                          
302 The Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) is a nationwide program that provides government food assistance through 
local committees headed by women. It was founded in 1984 by Lima’s leftist mayor Alfonso Barrantes, in response 
to the demands of women’s organizations in the working-class neighborhoods of the city, then spread to the rest of 
the country. During the 1990s the program was heavily subject to clientelistic manipulation by Alberto Fujimori’s 
government. Today the Vaso de Leche committees are still among the most ubiquitous women-headed institutions in 
the country.  
303 Tirando lampa is used here in the general sense of unskilled, low-paid work, not necessarily implying that hand 
shovels are still extensively used in the mines. 
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 These quotes illustrate a particular kind of concern that exists in Huayllay and Rancas 
regarding the effects of the recent mining boom (2003-present): mining employment brings 
income and financial security in the short run, but it lures people into a false sense of 
complacency and away from education and professionalization, which demands sacrifices in the 
short run but promises progress in the long run. Also in both communities, there is a strong 
awareness that mining is not sustainable, that it is only for a short time, unlike livestock. This 
sense comes not only from the spread of sustainable development discourse, but also from the 
local memory of the mining crisis of the 1980s and 90s and the mass workforce reductions that 
followed. Furthermore, the mining companies (Volcan, Pan American Silver) themselves 
encourage this, wittingly or unwittingly, by talking frequently about crisis and the possibility of 
closure during negotiations over land, in order to pressure communities to moderate their 
demands and acquiesce to company terms and conditions. The concern over the undermining of 
educational progress bears some similarities with certain discourses expressed when talking 
about the past in Huayllay (but less so in Rancas), that also have to do with negative effects of a 
dedication to mining work over the long run. In Huayllay, as mentioned, people frequently talk 
about how mining work not only moved people away from the world of raising livestock and 
craft production but also led them to lose the skills and cultural knowledge associated with that 
world. They see their long-term engagement with mining work as having stunted the 
development of livestock production in Huayllay, even if it brought other kinds of growth and 
development. Another such discourse about the past has to do with the false sense of 
complacency that is attributed to the families that lived in the mining camps up to the early 
1990s, as discussed in Chapter 4: those families felt secure with their income, benefits and camp 
housing, and did not invest in building their own house somewhere else, so when the layoffs and 
workforce reductions came they found themselves in dire straits. 
 In Huayllay and Rancas, mining and mining-related work is sometimes a means for 
young men from poorer households – those that tend to stay with the flocks in the estancias, 
often taking care of relatives´ animals – to gain access to more income than they have ever had 
before, even if it is only for a time, with no job security and for long work hours. They may find 
it hard to enter more skilled positions in the mines, since the latter now require two years´ 
experience. But they can get unskilled jobs or, so long as they are comuneros or children of 
357 
 
comuneros, they can hope to get employment through the communal company.   Other young 
people from more established, more affluent comunero families may also find the temptation of 
the income provided by a job as a driver or scoop operator in the mine too strong to bear. They 
are then seen as neglecting their own education and possibilities of professionalization. It is also 
important to note another source of employment that is often similar in terms of the work 
involved (i.e. driving and operating machinery) but that is indirectly rather than directly related 
to mining: work with the contractors engaged in construction projects for the municipalities. 
With the swelling of municipal budgets as a result of the post-2003 mineral price increase as well 
as the new mechanism of the canon minero, construction was all the rage in both Huayllay and 
Rancas at the time of my research; this new development had the mayors and the contractors as 
its main protagonists. Unlike the more capital-intensive mining contractors, which are almost 
always from outside the region – often founded by engineers from Lima or other major cities – a 
few of the small contracting firms that work on municipal construction projects are owned by the 
more affluent families of Huayllay and Rancas, though the majority are not.  
 The changes that took place in industrial mining work over the course of the 20th century, 
as well as those that occurred as a result of the restructuring of the 1990s, have been described in 
earlier chapters. In industrial mining regions like Pasco, the century saw the long-term shift from 
a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus, with the 1950s as a point of inflexion - 
though this has as much to do with the changes in the surrounding society (i.e. the decline of 
traditional rural systems of production and exchange, the growth of population and the 
emergence of an industrial reserve army) as it does with anything that goes on directly inside the 
sphere of production (i.e. mechanization). The process of mechanization in the medium-scale 
underground mines of Pasco and Central Peru took place gradually over the course of the 1970s 
and 80s, with scoop loaders, dump trucks and trackless mining systems increasingly replacing 
the old world of mine railways, shovels and timbermen. More slowly (and unevenly), raise-bore 
and jumbo drills have replaced jackleg and other handheld drills (some of the latter were still in 
use in the Huarón mine at the time of my visit). The changes in underground mining in Peru 
were paralleled by another, more dramatic technological leap – the rise of large-scale open-pit 
mining, in Cerro de Pasco but also in other Peruvian mines such as Toquepala (1950s), Cuajone 
(1960s), Tintaya (1980s) and several others since the 1990s (Antamina, Pierina, Yanacocha and a 
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host of developing projects). To all these gradual, long-term shifts was added the more sudden, 
drastic change in the legal regimes and the social organization of labor in the 1990s, as discussed 
in Chapter 4. Only a few more comments are necessary here, from a more contemporary and 
ethnographic angle.  
 The situation of mining work today, when compared to the period before the 1990s, can 
be summarized through reference to four main aspects: the rise of contracting, the shift towards 
the new accumulated-time sistemas and the accompanying 12-hour work day, the lack of labor 
stability, and the decline of unions. In a way, the contracting system harkens back to the early 
days of the 20th century, when contratas were common in many of the mines of the Central 
Highlands. They declined during the course of the century, as mining companies needed to have 
more control over its workforce so as to increase their training and duration on the job. Contratas 
began to appear again in the 1970s and 80s, but only to a very limited degree. But they increased 
markedly in the 1990s, after the majority of payroll workers had left the mines, and has 
continued to do so. At the time of my research, for example, the Animón/Chungar mine in 
Huayllay had a total of between 1,700 and 1,800 people working there, but only around 400 were 
on payroll. The rest were employed by 67 different contratas. The company had more than 200 
people from the community of Huayllay working there, of whom only around 60 were on payroll 
– and those on payroll were there largely because of the mine-community agreements or 
convenios. At Huarón, the proportion of payroll workers was significantly higher, though many 
of them were on 3-month or 6-month contracts. In Cerro de Pasco, at the time of my research, a 
minority of the workforce was on the Volcan company´s payroll, and the company was in the 
process of increasing the proportion of subcontracted workers as well as those on short-term 
contracts.  
Today, the contrata vs. planilla (payroll) division has become all-important in the mines 
of Pasco. Being part of the planilla is a highly desired but rarely achieved status. The distinction 
has very concrete implications; not only are planilla workers usually paid more, but they also 
have a better chance of accessing a more permanent position – i.e. an “indefinite-time contract;” 
rather one that must be renewed every 3 or 6 months. In addition, there is the issue of the profit-
sharing arrangement known as the reparto de utilidades. By law in Peru, all private companies 
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that have at least 20 employees must share a portion of their pre-tax profits with their workers. 
This is a holdover from the days of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), who 
established the “industrial communities” as a mechanism for worker participation and for 
workers´ gradual acquisition of their companies´ capital. While the most radical aspects of 
Velasco´s Industrial Reform were dismantled by later governments, profit-sharing remained in 
the laws, albeit under new rules and only to a limited extent. For mining companies, workers are 
eligible to receive, collectively, up to 8% of pre-tax profits. With the rise in metal prices after 
2003, payroll workers at large mining companies began receiving significant reparto de 
utilidades payments at the end of the year. This mechanism was part of the reason for the image 
of mining workers in Peru today as a highly-paid, privileged sector of the workforce. But not 
only are the profits in the medium-sized underground mines smaller; also, contracted workers do 
not receive profit-sharing payments from the mining companies in which they work. Rather, they 
only receive payments from the specific contracting firm for which they work, and this is 
inevitably much smaller, often negligible.  
  Another important change has been the implementation of “accumulated-time systems” 
by which workers´ time is rationalized and compressed into separate work and rest periods. In 
other words, rather than working more 8-hour days, as in the past, people now work a smaller 
number of days but these last around 12 hours. The introduction of the 12-hour work day took 
place in the 1990s and early 2000s– in those early days when labor was weakest, there often was 
an extension of the work day without an accompanying increase in the number of rest days. 
Abuses by contractors were common in the mines of this region as in other Peruvian mines, as 
both workers and some company officials acknowledge. Eventually, the 12-hour workday 
stabilized into the accumulated-time systems, of which the most common is 14x7 – 14 days of 
work followed by 7 days of rest. The 14 days of work are in turn divided into 7 days of day shifts 
(7am-7pm, or 8am-8pm) and 7 days of night shifts. Systems like this come from labor 
innovations in the global mining industry associated with the rise of Fly-in/Fly-out systems 
(FIFO), but in this part of Peru they occur even when people are not commuting from afar. 
Under the 14x7 system, people technically work the same number of hours as before, but there is 
less “dead time” during shift changes (since there are two rather than three shifts per day), and 
there are less workers at any one time, so the company can economize and rationalize their time 
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better. The sistemas are also convenient for the companies in that they allow them to bring 
specialized workers and technicians from afar without having to provide services for their 
families. But for the most part, they apply to workers who are from the surrounding area as well. 
At Huarón, for example, the concentrator plant workers are on the old 8-hour day, but almost all 
the workers in the mine are on the 14x7 sistema. The same is true at Animón/Chungar. In Cerro 
de Pasco, many of the payroll workers are on the old schedule, but most of the contrata workers 
(who comprise the majority) are on sistema.  
 The 12-hour work day is actually subject to different interpretations. At Huarón, although 
signs at the entrance to the mine complex state that the shifts are 8am-8pm and 8pm-8am, 
company officials consider that the actual workday is 10 hours and 15 minutes. They state that 
45 minutes are spent at lunch, and one hour moving to and from one´s place of work inside the 
mine, thus the total shift is 12 hours. On the other hand, if one examines the total time from when 
workers leave their home to when they return, including commute, this can extend to as much as 
14 or 15 hours, depending on the nature and length of the commute. Such is the case for example 
with workers from Rancas who go board the buses to the new Chancadora Centauro mine, or, to 
a lesser degree, those who live in Huayllay and board the buses to Huarón and Animón/Chungar.  
In both communities, the workers assemble at around 5:45 am to board their buses, and return 
home around 8 or 9 in the evening. In Rancas, they assemble in the main square of the town, 
while in Huayllay each contrata (including the communal company) has its own street corner 
where its workers gather awaiting the bus that will take them up to the mine. In Huayllay, around 
11:00 am, the workers´ families (often, but not always, their wives) gather to send them the 
lunches they have prepared, which are transported up to the mine by a bus.  
 One implication of the sistema is that workers spend virtually no time with their families 
during their “on” days; they come home and go straight to sleep. During the 7 night-shift days, 
they sleep during the day, and their families must be careful not to wake them up. The sistema is 
thus associated with a high degree of separation between the activities of men and women – 
something that was the case under the old 8-hour day, but less so. Naturally, this is something 
that people are aware of. For example, I once overheard a conversation between a juice vendor in 
one of the small markets in Huayllay and a young couple who were her customers. She was 
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telling the man that he should “stop being a miner,” and explained that when you have your own 
negocio (small business or store), you can work alongside your partner. But if you work all day 
in the mine, she argued, your wife cannot work, because she has to prepare the lunch to send to 
the mine, take care of the children alone, etc.  
 Although the new sistema order represents an extension of the work day beyond what it 
was in the past, there is a lot of stoicism on the part of workers regarding this fact. Whereas they 
object to and criticize the companies’ reliance on contractors, and see no benefits in being on 
contrata rather than planilla, the assessments of the sistema and the 12-hour workday are more 
ambiguous. One ranqueño worker, who at the time was driving a dumper truck for a contrata at 
the Cerro de Pasco mine, phrased it to me in terms of adaptation by the body to the intensified 
rhythm of work. He described his conversations with the older workers who, unlike him, are on 
the company payroll, and who are not on sistema, unlike the majority contrata workers: 
We talked about it with the guys on the company payroll [who are older] and they said, as 
long as you are young, you don’t feel it, you can work 12 hours. For example in the case 
of machine operators, from the time you come in, out of the 12 hours you effectively 
work 10 hours, 9 or 10.304 And so, the señores who are on payroll say, “When you get to 
be a certain age, do you really believe you´ll be able to last 8 or 9 hours driving?” And, 
well, in the time I´ve been working so far, what I see is that, it seems the body gets used 
to it. Or maybe it´s like the guys on payroll say, “it´s only when you´re young.” [But] 
there are other companies, for example the Milpo company, their payroll workers are on 
the sistema, and they are older guys.  
 Besides the spread of contracting and the new labor sistemas, the 1990s saw the end of 
the old regime of labor stability. The old order had developed gradually over the course of the 
20th century, as part of the protections that the Peruvian state offered formal-sector workers. It 
reached its apogee in the early 1970s, when the Velasco government implemented further 
adjustments in the norms that made it very difficult for companies to fire workers under regular 
circumstances (which did not prevent the later government of Morales Bermúdez from firing, 
through a special decree, hundreds of workers for organizing and leading the massive 1977 
general strike). By contrast, in the early 1990s the government of Alberto Fujimori followed 
                                                          
304 That is, not including time moving to and from the place of work inside the mine, eating lunch, or listening to the 
daily safety talk. Under the old 8-hour system, the time directly devoted to “actual work” was also less, by all 
accounts – 6 hours or even less.  
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worldwide trends, and complied with the demands of the Peruvian business class, by 
implementing a series of dramatic legal reforms that effectively ended the regime of labor 
stability. Today, there are two types of labor contracts in the mines of Pasco: indefinite and 
fixed-time contracts. Indefinite-time contracts are more permanent, though even there the degree 
of labor stability is lower than in the past, for the laws of the 1990s made it easier to dismiss 
workers for a number of reasons. Fixed-time contracts, on the other hand, have the mechanism 
for dismissal built into their very structure: they last only 3 or 6 months, and it is entirely the 
employer’s prerogative whether to renew it or not. This distinction based around the type of 
contract introduces an additional division in the workforce, on top of the planilla/contrata split.  
Thus, the workforce in any one mining company can really be thought of as being 
divided among three groups: contrata workers (technically not even employed by the main 
company), fixed-time planilla workers, and indefinite-time planilla workers. The second and 
third groups technically receive all the same benefits and rights (unlike the first); the difference 
is that fixed-time workers are under constant threat of non-renewal of contract, which in essence 
amounts to a dismissal. At Huarón, according to data provided to me by the company in 2009, 
there were approximately 660 contrata employees, 440 fixed-time planilla and 440 indefinite-
time planilla employees. Although the company did not specify, my sense is that most of the 440 
indefinite-time planilla workforce corresponded to the 315 empleados (roughly, white-collar 
workers and technicians). Thus, only a few obreros would be on indefinite-time contracts, which 
is something that entirely corresponds to the perception of the local population. In fact, there is a 
well-known group of 12 obreros (blue-collar workers) from the old days who managed to hold 
on through the 1990s and early 2000s, and who still have more protected contracts. At 
Animón/Chungar, according to the information provided to me by one official in 2010 and 
mentioned earlier, there were around 400 planilla workers and some 1,300 or 1,400 contrata 
workers, and virtually all the planilla workers were on fixed-time contracts.  
 The end of labor stability is the single biggest factor accounting for the decline of the 
mining unions in the last 20 years: more than the assassination and intimidation of union leaders 
in the 1980s and early 90s, more than any labor-saving technological changes, and more than the 
rise of the sistemas, the closure of the mining camps and the resulting scattering of working-class 
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communities that had stabilized somewhat in the second half of the 20th century. The workers I 
have spoken with certainly perceive it as the biggest reason why unionization is not even a 
possibility or something that seems relevant to their situation at the moment. The unions that 
remain basically exist for those payroll workers who are on indefinite-time contracts. The non-
renewal of contracts for workers who sign up to belong to a union is not an idle threat, rather it is 
standard, accepted practice. This has occurred numerous times, for example in Huarón in 2007. 
The head of Human Resources there told me clearly that they were accused of firing workers for 
joining the union, but they had fired no one – they had simply not renewed their short-term 
contracts. It also occurred in the Cerro de Pasco mine in 2012. Whereas the Huarón workers in 
2007 had attempted to join the union maintained by the 12 remaining old-time workers (this 
union was eventually dissolved after the attempt failed), the fixed-time workers in Cerro de 
Pasco in 2012 were trying to form their own union. Thirty-one of them were suspended until 
their contracts ran out, and the contracts were of course not renewed. This set off a labor conflict 
in which the fixed-time workers managed to get the support of the stable workers, who had their 
own grievances, but the campaign eventually failed and the workers are now in the courts trying 
to resolve their situation.  
 The decline of the once-strong mining unions is one of the most striking aspects of the 
social situation in the mining centers, and it is something that is readily admitted by the 
remaining unions themselves, all of whom are aware that the companies now have the upper 
hand. This development has largely removed a once-important political actor and local 
institution from the social scene. There is a generation gap between the former workers of the 
1970s and 80s, most of who are now retired, and the mostly young men who work in the mines 
now. Most of the latter have not been exposed to the union culture that existed at that time, and 
so the generational gap is a cultural gap as well.  
 
 A gathering at the estancia 
 I will now conclude this chapter with an ethnographic vignette to illustrate some aspects 
of the relationship between the worlds of livestock-raising and mining. Specifically, I will 
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describe a particular celebration of the yearly propitiatory ritual for the sheep that took place in 
an estancia in one of the caseríos of Huayllay in February 2010. In this area, this ritual is most 
commonly referred to simply as carnavales, due to the time of the year in which it takes place – 
i.e., right before Lent and at the same time as carnival celebrations in the Andes and around the 
world. It is also sometimes called herranza (literally, branding or horseshoeing, although this 
does not take place unless bovine cattle are involved), fiesta de los animales (feast of the 
animals) or even cumpleaños de los animales (birthday of the animals). The term carnaval 
ganadero (livestock carnival) is sometimes used in public discussions nowadays, to distinguish it 
from other types of carnival. It is one version of the broader family of Andean livestock rituals. 
This wider genre includes other carnival-season rituals all around the Peruvian Andes – such as 
the haywarisqa and ch´uyay described for different pastoralist communities of southern Peru by 
Flores Ochoa (1977, 212-214) and Ricard (2007, 209-217), respectively. It also includes the 
well-known rituals conducted in July and August, such as the Santiago (popular in the Mantaro 
Valley), the cattle-branding rituals of the upper Chancay Valley described by Rivera Andía 
(2005), and the t´ikachay for the llamas celebrated by the pastoralists of Ausangate in southern 
Peru (Ricard 2007, 217-218). In the Pasco/Junín plateau, although certain rituals and tasks in 
relation to livestock may be conducted at different points in the year, it is the February 
carnavales that have preeminence by far. My intention here is not so much to delve deeply into 
the meanings and ritual aspects of the celebration; these are analyzed at greater length by other 
authors. In addition to studies from more distant areas of Peru, Mendoza Villanueva (2006, 57-
72) offers an account for the general cultural area of the plateau communities of Pasco, while the 
analysis of Rivera Andía (2005), mentioned above, pertains to an agricultural quebrada region 
that has historically had close relations with Huayllay specifically (the upper Chancay Valley). 
Rather, my purpose is to use the gathering at the estancia as an opportunity to illustrate the 
different relationships to livestock-raising and mining work that exist within a single extended 
family, as well as to show the ways in which people relate to tradition and custom in a context of 
long-term change. Other aspects of local society described in this chapter should also become 
clearer through this account. 
 Unlike other local celebrations such as the patron saints´ days or the Cruces de Mayo, 
which are public and linked to communal institutions, the livestock rituals of the carnavales are a 
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private, household affair – indeed, a family gathering - that takes place away from the main 
towns. As people often say when asked about it, “that´s something that the families do in the 
estancias.” The livestock rituals are also somewhat less open to outsiders than the communal 
celebrations. They do have a public nature through local radio stations, which broadcast the 
traditional songs for the livestock as well as greetings sent by individual families for their 
animals. In addition, the feast of the estancias now has a very public counterpart. Since 2000, the 
Municipality of Simón Bolívar District has organized the Festival de la Herranza Andina, a 
public festival in which communities represent their own customs around the livestock 
carnavales, in a coliseum in the community of Yurajhuanca, situated between the community of 
Quiulacocha and Rancas, near Cerro de Pasco. It was initially created by then-mayor Valentín 
López Espíritu, a local politician from Quiulacocha who, before his tragic death in an auto 
accident in 2011, was associated with a position of revalorization of Andean culture. The 
festival, subtitled “Tribute to the Tayta Jirka [Father Mountain] and the Pachamama [Mother 
Earth],” takes place in mid-March, a few weeks after the rituals that it represents. Although now 
also promoted as a tourist attraction, it attracts locals rather than tourists (there aren’t many of 
the latter in the Cerro de Pasco area). Delegations from the different communities compete in 
their performance of the rituals of the estancias and of local culture and identity more 
generally.305 In the last couple of years, the Festival de la Herranza Andina has followed other 
regional festivals from around Peru in gaining national attention by conducting a previous launch 
event at the National Congress and in the main square of Lima. In November 2011, festival 
organizers obtained an official resolution from the Ministry of Culture recognizing “the 
Herranza of the Provinces of Pasco and Daniel Alcides Carrión” as “Cultural Patrimony of the 
Nation.”  
 By contrast, the ritual in the estancias retains its private, family character. I had been 
unable to attend in February 2009, while staying in the city of Cerro de Pasco. But in February 
2010, when I was living in the town of Huayllay, I expressed my interest in attending the 
carnavales to one of my closest local contacts, Dalia Roque. Her own family no longer had an 
                                                          
305 I attended the public herranza festival in Yurajhuanca in 2011, a year after the estancia carnavales described in 
this section. I owe the analysis of this festival as self-representation and as a performative event to my conversations 
with Elizabeth Lino Cornejo, who had already attended the public festival the previous year. 
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estancia, but she arranged for me to go with another family, explaining to them the nature of my 
research. Given her own interest and work in local tourism promotion, she added that it would be 
good for gaining experience in “experiential tourism” (turismo vivencial). So on Tuesday, 
February 16, 2010, I set out on the back of an old pick-up truck with the Calderón family from 
Huayllay to their estancia, Chiuric, in one of the caseríos of the community.  
As Mendoza (2006) writes, the carnavales in the high region of Pasco often include the 
rituals for the three classes of animals: alpacas (and llamas), cows and sheep, in that order and on 
separate days. The celebration includes not just the propitiatory rites but also the marking of 
animals that belong to different owners within a single herd or flock, and often the shearing of 
sheep as well. In recent years, many families have had to shorten the period of celebration, which 
used to be around a week, in order to accommodate work and other obligations. The Chiuric 
estancia does not include bovine cattle and, as far as alpacas and llamas are concerned (which in 
Chiuric actually outnumber the sheep), the family explained to me that they were planning to do 
a separate marking event for those animals in May, not during carnavales. For this reason, the 
description in this section does not cover the entire range of practices associated with the 
livestock carnavales in Pasco, but rather to one part of the rituals pertaining to the sheep, and, 
more importantly, to the context of the family gathering in which such practices take place. As 
the father, Don Isidro, explained to me, the family had initially planned to do it on Carnival 
Sunday, but some problems came up and it had to be moved to Carnival Tuesday (the day before 
Ash Wednesday). The sponsors of the celebration would be his son Freddy and his wife Katy.  
 The Calderón family does not spend most of its time in Chiuric, which is the land where 
many of the older folks grew up. Rather, like many others, they have long since relocated to the 
town of Huayllay, but the older members of the family come often to mind the business of the 
estancia. The estancia is in the charge of a shepherd. While some of the shepherds in Huayllay, 
as in Rancas, are migrants from other communities, in this case the shepherd is a female relative, 
Juana, a member of the extended family who lives in the estancia with her two young children.306 
                                                          
306 This is a pseudonym. 
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Chiuric is located relatively close (some 4-5 minutes by car on a dirt road) to the center 
of the caserío, which is a grouping of 5 or 6 buildings that include the communal hall, a church, 
a school, a small “communal theater” and the office of the local women’s committee, all 
arranged around a square plot of flat land that serves as the plaza. A bit further away are the 
ruins of an old mineral processing center (ingenio) from Spanish colonial days.  Chiuric itself is 
located on the banks of a small river that runs between two parallel rows of hills, the latter filled 
with a multitude of the large rocks characteristic of the Huayllay region and the Stone Forest. We 
parked the pick-up truck on the other side of the stream and then hopped over rocks to get to the 
estancia, which is made up of 4 small constructions around a courtyard. The largest is the main 
estancia house, with two rooms and a storage space above one of the rooms; its earthen walls are 
painted white, though part of the paint has worn off. The family explains to me that in the old 
days, when the grandparents were alive and there were more people in Chiuric, the house had a 
straw roof; this was warmer, but it required changing every year to prevent it from leaking water, 
and there wasn´t anyone to do that anymore. So now the roof has been changed to corrugated tin. 
The other three constructions around the courtyard are all small, one-room houses made of earth 
and rock and with straw roofs; one of them is the kitchen. Behind this area are several corrals for 
the animals, made of rocks stacked on top of one another, as well as a few small sheds. The 
number of animals on the estancia is not very large – some 100 alpacas and a few llamas, and 
some 50 sheep; they belong to different members of the extended family. On the other side of the 
river is another grouping of small, straw-roofed houses and sheds - technically another estancia, 
though also part of Chiuric – but there did not seem to be anyone there at that moment.  
I arrived the morning of the main day, with some members of the family, but others had 
already arrived the night before. Thus, I did not participate in the initial offering (mesa) to the 
mountain (cerro/jirka) that is usually performed the night before the livestock ritual, as on so 
many other important occasions. The morning was entirely devoted to preparing the meal of the 
day, pachamanca, the traditional dish cooked with hot rocks on the ground and commonly 
served on festive occasions in the Central Highlands – though Don Isidro, the father, referred to 
it simply as “meat roast” (asado de carne) or “peasant lunch” (almuerzo campesino). While his 
wife and the other women worked at seasoning the meat and at other cooking tasks in the main 
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estancia house, Don Isidro heated the rocks that would be used, using firewood and dousing the 
flames with alcohol, while we talked.  
A retired mining worker in his sixties, Don Isidro worked at the Huarón mine for 28 
years, from 1963 to 1991; towards the end of his time at the mine, he became a scoop loader 
operator.  In the old days, he says, things were different; the French were nice people (buena 
gente), they “shared with the worker from their table.” Sure, they were better to those who were 
on their side, but they had to share with the rest too, if nothing else to keep up appearances. For 
that reason, the workers had good convenios (agreements with the company). The later 
administration of the mine (Hochschild, which took over in 1987) was not generous. But what 
really changed things was the first government of Alan García (1985-1990) with its 
paquetazos.307 Did I know what the paquetazos were? That “screwed the workers” (eso jodió a 
los trabajadores). Then came El Chino (Fujimori) and “finished us off” by taking away labor 
stability.308 Now García is president again – he won in Cerro de Pasco (in 2006) by promising to 
restore labor stability, but then he didn´t do it. That is what ruined the workers, the lack of labor 
stability.309 Don Isidro also criticized the changes that have taken place over the decades in the 
organization of work at the mine, in particular the increase in engineers and technicians in 
relation to ordinary workers. In the old days, he says, people worked well, not like now when 
there are a lot of useless people (inútiles) inside the mine. Now, in each corner of the mine you 
                                                          
307 Paquetazos (“big packages”, conveying an image of a large load falling on one´s head) was the popular Peruvian 
term for the price and structural adjustment measures implemented from the late 1970s through the early 1990s -   
modeled on the designs of the international lending agencies (and sometimes directly ordered by them), as a 
response to the economic crisis then affecting Latin America. Although the earliest such measures occurred during 
the Morales Bermúdez government in the late 1970s, they were temporarily interrupted during the first two years of 
Alan García´s government, from 1985 to 1987. When the paquetazos resumed in 1987, with sudden price increases 
in the midst of a severe recession, this caused widespread immiseration among broad sectors of the population. 
Although the workers in Huarón were initially in a relatively better position compared to many other, poorer sectors, 
Don Isidro´s statement highlights the paquetazos of García´s period as indicative of the broader crisis that marked a 
turning point for many formal-sector workers like himself. The biggest paquetazo would be the “Fujishock” of 
1990.  
308 Although of Japanese ancestry, President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) was popularly known as El Chino (the 
Chinese man) during his government. He appropriated this term as a folksy nickname and used it widely in his 
campaigns. 
309 Indeed, Alan García promised labor stability when he visited Cerro de Pasco during his 2006 campaign, but once 
elected ignored this promise, which was entirely unacceptable to the Peruvian business class whose support he 
courted (and won) during his 2006-2011 government.  
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have an engineer. You can´t do anything without the engineers. But they don´t know [how to do 
things]. The worker is the one who knows. If you are an engineer you have to listen to what the 
workers say, they are the ones that matter. The engineers don´t know, they may have studied, but 
they don´t know (he would repeat this point when we met again in the town).  
While Don Isidro heated the rocks, the women in the family put the finishing touches on 
the meat and vegetables. They begin to talk about how in the old days the carnavales for the 
livestock were much bigger – back when the grandparents (abuelitos) were still around. Back 
then there were more families here in Chiuric, in those houses that now are abandoned (they 
point to the houses on the other side of the stream as well as others further away). In those days 
they did a cortamonte, the popular dance that takes place around a tree during carnavales 
throughout much of the Peruvian Andes (known elsewhere as yunza, unsha or by other names).  
Since there are no trees around here, they had to bring a tree all the way from Huariaca, in the 
quebradas on the border with Huánuco. They also brought an orquesta (as the 
saxophone/clarinet bands from the Mantaro Valley are known); they would go meet them near 
the road and bring them to Chiuric on horseback.  
Meanwhile, I also speak with Orlando, one of Don Isidro’s sons-in-laws. He’s from a 
different caserío of Huayllay. He asserts for his own caserío what people often say about 
Huayllay in general – that people there are not devoting themselves much to the campo (i.e. the 
rural land and rural work), that they are more dedicated to mining, as well as to commerce. 
Orlando is a trained professional in the field of animal science, who works with different 
producers in the area (such as the Communal Cooperatives). We talk about how recent increases 
in the price of mutton have encouraged more people to raise sheep, and about how alpaca meat 
sells for less, but there’s more of it on a single animal. He thinks that livestock raising can be a 
viable economic activity if it is done in a more technical way (con manejo); when done as 
huacchilla, like here, it can provide some support (sustento) but not enough to live. For him, 
huacchilla means raising animals “in an empirical way, almost as if by custom” (empíricamente, 
casi por costumbre), on the usufruct lands. He thinks it would be better to have fewer animals 
but of better quality. The ones who produce more, he argues, are the parceleros, i.e. people who 
have divided up communal lands (in practice if not in actual title), for example in Pucará (a 
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former hacienda nearby). However, when I ask him if people in Huayllay could fence in their 
pasturing grounds, he says it would not be feasible, there would be problems, conflicts; right 
now, he says, there are no fences, but people know more or less where the limits are. 
Once the stones were sufficiently hot, Don Isidro removed the ones on top, using a shovel 
to set them aside; we then all brought the meat (mutton, chicken and alpaca meat) and set it on 
top of the bottom rocks. The rocks that had been set aside were then placed on top of the meat, 
then the potatoes, sweet potatoes and other vegetables were added. The whole thing was then 
covered with an oilcloth and then with sod (champa) and earth, taking care to ensure no smoke 
could escape. After about 45 minutes, the food was cooked; we tasted some of the potatoes and 
meat and then moved to the space in front of the main estancia house, forming a semi-circle 
while one of the aunts prepared and distributed each of the plates. When we were finished eating, 
we all grabbed sheepskins from the main house (to sit on) and began moving to one of the corrals 
in the back, where the ceremony with the animals would take place. By that time, another son 
had arrived – Mario, who worked in commerce together with his wife. They had been driving on 
the steep, solitary road from Canta on the other side of the Western Cordillera, and it had not 
been clear that they would make it in time.  
As we sat in a row in the corral where the sheep were, it began to hail, but fortunately this 
passed quickly. Someone began to pass the bag of coca so we could each grab a handful to chew. 
The cigarettes began to circulate as well, and one of the young women began to serve the 
calientito – a hot drink made of alcohol (aguardiente) and lots of herbs and burnt sugar. As 
always, a single glass is shared by all the participants, who take turns accepting the drink from 
the server. As people chew their coca, they talk quietly about various topics. In the communities 
of Pasco, this is what is usually referred to as the chacchapada (from chacchar, to chew coca), 
an extended moment of reflection and communion that precedes the placing of offerings (mesas) 
or important occasions like weddings. The trinity of coca, alcohol and cigarettes is always 
present at such times. On this occasion, the radio was also on, as Huayllay’s Radio Oro played 
the traditional songs dedicated to the animals during carnavales. Many of these songs deal, in a 
humorous way, with the relationship between shepherds and owners of herds/estancias – a 
central theme of the carnavales in general, and one that was referenced several times during the 
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course of the day.310 The radio also broadcasted greetings to the different estancias, including 
Chiuric. These greetings had been solicited by the sponsors, Freddy and Katy, and were 
dedicated to the sheep, who were addressed with proper names.  After a while, one of the aunts 
grabbed the tinya (a small drum that is played only by women, and associated most strongly with 
the carnavales) and began beating out the steady rhythm of the carnaval songs while singing 
along with the radio. Don Isidro then joined her too, singing the mostly Quechua lyrics with 
great emotion, sometimes following the radio, other times singing independently without paying 
attention to the broadcast.  
As we chewed the coca, we were supposed to save and set aside a particular class of 
leaves, namely those that were small and well-formed, without holes or tears; I had been advised 
of this earlier in Huayllay, and Don Isidro´s daughter Elizabeth now repeated it to me so I would 
know. After a while, Freddy, in his role as sponsor of the feast, came around and collected these 
small leaves, which were referred to as the ñawi. When handing the ñawi to the sponsor, you 
have to say how much you have, but in thousands – if you have 6 ñawis, you say, “six 
thousand.”311 After this, it was time to begin the main activity of the afternoon, the ritual 
marriage of the sheep.312 Two sheep were separated from the rest of the herd that was in the 
corral – one was dark brown, the other white. When they were first pinned to the ground, the 
                                                          
310 In his discussion of livestock carnaval songs from the highlands of Pasco, Mendoza (2006) writes that “the songs 
have the form of a back-and-forth, call-and-response between shepherds [pastoras, i.e. specifically female 
shepherds] and owners [propietarios], accusing each other of not fulfilling their responsibilities. The patrones are 
criticized, in an ironic way, for their lack of support for the shepherds and their herds. [The patrones] do not let this 
go unanswered, either; with great humor they sing demanding firewood, woven cloth and yarn, sometimes accusing 
the pastoras of being lazy” (70). During the carnavales in Chiuric, Juana and Don Isidro often addressed each other 
as pastora and patrón, in a playful, humorous way. At one point, however, it was Juana, not the patrón, who made a 
joke echoing the common accusation against shepherds, that they tend to lose the patrón’s animals. When Don 
Isidro approached her during the dance and said “Let us dance, pastora,” Juana replied laughing that “this pastora 
loses too many animals, you shouldn’t ask me to dance!”  
311 Increase, growth and multiplication are central themes in the carnaval livestock rituals, which have as their 
purpose the survival and growth of the herds. 
312 Mendoza writes that in the carnavales in the community of Huachón (in the eastern quebradas of Pasco), ¨the 
families do not just do the poncho and the puya, they also simulate the marriage of their animals in a symbolic way, 
and call it casarachishun” (Mendoza 2006, 69). For the cattle-branding ritual in the communities of the Upper 
Chancay Valley, close to Huayllay, Rivera (2005) writes that, in the final days of the feast, “the cattle, in order to be 
´domesticated´ are treated almost as human beings... The owners give their cattle human names, dress them with 
necklaces and earrings, and even arrange weddings between their calves and young people” (148) (In those 
communities, he argues, this humanization of the cattle enters into contradiction with the fact that people also sell 
their cattle at the end of the feast).  
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sheep became anxious and restless, as if they were about to be slaughtered, but they later calmed 
down. One of the aunts brought over a glass in which the ñawi had been mixed with wine and 
quinoa, and this was given to each of the sheep to drink while they were pinned down. Next 
came the puya, the tying of yarn to the back of the sheep to resemble wedding garments. Bits of 
red yarn were tied to the sheep´s fleece, in groups of three and forming two parallel rows from 
the neck all the way down the back to the tail. As the family said, they were making a poncho for 
the ram, and a manta (blanket or shawl worn by women) for the ewe. Don Isidro´s daughter 
Elizabeth added, “estamos puyando” (we are doing puya). Meanwhile, different family members 
were going around and playfully flinging flour, confetti and talcum powder at people (and at the 
sheep), as is normal during carnival in the Andes.  
When the puya was complete, Fredy and Katy lifted the two sheep over their shoulders 
and began to dance around the corral, as the rest of us followed in a row and as one of the 
women played the tinya drum. After a while, the two sheep were finally set down and they 
rejoined their herd. As part of the family continued to dance – and as the coca, cigarettes and 
calientito continued to be shared – others began inspecting the whole herd of sheep to see which 
animals did not yet have the required ribbons hanging from their ears, in which case they were 
pinned to the ground and a needle was used to thread the ribbon. Their tails were also cut, and 
the blood smeared against our cheeks. At some point during this time, Juana´s son, Raúl, a 
worker at the Animón mine, arrived with his girlfriend, whom the shepherd referred to as her 
nuera (daughter-in-law). Meanwhile, the whole atmosphere was festive as the children continued 
to fling flour and confetti as well as placing streamers on our necks and those of the animals; 
they also asked to borrow my digital camera and began to take photos of everything. After a 
couple of hours, with the threading and tail-cutting concluded, the animals were speedily rushed 
out of the corral towards the surrounding pasture, while we threw candy at them as they ran.   
As we exited the corral following the sheep, the shepherd spoke to me about how in the 
old days the celebration was much bigger, you left the corral crawling on your knees from the 
effects of the alcohol and the festive atmosphere in general. Other family members also spoke 
nostalgically about the past. Don Isidro remarked how “it´s not like before,” when people were 
more dedicated to the campo (land) and the feast was much larger, in the days of the abuelitos 
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(grandparents). Now it´s much less, he says. But, he pauses, “we never lose our costumbre 
(custom).” Elizabeth adds, with a hint of self-deprecation, “We still do it, if nothing else as an 
adornment” (todavía siquiera como adorno lo hacemos). Mario in turn laments what he sees as 
the general neglect of livestock raising and the land in general, and adds: “Not to badmouth, but 
mining has ruined all of this” (no es por hablar mal, pero la minería ha malogrado todo esto). 
He is referring to the fact that mining has drawn people away from livestock raising, the 
traditional activity of the area.  
For the rest of the evening, we continue to dance in a circle, to the huaynos (the popular 
music of the Peruvian Andes) coming from a battery-powered tape player, while sharing 
calientito and beer. Sometimes we dance in the central courtyard of the estancia, sometimes in 
the one-room kitchen, depending on whether it is raining or not. As the evening wears on, people 
become more talkative and prone to sharing feelings with one another. The older people become 
emotional remembering their parents and grandparents who are no longer alive, or they talk 
about the obligations that yernos and nueras (sons- and daughters-in-law) have towards their in-
laws. Raúl, Juana´s older son who works at the Animón mine, tells me how this is the first time 
in years that he´s been able to come to carnavales. Like most mine workers nowadays, he works 
on sistema (i.e. the accumulated time systems, such as 14x7), and in previous years the 
carnavales in Chiuric always took place on days when he was working either the day or the night 
shift. But this time it finally coincided with his días libres (rest days); he had just gotten off work 
in the afternoon, so he rushed over to the estancia. He says he comes because of his mother, 
since she lives here in Chiuric, and besides he has a lot of memories of growing up here in the 
estancia. When his mother is no longer here, maybe he will no longer come. The group continues 
to dance until late in the night, when everyone finally lies down to sleep on the sheepskins that 








LAND, CONFLICT AND THE “SOCIAL BURDEN” 
 
In the previous chapter I laid out the social geography of the plateau region of Pasco 
Province, where my research took place and where the communities of Rancas and Huayllay, as 
well as the city of Cerro de Pasco, are located. I then delved into the basic functioning of the 
traditional livestock-raising sector, which alongside mining constitutes the center of local 
economy and identity. The chapter also briefly discussed the nature of mining work today, as it 
takes place in the underground and open-pit mines of Pasco Province. That discussion can be 
thought of as a complement both to the historical account of mining work at the Huarón mine in 
the 20th century found in Chapters 1 and 2, and to the analysis of the transformations in mining 
labor in the 1980s and 90s found in Chapter 4. Finally, I illustrated some of these various themes 
through a discussion of a family gathering for a livestock ritual in an estancia located in one of 
the caseríos (sections) of the comunidad of Huayllay.   
In this chapter, I focus directly on mine-community relations and conflicts, in particular 
negotiations over land. Both Rancas and Huayllay have mining companies operating directly on 
their territory. Huayllay and its neighboring community Huaychao are hosts to almost the entire 
operations of the Huarón and Chungar/Animón mines – two important underground mines 
operated by Canadian-owned Pan American Silver and by the Peruvian Volcan Compañía 
Minera, respectively. Rancas, on the other hand, is host to only part of the operations of the 
Volcan-owned Cerro de Pasco mine – namely, its large tailings deposit (Occroyoc). Other waste 
deposits from the mine are also located on territories included in the community´s historic land 
titles, even if the company disputes the validity of these documents. The open pit, on the other 
hand, is located in the middle of the city of Cerro de Pasco, not on communal territory – at least 
not on land that any comunidad currently seeks to include in its legal claims (although the city 
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was of course originally built on land belonging to local communities and claimed by a 
hacienda).  
The central theme of the chapter is that land and landownership are of crucial importance 
for analyzing the relationship between the communities and the mines. First I examine mine-
company negotiations and conflicts in Rancas, a community which is caught up in a particular 
kind of tension. On the one hand, Rancas played a leading role in the land recuperation 
movement of the early 1960s, and this history is central to local identity today. Moreover, it was 
precisely the mining company (the Cerro de Pasco Corporation), in its role as hacienda owner, 
that the comunidad of Rancas targeted in order to recover its lands in 1960. On the other hand, 
the community has since 1990 permitted the use of one of its pasture lands for tailings deposition 
by the mining company; this was exchanged for a sum of capital with which to start a 
“communal company” – in practice, a contractor for the mine. I focus most of all on the 
negotiations which took place in 2008-2010 over the renewal of the agreement for the tailings 
deposit, and on the tensions and ambivalences involved in this process. I argue that in the case of 
Rancas, history and the defense of territory still play a fundamental role in the relationship with 
the mining company; the benefits obtained through agreements with the company today are seen 
as flowing from the struggle of past generations to preserve communal patrimony.   
 Later in the chapter, I focus on the mine-community relation in Huayllay, where a whole 
new framework of accords and forms of compensation came into being in 2006-2008. I argue 
that the programs, policies and practices that mining companies (and many observers) interpret 
as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be understood as ways of attaining the “social 
peace” necessary for production, just as in the past the challenge lay in achieving “labor peace.” 
This is particularly evident in Huayllay, because such policies and programs are codified in 
extensive, detailed mine-community agreements, which local people see as the product of their 
actions and as their prerogative due to the fact that the companies operate on their land. 
Moreover, I also argue that there is a degree of continuity between the old labor convenios and 
the new mine-community agreements. In Huayllay District, the “social burden” has shifted, with 
land and community replacing labor as the repository of the social. Although this development 
has to do with specific local conditions, the close juxtaposition of labor and community in a 
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place like Huayllay can nevertheless help illuminate their relationship at a broader level. The 
changes discussed in this section – namely, the shift in the “social burden” and the increased 
vulnerability of capital to community demands - also has to do with larger global shifts; these are 
explicitly traced in a sub-section of the text. 
  For both communities, part of my goal is to emphasize that studies of corporate-
community relations should pay attention to local agency and power, however limited it may 
seem. Also, I believe that structural factors, rather than a particular company´s ethics, philosophy 
or intentions, are most important in shaping any particular framework of mine-community 
relations. This is evident in the case of Huayllay, where one company utilizes CSR discourse to a 
significant extent, whereas the other does not – yet both must respond to community demands in 
roughly similar ways. It is the increased vulnerability of mining companies to community 
protests, as a result of global as well as regional and local shifts, that explains the newfound 
prominence of “social license” and CSR. I thus agree with scholars like Welker (2006) and Rajak 
(2011) who see CSR neither as a deceptive facade nor as a high-minded, philanthropic solution 
to global problems. In my own case, I am interested in CSR as a crucial element in a system of 
production, not unlike similar elements (worker housing, social work, etc.) that were part of 
earlier productive paradigms worldwide. 
 
Community-company negotiations in Rancas 
As discussed earlier, Rancas was at the forefront of the land struggle in Pasco in the early 
1960s, when it occupied part of the adjacent Hacienda Paria owned by the Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation as part of its cattle-raising División Ganadera. The community´s confrontation with 
national police on May 2, 1960, which left three comuneros dead (including the president of the 
community) galvanized the land recuperation movement in the region, which in turn was part of 
the broader national process that led to the Agrarian Reform and the end of the haciendas in 
Peru. This event not only constitutes an important part of local identity in Rancas; it also 
constitutes a key antecedent to later land disputes between the community and the company 
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owning the Cerro de Pasco mine. At that time, however, the conflict was with the mining 
company as a cattle-raising hacendado, not with mining operations per se.  
This changed over the next couple of decades, as open-pit operations grew and the state 
mining company Centromín – which had taken over from the Cerro de Pasco Corporation upon 
nationalization in 1974 – began depositing increasing amounts of waste materials on the west 
and north sides of the open pit. This expansion encroached upon the southeastern edge of the 
community´s lands. In particular, in the early 1980s, the company began to look for a new space 
to dump its tailings, as the old Quiulacocha deposit (a former lake) became full. The place 
chosen was a pastureland known as Occroyoc, which belonged to Rancas and which provided a 
naturally enclosed space situated at a slightly lower altitude than the mine, so that the tailings 
could be carried by gravity through a tube.  In 1983, the government issued an order 
expropriating 540 hectares of land from the community for this purpose, in exchange for a 
minimal payment. Yet the community refused to hand over the land, and the conflict dragged on 
for seven years. Finally, in 1990, an agreement was reached between the state-owned company 
and the community; the former offered the latter a one-time payment of US$2.5 million in return 
for being allowed to use 141 hectares of land for 20 years. This was an uncommonly large 
payment in mining company-community relations in Peru at the time.313 In addition, the 
company also agreed to provide stable jobs to ten community members (Libro Blanco, 30), and it 
promised to implement a remediation program for the land before returning it to the community 
at the end of the 20-year period. Moreover, the company promised to ignore the earlier 
expropriation order that covered a larger, 540-hectare space.   
One of the most significant things about the 1990 agreement, however, is what the 
US$2.5 million compensation money was used for. Namely, it became the starting capital for the 
new “Communal Company for Multiple Services,” Ecoserm-Rancas.  Whereas older community 
                                                          
313 That this payment was unusual can be seen by comparing it with other agreements that the Cerro de Pasco mine 
made with other neighboring rural communities in the 1990s, as listed in the official “white paper” on the 
privatization of the mine in 1999. Granted, in these other cases the use of community land was much less intense 
than the large tailings deposit that was built in Rancas. For example, in 1998 the company paid the comunidad of 
Yurajhuanca 78,000 soles (around US$25,000) for the space taken up by the company´s water pipes, pumps and 
other installations of its domestic water system for a period of 13 years.  Similarly, in 1999 the company agreed to 
pay the comunidad of Santa Ana de Tusi US$26,400 for the use of 55 ha. of land that would receive overflow from 
the mine´s water store at Lake Alcacocha, for a period of 3 years. 
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enterprises, such as the Communal Farm and the Communal Cooperative, had been dedicated to 
cattle-raising, the new Communal Company would have mining, construction and transportation 
as its business. The compensation money was invested in expensive machinery and heavy 
equipment, and the communal company essentially became a contractor for the mines. Ecoserm-
Rancas would become the model for other communal companies across the province – 
particularly in those communities situated next to the mines – thus inaugurating a new type of 
company-community articulation (Chacón 2009). From the beginning, its creation was explicitly 
tied to the community´s cession of the Occroyoc land for the tailings deposit; this link is 
frequently recalled in present-day discussions about the communal company. Thus, the 
community exchanged one section of its pasture land for the ability to enter more fully into 
mining work, with community members becoming both the business´ administrators and its 
workers. Not only did the creation of the communal company signify the entry of the 
subcontracting model into the community; it also offered a way to counteract the unemployment 
that was rampant at the time, due both to the economic crisis and to the longer-term tendency 
towards the creation of a surplus labor force in the mining industry. From the beginning, and like 
other communal companies in the province, Ecoserm-Rancas would be explicitly conceived not 
just as a business meant to yield a profit but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a means of 
creating jobs for the young comuneros.  
During the 1990s, as Rancas´ communal company was trying to establish a foothold as a 
mining contractor at Cerro de Pasco and several other regional mines, the former pasture at 
Occroyoc was gradually filled with tailings from the mine´s two concentrator plants, becoming a 
fixture of the landscape readily seen from the surrounding hills as well as in satellite images of 
the region. By the middle of the next decade, it was clear that the 141-hectare tailings deposit 
needed to be expanded. The 2005 Closure Plan documents submitted by the Volcan company 
(which had bought the Cerro de Pasco mine in 1999, as part of the piecemeal privatization of the 
old state company) estimated that the deposit had enough capacity for just another 10 years at the 
current rate of tailings deposition.314 In any case, the 1990 agreement with the community of 
Rancas had been for 20 years, so it was set to expire in 2010. More generally, the cycle of high 
                                                          
314 The “Closure Plans” are legally mandated documents; they do not signify an intent on the part of the company to 
actually close the mine at any particular moment.  
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mineral prices that begun in 2002 pushed the mining company towards a general policy of 
expansion that made negotiations with its neighbors necessary. Thus, at the same time that 
Volcan was pursuing the “Plan L” negotiations with the city of Cerro de Pasco, with the aim of 
expanding the open pit, the company begun to request a new agreement with the community of 
Rancas so as to be able to maintain and expand the tailings deposit. Whereas in the first case it 
dealt with a multitude of individual homeowners as well as the municipality located in the urban 
area, in the second it had to negotiate with the comuneros who collectively claimed ownership to 
the land through the institution of the comunidad campesina. Conversations between the 
community and the company began in 2006, but they really got underway in 2008.  
In the eyes of the community, the 1990 agreement with the old state mining company had 
invalidated the 1983 expropriation order that covered a wider, 540-hectare tract of land. In 
practice, however, the company had been using parts of this broader area to dump its waste ore 
and build auxiliary installations. This whole region in a sense constituted a “gray zone” between 
the community and the mine, to which both lay claim. A few estancias occupied this area – some 
in regular use, others less so; herds of sheep, llamas and alpacas could be regularly seen 
pasturing close to tailings and company installations.  By 2007, the Volcan company had begun 
building a new cyanide leaching (lixiviation) plant in which to process, and put to profitable use, 
its vast stockpiles of ore.  For the city and the area as a whole, there were environmental 
concerns involving the new plant. On the one hand, it would potentially eliminate at least part of 
the huge, uncovered mounds of ore that constituted a locus of acid mine drainage and 
contamination with heavy metals on the west and north edges of the city. On the other hand, the 
plant would also generate its own waste; furthermore, it would introduce a new and toxic 
element – cyanide – that had not previously been used in operations in Cerro de Pasco. 
Furthermore, construction of the plant had begun months before the required Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) had even been presented to the public. For the community of Rancas, 
however, the new plant was also an encroachment on its land. Its construction was taking place – 
without community permission - on one side of a hill known as Shuco, adjacent to the Occroyoc 
tailings and traditionally claimed by the community as one of its parajes (pastures).  
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The plant construction, combined with the upcoming expiration of the 1990 agreement on 
the tailings deposit, thus brought to a head the broader issue of the status of the lands historically 
claimed by the community but increasingly utilized by the mining company, generating a 
conflict that was ongoing around the time I began my fieldwork in Cerro de Pasco and Rancas in 
2008. Although not as violent as the conflict in Huayllay discussed later in this section – or other 
mining conflicts elsewhere in Peru – the dispute between Rancas and the Volcan company did 
have some moments of marked tension. Early on, these revolved around the legally-mandated 
public hearings on the EIA for the new lixiviation plant. In a way, these hearings served to 
legitimate what the community considered was an illegitimate situation, due to the lack of 
community permission for the plant and the fact that its construction was underway prior to EIA 
approval. On May 6, 2008, one such hearing had to be canceled when members of the 
community of Rancas occupied the municipal auditorium in the neighborhood of Paragsha, 
where it was to take place. Another public session was supposed to take place on July 11, in the 
town of Rancas, which is not only the seat of the comunidad of the same name but also the 
capital of the larger district of Simón Bolívar, in which large part of the Volcan Company´s 
operations are located. But when the ranqueños attempted to enter the auditorium of the 
municipality, they were turned away on the grounds that it was full. According to the ranqueños´ 
account, the company had brought in busloads of their workers and their families from elsewhere 
in the district, filling up the available space and purposefully preventing people from Rancas 
from attending. In response, the bells in the Rancas church were rung, and the community 
assembled and forced the organizers to cancel the session. Later that day, in what was widely 
perceived to be a retaliatory move on the part of the mining company, two ranqueños were 
arrested by police while leaving a restaurant in Cerro de Pasco and held overnight on false 
charges, accused of stealing video equipment from the company. The two had been heavily 
involved in communal affairs and in the defense of communal territory; furthermore, one of them 
was the grandson of the president of the community who was killed by police during the 1960 
land recuperation. The next day, on July 12, a large group of ranqueños mobilized and marched 
through the streets of Cerro de Pasco and in that way obtained the release of the two comuneros.  
In response to these events, a 24-hour paro (strike/march) was called for July 17, the date 
on which yet another public session on Volcan´s EIA was supposed to be held in Cerro de Pasco.  
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On that day, approximately 800 people marched to the company offices in the neighborhood of 
Paragsha.315 Although many of the marchers were from Rancas, an effort had been made to reach 
out to the other communities as well as urban neighborhoods in Simón Bolívar district, and they 
also sent delegations. Speaking outside of the main Volcan offices, the march organizers asserted 
that Shuco (the site of the new plant) and Rumiallana (the site were the mining company was 
dumping its waste ore) both belonged to Rancas. Furthermore, they spoke about environmental 
problems that served as evidence of the irresponsible attitude of the company: the contamination 
of the water, lakes and rivers, the presence of lead in blood, the destruction of pastures and the 
death of cattle. It was emphasized several times that the marchers were not against mining per se, 
and that it was possible to coexist with the industry, but that they wanted responsible mining, not 
the irresponsible and abusive practices of the Volcan company.  
The march had been given added urgency by the fact that a conflict had also broken out 
between one of Rancas´ neighbors, the community of Pacoyán – a former hacienda that later 
became a comunidad – and Chancadora Centauro, a small gold mining company operating in its 
territory. The comuneros of Pacoyán had blocked access to the mine, complaining that the 
company had not fulfilled its agreements with the community. Earlier that day, the police had 
been sent to clear the road and had wounded six community members. A comunero of Pacoyán 
spoke about this conflict to the demonstrators outside the Volcan offices in Cerro, drawing a link 
between the abusive practices of both mining companies. Finally, the demonstrators named a 
commission to meet with the regional mining supervisory authorities; they managed to achieve 
the march´s goal of canceling Volcan´s public session planned for that day.  
Through these actions, the community managed to get the attention of the regional offices 
of the National Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo) as well as of the national supervisory 
agency for the mining sector (OSINERGMIN); the latter finally ordered the company to stop 
construction of the lixiviation plant in August 2008. This constituted a temporary victory for the 
                                                          
315 I had not been present at the July 12 demonstration, but I did attend the July 17 march.  
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community of Rancas, even if it does not seem to have altered the mining company´s long-term 
plans for construction of the plant.316 
This situation of confrontation between the community and the company continued 
during the talks over the renewal and expansion of the lease for the tailings deposit. One of the 
strategies followed by the mining company was to weaken the community´s bargaining position 
by attacking the legitimacy and soundness of its legal claim upon the land. This involved several 
things. On the one hand, Volcan argued that the 1983 expropriation order had never been 
formally rescinded and thus was still in effect, no matter what the 1990 agreement between the 
community and the state mining company said. On the other hand, the company´s legal team also 
attacked the validity of the community´s land titles. As mentioned earlier, the community of 
Rancas traces the first official, state recognition of its lands back to the late 16th century, when 
the Spanish Crown is believed to have granted a first land title known as the garashipu. The 
community´s first modern, notarized land title dates from 1910, and is inscribed in the national 
property registry system (Registros Públicos) that was created in 1887.  In 2009, during the 
negotiations over the tailings deposit and the land in dispute, Volcan´s team of lawyers argued 
that Rancas´1910 title was faulty because it laid claim to pastures that had already been 
registered in a 1903 land title by the Hacienda Paria.  
The date of 1903 for the Paria title was not coincidental – that was the year that James B. 
Haggin´s Cerro de Pasco Investment Company (later renamed Cerro de Pasco Corporation) 
arrived in the area and began buying both mining claims and surface properties. One of the first 
of these properties was Paria, the hacienda which bordered both the city and mine of Cerro de 
Pasco as well as the village of Rancas, and which the ranqueños consider to have been one of the 
main usurpers of their lands since colonial times. The 1903 registration of the hacienda´s land 
title was evidently part of the process of purchase from the former owners by the U.S. investors. 
By bringing this up, Volcan´s representatives affirmed the link between their company and the 
old U.S. corporation as well as the previous hacienda owners – a connection that was not only 
symbolic but also made up of real property transactions. Furthermore, like the old Cerro de 
                                                          
316 Volcan´s Annual Report for 2011 made no mention of the earlier conflict over the lixiviation plant and 
announced its construction for 2012-2013 (40). 
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Pasco Corporation, Volcan could afford a better team of lawyers to delegitimize the 
community´s land claims, and it could portray itself as being on the side of law and reason. 
These arguments, made forcefully by the company´s lawyers and by the outspoken 
general manager of the Cerro de Pasco operating unit, Teódulo Quispe – who, unlike the 
members of Volcan´s Board of Directors, was a native of Pasco – provoked offense among many 
members of the community, for they struck at the very heart of Rancas´ identity, tied as the latter 
is to the integrity of an ancestral territory recovered through long, difficult struggle. Some 
ranqueños countered that the 1910 notarization and inscription of its land title had only been the 
end result of a longer legal battle, which anteceded the hacienda´s 1903 inscription; others 
emphasized that, no matter what legal documents the company could produce, the lands had 
always belonged to, as they put it, the “ancestral community” of Rancas. Still others argued that 
their continuous occupation/possession of the land in question would reaffirm their legal right to 
it no matter what the older documents said (through a right akin to adverse possession).  
In reality, however, it seems clear that the Volcan company was not trying to deny the 
community´s land claims altogether. Such a denial might have been attempted in earlier decades, 
but by 2009 the legacy of the community´s multiple struggles could not simply be wiped away. 
To do so would have provoked a much bigger conflict, and it would also have gone against the 
precedent of the 1990 lease agreement for the tailings deposit, which was after all premised on 
the idea that the land belonged to Rancas. In fact, the company was willing to legally transfer its 
alleged ownership of part of the disputed territory over to the community – precisely the portion 
corresponding to the tailings (as opposed to the larger area in dispute). This was presented as a 
gesture of good will that was supposed to speed up the signing of an agreement, which surprised 
community members who believed the land to be theirs already. The mining company was likely 
well aware that an extension of the lease for the tailings deposit would require a new lease and a 
new payment to the community. Thus the fact that Volcan representatives saw it necessary to 
delegitimize Rancas´ land documents can be interpreted not literally as proposing that the 
community´s land rights be taken away, but rather as an attempt to weaken its confidence and its 
bargaining position and prevent it from making overly ambitious claims upon the company.  
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This strategy could have some effect on the community because it resonated with a view 
that existed parallel, and in a sense opposite to, the discourse of proud and unyielding defense of 
land. Alongside Rancas´ pride in its martyrs and in its historical role in the struggle against the 
haciendas, there was a discourse that portrayed past communal leaders, and to some degree the 
community as a whole, as a careless and ineffective defender of its boundaries. According to this 
view, community leaders earlier in the 20th century had been naive and easily manipulated by 
lawyers, hacendados and mining companies. Although in 1960 they had stood their ground and 
recovered much of their ancestral land, in the years since the community had once again allowed 
its boundaries to fall into disrepair and permitted the encroachment of its neighbors, whether it 
was the mining company to the east, the community of Pacoyán to the west (formed as a new 
community on the grounds of the former Hacienda Pacoyán, rather than annexed to Rancas as 
some would have wished) or the urban neighborhood of Asentamiento Humano José Carlos 
Mariátegui at the northwestern edge of Cerro de Pasco. This less triumphant, more regretful 
discourse could be, and sometimes was, used as a rousing call to revive the defense of communal 
land. But it could also weaken confidence in the legal standing of the community´s land claims, 
thus making some individuals more willing to accept the solutions proposed by Volcan´s 
lawyers, which offered saneamiento (legalization, elimination of legal defects) of the 
community´s boundaries – less expansively interpreted - in return for acquiescing to the 
company´s demands.  
There were also other issues that came up during the dispute. The 1990 agreement had 
stipulated that the company would be responsible for resolving any problems related to damage 
to community lands around the tailings deposit.  In 2009, Volcan representatives were willing to 
acknowledge that they had used or otherwise affected an additional 40 hectares of land, besides 
the 141 hectares of the tailings deposit. The community, on the other hand, had, through a 
contact, hired a small environmental consulting firm from Lima to conduct analyses of soil and 
water, which showed that a much wider area was affected by mining activity (EQUAS 2008). 
The community thus demanded that this problem be addressed in any agreement to be signed, 
either through environmental remediation actions or through compensation payments. 
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The communal company, which as we saw had been born out of the original 1990 
agreement, inevitably became involved in the dispute between the community and the company 
in 2008-2010. Namely, its administrators decided to temporarily pull their machines and workers 
out of Volcan operations. As they explained to me, they felt that Volcan was using its 
relationship with the communal company as a weapon with which to pressure the community, in 
the sense that they would threaten to cut its contracts and work assignments if Rancas did not 
sign the agreement over the tailings deposit quickly. Pulling out was thus a way for the 
communal company to assert its independence, and that of the community, from the mining 
company. They were able to do this because they had contracts in two other mining companies – 
particularly in the Chancadora Centauro gold mine, located close to Rancas, as well as in the 
slightly more distant Brocal (Colquijirca) mine. Since its inception almost two decades earlier, 
the communal company had attempted to diversify and avoid dependence on any single mine, 
and that proved useful at this time. The decision to withdraw from Volcan operations was 
initially questioned by some comuneros at the communal assembly, but it was eventually ratified 
as part of the community´s strategy during the land dispute with the mining company.  
Nevertheless, this withdrawal was understood by all to be only temporary. The communal 
company´s continued engagement with Volcan operations was seen by many as central to the 
future well-being of Rancas; in fact, obtaining more and better contracts for the communal 
company was mentioned as one of the community´s objectives in the negotiation process. Volcan 
also used this possibility as a way of enticing and pressuring those comuneros who were most 
afraid of losing access to mining work. Negotiations over land thus were also negotiations over 
access to jobs, and over the viability and stability of the communal company – because the latter 
ultimately owed its existence to the community´s hold over land. 
As would be expected, not all comumeros felt the same way during the negotiations with 
the mining company; although the community sought to present a unified front to the outside, 
inside there were fissures and disagreements. Some of this had to do with the fact that the 
communal authorities (the junta directiva) serve only a two-year term; elections for a new junta 
took place in the middle of the negotiations. Some of the individuals in the first junta (not all) 
were seen as being more favorably disposed towards the mining company. Moreover, they had 
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set up their own, private contracting firm while the communal negotiations were going on. This 
aroused suspicions from other comuneros who wondered how, and in exchange for what, they 
had obtained their starting capital, and there was a push to expel them from the comunidad (i.e., 
formally take away their comunero status). At the end of 2008, a new junta was elected; its 
members were generally seen as being more hostile to the mining company. Nevertheless, they, 
and other sectors known to be very vocal about the defense of communal lands, were also 
occasionally subjected to rumors of corruption – an exceedingly common type of accusation in 
Peru today. In early 2009, numerous copies of an anonymous flier were distributed around 
Rancas and surrounding towns that launched all kinds of accusations (including, but not limited 
to, corruption) against several such individuals who were well-known for their critical stance 
towards the company. This attack was widely seen as coming not just from the pro-Volcan camp 
inside the community but from the mining company itself.  
It is important to emphasize, however, that among those sectors most willing to 
compromise with Volcan were to be found not only the two or three private contractors from 
Rancas eager to do business with the mining company, but also some young men with families 
who depended on mining work through either the communal company or other contractors, and 
who were thus anxious about the possibility of a protracted confrontation that would make it 
difficult for them to work.317 On the other hand, some of those most willing to hold out included 
individuals who had more options and who were not as immediately dependent on the mine.  
Nevertheless, a strong discourse of communal unity served to bring the different sides 
together within the umbrella of the community, and to hold their disputes in check. Furthermore, 
in spite of their differences, they continued to interact socially at private and communal events. 
Because of the particular history of Rancas, moreover, it was the discourse of the defense of 
communal territory, and of a general critical stance towards the mining company, that had the 
                                                          
317 The mining company encouraged this anxiety by explicitly bringing up the specter of crisis, namely the drop in 
mineral prices that had resulted from the world financial crisis in 2008. According to the mine´s General Manager, 
Volcan´s Directory in Lima had been willing to close the Cerro de Pasco unit due to the decrease in prices, but he, as 
a cerreño, had prevented this from coming to pass, as it would mean job losses and economic suffering in the city 
and its surroundings. This account seems unlikely or at least exaggerated - the 2008 drop in prices, though 
significant, was not so severe as previous ones in recent Peruvian history, and, although it may have slowed down 
some investments, it did not result in the closure of existing mines in Peru – but it seems to have been aimed at 
provoking anxiety over jobs and increasing the community´s willingness to acquiesce to the company´s conditions.  
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upper hand. Even those who were less enthusiastic about these notions had to phrase their 
comments in such a way as to acknowledge the importance of the events of 1960 and of the 
continuing need to honor the memory of the martyrs who died for the land. It is important to 
remember that for the community, those events are not a distant or abstract occurrence; some of 
those most involved in communal affairs were children, nephews, nieces or grandchildren of the 
three martyrs from 1960, or of other community members who were wounded and who in some 
cases suffer the consequences of their injuries to this day. The land recuperation campaign is 
moreover memorialized every year in a public event on the main square of Rancas and in a 
pilgrimage to the statues of the three martyrs at the hill where the confrontation took place. Thus, 
in internal discussions during the negotiations with Volcan in 2008-2010, the fact that Rancas´ 
lands were a legacy of the martyrs and fighters of 1960 was frequently brought up, as was the 
argument that the lands needed to be preserved for future generations. This was combined with a 
discourse, common in Rancas at the time of my research, to the effect that mining is only 
temporary, and that the current mining boom would come to an end sooner or later, whereas the 
raising of animals on the land is something that will always be there to sustain the community.  
Yet the parallel with 1960 was of course imperfect – on that occasion, the ranqueños had 
recovered land from a livestock-raising hacienda (albeit one owned by the mining company) and 
had then put it to the same use, raising animals. By contrast, in the 2008-2010 negotiations, as in 
1990, the defense of communal territory was not ultimately about ensuring the availability of 
pasture lands for future generations. On the contrary, a section of land was being covered with 
tailings, from which it was unclear that it would ever recover. Although the Occroyoc pasture 
could be seen as small in relation to the community´s overall landholdings, some ranqueños 
wondered out loud how much they would be willing to allow the tailings and other mining waste 
to advance over time, and how much space the community was willing to give up. Similarly, the 
tailings deposit could one day affect not just the community´s pasture lands and estancias but 
also the town of Rancas itself, from which it is currently separated only by a couple of small hills 
(though Rancas is more protected than the neighboring towns/comunidades of Yurajhuanca and 
Quiuilacocha, which are actually more exposed to the Occroyoc tailings even if the latter are not 
situated on their land).  
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These concerns were brought up in conversations and in communal assemblies, as was a 
vague, almost tragic feeling that the community was in a sense betraying the legacy of 1960 and 
of its ancestors´ efforts to defend the lands. On the other hand, the “progress” of the community 
was also seen as a legacy of those struggles – as was, in a very concrete sense, the communal 
company - and this progress necessitated the provision of work opportunities for comuneros and 
their children. Thus, I would argue that the community´s overall willingness to continue ceding a 
portion of its land for the tailings deposit – provided its rightful ownership of the land was 
acknowledged and respected – can be seen as part of a search for a balance between, on the one 
hand, the preservation of a source of long-term sustenance and identity (i.e. pasture land), and on 
the other hand, the pursuit of progress and advancement as defined locally – i.e. employment, 
educational attainment and a better life. Though seemingly in tension with one another, both 
goals depended on the preservation and defense of communal patrimony, i.e. the land, either for 
the purposes of pasturing and cattle-raising or as the basis of a claim on the mining industry that 
could then serve as the foundation for communal enterprise, work and other opportunities.  
Moreover, the willingness to sign an agreement with the mining company cannot be 
understood without emphasizing two very concrete factors. First, as mentioned above, it must be 
remembered that Rancas is a relatively large comunidad when compared to others in the 
province; its landholdings are large, due to its antiquity, population, and the central role it played 
in the struggle against the haciendas. In 1990, and again in 2008-2010, the community was not 
ceding all of its pasture land, but only its southeastern corner. Second, this was not a question of 
agreeing or disagreeing with a new mining project; the Cerro de Pasco mine had operating, and 
producing tailings and other waste, since long before the community was in a position to 
successfully defend its boundaries. In 2008-2010, a hypothetical refusal by the community to 
renew the lease on the Occroyoc deposit would neither have eliminated the tailings already 
dumped there (or, for that matter, in the older, neighboring Quiuilacocha tailings deposit, which 
lies abandoned), nor would it have prevented the continued emission of tailings by the mining 
company, which then would have had to find another neighboring comunidad with which to sign 
an agreement with monetary compensation, job opportunities, etc.  
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 After holding out and extending negotiations over the course two years, towards the end 
of 2010 Rancas´ communal assembly finally voted to sign an agreement with the mining 
company. This convenio involved a renewal of the lease for the Occroyoc tailings deposit for 
another 20 years, in return for a compensation payment of approximately 10 million soles 
(around US$3.5 million, or $1 million more than the 1990 agreement). The company also agreed 
to give the communal company more contracts and to implement certain environmental 
remediation programs around the tailings area. The last few months before the signing of the 
agreement had seen a new round of animosity inside the community. Some accused the 
communal leadership of betraying the legacy of the 1960 martyrs by accepting the continued use 
of pasture lands for tailings storage; others believed that the community should have held out 
longer and obtained more in compensation. It is important to note that, whereas in 1990 the 
monetary compensation had been invested communally – in the purchase of heavy equipment for 
the new communal company – this did not occur in 2010. Although some favored doing a similar 
communal investment, others were apprehensive that the money would not be well spent or that 
it would fall into corrupt hands. For that reason, it was finally decided that the money would 
simply be split among all registered community members (comuneros titulares) – that is, heads 
of households and single individuals over 18 – with different amounts based on seniority.318   On 
average, each titular was supposed to receive around 15,000 soles (approximately US$5,300).  
This money was put to a variety of uses. Many families used it to buy an automobile, 
both for personal use and to use it to work transporting passengers to and from Cerro de Pasco 
and on other routes. The increase in vehicles in the community became evident to me when I 
returned to Rancas on May 2011 for the annual commemoration of the 1960 land recuperation.  
Whereas in previous years most people had crowded into the back of one of the old community-
owned trucks for the ride from the town of Rancas to the hill of Huayllacancha, this time a large 
number of private cars appeared beside the monument at the top of the hill – station wagons, 
pick-up trucks and others. One young couple that I knew bought a motorcycle; another 
purchased both a vehicle and a refrigerator so as to sell homemade ice pops (a common side 
occupation for women in Peru). A ranqueño friend of mine, who had previously worked in the 
                                                          
318 In Rancas, single adult women are usually comuneras, but not married ones, since only one person in a married 
couple can hold that status and the women usually (though not always) give it up for their husbands. 
390 
 
communal company as well as in a couple of small businesses, used his share of the 
compensation money to create his own small contracting firm together with his cousin. In 2011, 
they were doing “environmental work” (trabajos ambientales) around the tailings deposit – i.e. 
implementing the environmental remediation programs stipulated in the convenio, such as 
building a barrier to prevent the animals from eating grass too close to the tailings area. Like 
with other remediation programs, the convenio had reserved this job for the communal company, 
and the latter in turn subcontracted it out to my friend´s firm. Another friend pooled his 
compensation money together with part of that received by one of his siblings (who was also a 
titular) and invested it into a restaurant that he opened in Cerro de Pasco, in which he gave board 
(pensión) to workers at a contracting firm. Eventually he closed this business, in part because the 
shortage of water in Cerro forced him to buy his water for cooking from a cistern truck, which 
proved too expensive; he later opened up a second restaurant in the booming town of Huayllay, 
an hour away.  
 
 Huayllay: Community and Labor 
 So far in this chapter I have discussed the process of negotiation over land between the 
community of Rancas and the nearby Cerro de Pasco mine, owned by Volcan Compañía Minera. 
I will now examine the land relationship between mine and community as it has taken place in 
Huayllay, which is located near two underground mines: Huarón (today owned by Pan American 
Silver) and Animón/Chungar (today owned by Volcan). While Huarón was an important and 
well-known mine for much of the 20th century, the formerly small Animón has grown 
dramatically in the last decade, catching up to Huarón and even surpassing it in terms of the 
magnitude of its operations. Since the two mines are located immediately adjacent to one 
another, they can be said to form a single mining district, with two different owners.  
In this discussion, it is important to keep in mind a key difference between Rancas and 
Huayllay that has already been mentioned. Whereas Rancas is located very near the city of Cerro 
de Pasco, which is the center of the mine of the same name, Huayllay is situated much further 
away from other large towns, and is thus its own center. Although many ranqueños worked in 
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the Cerro de Pasco mine for much of the 20th century, the labor link was significantly stronger in 
the case of Huayllay. Since the old mining camps were dismantled in the 1990s, the new mining 
boom of the 2000s has seen the formerly small village of Huayllay become the place of residence 
for many of the workers at both Huarón and Animón; in a sense, the community has become the 
new mine camp.  
In Huayllay, as in Rancas, the mine-community relation is mediated by the negotiation of 
formal agreements or convenios between the company and the comunidad. There is both a new 
and an old aspect to these agreements. On the one hand, the negotiations and conflicts to be 
discussed later in this chapter began in 2006, and they marked a significant departure in 
company-community relations in Huayllay. As one of my informants put it, this constituted a 
“revolution” in the convenios and in the mine-community relation. Namely, in 2006 the 
comunidad conducted a 3-day paro (strike/blockage) against the Huarón mine, after having 
presented the company with a list of demands. This was followed by a dialogue process that 
culminated with a new convenio between Pan American Silver and the community of Huayllay 
in early 2007. In 2008, the comunidad conducted a new paro, this time against the Volcan-
owned Chungar mine. This time, unlike in 2006, the paro ended in violence between the police 
and the comuneros. Nevertheless, a dialogue process was also put in place that culminated with a 
new convenio.  
On the other hand, as I discussed in Chapter 1, convenios over land between the Huarón 
mine and the community of Huayllay go back to 1933, just as the French mining company was 
restarting operations after the Depression. Importantly, it was also just four years after the 
comunidad of Huayllay had gained official recognition under the modern regime of comunidades 
indígenas established by the 1920 Constitution. As mentioned earlier, the 1933 agreement gave 
the town of Huayllay electricity in exchange for the use of its lands as well as for the effects of 
contamination. The revisions of the agreement in 1936 and 1941 increased this electricity supply 
to 100 light bulbs of 40w and added a monetary rent payment for the lands used (250 soles per 
year plus 2.50 soles for each additional hectare of land).  
Thus, while there was a convenio between the company and the comunidad on whose 
lands it operated, the amount of the compensation was by any measure small. Even assuming 
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that there may have been increases in the amount of monetary payments after 1941 (although I 
am not aware of any specific increases), the portion of the agreement referring to the electrical 
supply is remembered today as having remained unsatisfactory throughout the 20th century. The 
amount of electricity supplied did not keep up with population growth, so that each house 
received only a faint glow and only for part of the day, thus reducing the advantage of progress 
that a community near a mine, like Huayllay, was supposed to have in relation to the rest of the 
Andean countryside.  
A letter from the company to the community, dated 1977 and preserved in the communal 
offices, complains of the low level of the lakes that supplied their hydroelectric plant and 
announces that as a result, electricity would be supplied to the community only between 6:00pm 
and 10:00pm until further notice.  A community publication from 1987 (Villareal 1987) 
discusses the problem at greater length.319 It quotes the district mayor of Huayllay at the time, 
Luis Oropeza, as having stated that “without electrification there is no progress;” the mayor 
himself writes an article in the publication in which he addresses the issue:   
The Huarón Mining Company, in compensation for the use of the lands that are property 
of the Comunidad Campesina, grants the community an electrical supply that is deficient 
and for limited times, which is insufficient, given the demographic increase of the 
population. Since our locality has its respective educational centers (primary, secondary, 
occupational school) the lessons are taught in half-darkness, requiring the use of lamps, 
which harms the intellectual capacity of our students. Due to this awful service, the 
outlying neighborhoods of the town, during the hours of greatest demand, find 
themselves almost in darkness with a supply of barely 30 W. It is sad to contemplate our 
streets with a gloomy appearance (Villareal 1987, 4) 
Similarly, another writer in the 1987 publication connects the problem of the electrical supply to 
broader issues of pillage and abuse by extractive companies: 
After the Revolution of October 3 1968, the capital of the Huarón Mining Company 
passed wholly into Peruvian hands.320 Unfortunately, the methods of the foreigners 
                                                          
319 This revista [magazine] was a one-issue publication printed by the comunidad and the communal cooperative 
around 1987. Agapito Villareal Escobal is listed as the person who directed the project. This is a valuable source that 
presents information on a variety of different issues pertaining to the community, from its history and customs to its 
signature institutions and communal endeavors. These kinds of publications are also found in a few other 
comunidades in Pasco, such as Yarusyacán (which produced a long pamphlet in the 1960s) and Rancas (which in 
2010 published a community history, with testimonies, of the 1960 land recuperation campaign). 
320 This detail is actually incorrect. Juan Velasco´s Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, which took 
over in the “Revolution” (actually a coup) of 1968, did nationalize the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in 1974, but it 
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remain. This company did not pay the comunidad campesina, nor does it pay now, for the 
immense areas of land from which it extracts incalculable riches, condemning the 
caseríos [outlying sections of the comunidad’s territory] and district [seat] of Huayllay to 
a painful and inclement backwardness. For example: It is incredible that this company 
refuses to provide an efficient lighting system to these pueblos [peoples/towns]. The town 
of Huayllay receives, from 6:00pm to 6:00am, a light of 30 W that as can be imagined is 
not enough to power even the engine of a sewing machine (Ibid., 39)321  
The deficiency of the power supply that had been supposed to function as compensation 
for the use of land can be seen as iconic of the weakness of the mine-comunidad relationship at 
the time, at least compared to today. On the other hand, it is important to remember that at this 
time there were other kinds of convenios – namely, those between the mining workers´ union and 
the Huarón company – that were negotiated and put into practice not in the town of Huayllay but 
rather up in the mining camp just a couple of kilometers away. These agreements had developed 
gradually since the union´s founding in 1945 – during a period of political opening in which 
many of the mining unions of the Central Highlands were organized – and had reached their 
apogee by the 1970s and 80s.  
Although these convenios were based around the labor relation and thus may seem 
completely unrelated to the mine-community link that is under discussion, in actual practice 
these old agreements were not just about wages but also about everyday life issues and in-kind 
provisions that the workers´ families had come to see as their right. According to the former 
secretary of the union, whom I interviewed, at one point there had been over 300 convenios 
between the workers and the company – meaning over 300 specific points on things like 
firewood and coal provision for cooking, school supplies for workers´ children, towels, toilet 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
did not do the same with medium-scale mining companies like Huarón. There was a process of “Peruvianization” in 
the company in the 1970s, under pressure from the government, as its place of incorporation moved from Paris to 
Lima and as the foreign personnel was gradually replaced by Peruvians; furthermore, some Peruvian capital was 
admitted. However, the French company Peñarroya (Groupe Imetal) retained ownership of a majority of shares until 
1987, when it sold the mine to the Hochschild group. Also, the quote states that the company “did not pay” the 
community for the use of land. As we saw, there were agreements over monetary compensation as early as 1936; 
clearly, what the writer meant was that there was not a remotely adequate or sufficient payment..  
321 It is important to mention that the community of Huayllay did not simply stand idly by waiting for the mining 
company to provide them with electricity. The 1987 community publication notes that in 1974 the organization of 
huayllino migrants in Lima (Centro Unión Huayllay) collected money for an electrification effort to be implemented 
jointly with the government, but this project fell through and the money was donated to the high school in Huayllay 
instead. The town of Huayllay did eventually gain access to a better electrical power system in the 1990s, but not 
through the mining company. 
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paper, etc. These in-kind provisions and agreements are definitely one of the things that people 
remember the most from the old Huarón mining camps, and which they recall having been 
central to what the workers´ union, and especially the women´s committees, fought for. Although 
several of their accounts could be cited on this point, for the sake of brevity I will only quote that 
of the former secretary of the union, who was in charge of organizing the women´s committees, 
and who provides a good overview of the system that had grown around the old convenios: 
We had a convenio that they would give us 30 centimeters [for] the size of a piece of 
firewood, because we used coal and firewood to prepare our food. So, the [women’s] 
committee worked on the fulfillment of this [agreement]. The committee also, what did it 
work on? On controlling the company stores. Controlling the weight, the delivery of the 
merchandise. It also worked on the hospitals, for a good [quality of] care... In the schools, 
for example the women’s committee was always present in the educational centers. We 
demanded that the teachers have their professional degree [sean titulados]. Before, we 
had seen that the teacher arrived on Tuesday, and left Thursday. They did not work 
Monday or Friday. But when the women’s committee began to work [on this], any 
teacher that did not work their hours, we proposed their immediate dismissal.322   
The intricate web of convenios of course extended to issues of payment and the 
workplace. The agreements could be quite specific, and over time they acquired certain stability, 
becoming part of a system of mutual expectations between workers and the company, almost a 
local tradition. This was facilitated by the fact that a (relatively) stable community of workers´ 
families had developed in the second half of the 20th century (i.e., people working at the mine for 
25 years or more, individuals who had been born and grown up in the camp and then stayed to 
work). Some of this specificity, intricacy and stability of agreements is reflected in the comments 
of Walter Peña Jumpa, an engineer who worked at Huarón and wrote his thesis about the mine in 
                                                          
322 Similarly, a group of huayllina women whom I interviewed told me about their memories of their mothers´ 
participation in the women´s committee in the old mining camp: “When there were abuses against the workers, for 
example if they didn´t bring them their exact amount of fuel, then [the women] went out and the company had to 
keep quiet and just give it to them” (cuando ya había abusos en los trabajadores, no les traía por ejemplo sus 
combustibles exacto, entonces ellas salían ya y la empresa les tenía que dar calladito). Additionally, Octavio 
Domínguez (pseudonym), one of the former workers whose life story I recounted at the end of Chapter 1, told me of 
how “[the women] controlled, for example, when there was a shortage of basic staple items, like sugar, milk, other 
things. So then they worked on that, the women’s committee. For example, [if] the fuel, firewood, coal for us to 
cook [with] did not arrive. So sometimes it did not arrive, or there was a shortage, then they had to come to the 
union to make their complaint [hacer reclamos]. Then they got together with the union and went to the General 
Manager’s office to complain” 
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1992. He describes one of the agreements, part of a wider web that was then in the process of 
being dismantled: 
In the San Narciso section [of the mine] an agreement has been made [se ha pactado] 
with the obrero workforce, since many years ago, for the payment of two extra hours for 
each day in which  water from Lake Lavandera is used for perforation, as opposed to 
water from Lake Naticocha which is normally used.  This concession, like others that 
used to be formerly practiced, is based on the desire to maintain a policy of LABOR 
PEACE in the face of union demands (Lake Lavandera is an old recipient of sewage from 
the Camp of the same name, in which people no longer live, located near the Huarón 
camp, thus the demand) (Peña 1992, 8; emphasis and parentheses in the original). 
Peña’s comments convey a sense not only of the specificity of the agreements but also of 
their direct connection to the issue of “labor peace” (paz laboral)– i.e., preventing strikes that 
could disrupt operations and cause losses.323  Like the company-community convenios to be 
discussed shortly, the worker-company agreements at the old mining camp were a condition for 
the attainment of the “peace” necessary to carry out mining operations. 
They are also relevant to the discussion of mine-community relations because the Huarón 
mining camps constituted a formative experience for many people living in Huayllay today. 
Many of the men involved in communal affairs in Huayllay are former mining workers; most 
other community members had at least a brother, a father or a husband who worked at the mine, 
and many lived in the mining camps at some point in their lives. Even those who lived 
permanently in Huayllay village or in one of the caseríos or estancias were familiar with the 
mining camps and went there frequently. Thus, together with the longstanding land-for-
electricity arrangement that the comunidad had since the 1930s, the old union agreements form 
part of the background to contemporary negotiations with the company.  
In the 1990s, however, the workers´ convenios were eliminated one by one, just as people 
were pressured to retire, labor laws changed and the union became gradually weaker. Today, as 
in other mines in Peru, there is no intricate web of agreements between the mining company and 
                                                          
323 Peña was critical of companies like Huarón that he said “attempted to maintain ‘LABOR PEACE,’ ceding to all 
the demands since profits could still be obtained so long as the operations were not paralyzed. In that way, little by 
little, the union organization was given sufficient force so as to make the most capricious (antojadizas) demands.” 
While one may disagree with this engineer´s assessment of union demands as “capricious,” his comments show the 
way in which the union had been able to negotiate quite intricate and detailed convenios with the company.  
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a community of workers and their families. Terms and conditions of work are set by the 
company or by national laws; even in cases where those terms do reflect some sort of demand 
from the workforce, they are nowhere near as complex as the old convenios, and they do not 
usually involve issues of everyday life or families (rather they are focused on pay and strictly 
workplace issues). Similarly, the ability of the workforce to disrupt the “peace” of operations is 
much weaker than before.  
When the workers and their families departed the mining camp in the 1990s, most went 
to other regions, but some moved to the town of Huayllay; this was especially the case, naturally, 
for workers who were originally huayllinos. Some men who had migrated to the mine and 
married huayllina women now joined the comunidad for the first time. During this time, the 
demographic center of the district shifted from the old mining camps to the town of Huayllay. 
This transformation became more dramatic in the next decade, after the Huarón mine reopened 
in 2001, followed shortly by Animón. When mineral prices started climbing upwards in 2003-
2004, giving rise to a new mining boom and to expanded operations at both Huarón and Animón, 
people began flocking to Huayllay. Some were returning huayllinos, other were new migrants. 
While both mines continued to provide housing for their upper-level staff, there was no more 
obrero housing at Animón, and only a small amount at Huarón. Many of the new workers thus 
found rooms in Huayllay itself, either renting living quarters themselves or sharing rooms rented 
by the contractor for whom they worked. This new growth of the town that is also the seat of the 
comunidad campesina is part of the background necessary to understanding the renewed 
importance of the mine-community relation.  
 
The rise of “the local community:” Global and national contexts 
Just as important is the larger national and international context in which the local shifts 
took place. In the early 1990s, the pro-market government of Alberto Fujimori encouraged the 
arrival of foreign mining investment as a way out of the economic crisis, and as a result new 
mining projects began either operations (Yanacocha) or exploration (Antamina). Though 
temporarily interrupted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (which had a significant impact in 
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Latin America), this first moment of mining growth set the stage for the second, more significant 
period of expansion that began after 2003. Furthermore, it brought the industry into contact with 
certain rural areas that had not had significant previous mining experience. This was similar to 
what had happened at a global level in the 1970s and 80s, when the mining industry moved into 
remote “greenfield” areas of the Asia-Pacific region (Ballard and Banks 2003). That global 
experience, and the resulting widespread conflicts with tribal and indigenous populations, led to 
a new industry and academic interest in the “local community” as a central actor in global 
mining. This worldwide shift, and its national variant, was noted by the Peruvian mining industry 
in the 1990s. In the latter part of that decade, Peruvian mining industry interests (through the 
Instituto de Estudios Energético Mineros – IDEM) commissioned a first study of mine-rural 
community relations in the country (Ossio 1998). This was not the first time that such issues 
were discussed in the country, but it did mark a shift in terms of the mining industry itself 
recognizing that rural communities constituted a subject of central importance for their 
operations.  
Another crucial factor was the development of the modern environmental movement and 
its impact both on public consciousness and on legislation and policy worldwide. In Latin 
America, a new wave of what Brañes (2000) calls “environmental legislation proper” (as 
opposed to earlier waves of “casual” and “sectoral” laws) began in the 1970s. This wave arrived 
in Peru in the mid-1980s, when two different government agencies, under the guidance of the 
United Nations, began work on the drafting of an Environmental Code. This Code was finally 
passed in 1990, against the opposition of the Peruvian business community; it established the 
modern regime of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and Environmental Remediation 
Plans (PAMAs). In addition to environmentalism, the influence of international human rights 
norms and discourses, as they developed in the second half of the 20th century, should not be 
underestimated. The same applies to transnational indigenous rights activism, which gained 
renewed force beginning in the 1980s, bringing new concepts and influences to Andean countries 
that had older histories of conflict, ideology and state policy around issues of indigeneity.  
 If the mining expansion of the 1990s (like that in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1970s 
and 80s) brought renewed attention to “the local community” on the part of the mining industry, 
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and if environmentalism, human rights and the transnational indigenous rights movement all 
influenced this process, there is a national context that merits at least as much attention – namely, 
the changes in land regimes in highland Peru. As mentioned earlier, a crucial moment in this 
history was the 1920 Constitution´s recognition of comunidades de indígenas (indigenous 
communities) as legal entities. This constituted a shift from the policies enacted shortly after 
Independence, a hundred years earlier, which under the influence of liberal ideology had 
abolished the colonial protectionist regime towards Indian lands (the old común de indios or 
pueblo de indios) and had sought to turn Indian community members into individual property 
owners who could sell their land freely. That 19th-century regime had not actually succeeded in 
eliminating the communities, but it is generally blamed for strengthening the haciendas and 
encouraging their expansion at the expense of Indian lands.324 The 1920 reentry of the 
comunidades into the national legal system took place early in Augusto B. Leguía´s “Patria 
Nueva” regime (1919-1930) and was a result of the influence of the intellectual and political 
indigenista movement as well as of ongoing indigenous peasant activism in rural Peru, 
particularly in the South. It was complemented by the creation of the Office of Indigenous 
Affairs (Asuntos Indígenas) and by the 1933 Constitution´s declaration of communal lands as 
“unalienable” (i.e. not to be sold).  
Over the next few decades, this new order provided the framework in which communities 
sought to assert their claims to land against the competing claims of the haciendas. Finally, in the 
early 1960s this dispute erupted into open conflict, in a way it had not since the early 1920s; 
beginning in both Cuzco (South) and Pasco (Center), but soon spreading to other parts of the 
country, peasants occupied hacienda lands. This movement led to the first and second Agrarian 
Reforms of the 1960s, and finally the more radical Agrarian Reform under General Velasco 
(1968-1975), who also changed the name of the comunidades indígenas to comunidades 
campesinas (peasant communities). In this way, the hacienda system had ended by the 1970s. 
Although the Agrarian Reform attempted to turn some of the larger haciendas into large, multi-
community productive units (SAIS and CAPs) so as to take advantage of economies of scale, 
most of these collapsed in the 1980s and their lands passed into community hands as well. As a 
                                                          
324 As Castillo (2007, 19) writes, “the community did not disappear in reality, even though it was absent from legal 
texts for nearly a century” (i.e. from 1824 to 1920). 
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result, the late 1980s saw the final and largest expansion in the number of recognized 
comunidades, with 1,321 recognized in 1985-1990 alone, during the first government of Alan 
García (Burneo 2007, 154). This was the culmination of a historical cycle of land recuperation, 
and it resulted in the present order in which 5,000-6,000 comunidades own around half of the 
agricultural and cattle-raising land in the country – albeit with private household usufruct inside 
of each community, and with widely varying forms of communal organization (Ibid., 157-158).  
Already by this time there were changes in the protectionist regime of 1920 and 1933, 
however. The new Constitution of 1979, and the General Law of Peasant Communities (1987), 
allowed the sale of communal land under exceptional circumstances, requiring a specific law 
from Congress and the approval of 2/3 of community members at a special assembly. Apparently 
there were no cases of communities that actually took advantage of this provision to sell their 
lands at this time (Castillo 2007, 68-70). Land laws changed more dramatically after 1990, when 
Peru shifted towards wholly pro-market policies (as opposed to the restrained liberalism of 1980-
1985 and the “heterodoxy” of 1985-1990). In 1991, all lands in the country were made fully 
alienable via Legislative Decree 653, which sought to create a market in rural lands and give 
communities the freedom to dispose of their property; this was confirmed by the 1993 
Constitution, promulgated a year after Fujimori´s “self-coup” of 1992. As Mayer (2002) argued, 
the liberalization of land regimes on paper did not result in any immediate rush to either dissolve 
communities or sell parts of their land, at least not in the highlands.325 Besides, although 
communities could now sell any or all of their land, for highland and rainforest communities this 
still required the votes of 2/3 of registered members.  
However, the conflict over communal lands did not end here. In 2008-2009, during the 
second government of Alan García – now a fervent convert to neoliberalism and a harsh critic of 
communal property – this suddenly became an explosive issue in Peruvian politics. In 2008, 
using special powers granted by Congress to facilitate the negotiation of the Peru-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement, President García issued Legislative Decree 1015, allowing communities on 
                                                          
325 “Interestingly, neither in Mexico nor in Peru was there a great rush to dissolve ejidos or comunidades... 
Communities refuse to go away despite the inducements to privatize. It seems that the legal status of communities as 
communal land with individual usufruct is unsettling to neo-liberal minds. Yet neo-liberalism happily admits to 
condominium property regimes in urban areas, and there is no reason why Andean communities could not be under 
the same legal regime” (Mayer 2002, 325).  
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the highlands and the Amazon region to sell their lands with only half of attendees at an 
assembly, rather than the more stringent requirement of 2/3 of registered members. This was a 
legal shift that had already occurred for coastal communities in 1997. While in that case the 
beneficiaries had been private agricultural investors, the 2008 extension of the same lax land sale 
regime to the highlands and rainforest was widely seen as a move calculated to facilitate the 
advancement of extractive activities such as oil, mining and forestry. This decree provoked 
massive protests by Amazonian indigenous organizations, who occupied several oil installations, 
leading the Peruvian Congress to override the President and repeal Decree 1015 and reinstate the 
previous 2/3 requirement for both the highlands and the rainforest.  
The 2008 protest was a prelude to the more violent events of the following year, when the 
Amazonian organizations again occupied oil facilities and roads demanding the repeal of a series 
of other Free Trade Agreement decrees that were also seen as harmful to communities´ rights 
over their territory. On June 5th 2009, the government sent the National Police to the northern 
Amazonian town of Bagua to forcefully clear the roads of protesters. The latter fought back, and 
the ensuing conflict resulted in the deaths of at least 10 civilians and 20 police officers - many of 
the latter executed by a particular group of protesters at one of the oil stations – as well as 
hundreds of wounded. The Baguazo, as the bloody conflict became known, forced the 
government to cancel more of the offending decrees, and became a defining event of García´s 
second government.  
Besides the evolution in land tenure regimes – both on the ground and in the law – there 
is another land-related context that must be taken into account: the relationship between mineral 
and surface rights in Peruvian law. As is well-known, in Latin America mineral deposits have, 
since colonial times, belonged to the state, not to the proprietors of surface land or to any other 
class of private owners. Of course, the state does not always conduct mining activity itself; 
today, in fact, that would be the exception rather than the norm. In Peru, the state grants what are 
called “concessions” (concesión) over mineral deposits to private companies, who then own the 
ore that they manage to extract. Taken by itself, this system pertains exclusively to the subsoil 
and has nothing to do with what happens on the surface. In practice, however, mine operators 
need to go through the surface land in order to dig shafts, blast open pits or dump tailings. 
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During most of the 20th century, this juxtaposition was not specifically regulated for mining 
activity; companies expected to be able to access any deposit so long as they had obtained a 
concession from the state. Early in the century, in particular, much of the land was still in the 
hands of haciendas and other individual, private owners, who were often willing to sell their 
surface properties to mining companies provided they paid an appropriate price. When that was 
not the case, and when holders of mining concessions needed to enter through surface lands 
belonging to someone else, there was the general legal concept of servidumbre (easement), 
which was the same either for a road, mine, water source or any other use. This easement right 
consisted of the ability to usufruct someone else´s property without in any way interfering with 
their property rights, as in a right-of-way.326 Although the Civil Code provided some regulations 
for this procedure, it did not prescribe any particular amount of compensation, which when 
necessary was supposed to be worked out by the parties involved. The term servidumbre is still 
how people in Huayllay refer to the payment that they receive from the mine for the use of their 
land.  
There was however one other way for holders of mining concessions to resolve the 
potential dispute with surface land owners, and that was through outright expropriation by the 
government. Even comunidad indígena land, which was otherwise “unalienable” under the 1933 
Constitution, could be expropriated “for reasons of public utility” (Art. 209). Expropriations of 
community land for purposes of mining did sometimes take place, as we saw earlier for the case 
of Rancas in 1983, when the government officially expropriated 540 hectares of community land 
for a new tailings deposit and other uses related to the Cerro de Pasco mine (the 1990 agreement 
was meant to override this earlier decree, but as we saw the latter was still occasionally invoked 
by mining company officials in 2009). Two years earlier, in 1981, the government had 
expropriated 2,368 hectares of land from the community of Antacama (Department of Cuzco), 
for the building of the Tintaya open-pit mine.  
                                                          
326 This general servidumbre was already regulated in the Peru´s first Civil Code of 1852.  Beyond the legal sense of 
easement, the term serividumbre means “servitude” in Spanish (as in servant labor). In the case of easement, the 
property affected is called the “servant” (sirviente), while the entity (such as a mining concession) making use of the 
“servant” is called the “dominant” (dominante).    
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The state´s ability to expropriate land for mining use came to an end in the early 1990s, 
however. This had to do with the pro-market shift in the government after 1990, which was 
enshrined in the Constitution of 1993. This new orientation rejected the legacy of the left-leaning 
Velasco government (1968-1975), with its multiple expropriations of private property (mining 
and oil companies, newspapers) and its land redistribution policy.327 The new order sought to 
limit the state´s role and ensure the property rights of potential investors in agriculture as well as 
other sectors; as a result, the new Constitution set much more demanding criteria for allowing 
expropriations (Castillo and Del Castillo 2003, 3).328 For the agricultural sector, this change was 
reinforced in 1995 by the new “Law for the Promotion of Investment in Economic Activities on 
Lands in National Territory and on Peasant and Native Communities,” better known as the Land 
Law (Ley de Tierras). This law restricted even further the possibility of expropriation and added 
a provision that had no precedent in Peruvian law, namely that mining investors were required to 
reach an agreement with the owners of the agricultural lands above their mineral concession. 
Although such agreements did often take place, they had not previously constituted a legal 
requirement for mining companies (Castillo 2007, 92).  
This provision (Article 7) aroused deep concern among mining industry representatives, 
who saw it as a threat to their interests and to the attraction of foreign investment towards the 
mining sector in Peru (Ibid.). We can think of this tension as exposing an internal contradiction 
in the neoliberal model of Fujimori´s Peru, based as it was both on the defense of property rights 
and, on the other hand, on the generation of hard cash by an industry that had become reliant on 
the use, taking or harming of other people´s property. Even if the industry was willing to pay or 
                                                          
327 The Velasco government´s expropriations and nationalizations should not be overestimated. They are considered 
excessive according to the standards of contemporary political discourse in Peru, but they weren´t necessarily 
radical by the standards of other Latin American and Third World governments at the time – especially as regards 
natural resource policy, where nationalization was common in the 1960s and 70s. Velasco did not nationalize all 
natural resource companies, or even all foreign ones, but only some of the larger, most emblematic ones – the 
International Petroleum Company, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Marcona Mining Company. Similarly, 
the government´s payment of compensation for the CPC nationalization was harshly criticized from the Left. On the 
other hand, the neoliberal and conservative critique (indeed, pillory) of Velasco’s memory has as much to do with 
his expropriations of newspapers and, above all, his radical redistribution of land.    
328 The mining industry recognizes that the 1993 Constitution´s limits on expropriation changed the conditions under 
which they work. As Luis Rodríguez Mariátegui, a lawyer for the National Mining, Energy and Petroleum Society, 
wrote in 2003, “expropriation is an option that is denied today, as a result of other norms with legal and 
constitutional standing, for which reason only the option of servidumbre is left” (Mariátegui 2003, 36).  
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otherwise compensate for the lands, it could not allow this transaction to be completely optional 
– some level of legal coercion or pressure was needed.329 As a result, only a few months later, in 
January 1996, mining interests managed to secure the passage of Law 26570, which amended the 
Land Law by introducing a new procedure that evoked the old notion of servidumbre (easement) 
but changed its basic character. Whereas the old servidumbre was a vaguely defined concept 
regulated by the Civil Code and assumed to be voluntary, the provision encoded in Law 26570 – 
which became known as the Ley de Servidumbre Minera – stated that if no voluntary agreement 
was reached, the owner of mineral rights could initiate a specific bureaucratic process at the end 
of which the state could force a servidumbre agreement on the surface owners. In theory, like all 
servidumbres, it was not supposed to infringe on property rights in any permanent way. In 
practice, however, this of course depends on one accepting mining companies´ claim that they 
return the land “as they found it.” This, combined with the new procedure´s coercive nature, 
made it resemble the old expropriations – as some have put it, “an expropriation in disguise” 
(Castillo and Del Castillo 2003, 25).  
In the next few years, the Ley de Servidumbre Minera would become a symbol of the 
Peruvian state´s continued pro-mining bias, and as such it would be frequently denounced by 
organizations like CONACAMI (National Coordinator of Communities Affected by Mining) and 
by communities opposed to the development of new mining projects. In fact, Law 26570 resulted 
in only a few legal servidumbre proceedings being initiated under its provisions. Rather, its 
impact was felt more strongly in the way in which it functioned as an implicit threat hanging 
over any mining-community negotiations – if no “voluntary” agreement was reached in a 
definite period of time, a mining company had the option of requesting a coercive servidumbre 
procedure through the state. This thus strengthened the bargaining power of mining companies in 
their negotiations with the owners of surface land, both to start new projects and to set the terms 
                                                          
329 This is not surprising. Capitalism relies on the property rights of liberal doctrine but cannot do completely 
without some form of what Marx called “primitive accumulation,” which goes against those liberal rights. It´s a 
question of whose property rights are going to be respected. The 1993 Constitution´s reinforcement of property 
rights was meant to benefit capitalist investors - such as those entering agribusiness on the Peruvian coast – rather 
than highland or Amazonian comunidades. In reality, there was not much of a conflict between large coastal 
agribusiness and mining projects, not only because the latter are located mostly away from the coast, but because 
both sectors share a common general outlook on the kind of development that Peru needs. Interestingly, it was small 
coastal agricultural producers (not agribusiness) – in Peru´s largest fruit-producing valley – who led one of the most 
emblematic fights against a mining project on their land (the Tambogrande conflict, late 1990s and early 2000s).  
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of compensation around existing operations. Ultimately, it is the struggle over “social peace” that 
determines the outcome of these negotiations, but the Ley de Servidumbre is an important part of 
the legal context that conditions this struggle. In the end, the whole concept of servidumbre - as a 
temporary right-of-way or right-of-use that does not interfere with the long-term property rights 
of the original owner – undergoes a distortion in the context of mining, an activity that causes 
significant and long-term alterations in the land and territory.330 
In analyzing the background to contemporary company-community negotiations in 
Huayllay, it is important to emphasize also the new turn that mining-community relations took 
across much of Pasco region in the 1990s. I described earlier the 1990 tailings deposit agreement 
between the community of Rancas and the state mining company. This agreement was 
significant not only because it resulted in the cancelation of an earlier expropriation order, but 
also because of the large compensation settlement that the community was able to obtain, which 
provided the capital for one of the first communal companies engaged in mining work. This 
outcome was no doubt a departure for mine-community relations in Pasco, but it was not the 
only one. Around the same time, old problems of contamination were garnering renewed interest 
in the region, under the influence of the new Environmental Code (1990), just as the mining 
companies´ image was tarnished by their mass layoffs and reductions in services (schools, 
hospitals, housing). One of these problems was the pollution of Lake Junín/Chinchaycocha.331 
The communities located around this body of water – Ondores, Pari and Vicco, among others - 
had long complained about the death of fish and other lake life due to tailings waste, as well as 
the flooding of part of their lands by the Upamayo dam at the north end of the lake (built by the 
old Cerro de Pasco Corporation in the 1930s).  
                                                          
330 As Castillo and Del Castillo write, “The common situation is that when mining activity ceases the lands over 
which property is recovered [by the original owners]  are lands that have undergone severe modifications, over 
which inert material has been deposited or which have been in direct contact with highly contaminating substances. 
More serious is the case of mines that have been exploited through the open-pit system, in which there will be no 
land to recover properly speaking, but rather an enormous hole in the ground, with zero utility. In this sense 
servidumbre is denaturalized and becomes a real form of disposition of the land on the part of an outside party, in 
this case the mining company. Nor does [the law] take into account the collateral damage of mining activity, such as 
the cost of restoring the river basin where [the mine] is located, the possible harm to lands that border the servant 
property, the environmental impact and the social cost.” (Castillo and Del Castillo, 24-25).  
331 The second largest lake in Peru, Lake Junín is situated in the middle of the Pasco/Junín plateau and is the source 
of the Mantaro River; for much of the 20th century, it received contaminating effluents from the Cerro de Pasco and 
Brocal (Colquijirca) mines, through the San Juan River. 
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On April 23-24, 1994, a group of comunidad leaders and young professionals from the 
communities around the lake organized a press conference on-site to show journalists and 
congressional representatives the extent of the destruction; they timed this event to coincide with 
Earth Day and to capitalize on the attention that was then focused on the state mining company 
Centromín (the former CPC) due to the government´s attempts to privatize it (Palacín 10-14). 
Initially formed as the Lake Junín Defense Committee (Comité de Defensa del Lago Junín), the 
group soon changed its name to Ecological Defense Front of the Communities of the High 
Andean Zone, better known as the Frente Ecológico. Several of those involved in this group 
would later go on to play a significant role in the Coordinator of Communities Affected by 
Mining (CONACAMI), the national organization that emerged in 1999.  
In the years after the Lake Junín protests, one of the communities involved, Vicco, 
became caught up in a conflict over land with the Brocal Mining Company. Located not far to 
the northeast of Huayllay, Vicco is a community with very particular characteristics. Like 
Huayllay, it is a plateau community, and thus practices cattle-raising rather than agriculture; 
furthermore, it is also a community that can be traced back to a late-16th century Indian 
reducción. However, unlike Huayllay, since the 1950s Vicco had moved away from mining work 
and towards transportation. One after another, the viqueños began purchasing vehicles, and 
through their hard work became rather prosperous truck drivers in charge of much of the 
transportation along the highways of this part of Central Peru, while maintaining cattle-raising as 
a secondary activity (Chang and Núñez del Prado 1970, 42-44). A number of viqueños also 
accessed higher education at the university in Cerro de Pasco. One of them was Miguel Palacín 
Quispe, a young Animal Science engineer (ingeniero zootecnista) who studied in Cerro and who 
played a leading role in the Frente Ecológico of Lake Junín as well as in the conflict between 
Vicco and Brocal.  
This latter dispute was significant both because, like the Lake Junín protests, it 
contributed to the formation of CONACAMI, and also because it was one of the first times in 
Peru that a community managed to stop a new mining project from developing. Although I have 
not conducted research in Vicco itself, here I will provide a brief description of the conflict and 
its impact on mining-community relations in the region, based on a critical reading of published 
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accounts such as Palacín (1999), Chacón (2004), as well as information from the press and, 
tangentially, from my own research in the larger region of which Vicco is part. 
The conflict had to do with the Brocal company´s San Gregorio project, a new open-pit 
zinc/silver/lead project not far from its present open-pit mine in Colquijirca, just south of Cerro 
de Pasco. 332 San Gregorio was a paraje (pasture/section) of the community of Vicco´s lands, but 
the company did not request permission when it began exploratory work in 1992, which 
motivated the community to complain to the Ministry of Mines as early as 1994 (Palacín, 15). 
The community´s main struggle, however, would be against the company´s pursuit of an 
administrative servidumbre arrangement through the Ministry of Mines, particularly after this 
procedure was specified – as an ultimately coercive arrangement – by Law 26570 (the Ley de 
Servidumbre Minera, which passed on January 1996). The community filed legal actions against 
the servidumbre proceedings as early as September 1996, insisting on direct dialogue with the 
company instead, but in July 1997 the national mining authority (the DGM) approved the 
initiation of the servidumbre.  
Although some leaders were more willing to accede to the company´s terms, by 1998 a 
faction more opposed to the company had won the communal elections, with Miguel Palacín 
from the Frente Ecológico as the community´s fiscal.333 Soon after, the communal leadership 
managed to interrupt and suspend the on-site inspection that was part of the servidumbre 
proceedings; in response, the mining company filed a criminal complaint against them, accusing 
them of kidnapping, for supposedly having held the inspectors and Brocal employees against 
their will.334 By this time, the community had established connections with NGOs from Lima 
such as the Peruvian Environmental Law Society (SPDA) and CooperAcción, and began also 
building links with environmental and indigenous organizations in Canada; in 1998 it also filed a 
                                                          
332 The Brocal company was originally founded by Eulogio Fernandini - who also became one of the largest cattle-
raising hacendados in the region – at the ancient silver mining site of Colquijirca, just south of Cerro de Pasco. 
Today, around half of Brocal shares are owned by Buenaventura, the large Peruvian mining company that also owns 
the Yanacocha gold mine, jointly with Newmont.   
333 The fiscal occupies an important position in communal governments in Peru, as the person in charge of oversight, 
control and inspection over the rest of the community´s authorities.  
334 This is a common accusation in social conflicts in Peru. 
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complaint with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. The conflict also involved on-
the-ground actions on the disputed land, with the mining company blocking an irrigation canal 
that had been built by the community, and with the latter planting 100 hectares of maca – the 
traditional high-altitude crop of the area – on the proposed San Gregorio open pit site in late 
1998. Also that year, hundreds of viqueños marched to Lima to express their opposition to the 
servidumbre proceedings.  
The faction most opposed to the mining company left the leadership at the end of 1998, 
with Miguel Palacín becoming more involved in presiding the newly-founded CONACAMI than 
in the day-to-day of the Vicco struggle. Nevertheless, in the following years the community 
continued to oppose the imposition of the servidumbre procedure by the company through the 
government. It did indicate a willingness to reach an agreement with the company for the use of 
the land, but through direct negotiations and without legal pressure. By 2000, in any case, the 
Brocal company was in less of a hurry to go ahead with the project, due to the fall in world metal 
prices that had resulted from the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis; the mining boom of the 
1990s had come to an end. Metal prices would rebound after 2003-2004, but the relationship 
between the company and the community has continued to be difficult. In 2009, the latter gave 
permission for further explorations and perforations during two years; this permit was renewed 
in 2011, but in 2012 there were conflicts again, with the community complaining of unfulfilled 
agreements. Thus, twenty years after the first exploration attempts in relation to the San Gregorio 
project, no mining has yet taken place at the site. 
Although the account presented here of the conflict over San Gregorio is of necessity 
brief, several aspects stand out as important for the discussion in this chapter. The conflict was 
significant because it was one of the first times that a community had stopped a mining project 
from developing, especially one that involved a company as well-established as El Brocal. As we 
saw earlier, the community of Rancas had resisted an expropriation order for several years in the 
1980s, but this had been only for a tailings deposit, not for an entire new mine, and in any case 
Rancas had eventually reached an agreement with the mining company.335  At the same time, it´s 
                                                          
335 The Rancas dispute no doubt had an impact on the conflict in Vicco, since the two communities are part of the 
same general region. One of the founding members of CONACAMI explained to me that the viqueños´ expectations 
were raised when they saw what Rancas had obtained for its lands in the 1990 agreement with Centromín. 
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not that Vicco completely rejected the possibility of accepting the San Gregorio operations. As 
becomes clear from Palacín´s account, the strongest opposition was to the imposition of the 
administrative servidumbre arrangement, with its coercive aspects. The community wanted its 
right to the land to be respected and preferred direct face-to-face negotiations with the mining 
company; in this way a better agreement could be obtained. Indeed, as the community held out 
longer, the proposed amount of the compensation was revised upwards.336 This was significant, 
for, together with the earlier negotiations between Rancas and Centromín, it helped to raise 
expectations around the entire region for what communities could expect to get as payment for 
the use of their land by mining companies.  Even leaders like Miguel Palacín - who would later 
be associated most strongly with a position hostile to the mining industry (through his work in 
CONACAMI) - were not completely opposed to the development of the mine, provided the 
community´s conditions were met.337 In this sense Vicco was different from the Tambogrande 
conflict of 1998-2004 that became emblematic of the new mine-community conflicts in Peru, as 
a coastal agricultural population managed to stop the development of a gold mine.   
On the other hand, in Vicco´s case the end result of the community´s actions has also 
been the indefinite postponement of the mining project. While the conflict was partly about a 
demand for direct negotiation and greater compensation, it is also true that the community has 
seemed to be in no hurry to allow the development of the mine.338 Moreover, other factors have 
                                                          
336 Thus, in March 1998, the government experts tasked with evaluating the proposed servidumbre proposed a 
compensation of US$574,916 for the use of 3,277 hectares (soon after revised downward to 2,900 hectares) over a 
period of 50 years (Palacín 20, 27). Then on April 1999, the same government agencies proposed a compensation of 
US$1´209,840, for 2,907 hectares for the same period of time. Although this represented an increase, the community 
pointed out that it still meant only US$8.32 per hectare per year (Ibid., 34). 
337 As Palacín writes in his account of the conflict, “We are aware, however, that the mining operations cannot be 
paralyzed. They are a source of jobs and a means of obtaining foreign exchange. At the same time we are worried 
about the defense of our lands” (Palacín, 17). He lists the conditions for a direct dialogue between the company and 
the community over the implementation of the mining project, as laid out in a document presented while he was one 
of the communal authorities. Among those conditions are: 1) Withdrawing all criminal complaints against the 
community´s leaders; 2) Reposition of the irrigation canal closed by the mining company; 3) Withdrawal of the 
administrative servidumbre procedure through the Ministry of Mines; 4) Reduction of the area of the mining project 
to that strictly necessary, and the implementation of separate dialogues for the exploration and operations phases, 
respectively. Palacín also proposed making the approval of the San Gregorio project dependent on a public consulta 
with the population of Vicco, as well as giving the community a direct participation in the profits generated by the 
project (Ibid. 44-45).  
338 Whether this was due to the fact that Vicco is not dependent on mining work as is Huayllay and, to a lesser 
extent, Rancas, is something that only localized research in the community would be able to determine. As stated 
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played a role in the conflict, in particular the critique of mining contamination voiced by 
communal leaders and the Frente Ecológico – it could hardly have been otherwise in Vicco, a 
community which borders the San Juan River, heavily contaminated by mining waste.   
The Vicco dispute contributed to a renewed sense of strength among communities in 
Pasco and Central Peru vis-a-vis the mining companies on their territory, as well as to the 
growing visibility of the problem of contamination left by 20th-century mining in the country. It 
also contributed to the emergence of the National Coordinator of Communities Affected by 
Mining (CONACAMI), under the leadership of Miguel Palacín and with the support of NGOs 
such as CooperAcción and Oxfam.339 That organization played an important role around mining 
conflicts in the early 2000s, even if it later moved largely away from these conflicts so as to 
dedicate itself to the building of an indigenous movement in Peru (Vittor 2008, 54-60)340. At the 
time of my research, CONACAMI and its sister organization, CAOI (Andean Confederation of 
Indigenous Organizations) maintained some links with the community of Rancas, but not so with 
Huayllay. Nevertheless, the organizing around mine-community issues in the 1990s and early 
2000s had created a changed context that would impact the situation in Huayllay as well. As an 
official at one of the mining companies operating in Huayllay (Pan American Silver) told me, 
when his company bought the Huarón mine in 2000, “Central Peru was considered the anti-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
earlier, Vicco is regionally well-known for being a community of truck-drivers. During the conflict with Brocal, the 
Ministry of Mines attempted to accuse members of the community of being involved with drug trafficking, alleging 
that this was the reason why they did not want the attention that a large new mining project would bring.  
339 CooperAcción is a Lima-based NGO that formed in the 1990s out of another NGO called IPEMIN, which among 
other things has worked with mining workers (in the late 1980s and early 90s), fishing communities and, more 
recently, the rights of the elderly and retired. CooperAcción played an important role in the early years of 
CONACAMI, organizing a national workshop for communities affected by mining activities in November 1998, in 
which community leaders proposed founding a national organization that then became CONACAMI. The latter´s 
first Congress was then held on October 2009.  
340 As Luis Vittor, a member of CONACAMI, writes in his history of the organization, about the II National 
Congress of 2003, “The accords of the congress marked the beginning of a new phase in CONACAMI, with the 
approval of the change from `coordinator to confederation’  and its self-affirmation as an indigenous organization” 
(Vittor 2008, 54). About the various shifts in the organization over the next few years, Vittor writes that “the 
changes in CONACAMI signified the ‘stagnation’ of the possibility of consolidating the process of national 
articulation around the mining conflicts, even though [CONACAMI] had contributed to placing the issue of mining 
on the national political agenda. We believe that the decision to affirm itself as an indigenous organization has 
assigned [CONACAMI] a different role from the initial one of an organization of people affected by mining” (Ibid., 
60). CONACAMI´s “indigenous turn” did not necessarily have to result in the organization’s distancing itself from 
the day-to-day of mining conflicts, but in practice the two shifts took place simultaneously.  
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mining bastion of Peru; it is the cradle of CONACAMI, which was born in Vicco, a stone´s 
throw away from us.” While this description may be an exaggeration – in terms of all of Central 
Peru being an “anti-mining bastion” - it does convey a sense of the changed climate around 
mine-community relations in Pasco around the start of the millennium. 
   
Huayllay: “Social peace” and the “social burden” 
Company-community negotiations in Huayllay: 2006-2008 
It was in that context that operations restarted in Huayllay District´s two mines, Huarón 
and Animón/Chungar, in 2001, under the new ownership of Pan American Silver and Volcan, 
respectively. Both mines expanded their operations in the next few years, as metal prices began 
their upward climb after 2003, due to the rise of China. In 2005, the community of Huayllay 
formed its current comunidad-owned company, EMICONSATH, after an initial attempt at a 
communal company had failed. And in 2006 a new communal leadership at the comunidad of 
Huayllay began taking action to renegotiate the convenios with the two mining companies 
operating in its territory, starting with Huarón first. Feeling that the company was not being 
responsive enough to its demands, the comunidad decided to do a paro by blocking the access 
roads to the Huarón mine for two days, on August 15-16.  
On August 17, a meeting was finally held between the company and the comunidad, in 
the latter´s offices, which gave rise to a mesa de diálogo (“dialogue table”), as formal processes 
of negotiation around social conflicts are commonly known in Peru. The mesa included several 
meetings over the following months, as well as the formation of a number of committees to work 
on specific areas such as labor, education and servidumbre payments, as well as others. These 
efforts concluded on June 11, 2007, with the signing of the Convenio Marco or Framework 
Agreement (another common term in mine-community relations in Peru). 
The renegotiation of the convenios between the community and the Huarón company in 
2006-2007 led to a significant increase in the forms of compensation received by the community, 
and in the company´s local development and Social Responsibility programs. Some forms of 
company assistance, as well as the annual payments for the land used, had existed before. 
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However, most of the Social Responsibility programs that existed at the time of my research 
(2009-2010) got their start in 2006-2007 or later, as a result either of one of the convenio´s 
specific stipulations or of the company´s broader efforts to stabilize relations with the 
community after the confrontation of 2006. Just like one of my informants from Huayllay 
described this moment as a “revolution” in the agreements that had traditionally existed between 
the community and the mine, the company also recognized this as a turning point. Its 2007 Social 
Responsibility Report stated that, “For Huarón, the most important thing about this Mesa de 
Diálogo has been the transition from a scenario where there was certain mistrust, towards one 
based on dialogue and agreement (concertación)” (PASSAC 2007, 48).  
After the negotiations with Huarón were complete, the community began a similar 
process with the other mine in the district, Volcan-owned Animón/Chungar. A first request for a 
dialogue was approved in the communal assembly in September 2007, and submitted to the 
mining company the following month. A mesa de diálogo between the community and the 
company was finally installed on March 28, 208, and it met periodically until September of that 
year. The negotiations produced an agreement on points that were similar to those accorded with 
Huarón – work for comuneros and scholarships for the young people, a donation of alpacas to 
the community, and economic development programs. As the negotiations were coming to an 
end, however, the subject of land and compensation became a sticking point. The community 
claimed that the company had expanded over one particular parcel of land without the 
community´s permission, and that it had secretly moved the land markers to hide this fact. In 
response to this, the community staged a paro against Animón/Chungar in October 2008, 
blocking access to the mine. This time, however, unlike in 2006, the blockage escalated into a 
conflict with police, the result of which was several comuneros wounded, two of them seriously. 
One of them eventually had to have a leg amputated as a result of the wounds; another suffered 
serious head injuries. The community and the company returned to the negotiating table to settle 
this issue, and an agreement was reached on October 22, 2008. 
 Having briefly described the process of negotiation between the comunidad of Huayllay 
and the two mining companies, we can now examine the nature of the convenios and of the ways 
in which they structure mine-community relations. One of the main aspects of the agreements 
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was the increase in servidumbre payments for the land used by the two mining companies. Here, 
the term servidumbre does not necessarily imply the administrative procedure that was laid out in 
the 1996 Ley de Servidumbre Minera and that was at the heart of the conflict between the 
community of Vicco and the Brocal mining company. Rather, in the Huayllay negotiations the 
term servidumbre is used in its more general, older sense of a right to use someone else´s 
property without permanently damaging it (something that is certainly questionable in the case of 
mining activity). While many people in Huayllay see all or most of the company´s programs or 
donations to the community as a form of compensation for the use of land, they generally use the 
term servidumbre to mean only the monetary component of that compensation.  
During the first few years of Pan American Silver´s operations in the district, the 
servidumbre payment for the lands was US$100 per hectare. In the 2006-2007 negotiations, the 
community asked that this be increased, at least for the new areas into which the company had 
expanded since 2000. At one point, a demand of US$1,000 per hectare was put forth by the 
community. Finally, an agreement was reached that the servidumbre for the new lands would be 
set at $400 per year per hectare, and that it would be paid retroactively for the years since 2000, 
for the new hectares of land into which company operations had expanded. One company 
representative whom I interviewed, and who had taken part in the negotiations, saw this four-fold 
increase as a result of the new “current” or “conjuncture” of increased community demands upon 
mining companies, especially in the other nearby mines of Pasco Department – he cited the 
example of the conflict between the community of Ticlacayán and the Atacocha mine a few 
years before. In this context, he felt, the US$400 agreement was not too bad for the company.341  
                                                          
341 Again, this increase in servidumbre payments was for the new lands occupied – the old surface area continued to 
be paid for at the former rate. I do not at present have the exact number of hectares contained in the “new” area – 
one source mentions 25 hectares (Defensoría del Pueblo, Reporte No.32, Oct. 2006, 12), while the former president 
of the community mentioned 54 hectares to me. The total area occupied by the productive installations of the 
Huarón mine is 180.41 hectares, of which 61.33 ha. consists of tailings (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, Informe 
No.221-2010-MEM-AAM/ABR/SDC, 9-10). Ministry of Mines documents consider the broader area of influence to 
be approximately 15 km² (Ibid.). The company claims ownership over 472 ha. of the former San José hacienda 
(PASSAC, Plan de Cierre, 2008) , which its French predecessor bought from the Andueza family in 1915 (it ceded 
part of the hacienda to the community in the 1930s).  In addition, there is an old tailings deposit of 19.39 hectares 
next to the town of Huayllay, left by the former company and which the current company has covered with clay and 
grass, as part of a Special Environmental Management Plan (PEMA) (Ibid.).  
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 Another major area of demand by the community had to do with employment. In a 
previous chapter I described how this area, like many mining regions, experienced a change from 
a situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus over the course of the 20th century. Although 
there are more mining workers than ever before in Huayllay District (largely due to the growth of 
Animón/Chungar from a small to a medium-scale operation, while Huarón has stayed the same), 
the demand for labor by the mines is not sufficient given the supply - which is much greater than 
before – and many of those employed by the companies and the contractors are actually people 
from other regions. Therefore, the community has seen it as imperative to seek more 
opportunities for its members – especially its young people – in the two mining companies. 
Some of that has taken place through the formation of the communal company. During the 2006-
2007 negotiations, the community also pressed for company commitments to hire more 
huayllinos. At one point, there were demands for quite extensive hiring of local people.342  
In the end, the company agreed to offer jobs to 30 comuneros each year, as well as to 
have a general policy of preferential hiring for local people and for contracts for the communal 
company. A demand closely related to that for jobs was that for education, particularly technical 
training, since a lack thereof is often seen as a reason why many huayllinos do not get jobs at the 
mines. Thus, one of the points of the agreement was that the Huarón company would provide at 
least 10 scholarships each year for young huayllinos to attend CETEMIN, a well-known mining 
technology training center located near Lima. Similarly, the company agreed to create a mining 
technology training center in the local area, where young people could learn modern mining 
skills and eventually seek a job in the company.  
 Besides monetary compensation, employment and education, another important area of 
the 2007 agreement between the community of Huayllay and the Huarón mine had to do with 
obtaining company support for local productive activities. In particular, the company agreed to 
the community´s request for a large donation of alpacas for the comunidad pastures.343 On 
                                                          
342 According to the Peruvian Ombudsman´s (Defensoría del Pueblo) monthly report on social conflicts, the 
community at one point demanded that 70% of comuneros and children of comuneros be hired as direct, payroll 
workers (Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe No.32, Oct. 2006, 12).  
343 This is a section of land that is owned by the comunidad as an entity. It is distinct both from the family-occupied 
estancias and from the communal cooperative´s lands.  
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August 31, 2007, one thousand female alpacas – brought from Puno in trucks hired by the 
company – were handed over the comunidad. This donation, which had originated in a request 
made by the community, itself, came up frequently in my interviews and conversations in 2009-
2010. The company´s flagship Social Responsibility project, however, is its weaving program, 
directed at local women in both Huayllay and Huaychao. Although it came about more as a 
company initiative than a formal comunidad demand, it also started around the time of the 
negotiations, namely in 2006 and more fully in 2007. 
 Thus, the period between 2006 and 2007 saw a significant shift in the transactions, forms 
of compensation and institutional arrangements between the Huarón mine and the comunidad of 
Huayllay. Similarly, as part of that, the company started implementing a set of Corporate Social 
Responsibility programs aimed at the local community, and began publishing both a local 
institutional bulletin detailing its development activities and an annual Social Responsibility 
report. During my time in Huayllay, I was able to speak to both Huarón company officials and 
different local people about how they perceive these institutional arrangements, social 
responsibility programs and forms of compensation. Before delving into the analysis of these 
arrangements, I will briefly describe the provisions of the 2008 agreement with the other mine in 
the district, the Volcan company´s Chungar/Animón unit.  
In many ways, this accord resembles the earlier one with Huarón, and was undoubtedly 
influenced by the latter. Again, one of the most important areas of negotiation had to do with 
labor, and with the related issue of education and training for local youth so that they will have 
access to jobs in the future. The Chungar/Animón company agreed to take forty workers from 
Huayllay into its payroll– in other words, people who were working for subcontractors at the 
mine and who would now be shifted into the more desirable state of direct workers on the 
company´s payroll (planilla). Specifically, it would be 10 workers in 2008, 15 in 2009, and 15 
workers in July 2010, after which new people from the community would be admitted 
“depending on the prices of metals on the world market.”344 More generally, the company agreed 
                                                          
344 Certainly, their incorporation into payroll did not imply job stability as it would have before the 1990s. Unlike at 
Huarón, where there is a small number of actually stable workers who held on from the days of the old company, all 
obreros at Animón – even when on the payroll - are on fixed-term contracts (plazo fijo), which are renewed every 
few months at the discretion of the company. The convenio with the comunidad specifically states the plazo fijo 
status of the forty workers being shifted to payroll.   
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to give priority to comuneros and children of comuneros when there were job openings; the 
comunidad would supply the names and information of community members interested in 
working. Similarly, the mine promised to give priority to the communal company when it came 
to contracts.  In regard to training and education, the company agreed to provide internships as 
well as temporary summer work for the children of comuneros, and to fund 10 scholarships per 
year to SENATI (one of the best-known technical trade schools in Peru).  
Also like the Huarón mine, Chungar/Animón agreed to make a contribution to the 
communal pastures – in this case, with 400 alpacas. In addition, the convenio included a large 
number of highly detailed points specifying forms of support for local schools and communal 
institutions. On the issue of payments for use of land, these also went up to $400 per hectare per 
year for the new parcels of land occupied. Additionally, there was a one-time payment of 
compensation for the approximately 50 hectares of lands whose unauthorized use had given rise 
to the conflict in 2008. This was 900,000 soles (about US$360,000). Similarly to what happened 
in Rancas with the compensation money in 2010, in Huayllay some people advocated investing 
the money in some kind of communal enterprise, but ultimately the position in favor of splitting 
the money and handing it out individually won out. Thus, although the compensation for the land 
was a rather large sum, once it was split among all 1600 comuneros, each received only around 
500 soles (slightly under US$200).   
Land, mine-community agreements and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
At the time of my stay in Huayllay (2009-2010), the renegotiated agreements between the 
comunidad and the two mining companies had produced a situation of relative stability, 
notwithstanding the violence of October 2008 when police attacked the comuneros blocking the 
road to the Chungar/Animón mine. Mining operations were proceeding along without major 
interruptions (other than a brief labor strike by Huarón´s direct, planilla workers for several days 
in April 2010). Many of the provisions of the 2007 and 2008 convenios had actually been 
implemented – such as the donations of alpacas and the increased servidumbre payments – or 
were already in process, as with several of the educational and training programs. Generalizing 
for a moment, I would say that in my conversations and interviews with people in Huayllay, 
there was a general sense of partial fulfillment of the accords. Almost everyone complained 
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about specific points in the agreements that had not become reality, or not in a satisfactory way. 
But most people did not accuse the mines of outright failure to comply – rather, they considered 
that the companies were in the process of meeting at least part of the responsibilities outlined in 
the convenios.  
Certainly, most huayllinos share the same skeptical and critical lens through which 
people in much of highland and rural Peru view powerful entities, whether they be the 
government or mining companies. In particular, they are critical of the extraction of mineral 
wealth away from the local area, the disparities in wealth between the companies and their 
community, the insufficiency of job opportunities and the subcontracting system (these are 
probably the four most common critiques that I heard, alongside the pervasive belief that 
contamination is an inevitable part of mining). But, on the other hand, there was not a significant 
public discourse denouncing or accusing the companies of complete and outright irresponsibility, 
like there was in the city of Cerro de Pasco at the same time. In the latter location, those 
accusations and denunciations were pervasive, whether on the radio, at public events and in 
everyday conversations. The fact that they rarely led to any organized action on the part of 
Cerro´s residents – due to the urban population´s fragmentation and lack of representative 
institutions, as well as other factors discussed elsewhere in this dissertation – does not invalidate 
the observation that the discourse on the local mining company is significantly more negative in 
Cerro de Pasco than it is in Huayllay.  
In Huayllay, most people I spoke to, especially communal leaders, did not talk about a 
company´s “responsibility” in vague or abstract terms, as often occurs in global CSR discourse; 
rather they see it as hinging on the fulfillment of specific, concrete agreements worked out with 
the comunidad, a fulfillment which they saw as taking place - partially. It is important to remark 
that this general attitude was, on average, held equally towards both Huarón and 
Chungar/Animón. Some people gave a more negative assessment of one company and some of 
the other, and certain specific officials were considered to be more manipulative or misleading 
than others, but, on the whole, I did not detect a consistent difference in how people assess the 
behavior of the two companies. This is interesting given that the two mines operating in the 
district projected different images at the time. Pan American Silver, the Canada-based company 
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which owns Huarón, had a more developed Corporate Social Responsibility discourse, as 
evidenced in the monthly newsletters and annual reports about its programs in the Huayllay area. 
Chungar/Animón, on the other hand, was owned by Volcan, which also ran the Cerro de Pasco 
mine and which had a negative image as a traditional, family-controlled Peruvian mining 
company whose operations were gradually destroying a city. Yet in Huayllay, the general 
attitude of the population emphasized the community´s own agency in enforcing an agreement 
with the mines that were operating on its land, so that the companies´ specific attitudes or 
conducts seemed less important.  
I have pointed out a significant difference in how communal leaders discussed the mining 
companies´ “social responsibility” as opposed as to how the companies themselves, and global 
CSR discourse more broadly, approached the subject. The huayllinos tended to answer questions 
about whether companies were “responsible” in terms of the fulfillment of specific accords, not 
of the abstract concepts on which global discussions of CSR often dwell. This can be illustrated 
through the following quotes from two individuals active in communal affairs – the first, a 
former mining worker who occupied a post in the junta directiva at the time of my research, and 
whom I had asked about which of the two companies had a better relationship with the 
community: 
I think that currently, partially they are at the same level, yes, they have the same 
commitments. Before, sure, Chungar was a smaller company, I´m talking about the 70s, 
more or less the 80s, it was small, but later it has strengthened its progress a lot, its 
operations, today it has surpassed Huarón, almost 80% more, but they are all under the 
responsibility [responsabilidad], they are fulfilling the obligations that we have thrust 
upon them [que nosotros le hemos implantado] that they should fulfill their obligations 
with our community, but even so it’s still a bit slow [con pasos un poco lentos]. 
Here, not only is “responsibility” directly linked to the formal agreements with the community, it 
is also linked to production – a company’s responsibilities towards the community increase 
proportionately to the scale of its operations. In this other quote, by Javier Vega, the communal 
president in 2006-2007, who played a key role in the negotiations with Huarón, , the term “social 
responsibility” is also used in the sense of the degree of fulfillment of the specific accords: 
What I see is that the mining company also has to have a bit more responsibility in 
fulfilling these convenios. The convenio marco, it really is broad, and there are several 
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items that are still in need of implementation. They are not being fulfilled at a hundred 
percent... I would really like to highlight also for the company, ask them that they really, 
that they have a social responsibility [responsabilidad social], to fulfill what has been 
written down. We would not want that to stay up in the air. It’s two years that have 
passed already. We’re closing in on two years, and up to this moment there hasn’t been a 
fulfillment of 100% of that convenio marco.345 
Here I am not so much interested in whether it is true that some of the agreements are 
“not being fulfilled” as in the fact that “social responsibility” is linked above all to the fulfillment 
of  specific provisions of the mine-community convenio – an agreement that moreover was the 
result of demands by the community. By contrast, although Huarón company officials certainly 
do mention the convenio, they, like the industry more broadly, tend to define Corporate Social 
Responsibility in more abstract terms and through a focus on the company’s own actions and 
agency. Here is just one example from the company’s first Social Responsibility Report, 
published at the end of 2007, not long after the signing of the convenio marco with the 
comunidad: 
Our Good Neighbor policy is based on forming an integral part of the communities in our 
area of influence, concerning ourselves with their needs and problems, for that reason we 
are always willing to dialogue and to apply social management tools [herramientas de 
gestión social] designed to achieve the community’s development.... These activities are 
the result of our corporate social responsibility policy [emphasis in the original], which 
reveals our commitment to conduct a joint effort with the community and contribute to 
improving the quality of life of the population; to this end the company plans and 
executes, in a concerted way, participatory community development projects, turning the 
community into a protagonist of its own change. One example of what we have described 
above is the installation of the Mesa de Diálogo, formed by the company and the 
comunidad campesina of Huayllay, which has culminated in accords directed at the 
execution of sustainable development projects (Pan American Silver, Reporte Social 
2007, 21).  
In this passage, the agreements and the Mesa de Diálogo are certainly acknowledged, but 
they appear as a function of the company’s social responsibility policy which is in turn described 
in the broad, expansive terms of contemporary world CSR and sustainable development 
                                                          
345 Some examples that he gave of commitments that had not been entirely fulfilled included the construction of a 
specific bridge in the town, the implementation of a promised fund for development projects (though he partly 
blamed the communal leadership for that), and the allocation of change in the allocation of water from the local hot 
springs (a decrease in the share used by company staff and an increase in the share allocated to the community-
operated thermal baths, to 100% during half of the week).   
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discourse. This is similar to the reply I obtained from the company’s chief Corporate Social 
Responsibility officer, when I asked him to define what social responsibility meant in the context 
of mining operations: 
A responsible mining company has to be very careful to contribute positively to the social 
web [red social]. That’s the first thing. And, secondly, to develop ties of trust, 
coordinating them and sharing them with the social actors, and to support development, 
within its capabilities. That is the concept. The explanation could take five hours. 
Here, again, we get a sense of the general, transnational concepts through which social 
responsibility is defined by the company (and others like it). In fact, in this passage, and in the 
rest of the interview, the Convenio Marco and the Mesa de Diálogo were not even mentioned. 
Another company officer – in Community Relations – did talk to me directly about the 
negotiations with the community, but when I asked him to define social responsibility, he also 
saw no need to refer to the accords, but rather explained it in terms of the company “sharing” 
with its neighbors: 
Social responsibility is the opportunity that a company has to share part of the product of 
its operations with its surroundings. For me it´s that, in other words if a company, 
through a particular activity, is going to have a profit, it should at the same time share 
with its surroundings. When we talk about the surroundings we are talking about all the 
institutions nearby, not only the comunidad, [but also] the schools, the municipality, the 
Church, all the institutions that make up a community.  
 I quote these various statements in order to highlight some of the different ways in which 
“social responsibility” is understood by the mining companies, on the one hand, and by 
huayllinos – particularly those most involved in communal affairs – on the other. It is not only a 
distinction between the broad, jargon-rich CSR discourse of the companies and the local 
residents’ focus on concrete agreements and commitments; there is also a difference in where the 
agency is located. The company portrays CSR policies as a product of its own ethic, while 
community members tend to see them as convenios that they have obtained through their own 
demands and struggle. I will illustrate this through a statement told to me by a huayllina woman 
in the local Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) committee, in the context of a discussion about labor 
and hiring issues – how the two mining companies initially were hiring more people from 
outside, not giving enough preference to huayllinos:  
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So it was too much, the company was here in the pueblo [town, people, locality] holding 
us back, even though it is from our lands that they are obtaining the wealth. We have 
united, the whole pueblo, and we’ve done a campaign, a protest, from which [we] 
obtained various apoyos [contributions, support] from the company, that they give the 
pueblo, among which is the work for the comuneros, who should enter the companies, 
and that the workers who work well should be afiliados [i.e. put on payroll]. That was 
gained through a protest, all of that was gained through a huelga [strike, blockage].346 
Several aspects are worth highlighting here – the focus on access to employment, on the 
fact that the companies operate on Huayllay’s lands, and of course an emphasis on local agency 
and organization as being necessary to win better conditions. The point here is not to romanticize 
local struggle – several huayllinos I spoke to were actually critical of the way some of the 
communal leaders in 2008 handled the Chungar/Animón protests – but rather to understand that 
local people see Social Responsibility policies less as a product of mining companies’ generosity 
or ethics and more as something that they have won through either negotiations, protests, or both. 
A different, less radical version of this can be seen in the comments of a comunero who 
participated in the commission negotiating with Chungar/Animón in 2008, and who spoke at an 
event in April 2010 inaugurating a company program to provide breakfasts at school for 
children. He made reference to this and to other items in the convenio, such as the English 
classes for children also provided by the company:  
Although it´s true that this is a benefit that Chungar is providing, it´s the gestión [effort, 
arrangements] of our comunidad. Everyone knows well that in the year 2008, talks had to 
be held the whole year. Still, we have been able to obtain benefits that are for the good of 
our education... Let me also call on the Chungar mining company, that if there are still 
some items contained in our convenio marco, that they should continue to fulfill them. 
Because we as a commission have a chronogram of the convenio marco... We are going 
to continue demanding that they meet their obligations. 
On the one hand, the local discourse about agreements, demands and obligations is not 
necessarily contrary to that of CSR. Although companies prefer to present their responsibility as 
a product of their own ethics and values, CSR discourse also emphasizes the importance of local 
community involvement and participation – as in the passage from the 2007 Huarón report 
quoted earlier, “turning the community into a protagonist of its own change.” Indeed, the CSR 
head at Huarón emphasized to me the importance of a “healthy civil society” and a strong “social 
                                                          
346 Interview conducted jointly with Jessica Smith. 
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web” as key to a successful mine-community relationship. And it could be argued that the 
relative strength of the institution of the comunidad campesina in Huayllay, like elsewhere in 
Pasco, can be an asset to mining companies as much as it is a challenge, in that it allows for the 
organized channeling of demands and complaints as opposed to other local contexts that are 
more unstable and volatile.  
On the other hand, company discourses and local perspectives part ways insofar as the 
latter tend to see the mine-community relationship as a matter not just of cooperation and 
negotiation but also as a power relation in which the community must exert its force as a 
landowner in order to gain better conditions - servidumbre payments, jobs – as well as support 
for educational and technical programs to benefit the community. While the companies do 
acknowledge the importance of land, they see it as directly related only to the issue of the 
servidumbre payments, not to the broader conditions of operation or to the social responsibility 
programs. I would argue that this way of thinking – i.e. to separate issues of land, and of 
operations more broadly, from corporate social responsibility – is common to many mining 
companies in Peru. It can be illustrated through this quote from a Community Relations officer at 
Huarón. I had asked him whether company programs were a form of compensation for the use of 
land, but he saw the different issues as clearly separate: 
One issue is the servidumbre which is a separate topic, in other words it has a cost, a 
tariff, an amount that you have to pay. Apart from that [in the negotiations] we have 
touched upon issues of education, of work, we have touched upon health, social 
responsibility. Those are the axes, within the axes we have discussed a series of issues, on 
which we have accepted to collaborate, if you like, or to participate as part of the 
community’s development, to ensure that the community will be sustainable in the future.  
By contrast, many huayllinos tend to see land not just as one of several issues but rather 
as the heart of the entire mine-community relation, and as the starting point for any agreement. It 
is important to emphasize the importance of land ownership, since I feel it is an issue that has 
been relatively downplayed in many recent social science studies of mining in Peru. These have 
tended to focus on the “local community” simply as a “local population,” or as an actor 
susceptible to potential or actual environmental and health impacts, but not as a landowner.  
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As in all of Latin America, Peruvian law has historically maintained a strict, if abstract, 
division between surface land and the subsoil. Private owners – including comunidades like 
Huayllay – own only the surface, while the state owns all of the subsoil and grants it in 
concession to mining and other extractive industries. Most communal leaders in Huayllay – as in 
Rancas and other nearby communities– do not actively challenge this, since it is a well-
established principle in Peruvian law and society (even if there are voices at the national level 
that support the recognition of communal ownership as extending to the subsoil). Yet although 
mining companies operate most directly on the subsoil, they also affect, remove and generally 
use surface land, and it is on this basis that the right of the comunidad as landowner, vis-a-vis the 
mining company, is constituted. The centrality of land to local perspectives and discourses on 
mine-community relations was evident in the earlier quote by the Vaso de Leche participant – “it 
is from our lands that they are obtaining the wealth.” Similarly, another woman in the same 
group later said, in the context of a discussion about whether the companies were fulfilling their 
obligations, “But seeing as they are inside our comunidad’s lands, it’s logical that they should 
contribute more to the comunidad of Huayllay, no?”  
The importance of land to mine-community relations can be seen even more directly in 
the following statement by Anselmo Roque, who was communal president in 2010. I had asked 
him why, if the mining companies pay their taxes and fulfill their obligations with the state, do 
they have a responsibility with the local community, to which he answered: 
The very fact that they are on our lands, no? They exploit our minerals and if the 
community does not give them one meter of land, they cannot accelerate their operations, 
they cannot expand their works. In this regard, whether they like it or not, they have to 
relate [relacionarse – establish relations with] the comunidad, because the comunidad is 
the owner of the lands. If the comunidad will not allow them to take one step further, it 
just won’t allow it.  
Similarly, when I asked him how the Mesa de Diálogo worked, he related it directly to 
the company use of land, on the one hand, and to the different projects that the companies 
implement in the community, as a form of compensation: 
We ask them for a dialogue so that they compensate [indemnice] for trespassing [invadir] 
upon our properties, because you cannot trespass upon anyone’s property without 
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authorization. So they have to [participate in] a mesa de diálogo so that they can 
compensate [retribuyan] in some way, in some projects for the community.  
As in the case of Rancas, where the use of a parcel of land was exchanged for the capital 
with which to build a communal company to provide jobs for the community’s young people, in 
Huayllay land is central to the mine-community relationship. And it’s not just land in a general, 
vague way, but specific tracts of land over which the community exercises ownership. In the 
case of Rancas and Huayllay, this right of ownership is the outcome both of processes of 
community formation going back at least to the late 16th century (i.e. the reducciones), and, more 
importantly and immediately, of 20th-century land struggles and political changes that led to the 
end of the haciendas in most of highland Peru.  
Mining investors and prospectors arriving in the Pasco region in the late 1800s and early 
1900s came upon a world in which surface land was primarily in the hands of individual 
hacendado families (and, sometimes, institutions such as convents) – or in which the latter were 
the main socially recognized owners, as different reports from that time attest. By contrast, 
mining companies arriving today in the region – and in much of highland Peru – have to work 
within a context in which the main landowners are the comunidades. In Pasco especially, the 
collapse of the haciendas and the victory of the comunidades was particularly complete – and the 
comunidades are relatively strong institutions, both in terms of their political functioning and of 
their relatively higher degree of economic development when compared to other parts of the 
highlands.347 All this makes the communities’ ownership rights over their land particularly 
strong in this region, which in turn becomes significant in the presence of mining companies. In 
itself, communal land ownership is not technically that different from other forms of private 
ownership – comunidades are private entities like any other. However, unlike the old haciendas, 
they are composed of large numbers of people – 1600 titulares and their dependents in Huayllay, 
                                                          
347 I mean a higher degree of economic development when compared, say, to many parts of rural southern Peru – not 
when compared to some of the more prosperous communities of the Mantaro Valley. In terms of the end of the 
haciendas, it needs to be emphasized that in Pasco this happened earlier (1960s as opposed to 1970s) and more 
thoroughly than in some parts of Peru where certain hacendados managed to keep parts of their former estates, and 
where many communities did not obtain legal recognition and/or land titling until the 1980s and even 1990s. Also, 
as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, in Pasco Province the pressures to individualize communal land are weaker 
than in some other regions, due both to the fact that it’s a high-altitude cattle-raising area, and that the mining 
economy relieves some of the pressure toward the accumulation of land.  
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some 600 titulares in Rancas - all of whom at least theoretically have equal voting rights and can 
make a claim on the basis of communal land ownership. And, in spite of the liberalization of 
land laws since the 1990s, most comunidades still tend to abide by the 20th-century legal 
tradition of the non-alienability of communal land – which again makes them different from 
most private landowners. 
Certainly, communal ownership rights over land are not the only way to articulate the 
relationship between local populations and mining companies. In Cajamarca (northern Peru), 
where the comunidades campesinas are not such strong institutions today, it is instead the rondas 
campesinas (self-organized peasant patrols, which are not themselves landowning entities) that 
have led the resistance against the Conga mining project since 2011. And in the Tintaya mine in 
southern Peru, the conflicts and dialogues with the landowning comunidades have been 
accompanied by a parallel process of clashes and negotiations with the broader population 
centered around the provincial capital of Yauri – the latter group defined not by ownership of 
land but rather by geographical proximity and political jurisdiction over the mine. What this 
means is that if relatively solid communal property rights did not exist in Pasco department, 
other social relations or identities could very well emerge to take the place of communal land as 
the main articulators of mine-community interactions – i.e. simple geographical proximity, a 
sense of local belonging, etc. However, the reality today is that the comunidades’ property over 
land is one of the most important “anchors” structuring mine-community relations and 
strengthening local populations’ ability to influence, in however small a way, the nature of 
mining activity and the forms of compensation that companies have to provide.  
The property rights of comunidades do not in themselves cause local people to assert 
themselves vis-a-vis a powerful outside entity like a mining company; rather, in this region, and 
probably in many areas of the Peruvian highlands, those property rights become the vehicle 
through which such assertion takes place. And they are a powerful index of the changes that took 
place in much of the Peruvian countryside over the course of the 20th century – the end of the 
haciendas, the legal recognition and eventual expansion of the comunidades, and the decline 
(particularly in the Central Highlands) of caste-like hierarchical social relations. All over 
highland Peru, large groups of rural people are less marginalized today than they were a hundred 
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or even fifty years ago; the property rights of comunidades campesinas are one important 
indicator of that, though by no means the only one.  
These property rights are of course a modern, legal construct, but they function as a way 
of indexing a variety of ways of relating to the land – some historic, some more recent. The 
relationship to the land in the comunidades of this region takes several different forms, all of 
which overlap a great deal. For some, particularly in a community like Rancas, there is a strong 
emotional component, insofar as people saw parents, siblings and other relatives die or suffer 
disabling injuries in order to recover the lands in the 1960s. For others, particularly those 
individuals in both Huayllay and Rancas who have been or are most closely involved in cattle-
raising activity, the land is an intimately known space - made up of individually named parajes 
or majadas (pastures/sections) and estancias - which offers the promise of a more reliable and 
long-term activity, in contrast to mining. And to other individuals – particularly younger people 
living in the towns of Rancas and Huayllay, away from the estancias – the land is a patrimony on 
the basis of which to assert rights to employment, education, technical training and other 
opportunities in the context of mining operations, and to obtain company support for communal 
as well as personal projects.  
This third meaning is particularly strong in Huayllay today, where the number of active 
members in the comunidad has grown rapidly in the last few years, as young people have come 
to see membership in this landowning entity as a means of empowerment and as an advantage in 
terms of gaining access to work in the communal company and to educational opportunities such 
as the scholarships provided by the mining companies. The very different social and cultural 
context notwithstanding, here it might be useful to recall Ballard’s (1997) observation for mine-
community relations in Papua New Guinea, when he emphasizes “the way in which 
landownership confers ‘voice’ – the right to speak and the ability to influence the flow of 
benefits from the land and its resources” (48).  
Social peace, the “social burden” and mining operations 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main benefits or forms of compensation that the 
community expects in return for the use of its lands consists of access to employment at the 
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mines. Due to the long-term, 20th-century shift from a situation of labor shortage to one of labor 
surplus, people in Huayllay – like people in other mining areas in Peru - tend to feel like they are 
frequently excluded from jobs at the mine, or at least from stable, payroll jobs. While this feeling 
is not as strong as in open-pit mining areas – for underground mining does still require a fair 
amount of labor – it is present nonetheless. Thus, employment is always one of the demands; 
through the exertion of pressure by the community, the effects of the tendency towards exclusion 
are countered in part. Again, this was evident in the earlier quote from the Vaso de Leche 
participants; similarly, according to Anselmo Roque, the communal president in 2010,  
After the paro [strike/blockage] against the mining companies, the mining companies 
take the comuneros into consideration more. Now they are afraid to accept people from 
other places, because if they want to have a good relationship, they have to have the 
comuneros of Huayllay [at work]... Now the comunero is respected by the mining 
companies.   
Thus, the 2007 and 2008 agreements with the two mining companies included the 
provision that a specific number of comuneros would enter the companies and/or be switched 
from contractors towards direct, payroll positions. In addition, both companies promised to have 
a more general policy of local hiring.  In themselves, these kinds of policies and agreements, 
incorporated into the convenios, are limited. The numbers of positions for local workers 
specified in the accords do not go above a few dozen at most. Mining companies tend to shield 
operation and production affairs from the social concerns of community relations; the last thing 
they want to do is lose the labor rationalization gains of the last 20 years by taking on a large 
number of direct, payroll workers that they do not need.  
However, there is also the communal company, which works as a contractor in the mines 
– especially at Animón – and to which the convenios promise to give preference in the allocation 
of contracts for specific tasks. As in Rancas, the communal company is seen primarily as a 
vehicle for providing jobs to young people in the community, rather than necessarily yielding a 
profit. In Rancas, as we saw, the communal company arose as a direct result of the 1990 
agreement to lease communal land for a tailings deposit. In Huayllay the connection is not quite 
as direct, but still, as in Rancas, the awarding of contracts to the communal company figures 
prominently among the demands that people make or would like to make on the mines, in 
exchange for the use of their lands. In this sense, it can be said that in both Huayllay and Rancas 
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– and in several other nearby communities – the use of land is exchanged for the opportunity to 
work; this allows a way to (partially) counteract the effects of the long-term change from a 
situation of labor shortage to one of labor surplus.  
 While the demand for jobs can be thought of as an intervention – however modest – into 
the structure of production, the other programs are more liable to be seen as either a form of 
generosity/ethics (from the perspective of the mining companies) or as a form of support-as-
compensation (from the perspective that is common in the community). In his interview with me, 
Javier Vega, who was communal president during the 2006-2007 negotiations with the Huarón 
company, emphasized this as much as the employment issue, and repeatedly used the term apoyo 
(support) to describe it.  
The comunidad campesina of Huayllay, there has been one hundred years of mining in 
our surroundings, and it has not received the apoyos that it really should have in the 
previous years. So it was because of that that we did this protest. And my concern has 
been, really that the community should have that kind of apoyos, because the wealth that 
it has, the mining greatness [la grandeza minera], they carry it off so easily. 
 A few of these forms of “support” were already in place before, but they have greatly 
increased since the negotiations of 2006-2008. Some of these arrangements have already been 
mentioned: scholarships, special classes, school lunches, support for ‘productive projects’ 
(proyectos productivos – as development efforts to improve local production are commonly 
called in the region). Certainly, the alpaca donations and the scholarships to technical institutes 
like CETEMIN and SENATI stand out among the most significant and talked about. But there 
are actually a multitude of other, smaller items in the convenios – actually, too many to list here. 
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the degree of detail and specificity found in the 
agreements. In the 2008 convenio, the Chungar company promises not only to generally help 
equip the different schools in Huayllay and in the seven caseríos, but also to pay the salaries of 
around 10 teachers (i.e., extra teachers hired to teach specific new courses), to help implement a 
chemistry lab for the high school, and to donate 10 musical instruments for a school band (the 
latter, like many of the points in the agreement, had been a specific request from the high 
school). The company also promised to build a veterinary clinic to improve the management of 
the sheep and other animals in the community, to construct a bathing space for the animals in one 
of the caseríos, and to build a hydroponic system in another caserío.  Similarly, the Huarón 
428 
 
company, in addition to its flagship weaving program, also agreed to a number of educational 
commitments. In 2008, for example, they paid the salaries of 9 teachers in the district. In 2009, 
when I visited one of the elementary schools in Huayllay that they were supporting, the company 
had just constructed a small greenhouse as well as a computer room (which the school had then 
named after the company´s Operations Director). The company was also engaged in a number of 
other projects – many of them based on specific requests from the communities, others less so. 
 These multiple, expansive demands on the companies would seem to suggest a sort of 
dependence on the part of the local community – echoing the common complaint by mining 
companies in Peru, that they are frequently asked to fulfill functions that properly belong to the 
state. No doubt, there is a measure of dependence and patronage in the relationship between the 
two mining companies and the local community in Huayllay – the companies take the form of a 
wealthy patron to whom local people turn for support when something needs to be done. This is 
certainly stronger in Huayllay than it is in Rancas; the former after all has a more intimate 
historic relationship with mining. For example, one huayllina woman, when I asked her which 
company had a better relationship with the community, focused on her discontent over a very 
concrete incident – she complained that, as president of her son´s class in the school, she had 
gone to one of the companies with a written request that they make a contribution for a school 
trip, and it had been denied.  
On the other hand, another way to think of these multiple requests is not to see them as 
dependence but rather simply as part of the normal pattern, in both Huayllay and Rancas, by 
which institutions are expected to contribute to collective endeavors, according to their means – 
whether the institution in question is the communal company, the communal cooperative, or the 
(much wealthier) mining company. And, notwithstanding mining industry complaints that they 
are made to supplant the state, it is clear that companies like those operating in Huayllay are 
proud of the way in which they are frequently called upon to fulfill immediate needs. This helps 
to build their legitimacy and integrate them, however partially, into the fabric of local society. As 
the head of Corporate Social Responsibility at Pan American Silver said to me,  
They must have told you in Huayllay, the day a bridge falls and everyone is left 
incommunicado, the only one that goes and builds it back is the mines. In other words, 
we put it in and we get everyone back on their feet.  
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 Moreover, I believe there is another, significant aspect to the intricate and extensive 
nature of the agreements between the mining companies and the community of Huayllay. If we 
examine the matter historically, we see that the new mine-community convenios have taken over 
some of the role of the old labor-centered convenios colectivos between the mining company and 
the workers and their families.  
On the surface, this may seem far-fetched. First, the comunidad campesina of Huayllay 
existed side-by-side with the mining camp of Huarón throughout the 20th century (and legally 
since the early 1930s). As discussed earlier, the comunidad had convenios with the Huarón 
company since early on; other mining companies in this part of Peru also had similar agreements 
with the communities on whose lands they worked. Thus, in themselves, the mine-community 
convenios are not a new phenomenon. Second, although the comunidad institution in Huayllay 
and the Huarón mining workers’ union certainly interacted, and although there were many 
individuals who were active in both, the two institutions are ultimately seen as pertaining to 
different spheres: one to the world of the mine and the mine camp, the other to the community-
owned lands and the raising of animals. Third, there are still unions and collective bargaining 
agreements at the two mines of Huarón and Animón, even if they are very much weakened and 
concern only a minority of the workers. 
 Certainly, when I discussed this with the head of Community Relations at the Huarón 
mine, he disagreed with my view that there had been some displacement from companies’ 
former responsibilities towards their workers in favor of their new responsibilities towards the 
“local community.” In his view, the company practiced responsibility towards both sectors at the 
same time: 
That responsibility that [mining companies] had with the worker has not been transferred 
or deployed towards the communities. No, this is a different thing, because the 
responsibility with the workers has not concluded, it has not ended, what happens is that 
the systems have changed... The issue of social responsibility, I personally consider that 
this is a separate issue, it is a responsibility that you have towards the community, 
towards that third party that is not involved in your operations, that town that is near your 
operations but does not benefit... Independently of your responsibility with your workers, 
with the families of your workers you have a responsibility with the community. And this 
community that is in your surroundings obviously wants that, no matter what, that you 
contribute to or participate in their development. 
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 Yet I would argue that, although the two issues are formally separate, there is an 
underlying commonality between them. At some of the newer, open-pit mines in areas without 
significant mining experience, the local community may indeed be a “third party” that is “not 
involved in operations.” But that is not the case in Huayllay and, I suspect, in similar, historic 
mining areas in Central Peru and elsewhere. Many of the huayllinos alive today either worked in 
Huarón or the then-smaller Chungar/Animón mine or spent some time living in the camps that 
existed until the early 1990s; among those who did not have one of these two experiences, 
almost all have a close relative who did. The community of workers and their families that once 
existed up at the camps was the demographic center of the district and a partial but important 
formative experience for the community of Huayllay as it exists today. The comunidad of course 
has an older history and preceded the camps, but after the early 1990s it merged with the latter. 
At that time, most of the workers and their families left the camps. Although many of those who 
were from other regions returned to their places of origin or moved to larger cities, many of those 
who were from Huayllay simply returned to the comunidad. Or, if they left, they have returned 
with the new mining boom that began after 2003. Also in the early 1990s, most of the old 
convenios between the Huarón workers´ union and the company were eliminated, as the 
company asked the remaining workers to make ever more sacrifices or lose their jobs. 
While in many of the “new” mining areas in Peru there is the desire for work on the part 
of the local population but not the reality of it (due to the low labor requirements of open-pit 
mining), in underground, silver-lead-zinc mines like Huarón the labor requirements are still 
significant enough that they can employ an important part of the local community – more so if 
the latter pressures the company for job opportunities. Thus, many of the huayllinos today are 
involved in mining operations – as their parents and grandparents were – even if nowadays it 
often is only through contractors. Moreover, many of the contractors that hire people from 
Huánuco or other places rent rooms in the town of Huayllay to house their workers. In this sense, 
the town that is the seat of the district and of the comunidad campesina is also, to some degree, 
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the new mining camp; again, the relationship is not so much one of replacement but rather of 
fusion.348  
Huayllay is not the only place in Pasco Department where this has happened – at the time 
of my research, the comunidad-as-mining camp phenomenon was even more present in the 
community of Huaraucaca, adjacent to the Brocal company´s operations. Most of the families in 
that town were working at Brocal through Huaraucaca´s large communal company. In a sense, 
the community had become both a subcontractor and a housing camp for the mining company.349 
The dependence on mining activity was even greater than in Huayllay; this was due to the fact 
that Huaraucaca had much less grazing land and much less commercial development than 
Huayllay, and also to the Brocal company´s specific policy of encouraging and supporting the 
formation of communal companies.   
In Huayllay, the “local community” is in actual fact both an internal and an external 
actor, yet in company discourses – such as that of the Community Relations director quoted 
above - the relationship is represented as wholly external. In this way, obligations are presented 
as generosity, and pacts and relations that are part of the process of production appear as 
contributions to an external actor´s development. As discussed earlier, huayllinos usually see 
company programs and payments as compensation for the use of their land, through the 
mediation of formal agreements made possible by community pressure. This certainly describes 
an important aspect of the relationship between the mines and the community. The other aspect 
discussed here – the transfer of the role of the old agreements from the mining camp towards the 
community, as a result of the fusion of the two – is also evident in the following statement from 
the fiscal of the community in 2009: 
As far as the [mining] company is concerned, yes, it does assist with its responsibilities 
because as you know, these last few years because of the government we had with Mr. 
                                                          
348 In thinking through these issues of fusion between the camp and the surrounding communities in mining areas in 
Peru, I am indebted to conversations with Guillermo Salas. 
349 I assisted in a communal survey in Huaraucaca for two days in 2008; this survey was organized by Víctor Falconí 
and Mariella Estrada, to whom I am indebted for this opportunity. While such quick observation obviously does not 
give me any in-depth knowledge of Huaraucaca, it does allow me to make the observation noted here, about the 
majority of comunidad members and residents being employed in mining-related activities. Huaraucaca is moreover 
known for this in the region.  
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Fujimori, it practically destabilized the labor aspect, and the companies made it so they 
would not have camps near the workplace, all that. Formerly the company managed all its 
educational centers, it had a social burden [carga social], now that social burden has been 
brought here to the town, in other words all the workers from here go to the mining 
centers here in Huarón [and Chungar/Animón], and all their children stay here in some 
cases, in other cases they’ve gone elsewhere. 
The term “social burden” is actually used with some frequency in discussions of labor, 
payrolls and company expenses. Although company officials are reluctant to recognize that 
obligations towards their workers have been reduced, they do sometimes acknowledge the 
change in the “social burden” that they have to bear. For example, the head of Human Resources 
at the Huarón mine explained that among the benefits of the new accumulated-time labor 
systems (e.g. fourteen 12-hour work days by seven rest days) was the fact that they rationalized 
and economized workers’ time so that they were not around when they were not truly needed; in 
this way, “it saves us a social burden that we would [otherwise] incur.”350 The head of 
Community Relations, quoted earlier, also discussed the change in the labor systems, though he 
focused particularly on how the old systems “made it necessary that the worker’s family also 
participate in the activities of the company, but not now.” Thus, the fact that the change in the 
labor systems (and the near-elimination of the old camps) has led to a transformation in the 
relationship between the company and the workers’ families, and by extension the “community” 
that such families make up, is something that does not go unacknowledged by mining officials.  
 Thus, the community has fused (partly) with the mining camp, and now serves to house a 
significant portion of the mines’ workforce. At the same time, people in Huayllay do understand 
the labor relation and the land relation to be different. It’s just that in this case, the groups 
included in both relations overlap a great deal. Both relations existed before and both relations 
exist now, but the relative strength of each has shifted. In their expansiveness, detail and sheer 
variety, the new mine-community agreements resemble more the old labor convenios than they 
do the old, austere agreements between the company and the comunidad. Because of the 
flexibilization and fragmentation of the workforce, the elimination of the camps, the change in 
the labor laws and the decline of the unions, the labor relation has become less viable as a 
repository for people’s aspirations for progress and advancement, as well as for the organized, 
                                                          
350 Interview conducted jointly with Jessica Smith 
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collective defense of local dignity in the face of an outside entity like a mining company. Labor 
agreements at the companies now cover only a minority of workers and deal mostly with issues 
of pay and working conditions, not issues like education. Similarly, a strike by payroll workers at 
the Huarón mine – for a few days in April 2010 – had to do simply with the payment of the share 
of profits to which employees are entitled under Peruvian law. Just as the “social burden” has 
shifted from the mine camp to the community, so has the vehicle for social pressure changed 
from the labor to the “mine-community” relation.  
It is in light of this, I believe, that the multiple demands on the company by the 
community – and the resulting extensive convenios that double as CSR programs - should be 
interpreted, rather than merely through the lens of dependence or patronage. This is particularly 
the case as regards support for education. In the old days, the mining companies provided 
schools for their workers’ children, as well as opportunities to learn skills by working in the 
company during the summers. Now, the companies no longer maintain such schools, but they 
provide partial financial support for the local schools, as well as scholarships and training 
programs. Formerly, the recipient was the community of workers’ families, now it is the “local 
community,” which in this case – as in much of highland Peru – is also a comunidad campesina. 
Before, both sides interpreted the relation to be about labor. Now, one side (the companies) 
present their support as having to do with responsibility and local development, while the other 
side perceive it as being based on their right to the land on which the mines operate.  
 I do not pretend that there is a precise symmetry between the old labor relation and the 
current mine-community relation. Clearly, times have changed, and so have people’s 
expectations in regards to education and other vehicles of progress in which the companies are 
supposed to play a role.  The changes in the operations of the mines themselves also make a 
difference – for example, training and experience used to be provided on the job, whereas now 
people are supposed to have at least two years’ experience, and possess certain skills, when they 
enter the companies; this helps to explain why training, internships and scholarships to technical 
schools figure prominently in the convenios with both the Huarón and Animón mines. What I 
mean to point out is that there is more continuity between the two relations than appears on the 
surface. Just as the “social burden” has shifted, land and geographical proximity have to some 
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degree replaced labor as the repository of the social; labor was never only about labor, and land 
and community are never only about land and community. 
 What we have is thus the weakening of one relation and the strengthening of another. In 
Huayllay, they happen to overlap a great deal, whereas in certain other mining settings they may 
overlap less, but the shift in their characters is nevertheless present.  By “weakening” I do not 
necessarily mean that workers are paid less or treated worse than before; that’s clearly not the 
case in many large open-pit mines, where the high technical requirements of the job imply a 
high-paid, relatively privileged workforce. Rather, I am referring to the degree to which labor 
articulates a significant community that can make social demands on the company. High-paid, 
skilled workers are paid well because of their skills and their position in the labor market, not 
because of social or political pressure applied by an organized community (at least not in Peru 
where the mining unions are weak today). And even if that were not the case, the number of such 
high-paid workers is usually small, making their story less significant to the overall society.  
I believe a case like that of Huayllay is interesting because it positions the labor and the 
mine-community relation side-by-side, clarifying their similarities and differences, continuities 
and ruptures. And it serves to highlight the ways in which the new order of mine-community 
relations and Corporate Social Responsibility constitute a system, an arrangement that is 
inextricably related to production, just like the old labor-centered system was. I thus agree with 
scholars like Welker (2006) and Rajak (2011) who take CSR seriously, rather than dismissing it 
as mere facade. Like them, I see CSR as a source of power for corporations, and a response to 
critique. In this case, however, I place CSR in the context of the pressures that landowning 
communities exert to modify their relationship with mining companies. CSR is a corporate 
response to these pressures, and is shaped by them. In fact, in the case of Huayllay, only one of 
the two mining companies utilize a CSR discourse to any significant extent (Pan American Silver 
– Huarón), yet both have to respond to community demands in roughly similar ways. This 
indicates that structural factors, rather than a particular company’s ethics, philosophy or 
intentions, are most important in shaping their policies and practices.  
 The power of communities like Huayllay is limited. They do not own the subsoil, and 
furthermore, their ability to demand higher rents and more substantial forms of compensation for 
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the surface land is limited by the administrative, coercive servidumbre proceedings codified in 
Law 26570 (the Ley de Servidumbre Minera) – part of a longer legal tradition that subordinates 
surface property rights to state decisions about resource extraction. Although in this case – as in 
most mining negotiations in Peru - the official, state-administered servidumbre has not been 
directly used, it nonetheless acts as a threat that conditions the bipartite servidumbre 
arrangements to which the companies and the community arrive independently. Moreover, 
mining companies frequently invoke the specter of crisis and potential closure, with resulting 
joblessness, as a way to forestall what they consider to be excessive demands.  
Nevertheless, these limits have not prevented a transformation in the ability and 
willingness of local communities in this part of Peru to pressure and make demands on mining 
companies since the 1990s. While in that decade the mining industry in Peru dramatically 
reduced its vulnerability to labor actions and strikes – compared to what it had been before - its 
vulnerability to community protests increased. I believe some of this has to do with general 
tendencies in capitalism as a whole. Capital may overcome challenges in the economic sphere of 
value – in part by reducing labor needs and creating a surplus population - but it cannot do away 
with heightened expectations in the sphere of use-value (which is inevitably cultural, political 
and social). Put another way, social, cultural and political shifts in the ways that the rights of 
local populations are understood globally may come to challenge the unquestioned dominance of 
capital; this challenge is only heightened if there are large groups of people whose inclusion in 
the world of labor is forestalled or at least called into question or made precarious.  
These broad tendencies in capitalism acquire special relevance and particular 
characteristics in the context of the world mining industry. There, certain currents of the late 20th 
century – in particular, the environmental, human rights and indigenous rights movements – have 
had a particularly deep impact, due to the specific characteristics of mining and its growing 
impact on surface land as production volumes increase and as open-pit methods come to 
predominate in the industry. Compared to the early 20th century, mining today requires less labor 
and more land. All this has changed the context for local communities as a new mining boom 
began in Peru in 1993-1997 and, more fully – after the interruption brought on by the Asian 
crisis of the late 1990s – after 2003. These changes made themselves felt in local realities and 
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tensions – i.e. scarcity of jobs, mining company encroachment upon communal lands - as well as 
in the example of mining conflicts elsewhere in the world, and in the rise of environmental 
ideology and legislation. In Peru, these developments coincided with the fact that the three 
decades immediately preceding the 1990s had seen the victory of peasant land recuperation 
movements and the consolidation of communal land ownership over territory that had previously 
been claimed by haciendas. While in terms of legislation the 1990s saw the beginning of an 
erosion in the status of communal land tenure, in actual practice the institution of the comunidad 
campesina was probably stronger in highland Peru – on average - than it had been for many 
years. In Pasco, a region of relative communal strength, the mining boom of the last decade 
seems to have strengthened rather than weakened the communities, since the land owned by 
them has become a way to access rent payments, special benefits and above all work, either 
directly or through communal companies. While the global developments in the mining industry 
certainly change the relationship with local populations in general – regardless of land ownership 
– in this part of Peru it is land ownership that serves to consolidate and strengthen the bargaining 
position of local populations.  
 Thus, to mining companies’ earlier concern with “labor peace,” a new, more diffuse 
notion of “social peace” or “social license” has been added. Although as late as 2005 a mining 
entrepreneur as prominent as Roque Benavides, co-owner of the Yanacocha gold mine, could say 
that he “hated the term social license” (he believed one should only need a license from the 
government) by the time of my research the term was in wider use. At the Huarón mine, the head 
of Community Relations explained to me that “the important thing is to win the trust of the 
community – if you follow that, the community will give you the social license.” It was clear that 
to him, like to other local-level mining officials, “social license” had a very concrete meaning: 
avoiding paros, i.e. road blockages or protests that could generate losses, tarnish company image 
and, in the worst-case scenario, paralyze operations after massive investments had already been 
made. Dialogue mechanisms, (partial) acceptance of local demands, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility policies are a response both to this local context and to other similar contexts and 
antecedents in the mining industry worldwide.  As the same Community Relations official at 
Huarón explained to me, when I asked him about these policies, 
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It was a response to the conjuncture that the country was going through at that moment, 
principally the mining companies. In other words the communities, propelled by the 
NGOs and other institutions, were propitiating paros, were propitiating demands that the 
companies could not fulfill. So then, we have at all times in the negotiations considered 
two important elements that must not be lost, which are leadership and initiative. If we 
lost those two things we were going to fail in our negotiations.  
 Here, company commitments to the community – which often double as CSR programs, 
in the case of the Huarón mine – become a way for the company to regain some authority, power 
and legitimacy. I am not suggesting that the threat of paros by local populations has become the 
sole or most important challenge faced by the mining industry. During the governments of 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) and especially Alan García (2006-2011), mine-community 
conflicts did seem to acquire a widespread, quasi-pandemic character in Peru. Yet for global 
decision-makers in the mining industry, changes in mineral prices are probably a more pressing 
concern. At that level, mine-community conflicts factor in as one more element adding to the 
cost of production, and in some cases threatening the viability of a project as a whole. In that 
sense, Corporate Social Responsibility and the gaining of “social license” become one more 
element in the process of production. This is evident in a statement made by a Community 
Relations official at a different, nearby mine (Brocal) to Victor Falconí, Mariella Estrada and 
myself in 2008:351  
The development of a mine in productive terms has already been solved with the 
technology we currently possess. What do I mean by this? To blow up a mountain in 8 to 
10 days, with the technology we currently have, is the easiest thing. But the hard thing is 
managing the behavior of human beings. In other words, at this moment, for a mining 
company, what is harder? To produce its minerals? Or to relate with its communities? For 
a mining company, what is more complex – to know that technology is going to allow 
greater production, or that the communal environment [entorno comunal] is at some point 
going to paralyze things and not allow it to do its job? ...Because if we [Community 
Relations specialists] do not generate peace and tranquility, if we don’t make it so that the 
communities work, say, with a positive mindset towards the mining companies, then this 
social environment is going to become much more complex, it’s going to become much 
more difficult, and they [the people involved in Operations] won’t be able to produce. 
The strikes [hulegas] will come, they will close down the mines, and what good will 
technology or science do then? None. 
                                                          
351 This interview was arranged by Falconí and Estrada as part of their research in Huaraucaca. I am indebted to 
them for having allowed me to participate.  
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This was in response to a question about the relations between the “social” and 
“operations” areas inside the company. Naturally, the speaker in question has a personal bias in 
favor of the importance of his own area of work. Nevertheless, his comments illustrate the 
concrete, immediate nature of Community Relations work as a part of the process of production. 
Here the “social” as one block is juxtaposed with operations; the former could in theory include 
both labor and community relations. But it’s clear from his comments that he is referring to the 
threat of trouble from the local communities as such, rather than from labor (ignoring for a 
moment the fact that in Brocal, as in Huarón and Animón/Chungar, the two overlap a great deal). 
Even the term huelga [strike] is used here in its general sense of a blockage or collective protest, 
as it often is in Peru, not in the more specific sense of a labor strike. This is not to dismiss the 
existence of occasional job actions and unions in the mines today, but to acknowledge that their 
power has been radically reduced from what it once was, and that to mining officials they seem 
more of a manageable problem rather than the menacing specter that mine-community conflicts 
seem to bring up. The Brocal official quoted above specifically acknowledged this, as did many 
of the other mine officials I spoke to during my research (and, for that matter, the workers 
themselves).352  
 Thus, in both Brocal and in Huayllay’s two mines, the convenios with the communities 
mediate a potentially conflictive relationship so as to allow production to proceed, just like the 
old labor convenios used to do. Moreover, in the case of Huayllay, the mine-community relation 
becomes a vehicle for the local population’s aspirations for progress and advancement, 
particularly as regards education as well as productive projects. Land and geographical proximity 
in some way become a receptacle for “the social” that has been decoupled from labor. The 
analysis of this process directs our attention to the systemic, structural character of contemporary 
mine-community relations and Corporate Social Responsibility, rather than seeing the latter 
either as a voluntary concern with local development or as a mere public relations strategy or 
                                                          
352 In the words of the Brocal official, “The issue of unionism [sindicalización] in Peru has passed over into a 
completely different phase. Some 15, 20 years ago the issue of the unions was something that generated a series of, I 
don’t want to say difficulties, but yes, there was a power on the part of the unions towards the companies. But lately, 
it’s not that it’s become weaker, but rather it’s that, I think there is a much more open, much more sincere dialogue 
between the unions and the companies. So then, they arrive at accords that are much easier, much quicker so then 
that makes it so conflicts don’t happen.” 
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facade. Although the convenios mediate the relationship, they do so within the conditions that 
limit the comunidad’s power, namely the precedence of state rights to the subsoil over private 
rights to surface land, and the threat (often explicit) of mine closure by the company.  
Additionally, the convenios function within a context in which the community of Huayllay – 
unlike nearby Vicco - is historically dependent on mining work.  
 The fact that the community is able to wrestle concessions from the mining companies in 
exchange for the “social license” the latter need to operate does not, however, necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the predominance of mining activity – and its recent expansion as part of the 
new mining boom that began in 2003 – is beneficial to the local population. That is a more 
complex question that would require long-term analysis, quantitative measurements, and value 
judgments on the basis of the local population’s desires and expectations (which in any case need 
not be stable or unanimous). In Huayllay, as in Rancas, the general feeling towards mining 
activity is one of ambivalent acceptance. People recognize their historic relation to mining, as 
well as their present-day need for the cash income it offers. At the same time, many see it as an 
unreliable activity that has turned people away from the raising of animals, maybe even 
impeding improvement in the latter sphere. They also see the mining companies as aggressive, 
expansive entities that encroach upon their land, which must then be defended both as communal 
patrimony and as a bargaining chip or foothold with which to wrest better conditions (i.e. more 
payroll as opposed to subcontracted jobs), compensation and benefits from the companies.   
 
Conclusion 
 In the previous chapter and in this one I have not covered all aspects of the local social 
articulation around mining in my region of study. In particular, I have alluded to but not 
thoroughly discussed a new phenomenon that is of central importance today: the emergence of 
mineral rent income as a significant factor at the local level, through the mechanism of the canon 
minero. This is a new system by which half of the profit tax (impuesto a la renta) paid by mining 
companies is returned to the local area of operations, specifically to the district and provincial 
municipalities, the Regional Government and the regional universities. The canon has emerged 
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both from recent transnational policy innovations and from longtime demands by regional and 
popular movements within Peru. The latter had long complained of the inordinate power wielded 
by the Peruvian capital, Lima (perceived to be not just geographically but also culturally and 
ethnically different from the rest of the country) and of the way in which regions of resource 
extraction were bled dry by foreign corporations and by the state. The canon was first put into 
place in 1992 (when it was set at 20%), but it really took its present form in 2004 (50%), not long 
after a general movement towards decentralization that took place after the fall of the Fujimori 
government. It has thus coincided with the post-2003 rise in mineral prices that has been 
sustained by the industrialization of China.  
Together, the novel institutional mechanism and the global price rise have made 
municipalities in Peruvian mining regions suddenly wealthy, turning formerly unimportant 
mayors into powerful brokers. Although this has been most dramatic in regions like Ancash, 
which houses the massive Antamina mining operation, it is also true, to a slightly lesser extent, 
in Pasco. On the surface, the canon minero may not seem like mineral rent income, since it is 
derived not from a special payment from mining companies to the state-as-landlord, but rather 
from the general profit tax that all companies in Peru (mining or not) pay. Mining profits in the 
last few years have just been extraordinarily high, out of proportion with the rest of the Peruvian 
economy, thus creating important revenues for both the national and now (thanks to canon) the 
local governments. The source of the high profits is not hard to locate – it is the rise in metal 
prices that results from world economic expansion, specifically economic expansion in one 
corner of the world (China), which has continued even after Europe and North America entered 
into recession in 2008.  
Personally, I believe this can be understood as a transfer of part of the surplus-value 
produced in China towards the extractive industries, resulting in high profits for the latter and 
thus high tax payments to states such as Peru.353 This transfer is due to the nature of mining as a 
“nature-intensive” industry (Coronil 1997) that is tied to specific locations and physical 
                                                          
353 I am not saying that no surplus-value is produced in mining itself (i.e. by mining labor) – clearly it is. Metal-
mining in Peru is not like the oil exported by Venezuela, which according to Coronil (1997) requires little labor for 
its production. As much of this dissertation has made clear, labor has been central to Peruvian mining. But the 
surplus-value produced by this labor, though important, would not be the source of the excess profit generated by 
high prices in the last few years. 
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characteristics and thus is not subject to the general tendency towards the equalization of rates of 
profit. In this sense, high mineral prices can be understood as themselves resulting in a form of 
mineral rent, which is based not directly on the power of landlord-states but rather on the 
irreducible importance of nature and place in the contemporary world economy; the rent itself 
can be appropriated by either corporations or states, or both.354 In other words, I am calling 
attention to the specific nature of mineral wealth as different from other forms of wealth; this 
specificity marks the canon income as mineral rent even if it is merely a general profit tax rather 
than a payment to the state-as-landlord per se. Although rent in this sense is an abstract concept, 
it helps to index the concrete dependence of mining on manufacturing (and thus of Peru on 
China), as well as the (partial) detachment of state mining income from local labor.  
Regardless of the nature and ultimate (as opposed to immediate) source of this sudden 
influx of wealth into municipal coffers, its local effects have been examined by Arellano (2011), 
who compared three contemporary mining regions in Peru: Pasco, Ancash and Moquegua. He 
argues, through meticulous quantitative analysis of published data, that districts and regions that 
have mines and that are rich in canon income have not seen improvements in living standards 
that are superior to those found in districts and regions without such income. In other words, 
there is no evidence of a positive local impact from mining activity through the canon 
mechanism (or other local-level mechanisms for that matter), at least not in the short run.355  
Arellano also examines the possible reasons for this. He emphasizes that the new extractive 
                                                          
354 I am inclined to interpret this price rise under the light of Marx´s concept of absolute rent, insofar as it is a 
payment due not to unusually productive deposits (resulting in low costs of production), as in differential rent, but 
rather a transfer from manufacturing sectors to the extractive industries. The latter appear as “land” (regardless of 
who owns them or who keeps the profits) in relation to manufacturing which appears as “capital.” I owe my interest 
in absolute rent to conversations with Fernando Coronil, who expressed his belief in the importance of the concept 
(as opposed to rent in general). The analysis here differs from his use of the concept in Coronil (1997), where 
absolute rent appears as a result of the political action of landlord-governments; I am instead interested in absolute 
rent as a regular feature of the capitalist economy and as a concept that helps us to understand the place of nature in 
capitalism (something that is also a general concern of Coronil´s book). In both cases, however, such rent appears as 
a transfer of surplus-value from non-extractive (mostly manufacturing) sectors towards the extractive industries 
(either state or private), through the mechanism of high prices, rather than as a transfer from extractive (or 
agricultural) capital towards landlords, through the mechanism of advantageous conditions of production, as in 
differential rent.  
355 It should be mentioned that Arellano´s study is not concerned with the macroeconomic role of mining income 
through its impact on national accounts, and how that in turn may influence local development, either in a positive 
way (i.e. macroeconomic stability and economic growth in the short run) or in a negative way (i.e. the “resource 
curse” in the classic sense).  
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industry policies being promoted worldwide, which emphasize decentralization, transparency 
and participation in the allocation of mining income, far from reducing conflict, have intensified 
it. He also argues against the view, common in Peru, that the inefficiency and incapacity of local 
and regional governments is responsible for the failure of mining income to yield positive results 
in terms of development and well-being.  
Rather, he argues, the problem is the framework of incentives currently in place, which 
force local and regional authorities to spend their bloated, canon-based budgets in the shortest 
time possible, without regard to the quality of investments or to their likely impact on local 
living standards. These imperatives originate as much with the national government, media and 
mining companies (eager as they are to divert blame for the failures of mining-based 
development onto local and regional authorities, and to frame the problem solely in terms of the 
percentage of budgets spent), and with the new electoral rules that permit the recall of elected 
authorities, as they do with local demands. Furthermore, Arellano argues, the sudden influx of 
mining income encourages the rise of mafias and clientelism around local municipalities. 
Although he sees these particular problems as being less serious in Pasco than in Ancash – where 
the influx of money has been greater and the local political structures less prepared to withstand 
it – they are nonetheless present there too.356 And although municipal capacities are somewhat 
greater in Pasco than in Ancash, the framework of incentives determines the same kind of short-
term expenditure of mining income on projects that for the most part do not have a positive long-
term impact on local well-being.  
Arellano conducted his study at the same time I was beginning my research, and some of 
my observations complement his analysis of canon income and its consequences. However, such 
a discussion, though crucial, is beyond the scope of the present chapter, which has focused not 
on the role of the state (whether at the national or local levels) and its use of mineral rent income, 
but rather on the direct relationship between local communities and mining companies, 
particularly around issues of land, compensation and employment.   
                                                          
356 Arellano 2011, and Arellano (personal communication).  
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I will thus conclude by summarizing the arguments and conclusions presented throughout 
this chapter. I have analyzed the mine-community relationship in both Rancas and Huayllay, 
focusing on company-community negotiations over land use and compensation. In the discussion 
on Rancas, I examined the importance of history, communal identity and the defense of land, as 
well as the ambivalences and anxieties that result from the cession of pasture land for tailings 
deposition. In the sections on Huayllay, I focused on how mine-community convenios 
(agreements) have taken over some of the role of the old labor convenios, as the “social burden” 
has shifted from the labor relation to a new relation based around land, geographical proximity 
and “community.” Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is understood locally not in terms of 
corporate ethics or policies but rather in terms of specific, detailed and extensive mine-
community agreements that the community is able to impose on the company as a result of its 
role as owner and possessor of the lands. The central issue is structural; although one of the 
companies in the district has a well-developed CSR discourse and the other does not, in the end 
both must implement more or less the same convenios with the community – there are 
differences, but these are minor. CSR can thus be understood as part of a system of production, 
one that responds to the newfound prominence of local communities in the global mining 
context, and to the corresponding precariousness of “social peace.” I examined some of the 
reasons for this prominence and precariousness at the local, national and global levels. Although 
these factors are specific to the mining industry, I believe some of them are also related to 
broader tendencies in capitalism, such as the development of a relative surplus population, the 
complex relationship between inclusion in and exclusion from the system, and the contradiction 
between capital´s reorganization of the sphere of value production, on the one hand, and the 
growth of expectations and desires in the sphere of use-value (and thus a corresponding shift in 









THE EMERGENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Contamination in historical perspective 
In the introduction to this dissertation I discussed how just as working-class politics 
seemed to decline in many parts of the world at the end of the 20th century, other social relations 
were rising to the fore as sites of conflict and also of governmentality. One such development 
has been the “rise of the local community” which I analyzed in the previous chapter. Another 
closely related yet distinct phenomenon has been the emergence of environmental issues as 
“hybrid” social objects that combine science and politics (Latour 1993). Issues of pollution, side 
effects and hazards, though not new, have acquired a new visibility and currency, and often 
exercise a significant influence on the form and language of political conflicts. 
Such is the case in Peru, where, in its March 2010 Report on “social conflicts” in the 
country, the National Ombudsman´s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) classified almost half (49%) 
of such conflicts as “social-environmental conflicts,” mainly around the extractive industry 
sector. This is far greater than the share apportioned to other types of sources of conflict, such as 
“local government affairs” (14.5%), “labor” (11%), “national government affairs” (7.8%), 
“communal” conflicts (5.5%) and problems of “territorial demarcation” (4.7%) (Defensoría del 
Pueblo 2010, 6). The Ombudsman´s division of conflicts into these particular categories is 
obviously a mediated, social construction. Still, the large number of cases that give at least 
partial grounds – whether in terms of content, form, or both - to be classified as “social-
environmental” conflicts around extractive industries, do give a sense of the relative importance 
that this type of politics has gained in contemporary Peru. Though such conflicts gather together 
a complex set of problems of land, autonomy, labor and distribution of resources, they also bring 
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to the foreground issues of side effects and pollution. Most importantly, the language of 
contaminación has become ubiquitous in mining-related conflicts in Peru. 
 In this chapter, I trace the emergence of environmental issues around mining in Peru, 
both historically and in terms of the role they play today in politics and everyday social relations 
in the Central Highlands and Pasco in particular. My interest lies in how environmental issues 
are both old and new, and how their meaning shifts over time. In this first section, I present a 
brief environmental history of mining in the Central Highlands, from the early records of 
pollution problems to the new post-Environmental Code order. I also explore how “the 
environment” has emerged as a category in recent years. In the second, central section of the 
chapter, I provide an ethnographic account of health-affecting environmental pollution in the 
urban context of Cerro de Pasco – in particular, the “lead in blood” problem. I focus on issues of 
uncertainty and confusion, “corporate response,” and compensation. Finally, in the last section of 
this chapter I shift from the topic of pollution and “hidden hazards” to the ways in which 
“environmental” issues intersect with issues of modernity, urbanity and the relationship between 
mineral wealth and society; I do this through an examination of the water shortage in Cerro de 
Pasco. In particular, I focus on the historic competition between the city and the mine for 
available water sources, the impact of privatization and the move away from a “company town” 
model, the production of uncertainty that accompanies open-pit mining in the city, and finally the 
contradiction between the state-centered nature of mineral wealth and the individualistic ethos of 
contemporary, market-oriented ideology.  
Poisons, fumes and accidents  
 Just like the unhealthy effects of certain metals – like lead and arsenic – have been known 
in small ways at least since antiquity, the issue of contamination has been a feature of debates 
over the mining industry more broadly for a long time, long before the rise of modern 
environmentalism. Writing in the mid-16th century, Georgius Agricola (1950) acknowledged the 
harm to the environment caused by the industry to which he had dedicated his life’s work: 
The strongest argument of the detractors is that the fields are devastated by mining 
operations... They argue that the woods and groves are cut down, for there is need of an 
endless amount of wood for timbers, machines and the smelting of metals... Further, 
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when the ores are washed, the water which has been used poisons the brooks and streams, 
and either destroys the fish or drives them away. Therefore the inhabitants of these 
regions, on account of the devastation of their fields, woods groves, brooks and rivers, 
find great difficulty in procuring the necessaries of life, and by reason of the destruction 
of the timber they are forced to greater expense in erecting buildings. Thus it is said, it is 
clear to all that there is greater detriment from mining than the value of the metals which 
the mining produces (Agricola 1950, 8) 
 While acknowledging that these issues were real, Agricola countered these arguments by 
asserting the inescapable necessity of metals and therefore mining: “If there were no metals, men 
would pass a horrible and wretched existence in the midst of wild beasts” (Ibid., 14). 
Furthermore, he echoed present-day depictions of regions surrounding mining operations (at 
least in Peru) as unproductive and inhospitable, by arguing that only rich agricultural regions 
should be an object of concern:  “As the miners dig almost exclusively in mountains otherwise 
unproductive, and in valleys invested in gloom, they do either slight damage to the fields or none 
at all” (Ibid., 14). Lastly, he invoked the value which the minerals stored underneath the earth 
could command in the wider world of commodity exchange, so as to help society escape the 
constraints of any particular natural space: “Moreover, with the metals which are melted from 
the ore, birds without number, edible beasts and fish can be purchased elsewhere and brought to 
these mountainous regions” (Ibid., 14).  
 Thus, the effects of mining activity on the environment and on human, plant and animal 
health were not unknown, yet references to them in mining documents and chronicles before the 
20th century are not common. Furthermore, they often do not appear as a separate sphere of 
“environmental” issues, as they do today, but rather as part of other concerns related to workers´ 
health or accidents. For the Andes, references to accidents and the pernicious effects of mining 
work on indigenous workers´ health can be found in some of the colonial chronicles of Potosí. 
The mercury mine at Huancavelica, Peru, which, together with the Almadén (Spain) and Idrija 
(Slovenia) mercury mines, supplied the Habsburg Empire with the mercury that was essential for 
the amalgamation of silver, was also notorious for its impact on workers´ health. As Brown 
(2001) and Robins (2011) have documented, besides the great dangers faced by workers in all 
mines, such as cave-ins, silicosis and carbon monoxide poisoning, workers at Huancavelica – 
both mitayos (coerced) and non-coerced - were subject to the toxic effects of mercury on the 
nervous system and other parts of the body, especially in the period before 1642, when the Belén 
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ventilation adit had not yet been built. This occurred both inside the mines and in the refining 
ovens, and was well-known at the time, with affected workers known as azogados (from the 
Spanish azogue for mercury). Some of the mercury inevitably got spread to the larger 
environment and to the non-working population through workers´ clothes and through the vapors 
from the refining ovens. 
In Cerro de Pasco, as in Potosí, we know of the frequent accidents during colonial times, 
such as the collapse of a mine in 1746 which killed around 300 workers. Writers also often 
describe the inhospitable, high-altitude conditions of the place, and it is in this context that the 
Spanish botanist Hipólito Ruiz, who visited the city between 1778 and1784, mentions the effects 
of fumes from the mercury amalgamation process then used to separate silver from its ore357: 
There [people] cannot walk long stretches on foot without resting from time to time so as 
to recover their breath and breathe more freely and not suffocate with  the large amounts 
of mercury and carbonic acid that rise up in the burning of minerals and of champas,358 
infecting the atmosphere with a poisonous air... (Ruiz 1931, quoted in Espinoza and Boza 
1981, 4). 
Descriptions of harmful gases and substances occur together with accounts of accidents 
and hazards affecting workers in the mines and amalgamation centers; one such account comes 
from Peruvian naturalist Mariano de Rivero y Ustariz´s 1828 report on the mining industry in 
Cerro de Pasco. Having crushed the ore in water-powered mills and mixed it with water and 
mercury (for which process both horses and people´s feet were used), the laborers then placed it 
in earthen jars (porongos) over the fire. This process, according to Rivero y Ustariz,  
...is risky, because if the earthen jar breaks the worker is exposed to receiving vapors 
which are harmful to their health and which are the cause of the many paralyzed people 
that one sees in Cerro (Rivero y Ustariz 2010 (1857), 32). 
 
 
                                                          
357 The mercury amalgamation process was the primary means of refining silver from the late 16th to the 19th 
centuries. Mercury is no longer used in Cerro de Pasco, as it is in artisanal gold mining in Peru. 
358 Champa is the primary biofuel available in this area, and it remains the main fuel used for cooking in the rural 
communities surrounding Cerro de Pasco. It consists of blocks of a particular star-shaped species of highland grass 
that are cut and dug out together with part of the soil. This is done shortly before the start of the annual rains, when 
the ground is driest, and the champa blocks are stored underneath sheds next to people´s houses. This fuel burns 
well and is more economical than buying gas.  
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The Second Industrial Revolution and the Smoke Affair 
 The arrival of industrial-scale mining in Peru in the early 20th century, in the form of the 
U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation, not only brought the attention of Lima-based 
indigenista activists to mining and smelting accidents (Mayer 1984 (1913)), but also led to the 
controversy known as the “smoke damage affair” surrounding the company´s smelting complex 
at La Oroya. This was part of a wider global phenomenon associated with the Second Industrial 
Revolution and its demand for copper and other metals, which led European and North American 
capital to set up copper mines and smelters around the world. As Nriagu (2002) writes, 
By the end of the nineteenth century, emissions of arsenic from base metal smelters and 
coal-burning power plants reached unprecedented levels because of low-level technology 
and little attention devoted to air pollution control. During this time, there were numerous 
complaints from smelter districts in many parts of the world that the smelter smoke was 
poisoning the horses and other livestock (Nriagu 2002, 14).  
 In the Cerro de Pasco region, we have evidence of such complaints from the areas 
surrounding the Huarón mine, where the small San José smelter was installed in 1914-1917,359 
and the Cerro de Pasco Corporation´s initial smelter at Tinyahuarco, which functioned from 1906 
to 1922.360 However, it was only when the latter company moved its smelting operation from 
                                                          
359 Kapsoli (1975) cites a complaint from the early part of the century by representatives of the comunidad of 
Huayllay, where Huarón is located: “The fumes killed the animals, destroyed the grasses and even caused huge 
damages to the inhabitants of the district.” An agreement between the community and the mining company, from the 
1936, also mentions “the damages that the fumes from the San José smelter had caused” (Gonzáles et al., 2000, 
Appendix 12). 
360 This first smelter, closer to the city of Cerro and known alternatively as Tinyahuarco, “La Fundición” or 
“Smelter”, lies today in ruins. Its environmental impact during the time that it functioned is less-well known that that 
of the Oroya smelter, since it did not give rise to governmental commissions or receive much attention in the press. 
In his 1958 recollections, long-time corporation executive B.T. Colley argued that “in all of the period of its 
operation” the smoke question “was never seriously raised.” He attributed this to the Tinyahuarco smelter´s 
geographical setting, with a favorable air current that carried the smoke above the ground and diluted it, in contrast 
to La Oroya which was set in a tight valley which kept the smoke close to the ground and sent it downstream 
through the valley. He did acknowledge that the proportion of lead and other metals escaping through the fumes 
must have been as great as in La Oroya, and that the hills nearest the smelter were “and still are, almost nude of 
vegetation,” but unlike in La Oroya, these were owned by the company, so there were no landowners to complain. 
On the other hand, Kapsoli (1975) cites a 1940 complaint by the comunidad of Vico against the company: “When 
the Smelter was in operation, the fumes ruined the greater part of our grasslands which have become barren and 
unproductive until now, without the company having compensated us either for the ruined grasslands or for the 
enormous mortality of our cattle” (60). In the Cerro Corporation archives, we find a 1924 complaint to the company 
from prominent hacendado Antenor Rizo Patrón, owner of the hacienda Atocsaico, which argues that there was a 
symmetry in the effects of smelter smoke on cattle at Tinyahuarco and at La Oroya. At the time, such effects were 
categorized as a disease called renguera. “The company can easily verify the reports I have that the renguera, which 
presented itself for the first time in the haciendas of Pacoyán, Quisque, Conoc, Racracancha [all haciendas close to 
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Tinyahuarco to the more centrally located railroad town of La Oroya in 1922 that the complaints 
grew large enough to attract national attention, forcing the government to name several 
investigative commissions over the course of the next few decades. This “smoke affair” has been 
examined by several scholars (Caballero 1981 89-106, 164-170; Laite 1981 59-64, DeWind 1987 
54-57, Mallon 1983 226-229, Flores Galindo 1974 50-52).  
At the time, the corporation was primarily interested in copper and secondarily in gold 
and silver; the lead in the ore, as well as other metals like arsenic, were thought to be of too low 
a grade to be profitably recovered. Thus, fine, volatilized particles of these metals were simply 
emitted with the rest of the fumes through the smokestack. B.T. Colley, a long-time company 
executive and at the time a close assistant to General Manager Harold Kingsmill, would later 
write that “the new Oroya plant was therefore practically without what now would be classified 
in any form as smoke control” (Colley 1958, 16). Early versions of Frederick Cottrell’s 
electrostatic precipitation methods, deigned to remove pollutants from smoke, were already 
known at the time, but were implemented only in a very limited form and in a gradual fashion, 
due either to financial pressure from the company’s high accumulated debts (DeWind 1987, 56) 
or to opposition from General Manager Kingsmill, who tended to downplay the smoke problem 
(Colley 1958, 18, 20).  As a result, in November 1922 the smelter began emitting massive 
amounts of sulphur dioxide, lead, arsenic and bismuth. Company tests and subsequent 
government reports showed that between 80 and 120 tons of fine particles of these substances 
(Colley 1958, 17) were falling daily on the town and on surrounding haciendas and 
comunidades, over a distance of 50 to 60 kilometers (DeWind 1987, 232). According to 
company reports cited by Caballero (1981), in the first year of operations 32,537.54 tons of the 
polluting particles were emitted through the smoke (91). The effects were immediately evident; 
as Colley wrote in his 1958 recollections, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tinyahuarco] and others of that region, as a result of the installation of the smelter, is disappearing in them with the 
interruption of the activities of that plant, at the same time that it intensifies its harmful effects in the haciendas next 
to Oroya. Additionally, the mortality of the large cattle has decreased there in a similar proportion as it has increased 
in the other place [Oroya].” It’s clear that knowledge of the effects of smelter smoke on cattle and grass was 
widespread among both hacendados and comuneros at the time, and that notions about the possibility of 




The whole hill immediately across the river from the smelter belonging to the community 
of Old Oroya was that year planted to barley, the most or one of the most sensitive plants 
to sulphur dioxide burns. Many people thought that the hill was so planted that year to be 
a proof of smoke damage and a method of collecting from the Corporation. But that was 
definitely not the reason. What happened was that Old Oroya was following a time-
honored custom of the Peruvian Indian in the high country who plants three crops in three 
successive years on the same ground, rests it for four years, and then repeats the process. 
The hill across the river at that time was fitting into its regular schedule. In a very short 
time the barley was all burned white and destroyed (16). 
 Complaints began pouring in not only of damage to crops but also to animals. According 
to Mallon (1983), by 1924, 30 comunidades and 28 hacendados had begun proceedings for 
damages (227). Many of the latter were wealthy families from the Peruvian elite, who had the ear 
of the national government and could not simply be dismissed by the company, even if the latter 
did initially attempt to argue that the deaths of animals were due to an infectious disease rather 
than to the smoke (Caballero 1981 99-101). For example, a judicial proceeding initiated by the 
Sociedad Ganadera de Junín – a company that owned several haciendas in the area – found that 
cattle mortality at its Hacienda Piñascocha had jumped from 4.94% in 1922 to 20.41% in 1923 
whereas at its Hacienda Cochas it had increased from 4.77% in 1922 to 15.33% in 1923 (Cerro 
Corporation Archive, “Eugenio Rivero” 106_1499, 106_1504). In the organs of the dead 
animals, laboratory analyses found “considerable quantities of arsenic, lead and sulphur gas” 
(Ibid., 106_1505). Colley describes the effects on animals owned by the mining company itself:  
These animals were heavily poisoned and badly affected by voluminous diarrhea; as they 
would rise from the ground the very liquid dung would pour from them, uncontrolled; 
they were lifeless and weak with staring eyes, slow moving, and very thin (Colley 1958, 
19). 
 Mallon (1983) similarly describes the effect of the smoke on the animals of the 
comunidades in the area, as recounted in some of her oral histories (227-228). The communities 
closest to the smelter, such as Old Oroya, Huaynacancha, Huayhuay and Saco basically had to 
cease their agricultural and herding activities. According to Colley “the situation became critical 
and also dangerous. For instance, the community of Chacapalpa, one of the largest, threatened to 
blow up the smelter” (Colley 1958, 31). The effect on humans were less documented; the first 
government commission did not perform analyses of individuals’ organs, but it mentioned that 
people complained of irritation of the lungs and eyes, loss of hair and skin problems (DeWind 
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1987, 234). The government ordered the company to temporarily reduce its operations from four 
furnaces to one only and to improve its smoke control measures. The latter was done only 
gradually, with the installation of new and improved Cottrell plants. As Colley writes, “it took 19 
years (1922-1941) to consummate this project of smoke control and even now [in 1958] it does 
not seem to be sufficient as the quantity of fume passing from it seems to be too great” (Colley 
1958, 20).  
By the late 1930s, the amount of arsenic, lead and other metals escaping daily through the 
stack had been reduced from 80-110 tons per day to 30 tons per day (DeWind 1987, 240); 
according to Colley, by 1941 it had been reduced to 3-5 tons per day. This process of smoke 
control was motivated by the realization that as Cottrell particle retention methods improved and 
as the demand for lead, bismuth and other metals increased, the substances previously emitted 
through the smoke could instead be retained, processed and sold. Environmental remediation 
thus became a source of profit.361 Thus, rather than be simply dumped in the surrounding 
countryside, an increasing share of lead and other metals previously regarded as by-products 
would be shipped abroad and become part of other lived environments. 
In the meantime, while the smoke was still at its worst, to deal with the discontent, the 
Company had to pay compensation to the haciendas and comunidades for the animals and crops 
lost. But it also adopted a policy of purchasing the damaged haciendas, at low prices, in order to 
avoid having to pay further compensations. Although the hillsides closest to La Oroya retain a 
moon-like appearance to this day, the gradual implementation of smoke control methods meant 
that the fields farther away from the smelter would eventually recover enough to be productive 
and profitable again. The Corporation thus began the process of constructing its separate 
Ganadera (Cattle-Raising) Division and becoming Peru’s largest hacienda owner, at one time 
claiming to own 322,000 hectares (DeWind 1987, 230), an area slightly larger than the state of 
Rhode Island. 362 This policy of land accumulation would eventually make the company the 
                                                          
361 As Colley wrote, “thus the recovery of fume from metallurgical smoke by the Cottrell process has grown into 
one of the most important and lucrative operations of the Corporation. It was never thought of before the smoke 
problem was forced on the Corporation, almost against its will, and it has grown into one of its most important and 
lucrative operations” (Colley 1958, 23). 
362 The smoke affair thus had a dual effect on the company: it accelerated its transformation from a copper company 
to a producer of lead, zinc and other metals that were previously discarded in the smoke, and it turned it into an 
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target of some of the first successful land recuperation struggles waged by comunidades in the 
early 1960s (in particular the community of Rancas next to Cerro de Pasco), a process that 
eventually lead to Peru’s radical Land Reform.  
 In the case of damaged land belonging to comunidades, the company could not simply 
buy up the land, since only a few years before the Leguía government had drafted the first 
modern legal recognition regime for comunidades (then known as comunidades indígenas), 
which among other things prohibited the sale and purchase of their land.363 The result was thus a 
complex combination of land-for-land exchanges, monetary compensation for animals and crops 
lost, and other agreements between the company and the communities. The negotiations and 
agreements were similar to many of those found between mining companies and communities 
today. It was not always clear which land belonged to communities and which to private 
individuals, since this was often contested, as was the exact membership and boundaries of 
communities. Laite (1981) describes the complex nature of this process for the community of 
Oroya, whose land was closest to the smelter and had mostly been ruined for productive use. The 
company bought a hacienda in the nearby valley of Tarma to compensate the community for its 
land. Some of the families of Oroya claimed to be private landowners and preferred cash 
compensation, whereas others had their rights to the ruined communal land questioned, and had 
to accept cash for their animals and crops only.  Of those who had their rights recognized, about 
half – often the older comuneros who were more oriented towards agriculture and herding – took 
the new land, whereas the other half – often their children – preferred to stay in La Oroya, take 
cash compensation, and work in the company. In later years, many of them joined their relatives 
in the new land. As La Oroya became increasingly polluted in the 1920s and 30s – due to the 
slowness of the implementation of the smoke control system – those who had stayed and still 
raised animals petitioned again, and formed a federation with two other communities with help 
from the APRA party. As a result, in 1947 the company had to buy a second hacienda for the 
community.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hacendado engaged in substantial cattle-raising activities in addition to mining. As Colley wrote, the smoke question 
“entirely engulfed the Corporation for the time being, finally greatly changing its history and completely altering its 
operations and its various products” (Colley 1958, 16). 
363 The difference in land regimes was noted by Colley: “He (Kingsmill) was negotiating the purchase of many 
privately owned properties claiming damage, and arranging with the Government for the payment of annuities for 
damages to properties which legally could not be purchased, such as communities” (Colley 1958, 18). 
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In the process, many of the comuneros from the areas surrounding La Oroya had thus 
abandoned agriculture and herding either for wage work in the mines and smelter or for investing 
their cash compensations in the growing town’s commercial opportunities; often a mix of both 
strategies was attempted.364 Some of the surrounding comunidades had managed to obtain 
significant compensation packages, whereas others had not;365 the ability of particular families to 
have their rights as members of these comunidades recognized had also varied greatly. 
The contamination of rivers 
Just as smoke constituted the main pollutant associated with the Cerro Corporation in La 
Oroya, further north the Cerro de Pasco mine itself, as noted in the previous chapter, was 
contaminating the San Juan river – the main tributary of Lake Junín, where the Mantaro river is 
born – as was the Colquijirca mine, owned by the Brocal company. This forms part of a larger 
story of the dumping of tailings and other mining waste into rivers near mining centers in Peru in 
the 20th century; this was common practice before environmental regulations began to weigh in 
during the second half of the century. As with the case of the Oroya smelter smoke, companies 
discarded that which could not be profitably processed and sold at the time, or whatever was 
simply a nuisance, such as the water pumped from the mine. It was of course known that slag 
heaps, waste ore and tailings could become profitable under changed technological and 
economic conditions, and for this reason they were sometimes retained in enclosed spaces such 
as tailings dams. Nevertheless, a significant amount made it into the nearest stream. Evidence of 
this can be found in mining regions themselves, where local people are usually aware of this 
history and of which rivers are contaminated and which not. It can also be gleaned from mining 
                                                          
364 DeWind (1987) cites a 1969 survey by the Ministry of Agriculture: “With few exceptions the only communities 
which had developed commercial activities in addition to livestock and agriculture were those most affected by the 
smoke. Of these affected communities half were dependent on mining as a significant source of their income” (Ibid., 
242-244). Thus, for communities closest to the Oroya smelter, it can be said that environmental pollution accelerated 
the process of incorporation into a wage-earning working-class.  
365 The amounts of the compensations were different for each community and the whole picture is highly complex, 
more so since agreements were sometimes renegotiated. Flores Galindo (1974), citing Basadre (1969), gives a list of 
30 communities claiming smoke damages in the 1920s. According  to a 1928 company report found in the Cerro 
Corporation Archive, it seems some of these communities received an annual indemnity, some received one-time 
payments for specific damages, and a few did not receive compensation. 26 communities had received some form of 
payment in the 4 years since the beginning of the smoke affair, and the total amount spent by the company on these 
compensations up to the end of 1928 was 840,331.12 soles. This was, however, less than it had spent on buying 
haciendas and compensating their owners for damages, which was 7’024,168.18 soles. (See appendix) 
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company reports, studies and documents – although they do not usually devote extensive 
attention to environmental issues, they do sometimes make passing reference to the dumping of 
tailings and other residue into rivers.366  
For communities and haciendas in these areas, this pollution often meant the loss of one 
source of water and river fauna (fish, frogs, etc.) – as was the case with the utilization of rivers 
and lakes as water sources for the mines´ concentrators, smelters and hydroelectric power plants. 
There were usually other streams, natural springs and lakes to supplement this shortfall. In the 
case of the San Juan River and Lake Junín into which it flowed, however, the contamination was 
particularly severe, and was the subject of numerous complaints from the comunidades of the 
lake area. A Cerro de Pasco Corporation internal memorandum from 1969 mentions a visit from 
officials of the left-leaning military government of Juan Velasco, which had recently taken 
power and which had a pro-comunidad discourse. One of the visiting officials, an army major 
and advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture on matters pertaining to the Agrarian Reform, made 
his views known to the company employees who hosted him: 
In my opinion, he said, the communities have been sending memoranda since twenty 
years ago, asking to have their claims for damages attended to, without being heard. [He 
said] that now things have changed because they are listened to as soon as is needed, and 
that the Government is willing to lend them all necessary help....the previous 
commissions have limited themselves to studying solely the La Oroya area when in his 
opinion the problem originates in Cerro de Pasco, where the “poisoned” waters have 
ruined some 30,000 hectares of grass in the Ondores zone (Centromín Archive – 
Memorandum Interno, 22 de Junio de 1969). 
                                                          
366 For example, in 1952 Cerro de Pasco Corp. General Manager Robert Koenig was trying to assess whether there 
might be leftover lead and zinc tailings in the company´s Casapalca mine which might be recoverable. A company 
employee replied to Koenig: “Until the Oroya smelter went into operation no lead nor zinc was recovered in 
Casapalca. It all went down the Río Rímac [the river on whose banks, much further downstream, is located the 
capital city of Lima]. After the smelter in Casapalca closed down Oroya did get some of the lead but the zinc was 
still sent down to the river until 1924.” This information, Koenig concluded, “definitely kills the idea that there may 
be any recoverable zinc in the Casapalca tailings pile” (Cerro Corporation Archive, 106-1344). Colley also describes 
how in its early days the Oroya smelter dumped its waste directly into the Mantaro – the river that forms the 
traditional Huanca heartland and one of central Peru´s most important agricultural valleys. “The Corporation was 
dumping all of its granulated slag into the Mantaro; owners of stock could show flake-like particles of slag adhering 
to the inner lining of animal stomachs. The Government appointed another commission to investigate this subject 
and that caused the installation of the existing slag depository on the opposite bank of the Mantaro River” (Colley 
1958, 17). At the French-owned Huarón mine, the 1936 mine-community agreement mentioned earlier also 




As mentioned previously, in 1981 the state mining company Centromín, which had taken 
over from the Cerro Corp., sought to reduce the contamination of the San Juan river and Lake 
Junín by building a new plant to treat the water before releasing it. The motivation for this was 
not so much concern for the communities along the banks of the San Juan and Lake Junín as it 
was a project at the time that sought to connect the Mantaro river with the Rímac, so as to secure 
a larger supply of drinking water for the capital city of Lima. Since the Mantaro is in a way the 
continuation of the San Juan River – after passing through Lake Junín – it seemed necessary to 
attempt to decontaminate the latter river so as to prevent the release of large quantities of heavy 
metals into the Rímac river. However, the new water treatment plant produced its own residue, 
and this began to be dumped on Lake Yanamate, formerly the source of the city of Cerro de 
Pasco´s drinking water.367 Nor was the contamination of the San Juan river and Lake Junín 
eliminated altogether, it was simply reduced, as the measurements in the previous chapter 
showed. 
 For the urban population of Cerro de Pasco, the issue of contamination has been one of 
gradual increase rather than sudden emergence. From the small but ever-present ore stockpiles 
described in colonial-era and 19th-century travelers’ and engineers’ accounts there have emerged 
the massive waste ore deposits of today. While in the past the rivers were contaminated with 
mercury used to extract silver in the old amalgamation method, today acid mine drainage (AMD) 
filters into the San Juan and Tingo rivers. Some lakes, like Yanamate and Quiulacocha, are 
poisoned with tailings and acid water, while others, like Patarcocha and Esperanza, have been 
filled in with solid landfill from the mine. Open-pit mining, which has existed on a large scale in 
Cerro de Pasco since the late 1950s, produces a much larger volume of waste than underground 
production methods. But contamination is a problem that has historically appeared in 
combination with, not in isolation from, other phenomena such as the danger of mine accidents, 
occupational illnesses such as silicosis, and the gradual destruction of the old city by the 
advancement of the open pit.  
                                                          
367 A 1982 letter from the state mining company to the Ministry of Mines states that “the utilization of the enclosed 
basin [cuenca ciega] of Lake Yanamate as a container for the effluents from the Mine Water Treatment Plan has as 
its purpose to reduce the contamination of the waters of the Mantaro river with the objective of making feasible the 
Mantaro Transfer Project [Proyecto Transvase Mantaro] which has been declared to be of public utility and need 
and high priority” (Centromín Archive, Box 1263,  Procesos Administrativos). The Mantaro Transfer Project was a 




 However, although it has a long history, in recent years the issue of contamination has 
taken on new force. While other political categories and currents, such as class and exploitation, 
and their corresponding mechanisms of articulation, such as labor unions, have diminished in 
strength, environmentalism has instead grown in prestige and institutionality, at both the national 
and international levels. In September 1990, just as Peru was beginning a rapid shift toward fully 
market-oriented policies under the Fujimori government, the country was also passing the most 
important piece of environmental legislation in its history: the Environmental Code (Código del 
Medio Ambiente). The Code, together with subsequent legislation based on it, introduced to Peru 
two mechanisms that have become central to debates and conflicts over mining: Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIAs), for new projects, and Environmental Remediation Plans (PAMAs), 
for existing projects. This was, of course, part of a wider global move towards more stringent 
and encompassing environmental regulation.368 The Environmental Code had been prepared over 
several years during the 1980s through the collaboration of government agencies such as the 
National Office for the Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN) and the now-defunct National 
Planning Institute (INP) (Suárez de Freitas 2000, 63), with the technical assistance of 
international bodies like the United Nations Envrionment Program (UNEP) (Brañes 2000, 29). It 
was also discussed in the Peruvian Congress over the course of 4-5 years (Caillaux 2000, 18), 
and was left for the Fujimori government to approve when it took office in 1990.  
At that time, as Caillaux writes, the Code met with the opposition of the business 
community, which had not been part of its preparation, and which asked that the new law be 
                                                          
368 Raúl Brañes, who in his role as United Nation advisor participated in the drafting of the Peruvian legislation, has 
placed Peru´s Environmental Code within a wider Latin American and historical context in Brañes (2000). He traces 
three periods in Latin American legislation related to the issues now categorized as environmental: “casual,” 
“sectoral,” and “environmental legislation proper.” In the 19th century, civil codes sought to protect property rights 
and assist in the resolution of disputes, and only “casually” affected matters pertaining to the use of natural 
resources; in the early 20th century, conservationist ideas and growing urbanization led the state to issue “sectoral” 
legislation on issues related both to the protection of water, flora and fauna and to public health and work safety. 
Beginning in the 1970s, on the other hand, “environmental legislation in Latin America experiments a true explosion 
and starts to be profoundly altered in conformity with a global tendency” (Brañes 2000, 32). This is what he labels 
“global” legislation or “environmental legislation proper;” by 2000, 17 out of 20 Latin American countries had 
passed it in some form: Colombia (1974), Venezuela (1976), Ecuador (1976), Brazil (1981), Guatemala (1986), 
Mexico (1988), Peru (1990), Bolivia (1992), Honduras (1993), Chile (1994), Costa Rica (1996), Nicaragua (1996), 
Cuba (1997), El Salvador (1998), Panama (1998), Dominican Republic (2000) and Uruguay (2000) (Ibid., 37-8). 
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repealed (Ibid., 18). In a January 1991 statement, leftist leader and then-senator Hugo Blanco 
presented a narrative of the Code´s inception that connected it to the history of mining 
contamination in Peru:  
For a long time, the mining companies have been poisoning the air, water and soil of our 
country. They are killing the fish, plants, grasses, and as a result the cattle and people. 
We can see that in La Oroya, in Bambamarca and in Ilo. For this crime against people 
and against nature, the peoples of our country have protested and have been able to obtain 
an Environmental Code that requires companies to put in place mechanisms to prevent 
the poisoning of water, air and soil. The advancement of technology and science allows a 
mine to be exploited without contaminating the environment. However, the mining 
companies want everything to be profit, they don´t want to spend one cent to prevent 
poisoning. For this reason, the mining companies with the multinational Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation at their helm have attacked the Environmental Code.  
According to Blanco, the companies had been able to persuade the Senate to pass a 
motion to repeal the Code, but the Chamber of Deputies had been able to kill this move so that 
the Code remained in effect.369 As with the mining tax redistribution (canon minero) laws passed 
a few years later, which have similarly transformed the social landscape of mining in Peru, the 
attitude of business and in particular the mining industry towards the Environmental Code 
eventually changed from one of opposition to one of acceptance.  The Code’s provisions have 
furthermore become part of the image of modernity and social responsibility that the industry 
tries to project (Salas 2008).  
Although some of its elements were subsequently curtailed by other laws protecting 
foreign investment and the mining sector in particular,370 the Environmental Code has helped to 
focus attention on contamination by mining companies, so that the ways in which they handle 
                                                          
369 Comunicado de Hugo Blanco Galdós, Archivo Documental de la FNTMSSP, Roll 6, XXIII Asamblea Nacional 
Ordinaria de Delegados, 1991. Hugo Blanco is a well-known figure in Peru. Born to middle-class but rural origins in 
Huanoquite, Cuzco, he went to study in Argentina in the 1950s and became a Trotskyist. He then returned to Peru 
and became involved in the peasant struggle against the landlords in La Concepción, Cuzco, being elected president 
of the Provincial Peasant Federation at the height of the struggle that led to the first Agrarian Reform but also to his 
arrest in 1963. Imprisoned for several years, he was pardoned by Velasco in 1970 and then exiled, returning in the 
late 1970s as one of the most popular leaders of the Peruvian Left, and then serving in Congress throughout the 
1980s and early 90s. Today he is an outspoken supporter of peasant movements against the mines, for example in 
the ongoing Conga conflict.  
370 For example, the Framework Law for the Growth of Private Investment (Ley Marco para el Crecimiento de la 
Inversión Privada) and the Law for the Promotion of Investment in the Mining Sector (Ley de Promoción e 
Inversiones en el Sector Minero) (Távara 2000, 57).  
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their tailings, smoke emissions and other waste are subject to greater scrutiny than before. 
Companies have invested large sums of money to comply – to different degrees - with the 
environmental remediation plans (PAMAs) that they are now required by law to submit to the 
Ministry of Mines. At the same time, however, this new culture of environmental regulation has 
taken hold precisely at the time in which mining has been expanding massively in Peru, in both 
traditional mining areas and in new frontiers previously dedicated more exclusively to 
agriculture and herding. There has thus been a tension between the increased production of 
environmental pollutants, as a result of the growth of mining activity (often through open-pit 
methods), and the greater emphasis placed on their containment and dilution. Environmental 
regulation and remediation has also encountered limits in the fact that EIAs and PAMAs are 
overseen not by an independent entity – even after the Ministry of the Environment was created 
in 2008 – but rather by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, historically committed to and linked 
with the mining industry.371  
The post-Environmental Code order has not eliminated mining-related contamination or 
made it an issue of the past; it has rather forced companies to contain their toxic by-products 
within more enclosed spaces or to find profitable uses for them. This development has been 
uneven; given the lax attitude of the government and the Ministry of Mines, much depends on 
the strength of local groups to pressure companies to reduce contamination. Such strength is 
most commonly found in the comunidades campesinas, as owners of the land, whether in the 
“new” mining areas, where they sometimes (though not always) oppose new mining projects, or 
in the “old” areas, where they usually demand compensation for environmental damage to their 
land, as well as rent payments for its use. In this sense, the fact that Cerro de Pasco is an urban 
space, with a multitude of individual owners of urban plots, rather than a comunidad with a 
socially recognized claim to land and a pre-established political organization, goes a long way 
                                                          
371 Such limits take very concrete forms. One well-known example is that of La Oroya, where the company has been 
able to obtain extensions for the completion of its PAMA, and, when the government finally threatens to enforce its 
deadlines, the company mobilizes its workforce by threatening to close down and eliminate their jobs. Another 
example is the tendency of the Ministry of Mines to approve almost all EIAs presented by companies. Finally, there 
is the ability of companies like Volcan to acquire the assets of the old state mining company without acquiring any 
responsibility for its liabilities, in particular for the tailings and waste rock left behind, which are thus effectively 
excluded from the private companies’ PAMAs. 
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towards explaining why even in the post-Environmental Code order the enforcement of 
environmental measures there has been so lax. 
 The emergence of “environment” as a category 
 The changes that have occurred in the last few decades both in regulation and in the 
prominence of environmental discourses and categories mean that, in the mining regions of the 
central highlands, there is a dual quality to environmental problems: there is something both old 
and new about them. They were known before, but did not seem to extend to as many domains; 
nor did they seem to have the central importance that they have today in local politics and 
economy. In the case of the contamination of the San Juan-Lake Junín-Mantaro hyrdrological 
system by residues from the Cerro de Pasco mine, the problem was well-known long before the 
Environmental Code; in the 1970s, its solution was included as a demand by the Federation of 
Workers of the state-owned mining company Centromín. However, one of my interviewees, 
Octavio Núñez372, a former worker and union leader at the Morococha mine, claimed it was 
never a priority for the Federation, but simply a way to get the peasant communities on the side 
of the mineworkers:  
We have considered that there should be sufficient communication between the mining 
workers and the peasant comunidades. We would go to the assemblies of the 
comunidades and say, ‘we as mining workers are demanding to the company that they 
purify the Mantaro River.’ That was our language, but it was an almost lyrical language. 
Why lyrical? Because we have not done anything, we have not demanded it with 
firmness, nor did we launch a strike so that the Cerro de Pasco Company would 
decontaminate the Mantaro River. 
It is interesting to note that although here he speaks of the comunidades in third person, 
Núñez was himself from a comunidad. Years after leaving the mining company in the early 
1990s, and after engaging in commercial activity in the city of Huancayo, Núñez became 
president of his own comunidad of origin, on the border of Lake Junín, and led protests over the 
contamination of the lake.  
                                                          
372 This is a pseudonym. He preferred that I not use his real name.   
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Similarly, Ernestina Lázaro, a former leader of miners´ wives´ committees in Cerro de 
Pasco, argued that there was a lack of discussion of topics related to pollution and to the 
destruction of the city.  
No, nothing, there was a total lack of knowledge about it in those days... The open pit 
was already growing, more and more each time, even the houses were already being 
demolished, but nobody, nobody said anything; not like now that we see that the 
environment [is talked about], so it’s only now that with these problems they talk about 
the environment, when actually that’s been going on for years now. 
Lázaro’s statement that “nobody said anything” as the open pit was growing should not 
be taken literally; we know from written sources as well as local memory that in the 1960s there 
actually was opposition to the growth of the open pit and the demolition of houses, churches and 
other buildings. These protests led the company to build a new section of the city, San Juan 
Pampa, to replace the old city that was rapidly being taken over by the pit. Lázaro’s terms 
instead highlight the contrast between the role played by environmental and urban livelihood 
issues in local politics at the time and in the present, as well as the changes in the terms used to 
construct and label these problems. 
  Elsa Ojeda, the wife of a mining worker, provided a very different account when we 
discussed the differences in how environmental issues were discussed in the past vis-a-vis the 
present. Though she lived in Cerro de Pasco at the time of my research, she grew up in La Oroya, 
where her father was a worker in the company’s smelting complex. She did not talk about a lack 
of knowledge of contamination; rather, people were aware of the problem, but the company did 
not act to solve it. This difference in her account may be due to the difference between Cerro and 
La Oroya – the latter location had been the site of a pollution-related conflict that had received 
much attention (the “smoke affair”). She emphasized the changes that had occurred since the 
implementation of the PAMAs in the 1990s and 2000s, as the Environmental Code had gone into 
effect. She thus emphasized not so much changes in categories and awareness but rather what 
she saw as actual modifications in environmental practice: 
Yes, it was talked about, but they didn´t pay attention. But now they do. The Doe Run 
company now for example wants the environment to be all green areas.373 Now they say 
                                                          
373 It is common for mining companies now to put up signs pointing to the “green zones” where they plant trees 
(often quenuales, small trees that grow at high altitude). These signs often include sayings such as “Let´s take care 
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the company has a technology that no longer is like before, how it used to come out from 
the chimney in La Oroya, the smoke very thick. La Oroya would be all covered up but 
with fog, with that toxic gas that meant you couldn´t walk, it stung. But now recently, I 
went to La Oroya the other week and you still feel it but only a bit, I mean your throat 
itches and everything, but it´s not like before, not anymore. 
On the other hand, Raúl Alejos, a schoolteacher who grew up in the Huarón mining camps and 
now lives in Cerro, was more like Ernestina Lázaro in emphasizing a change in awareness and in 
the categories used. In his case, he linked these changes to his own experience of leaving the 
camp and connecting to a wider world – of becoming aware of new things. In response to a 
question about how people got along with each other in the mining camp and in the nearby town, 
he said that:  
There are a lot of things that in their time were not perceived. There is a truth [that says 
that] when you live there you do not take account of what is going on. But when you 
leave, you can perceive the problems that exist. For example, the contamination of the 
rivers, the expansion of the tailings, which for us were not noticeable, for us who live 
[there], but when you leave you notice that there is a certain backwardness, and certain 
conditions that are prejudicial to peasant families.  
Question: When you lived there was there awareness of the contamination of the rivers, 
in Huarón? 
Answer: I think not. 
Question: Was it talked about in school? 
Answer: It was not talked about, no. They didn´t talk about it. It´s only now that it has 
become popular (boga). And what´s more, in spite of it being popular, the students are 
not prepared [on that topic], they only do it when they have to present a research project. 
 Mendoza´s statement suggests the emergence of “the environment” as a subject of 
discussion and as a topic of study for students. Indeed, “environmental engineering” is now one 
of the careers offered, alongside mining engineering, at the Daniel Alcides Carrión National 
University (UNDAC) in Cerro de Pasco – traditionally a focal point for the educational 
aspirations of the area´s young people, especially the children of mining workers. “The 
environment” (medio ambiente) and the adjective “environmental” (ambiental) have also become 
spheres of work, enterprise and economy. For example, one of the communal companies with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the environment.” Here “environment” (medio ambiente) is linked not to the effects of the company´s productive 




which I was acquainted during my research was engaged in putting up barriers around a tailings 
deposit in order to prevent herds (of sheep, llamas, etc.) from going too near the tailings and 
eating the grass around it. The communal company had in turn subcontracted this project to a 
smaller contractor who was a friend of mine. To him, this was an obra ambiental – in using the 
term obra (public works), generally used for construction projects, he was linking this type of 
“environmental” activity to the broader world of contractors, municipal budgets and mining rents 
distributed through the canon minero. Similarly, another communal company, with which I 
conducted brief fieldwork in the comunidad of Huayllay, had an acronym as its name 
(EMICONSATH). Spelled out, the acronym read “Huayllay Mining, Construction, 
Environmental Affairs and Transport Company.” “Environmental Affairs” thus becomes one 
more type of work into which the communal company can enter and thus secure jobs for its 
young people and some income for the community.  
In this way, the category of the “environmental” becomes associated with the broader 
world of the modern. For example, I asked an older comunero of Huayllay – who worked many 
years in one of the mining companies and now splits his time between Huayllay and Lima, where 
he currently works - why the town had grown so much in the last few years since the start of the 
current mining boom. His answer was, “because of mining, of course. Because of the canon, 
royalties, environment [medio ambiente], all of that brings money.”  For him, “environment” was 
just another one of the new terms and categories that, like the canon minero and royalties 
(regalías), had risen to prominence in the last few years and that “brought money” to the town. 
 
Environmental pollution and health in Cerro de Pasco today 
 If environmental problems are both old and new, in that they have always been there but 
have acquired a new valence and political importance in recent years, this is particularly true in 
Cerro de Pasco, Peru´s most traditional mining city. In Appendix D I provide an overview of the 
available data and studies regarding mining-related contamination of the environment in the 
lakes, river and soil of the area surrounding Cerro de Pasco. In the national media, Cerro de 
Pasco has been identified with the problem of mining-related contamination, in particular since a 
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2008 law was passed demanding the city´s relocation due to its polluted state and its gradual 
destruction by the open pit mine that sits in its midst. The relocation never occurred, and in fact it 
was eventually rejected as an option by local authorities, who were worried that such a plan 
would jeopardize the execution of obras (public works, without a large number of which no 
mayor can be politically successful today) in the present city. A state of “endless waiting” and 
“toxic uncertainty” (Auyero and Swistun 2009) has been produced by the constant deferral and 
uncertain prospects of the relocation as well as by the gradual, irregular and haphazard advance 
of the open pit.  
 As we have already seen, the Cerro de Pasco mine, located below and in the middle of 
the city, has been exploited since around 1630 (the date usually given by local tradition). After 
independence in 1824, the city continued producing silver, albeit with significant oscillations in 
volume. Silver declined in the world market at the end of the 19th century at the same time that 
demand for copper rose as a result of the Second Industrial Revolution. In 1902, Cerro´s copper 
potential caught the interest of U.S. mining baron James B. Haggin, who raised capital from 
other well-known investors to found what would later become the Cerro de Pasco Corporation. 
Over the course of the 20th century, the CPC built a vast network of mines, concentrator plants 
and hydroelectric dams, as well as the refining complex at La Oroya, becoming the biggest 
mining company as well as the largest landowner in Peru. CPC built its strength initially on 
copper and, increasingly after the 1940s, on lead, zinc and silver. In 1974 the company´s 
operations in central Peru were nationalized by the left-leaning military government of General 
Velasco, albeit with a compensation of net $28.5 million (Dore 1988 171).374 The state company 
Centromín ran the aging mining complex until the 1990s, when it was re-privatized in a 
piecemeal fashion.  
Whereas a U.S. company (Doe Run) bought the smelting complex of La Oroya and the 
Cobriza mine, the original mine at Cerro was purchased by the Volcan company, whose main 
                                                          
374 In addition to its mines in Peru, the CPC had been investing in industrial operations in the U.S., such as copper 
wire factories, since the 1950s. When in the late 1960s and early 1970s it began to foresee nationalization on the 
horizon, the company began diverting capital away from Peru and Chile and towards its U.S. assets. In 1976, the 
company´s U.S. industrial, sales and construction operations, into which it had invested the compensation money, 
were bought by the Marmon Group, thereby doubling the latter company´s size. In 2007, majority stock in the 
Marmon Group was in turn bought by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway group. 
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stockholders were the Peruvian entrepreneur Roberto Letts Colmenares and the Dutch 
commodity trading group Trafigura. In the context of the rise in metal prices that began in 2003, 
as a result of the strong demand from a growing China, the Cerro mine made Letts one of the 
richest men in Peru, worth around $1.5 billion at the time of his death in 2010.375 The production 
of risk and environmental hazards in Cerro is thus intertwined not only with the production of 
wages, rents and economic activity in the local sphere, but also in very specific ways with 
processes of accumulation at the national and international levels.  
Today, Volcan’s mining complex at Cerro is composed of both the underground mine, 
worked since the 1600s but expanded through the 20th century, and the large open pit whose 
exploitation began in the 1950s.376 The current underground workings have grown out of the 
consolidation of what were originally multiple mines, around which the city was built in a 
haphazard fashion. The tunnels are thus directly underneath the urban population, and it is not 
unheard of for cave-ins to occur.377 The methods used to mine the ore include both cut-and-fill 
and room-and-pillar. The open-pit mine, on the other hand, occupies the center of the city. 
Though no longer the largest open-pit mine in Peru, it was one of the first of its kind in the 
country. In 2006 it measured 1800 by 1100 meters, and was almost 400 meters deep; the 
stripping ratio in 2005 was 3.41 to 1.378 Though employing fewer workers than the underground 
mine, it produces a greater quantity of ore; in 2005 it accounted for 66.79% of the total mineral 
processed.379 Since the 1950s, the expansion of the open pit has progressively destroyed most of 
the old city as well as other neighborhoods. Some of the monuments and landmarks from the old 
city were transferred to the new areas, others had replicas take their place. In 1997 an agreement 
                                                          
375 For this latter figure, see press accounts from the time of Letts´ passing, for example 
http://www.poder360.com/article_detail.php?id_article=4130&pag=2. It should be noted that Cerro de Pasco was 
Letts´ largest mine, and that his standing within the Peruvian business community grew significantly in the years 
after its acquisition in 1999, and especially since the rise in metal prices experienced in the last decade.  
376 The modern pit grew out of smaller pits dug at least since the 19th century, but these were very modest compared 
to the operations that began in the 1950s. At that time the new open mine was called “McCune Pit,” after the U.S. 
mining engineer who first explored the Cerro deposit for James B. Haggin in 1902; it is now known as Tajo Raul 
Rojas, after a Peruvian engineer who died during a flooding of the mine. 
377 One such incident occurred during my stay. The underground mine is composed of many different levels, of 
which levels 400 through 1800 were in exploitation in 2006. This information and the quantitative data in this 
paragraph come from Volcan’s Closure Plan of August 2006, prepared by CESEL S.A. The information is thus from 
that year. 
378 For the stripping ratio, see Closure Plan, Chapter 2, 15. This is the ratio of rock discarded to that processed in the 
Concentrating Plant. 
379 Closure Plan, 2.2.2 
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was signed between the municipality and the state company that ran the mine at the time, 
agreeing to a further expansion that promised to be the last, and which demolished two 
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, this agreement was forgotten after privatization and the change in 
ownership in 1999. Thus, at the time of my fieldwork Volcan was beginning work on “Plan L,” 
an expansion plan supposed to enlarge the pit over one of the last remaining areas of the old city, 
though this plan has since been put on temporary hold. 
 
Figure 9 - Cerro de Pasco Open Pit, with Paragsha, José Carlos Mariátegui and San Juan 
neighborhoods in the back. Photograph by author, 2009. 
 
Within the matrix determined both by the visible signs of contamination in the city and 
by the rise of environmental consciousness at both the national and international levels, the 
phrase “lead in blood” occupies a privileged place. This is in spite of the fact that lead is only 
one amongst several polluting metals in the city. The place of lead in local discussions of 
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contamination was evident to me on my first visit to the city, in 2008, when a painted political 
advertisement included the phrase “No more lead children!” (no más niños plomo) under its 
candidate´s name. On one of the cement panels that ring the open pit, someone had spray-painted 
“Avoid lead in blood... Wash your hands” – apparently a parody of the mining company´s 
argument that the problem was the result of inadequate hygiene. Similarly, when people knew I 
was a researcher, they often assumed that I was there to study contamination and in particular the 
lead issue. One time, during an afternoon conversation at a restaurant, someone in the group I 
was with asked what I was studying, and before I could answer one of them interrupted: “Lead in 
blood? Lead in blood right?”  
Lead is, of course, one of the three main metals produced in Cerro, along with zinc and 
silver. Volcan, the company that owns the mine, is the number one producer of lead in Peru, 
thanks to both Cerro and its underground mine at Ticlio in Junín department.380 Lead has been 
produced in large quantities in Cerro since the 1940s; it has been sold for industrial purposes 
abroad, and today its foremost use is in the manufacture of car batteries (Kesler 1994, 218), as 
well as solder, cable sheathing, ammunition, glazes and plumbing fittings (WHO 2003, 1). Lead 
was formerly (and notoriously) used in fuels, but this has been phased out in most of the world.  
Lead´s privileged place among the metals accused of being a contaminant, in public 
discourse in Cerro, is due to its worldwide notoriety as a pollutant. Unlike zinc, its frequent 
companion within ore deposits, lead is not needed for nutrition or any other known biological 
function in humans, and is a known environmental hazard (Kesler 1994, 214). Concerns over 
contamination from lead pipes and lead paint have prompted legislative action in industrialized 
countries, as when the United States banned the use of lead paint in homes in 1977. As the World 
Health Organization states, lead is “a cumulative general poison:” the known effects of chronic 
lead exposure on the health of humans include muscle weakness, disturbances in mood, lower 
scores on psychometric tests, and symptoms of neuropathy; acute intoxication can cause 
headaches, muscle tremors, abdominal cramps, kidney damage, hallucinations, and 
encephalopathy (WHO 2003, 5). Pregnant women, infants and children at 6, as well as fetuses, 
are particularly vulnerable.  
                                                          
380 Volcan Annual Report, 2008, p.96. 
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It is thus not surprising that lead has been singled out in discussions of environmental 
pollution in Peru, as in other places. The metal has also gained notoriety in the country through 
the case of La Oroya, the city that houses the large smelting complex built by the CPC in 1924 
and which still today processes the concentrates from Cerro and other mines.381 In Cerro itself, 
measurements of the population’s blood lead levels began to be done in the 1990s; until then, 
studies of the effects of pollutants had largely been limited to mining workers, within an 
industrial safety framework rather than one of public health. By the time I arrived in the city, 
studies had been conducted by both the National and Regional Health Offices (DIGESA and 
DIRESA) and, in 2007, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In some 
parts of the city health workers were giving calcium supplements to children with high lead 
levels, to counteract the effect of the metal on calcium absorption in infants. People in certain 
neighborhoods had become accustomed to nurses and other health workers coming to take 
samples of their blood and to hearing talk of lead over the radio.   
In particular, one set of cases from 2006 had served to raise the profile of lead 
contamination in the city. Several children from two neighboring families had shown lead 
measurements that were much higher than those of the rest of the city´s young population, most 
of which tended to show chronic rather than acute levels. These two families lived in a section of 
the asentamiento humano382 of Columna Pasco, apparently near an abandoned mine chimney or 
shaft that contained large amounts of lead; the children had become contaminated in this way, 
and some of them had lead levels that could be described as acute contamination. One of them, 
Thais Palma Carhuaricra, had an extremely high level of 120 ug/dL and, according to both her 
family and the local health officials I spoke with, as well as available documentation, had already 
suffered convulsions and neuropathy. Her case had received attention in the city and had even 
appeared in some national media. When she was five years old, in 2009 (while I was in Cerro), a 
                                                          
381 In 2002, a well-publicized study by the Ministry of Health´s Environmental Health Division (DIGESA), which 
monitored the blood lead levels in 346 children in La Oroya, found that 99.1% of the children had levels above the 
acceptable maximum of 10 ug/dL. 
382 This is the term used in Peru to refer to the new, self-built neighborhoods that grew up in the outskirts of urban 
areas during the period of population growth and migration to the cities in the second half of the 20th century. 
Columna Pasco arose in the 1970s and 80s is one of the largest such neighborhoods in Cerro de Pasco.  
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fundraiser was conducted over the local radio stations to raise funds for her to travel to Cuba for 
treatment.383 
At the time, people in Cerro were aware that they and their children might be 
contaminated, but they were uncertain about the precise nature of the pollution and its effects. 
Some individuals I encountered saw signs of illness in their families, and they wondered whether 
it was linked to lead or other forms of contamination, or whether it was an unrelated sickness. I 
knew of at least one mesa (ritual offering) placed specifically for a child with high blood lead 
level results who was having health problems that seemed to impair her learning.  
The recent foregrounding of environmental topics is not only due to  influence from 
outside, but also to the visibility of contamination within the city – the waste ore, tailings, 
chimneys, the proximity between the open pit and the houses, etc. Yet these visible 
manifestations do not necessarily make clear the exact nature of the hazards, their degree of 
intensity and whether there is any method for preventing them. Other signs, such as rashes on the 
skin or pains in the body, are even more uncertain – are they due to contamination from the 
mine, or to other causes? These types of questions produce confusion not only in the researcher; 
they also underlie much of the uncertainty among city residents themselves. As Auyero and 
Swistun write, anthropology tends to concern itself more with what people know rather than 
what they don´t know. Yet, in contaminated places such as Cerro and the Argentine shantytown 
of Villa Inflamable, which they study, we must ask the question: “How can local residents not be 
mystified if even local doctors are confused and/or wrong about the sources of suffering?” 
(Auyero and Swistun 2009, 105).  People´s uncertainty about the sources, effects and intensity of 
contamination is intensified by both the relative opaqueness of hidden hazards in themselves, and 
by the “labor of confusion” (Ibid., 19) of state and corporate officials (see next section).  
In the some of the neighborhoods nearest the mine and the mineral waste deposits, like 
Paragsha, Champamarca and Quiulacocha, a handful of studies have been conducted in which 
residents and their children have offered up their blood to be tested for lead. In some cases, 
people received their results and can recite them by heart, in phrases like “my child has 16.75 of 
                                                          
383 Cuban medicine is highly regarded in Peru; cures promoted as medicina cubana are sometimes sold in the fairs in 
both Cerro and Huayllay. 
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lead.” In others, people either complained of not receiving the results or doubted their accuracy, 
sometimes alleging the dishonesty of corrupt health officials supposedly bribed by the mining 
company. Compared to other types of evidence, blood lead measurements carry more symbolic 
weight, but they are also more controlled by “experts.” Furthermore, people rarely received 
explanations about the meanings of these numbers, or about topics such as the difference 
between acute and chronic lead contamination. 
Given this lack of information, residents of the city often oscillated between two 
extremes. On the one hand, people sometimes interpreted contamination by metal particles 
through a framework derived from infectious disease – as if the “disease of lead in blood” (la 
enfermedad del plomo en sangre), as it is sometimes called, could have sudden and catastrophic 
effects that would be visible and spread around the whole city in a homogenous way, rather than 
the long-term and often invisible impact of chronic contamination with heavy metals. On the 
other hand, other people seemed unconcerned or accepting of the level of contamination, or at 
least unwilling to leave the city in order to avoid the hazard. This second response is probably 
more common, and it makes sense if one contextualizes it within in the city´s mining history. 
Although the accumulation of waste ore and tailings has certainly increased in recent decades, 
these have been around for a long time, if in smaller quantities. More importantly, families with 
a history of mining have obviously long been aware of the dangers associated with the industry, 
even if they were conceptualized more in terms of work accidents or occupational illnesses such 
as silicosis, rather than the current preoccupation over childhood lead contamination. Risk has 
always been a part of mining work and had to be accepted in order to be able to work and 
support a family. Thus, side by side with people who argue that “we are all contaminated,” many 
individuals express skepticism over whether lead is really harmful at all.  
This attitude of acceptance often leads to the perception, especially on the part of health 
officials, that people simply do not care about the problem, or that they will feign to care only in 
order to be eligible for some form of compensation. One local health official told me that people 
suffered from a “lack of conscience” (inconciencia) when it came to following their guidelines 
for preventing lead contamination. Echoing company arguments about the cause of the lead 
problem, she complained that people neglected to wash their hands or to teach their children how 
470 
 
to do so (though she quickly recognized that this might be hard to do given that the city is 
without running water for most of the day).  
Another health worker, whom I will call Ester - a nurse who has been involved in the 
local health office´s campaign to identify contaminated neighborhoods and educate people about 
prevention – also echoed common company arguments that place the blame on the way people 
live their lives. She complained that people don´t know how to wash their hands or use the 
bathroom, that they use old plates and utensils that may contain lead, that in order to save money 
they paint their houses with low-cost paint which comes in a bag and supposedly contains lead. 
Ester and her team had been giving calcium supplement tablets to children with lead levels above 
the accepted 10 ug/dL threshold, since lead tends to limit the absorption of calcium in children. 
Mothers would bring their children for this treatment once and then not return again. Moreover, 
she complained, when people came from the countryside to sell milk in the month of August, 
mothers would buy milk but not to give it to their children, as they should. Rather, they would 
give the milk to the sheep they kept in their yard, to strengthen them and prevent them from 
dying during the time of the frost. Finally, she blamed the lead problem on fathers having 
children with more than one woman and then letting the children run unsupervised, playing in 
lead-contaminated areas. All of these arguments, of course, not only echo current company 
allegations as to where the blame lies, but also are part of a long tradition of pathologizing the 
lives of working-class people and the way they live. On the other hand, Ester said, she felt like 
health officials like herself were caught “between two fronts:” the company wanted them to 
blame the population´s lifestyle, and the people wanted them to place all the blame on the 
company. 
In Appendix E I provide an analysis of the available data on blood lead measurements 
from Cerro de Pasco that I have been able to find. Although I am not an expert on issues of 
public health, and although the data is sparse, my general sense is that there is a generalized 
phenomenon of chronic lead contamination among children in the neighborhoods closest to the 
open pit, the waste ore deposits and other foci of contamination. The concept of “chronic” as 
opposed to “acute” contamination refers to the idea that there are likely harmful effects at work, 
but that these are manifested in the long term (for example, in lower learning abilities) rather 
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than through immediate, severe illness or death. Summarizing the data from the three different 
studies discussed in Appendix E (a 2005 Health Ministry study, a study by the Atlanta-based 
CDC and Bianchini (2009)), we see that they report different averages for blood lead levels 
among children in different city neighborhoods: 15.79, 10.5 and 8.257 ug/dL, respectively. Just 
as important as the averages are the ranges: 6.17 to 34.53, 1.8 to 64.0, and 2.61 to 23.25 ug/dL. 
However, although most of these figures fall into the “chronic” rather than “acute” category, 
some of the levels are high enough to be considered “severe” – such as two children above 60 
ug/dL (Conklin 2008, Tables 6 and 7), and 21 children between 20 and 44 ug/dL (Ibid., Table 9), 
according to the CDC study. In addition, there are also a few cases of “acute” lead contamination 
in the city, such as that of Thais Palma mentioned above. Again, it is important to remark the 
distinction between “chronic,” “severe” and “acute” is a technical one – all of these levels are 
harmful, as discussed below.   
If we compare the levels in Cerro in 2005-2008 with those of La Oroya in 1999 
(Cerdestav and Barandiarán, 2002, 29-30), before the most recent clean-up efforts in that city, we 
find that the levels in Cerro are somewhat lower. In the last decade, however, certain 
improvements have been made to the La Oroya foundry as part of the Environmental 
Remediation Program (PAMA) required by the national governments well as programs to reduce 
lead intoxication in children (Wilson 2008); it is possible that these may have resulted in lower 
blood lead levels in La Oroya today. 384 
On the other hand, the levels in Cerro are higher than the average for the United States 
today. Since 1999, the average level in the U.S. has been about 2.2 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 3). This 
low U.S. level came only after the massive process of de-leading that took place in the 1970s and 
80s as a result of decades of activism and public concern over lead poisoning. As Warren (2000) 
has detailed, although occasional lead poisoning has accompanied humanity since antiquity, for 
the United States the 20th century entailed a “saturnine binge” (Warren 2000, 258) in the form of 
the near-universal use of white lead paint and leaded gasoline, as well as other products. 
                                                          
384 The government began requiring companies to institute PAMAs in the 1990s. In the case of La Oroya, the 
PAMA began under the old state mining company in 1996 and continued when the metallurgical complex was 
acquired by the U.S. company Doe Run in 1997. On the company´s request, the PAMA´s initial 10-year span for 
completion was extended to 13 years (Wilson 2008, 3), but even after 2009 it had still not been fully completed and 
remained a source of public controversy in Peru. 
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Incidentally, a good portion of this lead came from the mines of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation 
in Peru, including the company’s original mine at Cerro itself – in 1952, the company claimed to 
be the largest producer of refined lead in all of South America.385 
In the U.S., while white lead paint accounted for many cases of acute lead poisoning 
(above 70 or 80 ug/dL), often leading to irreversible brain damage and even fatality, leaded 
gasoline was the single agent most responsible for chronic lead contamination. This was 
signified by the fact that in 1965 the average U.S. resident´s blood lead level was around 20 
ug/dL (Ibid., 211). After this problem grabbed national attention in the 1970s, leaded gasoline 
was phased out over the next two decades; this had an immediate effect on measured blood lead 
levels. For example, between 1976 and 1980 they fell by 40%, from 14.6 to 9.2 ug/dL (Ibid., 
222). Over the next decade, aggressive restrictions on these and other products brought further 
reductions; the drop in average blood lead levels between 1978 and 1994 is estimated at 78%, 
from 12.8 to 2.8 ug/dL (Ibid., 239).  
Thus, lead contamination formed a crucial and visible part of the U.S. experience in the 
20th century, particularly as awareness grew in the second half of the century. This is in part what 
accounts for lead’s visibility in transnational public health discourses and in places like Cerro de 
Pasco and La Oroya today. As Beck (1987) argues, “risks of modernization sooner or later also 
strike those who produce or profit from them” (Beck 1987, 23). In other words, issues of risk are 
different from issues of class in that they can sometimes affect the rich as much as the poor, or 
the industrialized countries as much as the developing world. This is not always the case, 
especially within countries, as environmental justice activists have noted. But comparing across 
countries and continents, more industrialized societies can sometimes suffer the effects of 
pollutants as much as if not more than less developed countries, for the former are more 
dependent on industrial products. Thus, the experience of lead contamination is shared by the 
place that produced the metal (Cerro de Pasco and Central Peru more generally) and by the 
country that consumed it (the United States).  
                                                          
385 Cerro Corporation Archive, “General Information,” January 7, 1952. In 1962, the company calculated that since 
1906 it had produced 2,803,820,707 pounds of lead (Cerro Corporation Archive, 106_1718, “Reply of October 30, 
1963 to Questionnaire on Resources Survey for Latin American Countries).”  
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Yet as knowledge of the effects of lead have increased, risks from lead have been reduced 
in the U.S., but not so (or not as much) in Cerro. Whereas in the U.S. the primary vehicles for 
lead contamination were white lead paint and leaded gasoline, it is unlikely that this is what is 
causing harmful lead levels in Cerro today, as documented in the 2005-2008 data. The phasing 
out of leaded gasoline in Peru was officially completed in 2004, and in any case the number of 
cars in Cerro is much lower than anywhere in the U.S.386 White paint is not widely used, either. 
Rather, spatial data from the CDC (Conklin et al. 2008) and from Van Green et al. (2012) 
support the idea that the main sources of chronic lead contamination in Cerro are the waste ore 
deposits that lie on the city’s northern and western sides.  
Discussions of blood lead measurements often focus on the issue of whether a person is 
above or below the internationally accepted threshold, namely the CDC’s “level of concern.” At 
the time of my research this was 10 ug/dL (i.e. 10 micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood). Yet 
such numeric guidelines should not be essentialized or treated as fixed – they are historically 
changing constructions, elaborated in dialogue with changing scientific evidence. As Warren has 
shown, the idea of “threshold limit values” or “maximum allowable concentrations” originally 
comes from the fields of industrial safety and hygiene in the U.S., where successful campaigns 
against fatal lead poisoning were waged in the 1920s and 30s. It was this industrial background 
of fatal lead-poisoning accidents that initially set the standard for ideas of what was a permissible 
concentration of lead in the blood. In the 1970s, the U.S. lead industry still saw 80 ug/dL of 
blood as a safe threshold limit value for workers (Warren 2000, 248). In the mid-century, such 
threshold values permeated the more general public discussions on the effect of lead on public 
health.  
As childhood lead poisoning became a public issue in the 1950s and 60s, and as evidence 
of the full extent of lead contamination of the environment began to be published, these 
thresholds began to be revised. Thus, between 1960 and 1990 the blood lead level for individual 
intervention in young children was lowered from 60 to 25 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 2). In the 1970s, 
the work of scientists such as J. Julian Chisolm and Herbert Needleman brought attention to the 
                                                          




long-term health effects of lead exposure even when it was asymptomatic, thus helping in “the 
reconstitution of childhood lead exposure as a pandemic thief of intelligence” (Warren 2000, 
236) rather than only as a cause of fatality in more extreme cases. In 1991, the CDC further 
revised its “intervention level” of 25 ug/dL downward to 10 ug/dL.387 At the same time, the very 
notion of a “safe” threshold came to be questioned, as evidence continued to surface of the health 
effects of blood lead concentrations below10 ug/dL, particularly on children’s IQ.388 Thus, in its 
2005 public policy document on the issue the CDC stated that “Although there is evidence of 
adverse health effects in children with blood lead levels below 10 ug/dL, CDC has not changed 
its level of concern, which remains at levels ≥10 ug/dL... If no threshold level exists for adverse 
health effects, setting a new BLL of concern somewhere below 10 ug/dL would be based on an 
arbitrary decision” (CDC 2005, ix). Further, it argued,  
The concept of a threshold existing for the population makes little sense toxicologically since 
even if individual thresholds exist, these are likely to vary. Nonetheless, the threshold concept 
plays a major role in regulatory toxicology, and it only becomes clear in cases like lead that such 
constructs can be highly problematic (CDC 2005, 6). 
 
 Although in 2005 the CDC still believed that revising the 10 ug/dL threshold downward 
would be “arbitrary,” in 2012 it changed course and decided to set a new “reference value” of 5 
ug/dL. This calls into question the assumption that seemed to permeate public discussions of the 
lead issue in Cerro in 2008-2009, namely that there was a sharp break in terms of harm and 
health effects between those directly above and those directly below the old 10 ug/dL threshold.  
 The focus on lead in Cerro de Pasco furthermore marginalized other, possibly harmful 
metals from the discussion. Arsenic, for example, is present in the environment, particularly 
around the abandoned Quiulacocha tailings pond, which sits between the urban neighborhood of 
Champamarca and the village of Quiulacocha. The data for these other metals is even sparser 
than that for lead. In his measurements in the neighborhood of Paragsha, Bianchini (2009) found 
several metals at levels of concern: arsenic, chromium, nickel and aluminum. These were all 
                                                          
387  “The scientific evidence showing that some adverse effects occur at blood lead levels at least as low as 10 ug/dL 
in children has become so overwhelming and compelling that it must be a major force in determining how we 
approach childhood lead exposure” (CDC 1991, 9). 
388 Robert Taylor, of the LEAD Group in Australia, has compiled a list of sources on the effects of blood lead levels 




above allowed limits (see Appendix E). Similarly, the CDC study found somewhat elevated 
levels of cesium and thallium (Conklin 2008). 
 Environmental pollution and its impacts on health were not solely topics that arose in 
discussions among health officials and local residents; they also attracted attention from outside 
visitors. During part of the time I was in Cerro, a film crew was making a documentary about 
pollution in the city, as it had done in a previous film on La Oroya, focusing especially on the 
lead problem; the film was subsequently screened at various film festivals. Furthermore, in 2008 
the well-known TV program Cuarto Poder had done an extensive report on the contamination 
and destruction of the city and its possible relocation.  
However, there was a particular visual economy that sometimes characterized 
interactions between local residents and outsiders interested in the effects of contamination. Here 
I will give two examples of this. In June 2009, during the course of my research, I was asked to 
serve as a guide and translator to two European journalists who were going to visit Cerro de 
Pasco. Informed by a friend about the contaminated state of the city and its expected relocation, 
they had come to gather material for an article, before heading to the Peruvian Amazon to take 
pictures of wildlife as part of other journalistic work. We spent the day walking through the city, 
as they met city residents and representatives of various organizations. The journalists explained 
to me that since pictures “speak louder than words,” they were especially interested in taking 
photographs, if possible of the effects of contamination on individuals. At one point, we headed 
to Quiulacocha, a small village located on the outskirts of the city and locally notorious as a 
particularly contaminated space within the Cerro de Pasco area. There we met a group of women 
gathered outside, who told the journalists about the widespread pollution. One in particular 
responded to their interest in visible marks by explaining that her husband was suffering from a 
skin rash induced by the chemicals in the water. The photographer in the pair asked if it would 
be possible to take a picture, to which she replied that her husband was away at work, but that we 
could find him in the evening. The photographer, worn out from the effects of altitude sickness 
and a long day’s walk, was reluctant to make the trip again, and requested that I ask her if the 
rash was big, so as to know whether, as he put it, it was worth coming back for.  
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 When we returned that evening, after dark, the husband took his shirt off to show his 
back where the rash was supposed to be, as the photographer clicked away with his camera. 
Afterwards we said goodbye, I went on with my research, and the two journalists went off to the 
Amazon and from there back to Europe. Although I do not think that the two journalists were 
particularly unethical people, the interaction felt voyeuristic. What I want to highlight about this 
encounter is the particular visual economy it encapsulates as well as the broader economy of 
suffering in which environmental pollution both takes a central stage in the public imagination 
and also does so only in very particular ways. The husband and wife were acting within a 
standardized frame of highlighting the effects of contamination to outsiders for whom this topic 
currently seems to be of greater interest than others. At the same time, environmental suffering 
must present itself as visible marks on bodies or lived spaces. Furthermore, the marks must be 
sufficiently spectacular to sustain outsiders’ attention – to be, as the photographer put it, “worth 
it.”  
 A similar interaction had taken place a couple of months earlier. The initial encounter had 
come about while I was sitting inside one of the cramped cars that make the journey from the 
center of the city to the nearby villages of Quiulacocha, Yurajhuanca and Rancas. I made a 
comment about lead to my travel companion, and that prompted one of the other people in the 
car, a middle-aged woman whom I will call Inés, to begin telling us about her family’s 
experience with contamination and lead. She told me that her daughter was very ill and could not 
walk, “because of the lead;” other children of hers were suffering different ailments. Like the 
couple mentioned above, Inés lived in Quiulacocha, and her house was practically a stone´s 
throw away from the edge of the Quiulacocha tailings deposit. Her father had worked for the 
U.S. mining company, and she had grown up next door in a workers´ camp that was later 
dismantled to make way for the tailings. The house she lived in now had belonged to her 
grandparents, who were also from the community.  
Like other people I spoke to, Inés spoke of vague hopes that she would receive some sort 
of compensation from the authorities or the mining company – maybe a house farther away from 
the tailings. However, she also told me she was in the process of obtaining support to travel to 
Lima with her daughter and from there to Cuba, where she would be healed. I visited Inés a few 
477 
 
weeks later, when I was with a pair of foreign visitors (different from the ones in the other 
encounter) who were trying to document the ruinous state of the city and its contaminated 
population. I thought Inés might provide some good insight from the perspective of a local 
resident, and so took the visitors to her house to do an interview. To my surprise, she brought out 
her daughter, who looked to be around eight years old, and carried her in her arms to a chair on 
the side of the house, as my companions took photos of her smiling, her clearly debilitated or 
non-functioning legs slanted to one side, against the orange background of the tailings and the 
waste ore behind. Again, I was struck by the voyeuristic tone of the encounter, and after these 
two occasions I decided to be more cautious when mediating such interactions that are based 
around “the presentation of the contaminated and damaged self” (Auyero and Swistun 13) for 
outsiders.  
However, these incidents also helped me to understand the particular qualities that the 
discourse on contamination assumes in such interactions. Auyero and Swistun write that, for the 
case of Villa Inflamable in Argentina, “two years and a half of intensive fieldwork convinced us 
that most of the ´pollution critical talk´... is, to a large extent, an artifact of outsiders´ incursions” 
(82). By this they do not mean that people´s critiques of pollution are “invented” out of thin air at 
the moment when journalists, researchers or state officials show up, but simply that these are 
times when a lot more of such talk is produced. In “contaminated communities” (Edelstein 2003) 
such as Villa Inflamable and Cerro de Pasco, encounters between local residents and outsiders – 
whether they be environmental activists, journalists or health officials – take on certain 
standardized qualities. People talk to visitors about pollution both because it is something they 
are confused about – even if it is not the only or necessarily the uppermost thing on their minds – 
and because it is one of the few things that outsiders are interested in and will listen to. 
Discussions of lead contamination with outsiders can also take a light-hearted tone; a common 
joke with visitors is that whoever comes to visit Cerro and surroundings takes a bit of lead in 
their blood with them. 
Corporate response  
 Benson and Kirsch (2010) argue that “the defining feature of contemporary capitalism is 
the corporate response to critique” (p.474). How does the Volcan Mining Company respond to 
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the ubiquitous talk of contamination on the radio, at public events and in interactions between 
locals and visitors? In late 2008, Teódulo Quispe Huertas, at the time Operations Manager for 
Volcan´s Cerro de Pasco unit, gave a speech defending the company in relation to the much-
discussed “lead-in-blood” problem. Unlike the company’s Director and main shareholder at the 
time (Roberto Letts Colmenares) and most of its Board of Directors, Operations Manager Quispe 
was from the local area, and was a charismatic, combative and well-known figure in the city. He 
had worked for both the old state-owned mining company and the nearby Milpo mine, before 
becoming head of Operations at Volcan’s Cerro unit in 2006.  
A group of local journalists seeking to denounce the company edited a small part of 
Quispe’s speech, so that one particularly insensitive turn of phrase was heard over and over 
again: “The issue of contamination by lead is due to the lack of hygiene.” In Peru, radio is a 
particularly powerful medium, since it is usually turned on not only at home and at work but also 
in buses (passenger vans or combis in this case), stores and other public places. In Cerro, the 
radio ad with Quispe´s speech fragment was heard repeatedly. Volcan issued a response ad, 
which was also broadcast extensively, and which argued the following: 
The edited fragments, taken out of context, of the declarations by Ing. (Engineer) 
Teódulo Quispe Huertas, have been distorted, and aim to hurt the image of Volcan 
Mining Company and its Operations Manager. In what follows, [we play] the actual 
speech by Ing. Teódulo Quispe Huertas. 
The ad then played a longer fragment of Quispe´s speech, which started by referencing the 2007 
study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta: 
We have conducted studies in Pasco, by the CDC Atlanta, from the United States, so as 
to do an honest, precise job, so as to not be deceived. I will speak about Chaupimarca, 
Ayapoto and Paragsha. There we can observe a low level, of less than 10 micrograms per 
deciliter, in women: 192 [individuals], which is equivalent to 90.6%. Among children, 
162 [individuals], which is equivalent to 47%.  Therefore, to be brief, the issue of 
contamination by lead, is due to the lack of hygiene. The lack of intuition [intuición, in 
the sense of having the intuition to wash one’s hands]. That is where all of us must pay 
attention, so as to solve the problem. 
Quispe’s speech, and its reiteration in the form of the company ad, provides a window 
into some of the rhetorical strategies that the company uses in its defense within the public 
sphere in the city. The reality of the problem of contamination is not denied outright, rather it is 
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acknowledged but addressed in two main ways – one is to minimize it, the other to deflect 
responsibility. First, Quispe selectively quotes from the CDC report. This study, which will be 
discussed in more depth in the next section, actually argues that there is a problem of 
“generalized contamination with lead in Chaupimarca, Paragsha and Ayapoto” (Conklin, 16, my 
translation), and also highlights a problematic level of two other lesser-known heavy metals – 
cesium and thallium. Rather than mention this, Quispe highlights the high percentage of women 
in fertile age who have blood lead levels below the 10 µg threshold. When referring to children, 
who are the population particularly at risk for lead contamination, he again mentions the 
percentage who are within the threshold, but does not seem to realize that by mentioning the 
47% figure he is actually acknowledging that a majority – 53% - have levels above that 
considered “safe.”  
In the next sentence, he switches from a strategy of denying the significance of the 
problem to one of acknowledging it but placing the blame on a lack of hygiene by the 
population. He is referring to an argument commonly voiced by the company – and parodied by 
the graffiti quoted in the previous section – that the “lead problem” is due to people not washing 
their hands. As Warren (2000) discusses in his social history of lead poisoning in the U.S., there 
is a tradition of blaming the victim that was similarly at play in the early years of awareness of 
childhood poisoning with lead paint in the United States, when “cultural assumptions about the 
poor shifted blame from the toxin to the victim.” As one paint industry representative told a 
Pennsylvania health advisory group in 1972, referring to inner-city parents who supposedly were 
absent from home while their children ate the lead paint off the walls, “`parental neglect is the 
root of the problem’” (Warren, p. 185).  What the CDC report actually states is that while 
unwashed hands could be one source of exposure to heavy metals, the relative weight of this 
medium cannot be adequately evaluated “due to existence of multiple routes of exposure through 
contact with the air, soil, water or contaminated foods.” (Conklin, 16, my translation). 
 The radio ad then cuts to an announcer´s voice extending the arguments made by the 
Operations Manager:  
Volcan has never denied the collateral effects that mining generates in the environment, 
but has also made it clear that the levels [of metals in blood, as well as other health and 
environmental indicators] claimed by certain interested parties, are not what they claim. 
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All human activity generates collateral impact on the environment. The important thing is 
that it be mitigated, as modern mining [minería moderna] does today. As Volcan does in 
Cerro de Pasco.  
Here the company attempts to establish a link between itself and the concept of minería 
moderna (Salas 2008, Damonte 2006), a discourse utilized by the mining industry to describe the 
new era of mining investments that began in the 1990s, a period marked both by an expanded 
scale of capital-intensity and by the new prominence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Ironically, as an “old” mine, Cerro de Pasco is not usually considered part of “modern mining,” 
and several officials from other mines whom I interviewed actually cited it as a paradigm of the 
opposite of responsible mining. In any case, the ad then goes on to argue that “the cases of 
contamination with lead in blood detected in Cerro de Pasco do not correspond to the zone of 
operations of Volcan.” This may seem odd given that the three neighborhoods mentioned in 
Quispe’s speech – Paragsha, Ayapoto and Chaupimarca (centro) – all border the open pit; 
Paragsha is actually where the company’s offices and two concentrator plants are located, and 
Ayapoto is a tiny neighborhood sandwiched between the pit and the company’s mineral 
stockpiles. It may be that this passage is referencing not the three neighborhoods from the CDC 
study but rather individual, high-profile cases like that of Thais Palma mentioned earlier, who 
was from Columna Pasco. This is a neighborhood more distant from the waste ore, stockpiles 
and concentrator plants, but which borders a smaller, long-abandoned pit that is also owned by 
Volcan and that is now in the process of being incorporated into the large open pit;389 Noemí’s 
father’s complaint was about a ventilation chimney, which the company may not count as part of 
its “zone of operations.”  More generally, the statement in the radio ad may also reflect the 
company’s tendency to define its area of legitimate responsibility as narrowly as possible. This 
tendency is seen in the fact that the environmental wastes left behind by the former U.S. 
corporation and the state mining company – such as the Quiulacocha tailings deposit and the 
Excelsior waste ore pile – did not pass into the scope of Volcan’s operations during the 
privatization process in the 1990s. The assets were privatized, not so the liabilities, which today 
are never included in any of Volcan’s environmental management programs or maps of its 
operations, even though they are adjacent to the mine. 
                                                          
389 In 2009, dozens of houses in Columna Pasco were being bought and demolished by the company in order to 
make way for this expansion project. 
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 Finally, the ad then makes an argument that acknowledges contamination, but delinks it 
from mining activity altogether and instead presents it as the result of age-old, non-human 
natural processes: 
And it is public knowledge that the soils of our city, where our children play, are 
mineralized. Not because of mining activity, but rather since millions of years ago, 
because of its geomorphological formation. In the opinion of medical specialists, to live 
among soils like ours requires special precautions, such as adequate hygiene, to prevent 
contact between minerals and our organism, as well as adequate nutrition, so that our 
body has enough defenses.  
Here, the company ad invokes the specter of a non-human, non-political nature working 
silently over millions of years to produce a soil rich in minerals that then find their way into 
residents’ bloodstream, without the mediation of any corporation or other social actor that can be 
held accountable. Of course, the company is right that long-term geological processes did 
produce an unusually high concentration of silver, copper, lead, zinc as well as other minerals in 
the area. This is what led to the founding of the city in the first place and what has propelled 
generations of migrants in search of work and economic opportunity to move to a place 
otherwise inhospitable to large concentrations of people. At the same time, the ad fails to 
mention that the rock and soil under the city have been almost continuously moved around for 
the past 380 years, and particularly in the last half-century since the initiation of open-pit 
operations. Rather than co-exist with an undisturbed, pre-human soil, residents of the city share 
their living quarters with large hills of waste ore particles freely exposed to the air and rain, with 
the twice-daily explosions from the open pit in the center of the city, and with the dust brought 
up from the mine in workers’ clothes. As the CDC study and multiple volumes on environmental 
toxicology emphasize, there are usually multiple sources of exposure to contaminants, in this 
case metals. And as most of the literature argues, in the specific case of lead (unlike with 
arsenic), contamination is almost always the result of human activity: “Lead is unique in that 
man-made sources contribute almost solely to exposure in the post-industrial era.” (Patrick, 
2006, 4). 
 The purpose of this analysis is not so much to highlight the duplicitous nature of 
Volcan’s discourse as to emphasize the multiple and varied arguments that the company uses in 
its approach to the issue of contamination. Rather than deny the problem outright, which would 
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be unrealistic given the visual landscape in Cerro, as well as the high profile of mining-related 
contamination worldwide, Volcan makes a token acknowledgement – “Volcan has never denied 
the collateral effects that mining generates in the environment.” At the same time, it downplays 
the problem not only by selectively quoting from the CDC study – and mentioning the 47% of 
children below threshold levels rather than the 53% above – but also by alluding to the specter of 
an unspecified sensationalism and exaggeration: “the levels... are not what they claim.” Further, 
the ad throws into the mix certain statements which are generally uncontroversial – such as that 
unwashed hands could conceivably be one source of ingestion of metals into the body, or that 
inadequate nutrition can worsen lead contamination in children, or that there are long-term 
geological processes specific to a mineral-rich district like Cerro – and uses them for particular 
ends, in the latter case arguing that there is no human mediation that takes place between 
geological processes and human health. At other times, the statements switch from a descriptive 
mode to a normative one, such as arguing that “the important thing is that [contamination] be 
mitigated” - without giving concrete evidence as to whether or how this occurs to a sufficient 
degree in Cerro.  
These varied strategies do not necessarily add up to a logically coherent whole, and in 
fact in a strict sense some of them could be seen as mutually contradictory – for example, saying 
that the presence of metals in the city is not due to mining activity, on the one hand, and 
acknowledging that mining activity generates a “collateral effect” on the environment, on the 
other. Rather, the overall rhetorical strategy is a more flexible one of closing off different 
avenues of critique at once by combining the questionable with the uncontroversial, the 
descriptive with the normative, denial with partial acknowledgement, and vagueness with 
specific (and selectively quoted) numerical figures. In this way, the company manages “critique 
in such a way that recognition of and discontent about harm are converted into structures of 
feeling that promote cynicism about the ability to alter social structures and makes resignation a 
dominant mode of political action” (Benson and Kirsch 2010, 474). Volcan Mining Company is 
not the only agent creating such structures of feeling, but the corporate response analyzed here is 
one way in which such management of critique happens. It is part of the “labor of confusion” 
(Auyero and Swistun 2009, 66) that also includes other factors such as the government´s 
vagueness on and lack of concern for the question of the city´s relocation. Such labor need not be 
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conscious or intentional; Volcan´s ad is varied and vague enough in its arguments that company 
officials and employees can probably each find a specific part in which to believe.  
Benson and Kirsch argue that corporate response to critique often goes through three 
main phases: denial, partial acknowledgement/token accommodation, and finally strategic 
engagement. Mining companies in Peru generally combine elements of all three phrases. Phase 1 
is much more important at the level of the specific than at that of the general – in other words, 
the environmental impact of mining on the environment in general is usually not denied, but 
companies deny specific incidents. Phases 2 and 3 are both found in industry responses. In Cerro, 
however, the specific history and social configuration of the place determine that Phase 2 
responses are more important than Phase 3 – that is, generic acknowledgements, vague 
statements and various forms of manipulation are more important than formal partnerships with 
institutions or mechanisms of negotiation, which do occur in other mining projects in Peru 
(whatever the co-opting effects of these forms of engagement may be). 
It must be mentioned that there is one key factor that is missing from the radio 
advertisement and that is prominently included in Volcan’s corporate response at other times: the 
question of jobs. The company´s strongest argument, in the end, is the fact that it “provides” 
employment to a large portion of the city´s workforce. There is little doubt that if the mine were 
to close, the city´s economy would suffer a negative impact. Significant numbers of people 
would probably need to leave, affecting commerce and leading to even more departures. In 2008 
and 2009, the company was using this fact to pressure the city government into accepting the 
open pit expansion project known as “Plan L,” which was to demolish 11.5 hectares in some of 
the last remaining blocks of the old neighborhoods of the city. In January 2008, when the 
municipality suspended Plan L negotiations because the company had not yet presented the 
corresponding Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study, Volcan responded by mobilizing 
its workforce in a demonstration through the city. This is similar to tactics used by Doe Run 
Peru, the owner of the metallurgical complex at La Oroya, in response to criticisms over its 
inability to meet deadlines for the implementation of its Environmental Management Plan 
(PAMA) in recent years. At Doe Run, the mobilization of workers against environmental and 
health concerns has been a more recurrent phenomenon, however. Although I have not 
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conducted fieldwork in La Oroya, my sense is that there are at least two reasons for this. First, as 
a smelting rather than a mining city, La Oroya has different labor dynamics, and is more 
dependent on work at the company than Cerro is today. Second, the Doe Run smelter at La 
Oroya was actually under threat of closure from the government (for environmental violations) 
several times, which the mine in Cerro de Pasco has not been under such threats at any point. 
Nevertheless, although to a lesser degree than in La Oroya, in Cerro the strategy of pitting labor 
against environmental and health concerns is also sometimes utilized.   
Hidden Hazards and Logics of Compensation 
The new scrutiny placed on environmental problems is the result of a heightened 
awareness of risks and invisible hazards associated with modernity and industrial production – 
part of what Beck (1992) calls “risk society.” As Beck writes, “the focus is more and more on 
hazards which are neither visible nor perceptible to the victim” (Beck 1992, 27). Visible signs of 
contamination are still present in places like Cerro, in the form of waste ore mounds and the 
exposed tailings deposits. Similarly, in the two incidents recounted earlier in this section, local 
residents either were asked to or decided to show visible marks of contamination on their bodies. 
Yet beyond such visual practices, the contests over recognition and compensation are also about 
abstract, numeric indicators like blood lead levels. As Beck writes, 
Hazards in those days assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus perceptible to the 
senses, while the risks of civilization today typically escape perception and are localized 
in the sphere of physical and chemical formulas (e.g. toxins in foodstuff or the nuclear 
threat).” (Ibid., 21) 
As the study of toxicology has progressed, awareness has grown among scientists that 
exposure to heavy metals and other substances at levels that were previously thought to be 
harmless, can actually produce cancer, reduce learning ability or cause birth defects. 390  As 
Warren writes for lead exposure in the United States,  
                                                          
390 It should be mentioned that, according to the Regional Health Office (DIRESA), the second leading cause of 
mortality in Pasco Region in 2010, after acute respiratory infection, was stomach cancer (personal communication, 
and “Análisis de la Situación de Salud” (ASIS) 2011). According to the data in the ASIS report, for the highland 
area of Pasco only, stomach cancer accounted for 5.1% of deaths (p.73). I do not know how accurate these official 
ASIS figures are.  
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The great irony of this geometric rise in the population defined as at risk is that it 
occurred at a time when the average American’s exposure to lead from all sources was 
beginning its fall to today’s historic low. Changing technologies in paints, food 
preservation, and automotive fuels reduced the amount of bioavailable lead in the 
environment. But as the ‘background’ level of lead exposure dropped, researchers were 
able to identify the mineral’s role in health problems at or below previous years’ average 
blood-lead levels. Consequently, as Americans’ exposure to lead dropped dramatically, 
their ‘exposure’ to the troubling issues of low-level lead absorption rose just as 
dramatically. (Warren 2000, 228) 
Similarly, in Peru, at the same time that greater stringency has began to be placed on 
environmental remediation in mining areas, attention has shifted from a sole focus on immediate 
and visible effects – such as accidents, dead animals and lifeless rivers – and expanded to include 
long-term effects on health, for example on internal organs.  
These consequences generally occur in the long run and are mixed with the effects of 
other factors, making it difficult to trace a direct connection in individual cases. As Beck writes 
about risks: 
[They] induce systematic and often irreversible harm, generally remain invisible, are 
based on causal interpretations, and thus initially exist only in terms of the (scientific or 
antiscientific) knowledge about them. They can thus be changed, magnified, dramatized 
or minimized within knowledge, and to that extent they are particularly open to social 
definition and construction.” (Beck 1992, 22-23). 
Risks are thus both present everywhere and questioned everywhere – though they remain 
the province of “experts,” they are subject to confirmation, exaggeration or denial on the part of 
different actors with varying amounts of power. This not only gives rise to “toxic uncertainty.” 
Rather, the particular openness of risks to social construction – their often hidden, invisible and 
abstract nature - also gives them a flexibility that allows them to become a focal point of many 
different kinds of disputes. This fact in turn helps to make contamination an ever-present issue in 
demands and complaints in mining regions. Furthermore, this occurs in a context in which 
environmentalism enjoys relative prestige worldwide, compared to other causes. Since it is one 
of the few issues that outsiders seem to care about, residents and communities frame their 
demands in terms of pollution even when they are also about other things. Also, the environment 
and pollution are seen as relatively “neutral” and “safe” issues, belonging to science rather than 
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politics; this makes them an appealing vehicle for other demands.391  This does not mean that 
contamination in a place like Cerro de Pasco is not a real problem, rather it becomes the 
articulating demand around which other concerns and interests gather. As Warren writes for lead 
pollution in the United States, quoting Saul Bellow, 
It often seems that lead exposure has become emblematic of the nation´s ills – in the 
words of Saul Bellow´s dean, it is simply what we have ´fixed upon but stands for 
something else that we all sense.´ Lead becomes a proxy for the nation´s education 
problems, for its failure to provide decent housing, and for its inequitable health care 
system.” (256-257). 
In Cerro, the discourse of contamination, health and harm becomes a way for people to 
negotiate around structural issues that have persisted or even become more pronounced in the 
last few decades: the lack of enough jobs and the subcontracting of employment, the reduction in 
the services provided by the mining company, and the continuing asymmetries in power and 
wealth between large mining companies and the local population.  
This is true not only for the discourse of contamination per se but for the idea of being 
“affected” (afectado) more broadly. This language meshes well with currently dominant 
ideologies that emphasize the passivity of ordinary people – portraying them less as producers of 
wealth, as workers or as citizens endowed with rights than as “the poor” or “the local 
community” who receive aid from a generous government, corporation or NGO. Though long 
present in negotiations between mining companies and communities, the discourse of being 
“affected” takes on greater prominence in this context. As shown earlier, in interactions with 
outsiders a situation is produced in which people are encouraged to show their affected and 
damaged bodies; this extends to their houses as well.392  
                                                          
391 Stuart Kirsch, personal communication. 
392 Several times when I was taking groups of visitors around Cerro, in the streets closest to the open pit, we were 
stopped by people who wanted to show us the cracks in their houses. Such cracks were generally believed to be the 
result of the twice-daily explosions in the open pit, which in the closest neighborhoods felt like a sudden, brief 
tremor. These buildings were also in a state of decay due to their age and – like the infrastructure of the city in 
general – to the lack of improvement and planning characteristic of a city that is always on the verge of moving 
someplace else. We would walk up rickety steps as our hosts pointed out long cracks in the walls, sometimes 
extending from the ceiling to the floor. 
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If the logic of being affected, of suffering an “impact,” and demanding compensation, is 
something that has long mediated the relationship between mining companies and local 
populations in highland Peru, it has also lent itself to the accusation that local people feign 
damage in order to extract payment from companies. During the “smoke affair” at La Oroya in 
the 1920s there was the argument that local communities had planted barley in their fields 
opposite the smelter in order to receive compensation from the corporation – supposedly part of 
a broader practice that General Manager Harold Kingsmill called “smoke farming,” but which 
another company official, B.T. Colley (1958, 18), denied was taking place.  
Such accusations of manipulation by local people occur not only in the context of 
discussions of environmental pollution, but also of conflicts over space more broadly. In Cerro 
de Pasco at the time of my research there was a frequently voiced argument about people whose 
houses were situated close to the open pit. The latter was undergoing a process of expansion for 
which the company needed to buy houses so as to demolish them. According to this common 
story, people would sell their homes to the company, and then use the money to buy or build 
another house slightly further away so as to again obtain money from the company when the pit 
expanded further. This tale seemed to almost take the form of an urban legend, in its vagueness 
as to the individuals involved and in the formulaic way in which it was recited again and again 
by different tellers. It has sometimes been reproduced uncritically by academics and journalists, 
as an account of an actual practice, which it may or may not be. In the course of my research, I 
was never able to witness this practice or hear someone admit to it themselves, and I cannot 
testify to its actuality. The slowness and especially the unpredictability that characterizes the 
advance of the open pit makes it difficult to believe that such a strategy would be workable, at 
least at an individual level. What I did frequently encounter was the practice of holding out in 
one´s house for the longest possible time, in the hopes of obtaining a higher payment from the 
company.  
Such practices, whether real or imagined, also express a more general underlying pattern 
in the area (and arguably in highland Peru in general and other places as well) by which class 
conflicts tend to take the form of struggles over space. The land is one of the few dimensions in 
which local people can hope to assert themselves against either mining companies or, in the past, 
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large landowners. Negotiations and contests over space of course have been central to demands 
for compensation in mine-community relations in Peru, especially since the 1960s as 
comunidades have taken over most of the lands that formerly belonged to the haciendas. 
Whereas the haciendas in the past could and usually were sold to mining companies that needed 
them for various purposes, a community’s land could not legally be sold, and so long-term rent 
payments and compensation agreements had to be put in place. These occurred in response both 
to the use of land, as a form of rent payment, and as compensation proper for contamination of 
rivers or other spaces.  I showed an example of this in the previous chapter, where I discussed the 
history of negotiations between the community of Rancas and the Cerro de Pasco mine, over the 
use of pasture land for the dumping of tailings. That history is a good example of how 
“environmental” issues are interwoven with economic questions and with different ends, goals 
and strategies. 
Like with space and land, compensation may also be sought for damage to human health, 
even in extreme cases. In early 2009, a group of journalists in Cerro held a fundraiser over the 
radio to collect money for Thais Palma Carhuaricra, the 5-year old girl who had very high levels 
of lead in blood and had suffered various acute ailments as a result. The money from the 
fundraiser was to be used to finance her trip to Cuba where she would receive treatment. In the 
days leading up to the fundraiser, Thais´ father gave interviews on the radio, detailing how his 
daughter´s health problems had come about. His house was located in Columna Pasco, an 
asentamiento humano on the northeastern side of the city, away from the waste ore and tailings 
but close to the open pit nevertheless. According to Mr. Palma, close to his house there was a 
chimney through which gas emanated from the mine.393 In fact, a hole had opened up from this 
chimney directly into his house. It is not unusual for there to be cracks in the walls in the houses 
closest to the open pit, or even for wholesale cave-ins to occur.394 This, according to Mr. Palma, 
had contaminated his four children, who suffered from headaches, stomach pains, low learning 
                                                          
393 The company´s 2006 closure plan lists 19 ventilation chimneys from the subterranean mine as part of its closure 
responsibilities in the urban radius (Plan de Cierre, Resumen Ejecutivo, No.2). However, it is possible there may be 
other chimneys, as mining installations that are abandoned and not part of the company´s direct responsibilities (for 
example, the Quiulacocha tailings deposit) are not listed in the closure plan. 
394 At least one such cave-in occurred during my time in Cerro, in the middle of a street next to the southern edge of 
the open pit. Also, as mentioned earlier, I saw many of the cracks in the houses nearest the open pit, and some of the 
neighbors were eager to show them to visitors. At least one house in the old part of the city collapsed in 2009, 
whether as a result of the daily explosions or simple structural decay. 
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ability and frequent sleepiness, and whom measurements had shown to have high blood lead 
levels (as affirmed to me also by city health officials). Particularly affected was five-year old 
Thais, whose development had been seriously compromised. In the Children´s Hospital in Lima, 
the father said, doctors had stated that “here in Lima there are no specialists able to do Noemís´ 
treatment. You have to make an effort to take her to the country of Cuba, because there are 
specialists there.” When asked by the interviewer whether he had sought to make a legal demand 
against the company, Mr. Palma explained how he had tried to obtain compensation from the 
mine: 
I spoke with Ing. Teódulo Quispe [the mine’s General Manager], so that maybe they 
could help me in some other way. I asked him for a job on the payroll [trabajo en 
planilla], and other things. And that did not happen...  
Later, however, he had managed to secure the company’s help in holding a raffle to raise money 
for the treatment: 
I spoke with Ing. Teódulo Quispe last year, to do a raffle for health [pro salud]... Thanks 
to his support, I did it. I distributed all the tickets. But, the problem is, there are 
contractors, that to this day do not pay me, there is a debt of almost 10,000 soles. To do 
that raffle I took out a loan... Some of them paid me, the ones from payroll. And maybe 
two, three contracting companies that paid me. But most of the workers from contracting 
companies who bought raffle tickets still do not pay me. Some already left [the mine], 
some continue to work, but to this day they do not pay me. I have a document of which 
companies owe me money. 
As these quotes show, a stable payroll job at the mine – something that has become 
scarce since the labor restructuring of the 1990s - is seen as at least partial compensation for the 
damage. The company is also expected to help with organizing a raffle – which in Peru is one of 
the common ways of raising money to cover medical as well as other costs. None of this is meant 
to imply that the girl’s health problems were not real, or not related to environmental pollution; 
the evidence on both counts was accepted by all parties involved. Rather, these quotes show how 
complaints over contamination and its effects on health are interwoven with issues of jobs, 
compensation and economic problems. Environmental and health problems do not present 
themselves to people in pure and isolated form, but rather as part of a broader complex of issues. 
The reality of pollution-related illness, and the desire for treatment, is in no way incompatible 
with its role as an argument for compensation in the form of a job or direct assistance. This does 
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not mean that the complaint or conflict ceases to be about health or the environment at the same 
time that it is also about other things.395 
I write this because twice in the beginning of my research, I heard academics in Peru 
state that the mining conflicts in the country “are not environmental conflicts” because, even 
though communities make statements and complaints about contamination, their actual lists of 
demands ask for compensation in the form of money, job opportunities, training and other non-
environmental objectives. In my opinion, this view of mining conflicts is based on a 
conventional vision of environmentalism in which the environment is seen as a sphere separate 
from and incommensurate with other domains. Instead, according to the position taken in this 
chapter, the “environment” is contiguous with other domains such as the economy and politics. 
What makes a conflict environmental is, first, whether there is credible evidence of 
contamination taking place – as is the case in Cerro de Pasco and many other mining regions in 
Peru – and, less important but still significant, whether there is perception of or concern over 
possible contamination – as in almost all mining areas in the country. Given this, as I argue in 
this section, communities accept money, jobs or other forms of compensation because they tend 
to see contamination as an inevitable part of mining activity, over which they have little control; 
compensation then becomes a way to make up for some of the damage done. Compensation must 
also be seen in the context of wider contests over the distribution of wealth and resources. 
To put this in further context, it may be useful to consider it alongside another long-
established pattern connecting harm to the right to work: the expectation that when a worker died 
in an accident at the mine, in addition to his family receiving compensation money for the death, 
at least one of the worker’s children or other close relatives would then be guaranteed a job. This 
pattern is widely known and was also recounted to me several times during my fieldwork in the 
Pasco area. For example, Ernesto Blanco, the son of a mechanic who died in an accident at the 
Huarón mining company in 1962, before he was born, told me what had happened with his 
family: 
                                                          
395 On the other hand, the view that mining conflicts “are not [only] environmental conflicts” can be somewhat 
helpful in pointing out that environmental concerns are not the only or necessarily the most important ones for 
communities or local residents, as certain simplistic strands of environmentalism might assume. 
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When my father died, my older brother was around 14 or 15 years old. And the company 
gave him the opportunity to work and take on the sustenance of the family, since we had 
been orphaned. And my mother actually a widow, and on top of that my mother was 
illiterate. So yes, the company helped us out a lot. 
 Similarly, in Chapter 2 I discussed the life story of Gaudencio Machacuay, a former 
worker at the Huarón mine, and how in 2008 his son died in a gas leak accident at the Animón 
mine. Don Gaudencio asked that his other son, who was working at the same mine, be switched 
from the subcontracting system to a direct payroll job– in other words that he be included within 
the few payroll spots that the community has reserved for its members at the mine, through its 
agreement with the company. He complained that this had not happened, and so his son was still 
working on the subcontracting system 
And so I asked the leadership, as comuneros that we are, I want your help. I want my son 
to enter in replacement for my [other] son... because my son has lost his life in the 
Animón mine. Do you think they agreed? What happened? Soon after, the  [community] 
president´s son, [got into] payroll. The fiscal´s396 son, into payroll. And they left me out. 
That´s how it is. 
Although here it is the visible harm of job accidents, rather than the invisible risk of 
hidden environmental hazards, that is at issue, there is a similar logic as in the case of Thais 
Palma’s father: a job is one form of compensation for harm. This does not necessarily mean that 
the presentation of the harm – whether accident or health-impairing contamination – is being 
“manipulated” for personal purposes. Rather, contamination and harmful effects are assumed a 
given fact of mining activity, and compensation in other realms – such as work or money - is 
therefore sought to ameliorate its effects.   
Lastly, on the topic of compensation, a comment by Ester, the nurse quoted earlier, may 
help shed some light on the issue. Rather than protect their children from lead contamination, 
Ester complained, in Cerro people “use the lead issue to get money.” She said that people do not 
believe that methods that her team tries to promote, like covering food or mopping the floor 
instead of sweeping it, could possibly help reduce contamination. So one time when they took a 
few specially-designed stoves to an assembly in one neighborhood, people said “We don´t want 
those little stoves, we want money.” However, Ester also mentioned a belief she had encountered 
                                                          
396 Another communal authority position. 
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among people, to the effect that when health workers go to withdraw the 5 centimeters of blood 
that they need for the analyses, their real purpose is to gather all that blood in a bucket and sell it 
somewhere.  
This belief carries echoes of the Peruvian myth of the pishtaco – the killer who extracts 
people´s body fat to sell it in first-world countries where it is used in some kind of manufacturing 
process (for example, to make cosmetics or oils with which to grease machinery). Of course, 
health workers in this area do not fit the stereotypical image of the pishtaco as a white man, and 
they do not kill their patients. Nevertheless, in an area where the pishtaco myth is very much 
alive (especially in 2009, when there was a national scandal involving pishtaco allegations 
centered on an area not far to the north of Cerro de Pasco), it is reasonable for people to think 
that there are profitable uses to be made of the extraction of parts of the human body, and that 
those who pretend to help them are actually self-interested. This applies specifically to the case 
of this belief regarding health workers who extract blood for measuring lead levels. However, 
generalizing more broadly, one could ask: In a world where other people are making money at 
one´s expense – in all kinds of ways - why should people who have high blood lead levels or 
who have suffered some other form of environmental harm not try to obtain some money from 
this? The drive for monetary gain may not be an inborn, natural human characteristic, but it has 
become a structural and accepted, even celebrated feature of the world beyond the immediate 
realm of kinship and community (and sometimes in those realms as well). Compensation claims 
for environmental harm must thus also be seen within that logic, as an attempt by people to tap 
into that system and improve their position within it.  
 
Mining, Water and the City 
Earlier in this chapter I have discussed environmental issues in terms of contamination as 
well as “hidden hazards” such as lead. In this section, I shift to an examination of the intersection 
between environmental concerns and issues of modernity and urbanity. I focus on a particular 
link between those two realms – namely, the problem of running water and water shortage in the 
mining city of Cerro de Pasco. Although water shortage is a problem in many parts of Peru, the 
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lack of water in this city of 80,000 people has certain specific characteristics. Unlike in other 
Peruvian cities where running water is scarce or absent in the outlying asentamientos 
humanosbut present in the central areas of cities, in Cerro the water shortage affects the city as a 
whole, even if it is more acute in the outlying areas.397  The central parts of the city have water 
for no more than 2 hours a day, not to mention the occasional service cuts that last several days 
at a time. The asentamientos humanos often have water for no more than 2 hours every other 
day. Furthermore, whereas in other urban areas in Peru some effort has been made in recent 
years to extend water connections to more of the outlying areas of cities, in Cerro little or no 
progress has been made. Thus the city appears as having one of the worst drinking water and 
sanitation systems of any urban area in the country, according to the National Water Supervisory 
Authority (SUNASS). 
One aspect of the city´s location and geography – it´s high altitude, at over 14,100 feet – 
helps to explain the water shortage. Yet there are other aspects of the local geography that are not 
in consonance with the lack of water – namely, the presence of many lakes nearby, most of them 
located at a similar altitude within the highland plateau in which the city sits. Additionally, the 
lack of running water – a powerful symbol of urban modernity, though to a lesser degree than 
electricity - seems to be in contradiction with the fact that the city has historically been a 
producer of great wealth, as one of the most important silver mining centers in late colonial 
South America and more recently as a producer of copper, lead, zinc and silver for the world 
market. In this section I approach this problem historically by tracing several aspects of the 
relationship between the mine, the city and the environment. I focus on certain key factors: 1) the 
competition between the mine and its urban population for available water sources; 2) the loss of 
lakes due to either draining or contamination; 3) the shift from a company-town model to one of 
reducing the social burdens on companies; 4) the uncertainty about the future that open-pit 
mining has produced; and, lastly, 5) the contradiction between the nature of mineral wealth in the 
form of rent, on the one hand, and the emphasis that contemporary market-oriented ideologies 
place on a “culture of payment,” on the other. 
                                                          
397 Asentamientos humanos (human settlements) is the name given in Peru today to the self-organized 
neighborhoods that arose in the outskirts of cities during the second half of the 20th century, which like in many 
parts of the world was a period of population growth and rural-urban migration. In Cerro, the difference in living 
standards between the asentamientos humanos and the  rest of the city is less marked than in a city like Lima.   
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In the city, obtaining water for daily needs like washing, cooking and drinking can be an 
object of intense activity. People gather water in buckets, plastic cylinders, and in used-up 
kerosene and gasoline containers. In some parts of the city, there are public faucets where 
residents of certain neighborhoods can congregate to draw water at particular times. During the 
rainy season, some residents install tubes to draw the water from their roofs into cylinders. 
Business owners who need to be assured of a plentiful supply of water, such as owners of large 
restaurants and public showers, often must purchase it from cistern trucks. Only a handful of the 
restaurants and hotels in the city – those that serve owners of larger contracting companies, 
engineers and the occasional visitor – can guarantee their guests a constant supply of water. 
Some city residents who are not served by the existing water network install their own, 
clandestine connections at strategic locations – a practice on which the local water company has 
been trying to crack down in recent years. In addition, in the past at least one of the 
asentamientos humanos tried to create its own independent water system, acquiring pumps and 
building a connection to one of the last remaining springs near the urban area. 
In Peru, as in most countries, the provision of potable drinking water tends to be 
associated with urban modernity and to differentiate urban from rural spaces. However, in Cerro 
this particular inequality between the urban and the rural tends to diminish, and is even inverted 
sometimes, at least as regards some of the nearest and more urbanized villages. One of these, 
Rancas, has a system to channel water – albeit without treatment - from a nearby spring (puquio) 
into taps in people’s backyards, and it does so for more hours than in the city. The difference is 
particularly clear during the rainy season. As a friend told me when I moved from Cerro to 
Rancas, “at least you’ll have water there.” Inversely, when people move from the more 
urbanized villages like Rancas to the city, they often experience a decreased availability of water.  
 As mentioned earlier, the chronic shortage of water in the city is in part due to location – 
although the larger region contains many water sources, it´s also true that the urban area itself is 
located in an upland spot slightly more elevated than the surrounding plateau – hence the name 
Cerro (mountain). The two rivers closest to the city - the San Juan and the Tingo - are both 
situated slightly lower than the urban area, which sits between. 4,300 and 4,400 meters above sea 
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level. 398  Unlike most other cities of its size in Peru, all of Cerro’s drinking water must be 
pumped upwards with the use of electrical power. The high altitude of the city is not a purely 
“natural” factor but is rather the result of the larger transnational economy´s interaction, since the 
17th century, with the products of non-human agents, namely geological processes – not only did 
the latter have to produce the mineral deposits at that location in the first place, but social groups 
interested in exploiting them had to find them also. It is doubtful that any settlement of this size 
would have emerged at this altitude were it not for mining. The costs of harboring a population at 
high altitude – in terms of health and availability of water and other services - have not been 
borne in their entirety by the owners of the mines.  
However, location by itself does not suffice to explain the shortage of water in the city; a 
number of other social and historical factors have also contributed. I will now examine each one 
of these in detail, beginning by tracing the historical evolution of the relationship between the 
mine´s water needs and those of the urban population. 
Competition over water 
Before the 20th century, there were a number of small lakes in the immediate vicinity of 
Cerro de Pasco and at the same elevation. Adjacent to the town were lakes Patarcocha-Tomar, 
Patarcocha-Lavar, and the smaller Lake Esperanza, while slightly further away were Lake 
Yanamate (to the south) and Lake Quiulacocha (to the west). 399  Patarcocha-Lavar was the place 
where women gathered to wash clothes, whereas Patarcocha-Tomar provided the urban 
population with drinking water. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, water was brought from this 
lake to people´s houses and sold by women organized into a guild; in addition to the lake, they 
also collected water from a spring on the outskirts of the city. 
Already at this time, there was competition between the domestic use of water and that 
required by mining, as the amalgamation of silver, conducted in many small mills until the late 
                                                          
398 The San Juan River begins at around 4,200m. (Bianchini 2009, 20) and ends its course at Lake Junín at 4,080m, 
where the Mantaro River is born (INEI – Compendio Estadístico 1996-1997, 1.13). The Tingo River begins its 
course just outside of Cerro de Pasco, but moves downward with a slope of 35.95m/km (Bianchini 2009, 19). The 
central Chaupimarca square in Cerro de Pasco sits at 4,338 meters. 
399 Here I write “Lake Quiulacocha” or “Lake Patarcocha” for the sake of clarity, but this is actually a redundancy, 
since the Quechua word qocha (cocha) in itself means lake.  
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19th century, required water and in turn tended to pollute it with mercury. Ironically, excess mine 
water was also a constant problem for the mines in Cerro, as the constant documented attempts 
to build drainage tunnels and install steam pumps show.  
The water needs of mining activity in Cerro increased in the early 20th century with the 
arrival of industrial-scale mining. One example of this comes from the planning for the 
construction of the U.S company´s new smelter: in a report from Nov. 23, 1903, A.W. McCune 
(the agent of company founder James B. Haggin) discussed the different locations available in 
terms of the proximity of water supplies: 
I found an absolutely ideal location for a Smelter, with any quantity of water from 3 rivers...I am 
worried a great deal about the site that [smelter manager] Klepetko has located the smelter on. 
We have no water whatever, except what will have to be pumped from a river a mile and a half 
away, and the cost of pumping that water will always be a heavy expense. The water at smelting 
works of this capacity is of vital importance, and it would pay to go to quite a little expense to put 
the Smelter where we will have plenty of water (Cerro Corporation Archive). 
 
Inevitably, the company’s utilization of available water sources for industrial purposes 
brought complaints from the local population. In 1913, the municipal council of Cerro de Pasco, 
still led by some of the most important hacienda owners and elites of the city at the time, wrote a 
memorandum to the national government in which they complained about the use of one of the 
two Patarcocha lakes: 
The utilization of the water from one of the lakes for industrial uses has produced a notable 
decrease, [so that] the water is close to running out, and as a consequence, possibly as a result of 
underground connections, [it has caused] the reduction also of the level of water in the other 
[lake], that which serves the city, and which in this way is similarly threatened with extinction 
(quoted in Pérez Arauco 1997, 442). 
 
The municipal council not only complained about the use of local water by the mining 
company; it also asked the national government to finance the construction of a water system for 
the city as was being done in other Peruvian cities at the time. Only small sums were 
forthcoming from the government, however, and as the century wore on, the city´s population 
came to rely on the U.S.-owned mining corporation for the provision of drinking water. This was 
in some ways a predictable development: the company had in any case to build a water system 
for its workers´ camps. At the time, this service basically meant providing outdoor taps for rows 
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of housing, to be shared among many families. In addition, water was a central element in the 
mine’s operations; it needed both to drain it away from its underground workings, in which it 
was a nuisance, and to pump it towards its processing plants, where it was a vital necessity. The 
city´s drinking water supply thus became interlinked with the company´s system for the 
provisioning of water for its industrial needs. Gradually, this domestic/industrial water system 
came to be supplied from Lake Yanamate as well as from the San Juan River. For much of the 
twentieth century, water drained from the underground mine was also supplied to the population. 
As in other mining areas in different parts of the world, city residents had to add lime to the 
water to make it drinkable. 
The loss of lakes 
 At the same time, during the course of the century the various lakes in the vicinity of the 
city or in the immediate surroundings were gradually rendered unusable by the company´s 
operations. Those that were closest to or directly above the underground mine had to be drained 
and filled with waste rock, to prevent mine flooding. Such was the case of the small Lake 
Esperanza, which is today a soccer field in the neighborhood of the same name, and the larger 
Lake Patarcocha-Lavar. The latter was filled in only in the late 1970s and early 80s; it is now the 
location of the city´s main bus terminal as well as of an urban neighborhood. Its role as the main 
location for washing clothes in the city is a distant memory now. I once met an older woman 
from the nearby town of Huayllay who had lived in various mining camps in her childhood and 
youth. For a time, she told me, her father had worked in the Cerro de Pasco mine, and she had 
gone with her mother to wash clothes in Patarcocha-Lavar. However, the spot they chose was 
one customarily used by another woman, who rudely kicked them out. She laughed as she 
recalled this incident and asked rhetorically of the woman: “Where is your lake now?” 
 Next to it, Patarcocha-Tomar, once the drinking-water source on the edge of the city but 
now surrounded by new neighborhoods since at least the 1970s, was spared the fate of its sister 
lake but instead became a repository for sewage. By 1985, at least 10 sewage canals poured into 
it, a development that was apparently unplanned.400 Today there is a sewage treatment plant just 
outside the city, but it is non-operational, and as city water officials acknowledge, the city 
                                                          
400 El Pasqueño, No.83, March 1985 
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currently has no system for the treatment of sewage. At the time of my research, Lake 
Patarcocha-Tomar was regarded as a focal point for disease and contamination.  
 Slightly further from the mine, two important lakes – Quiulacocha and Yanamate – were 
not drained and filled in but rather became depositories for tailings and other residues from the 
mine. Quiulacocha, on the western edge of the city, began to be used as a tailings deposit for the 
first concentrator plant in Cerro in the 1920s. Subsequently lead- and zinc-rich tailings were 
deposited there from the 1940s until 1992. This 114 acre tailings deposit now lies abandoned in 
the open air, superseded by the newer, larger Ocroyoc tailings deposit (formerly a pasture land in 
the community of Rancas) to its immediate north.  
Meanwhile, Lake Yanamate, to the south of the city, continued to be used as a source of 
clean drinking water for the city until 1981. On that date the state company Centromín (which 
had taken over from the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corp. in 1974) began filling the lake with 
discharge from its new Solvent Extraction/Electro Deposition Plant. The purpose of this plant 
was to extract copper from the acid waters pumped from the mine and in that way also reduce the 
amount of contaminants released into the San Juan River, since there was a plan to use water 
from the Mantaro River (the continuation of the San Juan) to supply the urban population of 
Lima, the country’s capital. An outlet had to be found for the residue from this new plant, 
however, as well as for the excess acid mine water that could not be treated. Lake Yanamate was 
chosen as the outlet, effectively sacrificing it in order to reduce – although without eliminating 
entirely – the contamination of the Mantaro River. Today, as all company documents 
acknowledge, Yanamate is effectively a dead, lifeless lake. 
As more bodies of water were becoming repositories for the mine´s effluents, the 
company also had to find sources of water for its industrial operations, since water recycled from 
the mine and processing plants could supply only part of its needs. Eventually, the company 
began drawing its water not only from the San Juan River but also from Lakes Alcacocha and 
Huicra. A large lake, Alcacocha is situated on the border between the highland community of 
Rancas and the valley communities of Santa Ana de Tusi and Chacayán. In Rancas, it is also 
important in local narrative as the site of a submerged town –a story found in many communities 
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throughout Peru.401 Today, water for the mine is drawn from Lake Alcacocha and conducted by 
means of a natural canal to Lake Huicra, a smaller body of water situated halfway towards the 
mine, in the middle of the land belonging to the community of Rancas. From there it is pumped 
towards the company´s reservoir in the city.  
 Thus, the city´s provision of water had to compete more and more with the use of lakes 
and rivers as depositories for effluents and as sources of water for mining use. When Lake 
Yanamate became a container for acid waters from the new plant in 1981, a replacement had to 
be found for this former source of drinking water. Such a replacement was found in Lake 
Acococha, situated some 33 kilometers to the west of the city, at 4,580 meters above sea level 
and near the larger Lake Punrún. Acococha was considerably more distant from the city than 
were Alcacocha, Yanamate or the other lakes previously mentioned. The company began 
drawing water from this lake through a combination of open-air canals as well as pre-existing, 
natural streams – the whole system finally brought the water to the San Juan River near the 
village of Yurajhuanca (upstream from where the river is contaminated with waste from the mine 
and the city). From there it was pumped over the final 7 kilometers to the reservoirs in the city. 
This system still remains the primary way in which drinking water is provided for the city.  
Thus, one by one many of the freshwater sources around the city have effectively been 
ruled out, forcing water operators to go further in their search for possible sources for the city´s 
population. All this adds to the cost of providing water for the city beyond the factor of altitude. 
Privatization and the End of Dependence 
Thus, during all these years, Cerro de Pasco, like the company´s smelting city of La 
Oroya, had become dependent on the mining company for its supply of water. However 
insufficient or contaminated the supply may have been, the company was expected to provide the 
city with water. This persisted even after the nationalization of the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco 
Corporation and its transformation into the state company Centromín. However, the company 
was already at this time attempting to divest itself of this obligation, which it claimed placed an 
                                                          
401 See Morote Best (1988: 241-282) and  Mannheim and Van Vleet (1998: 338-340). The particular version from 
Rancas referenced here comes from the oral history research of Elizabeth Lino Cornejo (Unpublished Manuscript) 
and was told to her by Felipe Atencio Tufino. I subsequently heard shorter versions of the story from other 
individuals in Rancas. This story is also mentioned in the early colonial-era Huarochirí Manuscript (c.1600). 
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onerous burden on its budget. Such complaints gained renewed force when in the early 1990s 
Centromín and other state companies began a more general policy of withdrawing from the 
provision of services – like health care and education - to their workforces. This was a result of 
new national and international policy guidelines which emphasized privatization of state-owned 
assets and the general retreat of the state from productive enterprise as a solution to the economic 
crisis of the 1970s and 80s. This new policy was often framed in terms of ending the situation of 
“dependence” in company towns like Cerro and making local society more autonomous from 
mining companies. Company documents at the time argued that the neglectful attitude of the 
local and national governments had forced the company to cross the line between production and 
“extra” activities that were not its real responsibility.402  
The discourse of reducing dependence is still present among mining companies in the 
area today, and it tends to recast the past history of the mining industry as one in which 
companies became involved in providing services that were alien to their real mission of 
extracting minerals. Whereas in the early 20th century promoters of the mining industry in Peru 
promoted the view that mining companies were purveyors of modernity, and that their schools 
and hospitals were among the best in the country, today the industry often downplays or even 
critiques the quality of these company-provided services of the past. As an executive from a 
nearby mining company told me, “I do not know any company that is an excellent educator. Or 
any company that is an excellent health provider – any mining company... when you have all the 
children studying in a mining school, they all end up being miners.”  
In order to make state-owned companies attractive to foreign and domestic investors, 
they had to be brought back into economic solvency, which was to be accomplished in part by 
trimming their obligations and budgets and centering their efforts more exclusively on 
                                                          
402 They insisted that the company, “which has as its principal operations the extraction, concentration, smelting and 
refining of minerals, has found itself circumstantially involved in the provision of a public service that does not 
correspond to it.” Draft agreement between Centromín-Perú and the “Proyecto Especial ´Agua potable y 
alcantarillado de Cerro de Pasco,” version of January 15, 1992. Centromín Archive, Box 1263, Folder 25 – “Aguas.” 
Furthermore, the company acknowledged that because of the insufficient supply of water provided to the city, “it is 
a common and permanent situation, the conflicts and controversies in relation to the distribution of potable water in 
the populations of the localities of La Oroya and Cerro de Pasco” (“Alternativas para el problema del agua potable 
en Cerro y La Oroya.” Centromín Archive, Box 1263, Folder 25 – “Aguas.”). If the responsibility for the water was 
not handed over to an independent entity, this would “lead the company to greater conflicts with the population and 
the authorities.” (Internal memorandum CST-828193, 23 September 1993). 
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production. Thus, as in La Oroya, at this time the company began arrangements to transfer 
responsibility for Cerro´s water either to the local municipality, the regional government, the 
national water authority or a combination of these entities. The company succeeded in 
persuading the national, regional and local governments to create a new, independent water 
company for the city. The new water agency created at that time has since evolved into the 
current water company Emapa Pasco; though this entity has the legal status of a private 
company, the stock is jointly owned by four of the local municipalities. It continues to draw 
water from Lake Acococha as well as from two springs near the city. The city´s water system has 
thus become largely, though not entirely, separate from that of the mine. However, the move 
away from dependence on the mine has not succeeded in solving the problem of providing a 
sufficient source of drinking water for Cerro. This becomes evident when one compares 
indicators of water provision in Cerro with those of other cities in Peru, using data provided by 
the National Water Supervisory Authority (SUNASS). 
Expectations of Relocation and the Production of Uncertainty 
The takeover of available water sources by the mine and the shifts in the ideologies and 
discourses of companies and the state are still not enough to explain why the city does not have 
sufficient water. There still are other lakes and rivers further away that could be used, and the 
current system of provision from Lake Acococha could be improved upon. It is precisely in the 
last 15-20 years since the system began to operate more independently from the mine that the 
contrast with other cities in Peru has increased; whereas water services in the country as a whole 
have improved, in Cerro the provision of water has stagnated or even receded.  
One reason for this stagnation in recent years has been the sense of instability and 
inability to enact long-term planning that has resulted from the various relocation projects and 
plans since the beginning of open-pit operations in the center of the city in the 1960s. It may be 
useful to briefly recall this history. When houses in the old city began to be demolished around 
1963, protests from the urban population pressured the U.S.-owned Cerro de Pasco Corporation 
into building a new city. The chosen location, San Juan Pampa, was a mere 1.5 kilometers from 
the old city center, and was meant to be only a temporary solution. Nevertheless, construction 
there continued after nationalization in 1974; today, San Juan is simply another of the city´s three 
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main divisions, and sits practically on the edge of the open pit. Throughout this time, the idea 
persisted that the city would have to move again, as people who grew up during those years 
recall. In the late 1980s, a plan began to be implemented to start a new relocation to the town of 
Villa de Pasco, situated on the flattest part of the plateau, to the south of the city. New projects 
were drafted in 1995 and 1996, but nothing occurred in the next few years.  
In 2006, however, one of the recently elected congressional representatives for Pasco 
Region, Gloria Ramos, began new efforts to promote the construction of a new city, this time in 
the form of a law that declared the relocation a national necessity. Unlike other cases where 
companies themselves relocate populations as a condition for beginning or expanding operations, 
Volcan was opposed to the new relocation law, for it feared that it would be expected to shoulder 
a large part of the costs. The city´s major was also skeptical about the proposal. The law was 
finally passed by the National Congress in 2008; although it has received a lot of attention 
nationally and locally, it has so far had little practical effect. Except for one brief period, the 
executive branch of the government seemed to take little interest in the relocation project, and 
instead a multisectorial commission was formed. On the ground, people are skeptical that the 
relocation will materialize, and authorities generally admit that the project would take decades.  
Naturally, all these expectations of relocation and the uncertainty about the city´s future 
have had the effect of inhibiting the ability to plan for the long term and to build large-scale 
infrastructure (as opposed to individual buildings and other small-scale projects) for the current 
city. Why invest in a new water system for the city when it might move in the next few years? 
Indeed, after the relocation law was passed in 2008, the other Congressional representative from 
Pasco, Oswaldo de la Cruz, asked that construction cease on new water and sanitation 
infrastructure in the current city. New domiciliary water connections have continued to be built, 
but larger-scale investments needed to bring a sufficient amount of water towards the city have 
not been implemented. As it is, local governments are already hesitant to make investments that 
are harder for voters to see and that will not bring them immediate political capital; the 
uncertainty surrounding the city´s future serves to reinforce this tendency. Thus, we can see that 
the nature of extractive activity not only complicates the provision of water to the city by 
contaminating nearby lakes and rivers; it also impairs the ability to plan by producing 
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uncertainty. Mining created the city and attracted a significant population to this otherwise 
difficult space; yet open-pit mining methods also make the urban space unviable, creating the 
expectation of relocation. But the national government and the mining company both take little 
interest in the future of the city. The apathy of the government is enabled by the contemporary 
preference for decentralization over large-scale state planning. The inaction of the company, on 
the other hand, is due to the limited ability of the local population to exert pressure – a weakness 
that has to do with its status as a divided urban collectivity as opposed to a land-owning peasant 
community like those that occupy the rural surroundings. Without strong executive action in 
either direction, the city is left in a limbo that inhibits the provision of services such as water.  
Mineral Wealth and the Culture of Payment 
However, there is also a more immediate reason for the inability of the local water 
company to provide an adequate supply of water to the city: its lack of funds. This seems 
paradoxical at a time when the city forms part of the broader mining boom in the country. Unlike 
in previous times, not only is the mining company making large profits, but local government 
budgets are also swollen from the influx of money through the new mechanism of the canon 
minero. The canon is a mechanism by which 50% of the income tax paid by mining companies 
has to return to their area of operations, in the form of monetary transfers from the national to the 
local governments. It could be argued that this increase – which became significant only around 
2006-2007 – is too recent and that, given more time, local governments will utilize canon funds 
to improve the city’s water system. Yet, at the same time, officials at the water company 
identified the problem of insufficient funds not as one of a delay in local government investment 
but rather of city residents’ unwillingness to pay their fair share. 
Indeed, one point on which both water company authorities and at least some local 
residents agree is that the population does not pay a sufficient amount for its drinking water. 
Moreover, a significant percentage is remiss on its payments at any one time. Attempts to raise 
the water bill in Cerro have met with opposition from the population. As several people pointed 
out to me, people are barely willing to pay 10 soles a month for water in Cerro, while in 
Huancayo the cost is several times higher. Moreover, it is said that those city residents who also 
have houses in Huancayo or in Huánuco are willing to pay high water bills there, but not in 
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Cerro. Of course, it is also true that the water service in both cities is many times better than that 
of Cerro. There would seem to be a vicious cycle – as one resident and local authority 
emphasized to me – whereby people do not want to pay more because the service is so bad, and 
the service is bad because people do not pay more. Also, as several people pointed out to me, 
during the years that the company provided water to the city – no matter how limited in amount 
or how contaminated it may have been – a cultural pattern developed whereby people came to 
expect this service free of charge. Since the company abandoned its provision of services to the 
city, people have had a hard time developing the “culture of payment” – as one water company 
official put it – that is now expected of them. 
There is thus a tendency among local authorities to blame the local population for the 
water problem. This takes the form of several charges: that people do not want to pay, that they 
waste the water, and that they create illegal connections to tap into the water system without 
paying. As one water official put it, “We are fighting against a monster: lack of 
conscientiousness [inconciencia].” He claimed that the asentamientos humanos on the outskirts 
of the city were the ones that generated the problem, “because of their customs from the 
countryside;” according to him, they do not know “the value of water,” and do not understand 
that it is a service, like telephone, which has to be paid for. This official argued that many people 
were willing to pay 40 soles a month for TV cable, but do not want to go above 10 soles for 
water. While he acknowledged that the result of all this was that the water company did not have 
money to provide an adequate service, at the same time, and somewhat contradictorily, this 
official claimed that the problem was not one of insufficient service but rather of water waste by 
the local population. Therefore the aim, he argued, should not be to give people more water, but 
to have them ration it more.  
The discourse of water officials thus locates the source of the problem in the local 
population; the solution is to “sensitize the people” and create a “culture of payment.” As they 
explained to me, the water company, though owned by the local municipalities, is legally a 
private company, and the idea of a private company, they argue, is that it be self-sustaining. 
However, this market-oriented ideology is not solely a discourse, but rather a reality that has 
powerful effects - the company is actually expected to sustain itself solely through the payments 
505 
 
people make. The possibility that the local and regional governments´ canon funds – derived 
from mining companies´ tax payments - might pay for improvements to the water system is thus 
not considered here. A population of consumers paying for a service out of their own pockets, 
and not the vast mineral wealth circulating through local government budgets and contractors´ 
pockets, is held up as the solution to the water problem. While officials may be right that a 
responsible “culture of payment” may ultimately be more sustainable than using mining income 
to finance a new water system, this begs the question: What good is mineral wealth if it cannot 
be used to obtain water for the city?  
Such a question points to a contradiction inherent in current dominant ideologies around 
economic and social policy in Peru and probably other parts of Latin America as well. On the 
one hand, government and industry argue that mining activity benefits the country because of the 
vast wealth it creates – the values it is able to realize in the market are much greater than those of 
the agriculture or animal husbandry with which it competes for rural space. Mining is thus an 
avenue toward successful insertion into the capitalist world. On the other hand, the ideology of 
capitalist modernity holds up values that are not those of extractive-based societies, in which a 
portion of mineral wealth is disconnected from the productivity of local labor, but rather those of 
individual, taxpaying property-owners. 403  In other words, the government tells people that they 
should accept mining because of the vast wealth it creates, while at the same time they are told 
that this wealth – or the large portion of it that does not go into wages – should not finance public 
services like water, because this would go against the “culture of payment” and the model of a 
private company that a water service like Emapa-Pasco should seek to emulate. The market-
oriented ideology of individual responsibility, which attempts to reduce the public sector and 
move away from politics, thus ends up clashing with extractive-based capitalism, which is 
inevitably linked to political relations and forces, and to the state – particularly in Latin America, 
where the state is legally the owner of the subsoil and its resources. The government is the only 
                                                          
403 Similarly, for the case of Venezuela, Coronil (1997: 389) argues that “the infusion of oil money into the domestic 
economy helped naturalize wealth, disconnecting it from the productivity of local labor by basing it on the 
valorization of a mineral resource which required little labor for its extraction.” See Fernando Coronil, The Magical 
State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). In the case of 
metal mining, of course, significant labor is involved; again, it is a portion of the circulating mineral wealth that is 
disconnected from local labor and is derived instead from global pricing and from capital-intensive inputs 
manufactured abroad. It is that portion that impresses promoters of the mining industry, who point to the vast sums 
of revenue that mining generates. By contrast, the idea of the “culture of payment” focuses precisely on the local. 
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entity that can re-appropriate for the nation that portion of mining company profits that derive 
either from differential rents or from a sudden increase in the demand for minerals, such as that 
which began in 2002-2003.  Contemporary market ideology promotes small states and small 
public sectors, whereas, in countries where the state owns the subsoil, mineral wealth tends to 
enrich governments, placing more financial resources at their command. 
It may be that, given more time, mineral wealth – whether in the form of canon or other 
mechanisms – may be used to finance a suitable water system for the city. Indeed, on July 5, 
2011, an agreement was signed between the Provincial Municipality and the Regional 
Government promising to undertake a “definitive solution” to the city’s water problem. It was 
unclear whether the projected investment of 129 million soles was to come from their own 
canon-based budgets or whether they would petition the central government for funds. Such 
solutions have been promised before, and it remains to be seen whether this one will materialize. 
Yet as of 2011, the answer to the city´s water problem, for at least some authorities – such as 
those at the water company – was still limited to the issue of creating a culture of individual 
responsibility and payment among local residents. Canon funds, on the other hand, were being 
used by local governments for a variety of construction projects – building roads, stadiums, 
buildings of various kinds. These projects strengthen contractors, who – when successful - are 
able to build profitable enterprises, as well as local mayors, who not only become agents of 
development but also receive substantial payments. Canon money is prevented from becoming 
the solution to the city´s water problem both by mayors´ preference for cement-based public 
works that involve less planning and that can be seen right away, and by the ideology that says 
that people should pay for their own water and that the water company should be self-sustaining. 
To the degree that this occurs, the contradiction between the anti-political slant of contemporary 
market ideology and the state-centered nature of mining wealth becomes one more factor 








 I began this dissertation by highlighting the decline in class-based politics and labor 
movements in particular in the latter decades of the 20th century. This decline, which occurred in 
much of the world, was in large part a result of the neoliberal “solution” to the crisis of the 
1970s. In industrial capitalist countries like the United States and Great Britain, not only were 
many of the unions politically defeated, but the industrial base itself was reduced, while finance 
and services emerged as growing sectors of the economy. Of course, manufacturing and factory 
labor have not disappeared from the world; they have simply moved to East Asia, and most 
recently to China, the new “world’s workshop.”  
 In this dissertation I have not directly examined this story of the shift in the locus of 
world industry. Rather, I have focused on an area in the periphery of global capitalism, namely 
Peru, and on an extractive rather than manufacturing sector, namely mining. Nevertheless, here 
too the same decline in labor politics occurred, perhaps even more dramatically. Although 
mining is an extractive activity based around a natural resource, underground mining in 
particular has historically involved a significant amount of labor. For that reason, a sizeable 
collection of working-class communities, based around wage-labor, had developed in the mining 
sectors of countries like Peru, especially after the requirements of production began to demand a 
stable rather than transient workforce. If during the first half of the 20th century the mines had 
struggled to attract workers, by the 1980s these relatively stabilized communities had become 
obstacles to the restructuring that the mining companies sought.  Besides, the drop in metal 
prices, resulting from the global economic troubles of the 1970s and the decline of 
manufacturing in the traditional industrial countries, created economic difficulties for mining 
companies. This occurred at the same time that the broader national economy was in crisis due 
not only to the decline in metal prices but also the shift to monetarist policies in the North, and 
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the resulting Debt Crisis in the South. Also, during the second half of the 20th century many 
countries in the South had pursued social reforms and greater autonomy at the expense of 
economic efficiency, and it was the latter that was reasserted by institutions such as the IMF 
during the 1980s. This broader crisis in the national society, together with the situation of 
violence that was stimulated by it and that in turn contributed to the crisis, created the conditions 
not just for mine closures and workforce reduction but also for structural transformations in labor 
whose influence would be felt once prices rebounded and production resumed and even 
surpassed previous levels. Furthermore, the political defeat of the mining unions by the National 
Mining Society in 1988-89, and by the Fujimori government in the early1990s, together with the 
physical departure of the majority of the miners and their families from the old camps, ensured 
that a cultural gap would arise between the previous and the newer generation of workers.   
The dispersal of the mining working class as it had developed up to that point marked the 
dissolution of a peculiar sector in national society, numbering perhaps no more than 80,000 
families. This group resided in isolated settlements but formed part of the modern, formal sector 
of the economy – the world of pensions, social insurance and company-provided benefits, the 
latter varying widely depending on the size and type of company; they had achieved this status in 
exchange for difficult work and a high degree of risk. Upon dispersing, they mostly entered the 
realm of commerce, petty commodity production and the “informal economy,” with some 
retaining or recovering certain links to the land. The monetary resources and skills with which 
they rejoined this broader world varied widely, though they were often greater than those of their 
new neighbors. Older workers were usually able to secure pensions, although long legal 
proceedings were sometimes required. On the whole, this process represented a reversal of 
previous expectations of progress, even if for some it also constituted an opening away from the 
narrow world of the mining camp. Like other sectors of the population at the time, the former 
mining workers paid the costs of the crisis, and eventually moved on with their lives. This 
dispersal also marked the decline of an important social and political actor, one that had 
maintained a certain degree of contact with both the rural world and the urban labor movement 
and political parties.  
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 When mining capital began investing again in Peru in the 1990s and especially in the 
2000s, seeking to open new projects and to restart production in mines that had been closed or 
moribund, it encountered a different kind of challenge. Conflicts began to arise not so much with 
their workers but with other local populations on or near the sites of operations. One of the first 
of these disputes, discussed in Chapter 6, was that between the Brocal Company and the 
comunidad campesina of Vicco in Pasco, over the San Gregorio open-pit zinc project. The 
conflict began as early as 1992 but reached its peak around 1998, and to this date no mining has 
yet taken place at the site. Another of these disputes was between the population of 
Tambogrande, an agricultural fruit-growing settlement on the northern coast, and a Canadian 
mining company that had received permission from the government to mine gold on the land. 
This conflict attracted national attention and reached its greatest intensity in the latter 1990s and 
early 2000s; by 2003 the mining company had had to abandon the project due to local 
opposition. Other disputes involving opposition to particular mining projects followed: Cerro 
Quilish (Yanacocha), Majaz/Rio Blanco, Tía María, Santa Ana, Conga and most recently 
Cañariaco. These confrontations have increased in intensity to the point that by late 2011 the 
Conga conflict had become a major force in national politics, precipitating the resignation of a 
government cabinet.   
At the same time as these large conflicts involving opposition to open-pit projects, a 
series of smaller company-local community disputes have occurred at many if not most mines in 
operation, involving the terms and conditions of resource extraction. Such is the case of the 
conflicts and negotiations between the community of Huayllay and the local mining companies, 
as examined in Chapter 6, but this is by no means an isolated case. These latter kinds of conflicts 
do not usually threaten the viability of entire mining projects, but they bring up the specter of 
road blockades, temporary closures and takeovers of company installations. Companies respond 
to this through a mixture of limited concessions, which then double as Corporate Social 
Responsibility programs, as well as through local political manipulation (something for which 






Figure 10 – Mining concessions in Peru, 2009. This includes all areas for which a 
concession had been granted by the Ministry of Mines by that year. Although most concessions 
are not in operation at any one time, they still often become sources of conflict with local 
populations that fear the imminent advent of mining activity.                                                  
Source: Cooperacción, http://www.cooperaccion.org.pe/NACIONAL.html. 
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To a large degree, the difference between the conflicts that seek to stop mines from 
developing and those that seek to negotiate the terms of operations has to do with the difference 
between open-pit and underground mining. Both kinds of mining are present in Peru, but since 
the 1990s open-pit mines have greatly increased as a proportion of the total capital invested, as 
has occurred throughout the world. All of the projects listed above that have been unable to start 
operations are open-pit. While some large open-pit mines have been able to proceed, both in the 
1990s (Yanacocha, Antamina, Pierina) and in the last few years (Las Bambas, Toromocho, both 
still in the construction stage), the sentiment against new open-pit projects seems to be on the 
rise – not in every case, but as a general tendency. It is safe to say that open-pit mining has 
proven remarkably unpopular in Peru, compared to other types such as underground or small-
scale artisanal mining. This is ironic given the image of modernity and responsibility that the 
mining companies try to project. As Salas (2008) has analyzed, the Peruvian mining industry´s 
contemporary discourse of minería moderna relies on an opposition between a problematic past, 
when little attention was paid to environmental and social issues, and an enlightened present in 
which modern technology and a newfound sense of corporate responsibility have done away 
with whatever problems may have existed before. The high-tech nature of open-pit mining is an 
integral part of this discourse, both because technological developments are explicitly said to 
solve environmental problems, and because the large, powerful machines that operate in the open 
pits are iconic of technology and modernity more broadly. 
 Yet it is precisely the technological advancement of open-pit mining that generates 
opposition, through two main mechanisms. For one thing, although it is true that now there are 
environmental remediation programs and techniques, as a result of the 1990 Environmental Code 
– an adoption of international environmental standards that the Peruvian business sector initially 
opposed – what the mining industry fails to mention is that the technological leap of open-pit 
mining also results in much larger amounts of rock and ore processed and in much more waste 
generated. Tailings are often covered with clay and grass nowadays, and a geomembrane is 
sometimes used as lining for new tailings deposits, but there are more tailings being produced. 
It’s possible that the generation of contaminants may have decreased as a proportion of output, 
but production has increased so much that this cancels out the effect. And while underground 
mining produces tailings (i.e. emissions from the concentrator plant) and only small amounts of 
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waste rock (i.e. rock discarded before the concentration process), open-pit mining generates large 
amounts of both.  
 
Figure 11 - Current open-pit mines and open-pit mining projects in Peru (includes large-
scale and better-known projects only).  
 
More important, open-pit mining produces larger and more visible alterations upon the 
landscape, and also requires a greater movement of water both to and from the mine. In a conflict 
such as Conga, the ronderos (i.e. members of the self-organized rural patrols of Cajamarca, or 
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rondas) have sought to protect a visible local space of lakes, mountains and grasslands from 
suffering the same fate as the area where the Yanacocha company’s five original open pits now 
sit. Underground mining is hard on the workers, but, although it does generate contamination, it 
has a smaller impact on the visible, surface environment. Another factor is of course at play here: 
the nature of the activity that local people engage in. Mining has tended to arouse more 
opposition in agricultural areas like Tambogrande, Majaz, and Cañaris than in a high-altitude 
plateau region like Pasco. Even when the proposed pits are situated high up, as in Conga, there is 
often agricultural activity not too far downstream (unlike in Peru´s two large plateaus, the Pasco-
Junín plateau and the Collao altiplano on the border with Bolivia). Although it is important to 
question the common discourse of the mining industry and the Peruvian government that tends to 
portray high-altitude puna regions as “uninhabited” or a “wasteland” (eriazo), it is true that the 
animal herding to which these regions are dedicated takes place over a much wider land area 
than does agriculture. The same number of hectares impacted by an open-pit mine in an 
agricultural as opposed to a herding area naturally has greater immediate consequences for the 
livelihoods of a larger number of people, as do any disruptions that may occur in the flow of 
water.  
 The other mechanism through which the technologically advanced nature of open-pit 
mining leads to greater opposition is the high degree of organic composition of capital – in other 
words, the ratio of non-labor (such as machinery) to labor costs. Open-pit mines require 
relatively little labor to operate. Labor needs are low both in relation to those of underground 
mining, and in relation to the much larger capital volumes and larger production that open-pit 
mining projects involve. Moreover, there is a greater need for qualified, skilled operators, who 
are often not found in the villages surrounding new mining operations, but rather in the cities or 
at most in traditional mining areas like Pasco (though even there people often feel they lack 
access to high-skill mining jobs too). This creates a sense of exclusion and disappointment that 
can be quite alienating as it constitutes the mining company as an entirely external entity rather 
than as a source of work. Although as we have seen the long-term tendency towards labor 
surplus (which is inherent to capitalism but takes a particular form in mining) is present even in 
underground mining areas like Huayllay, it is sharper around open-pit mines. I became aware of 
this during my first visit to a new open-pit mining project, the Las Bambas copper project in 
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Apurímac, southern Peru, in 2005. The President at the time had visited the area and promised a 
large number of jobs would be created as a result of the project, which quickly became a rumor 
of “20,000 jobs.” People assumed that this meant direct jobs at the company, but it was actually 
based on someone´s estimate of long-term, indirect job creation as a result of increased economic 
activity in the area. At the time of my visit, there were no more than 80 or 90 local people 
employed in the exploration phase, and the company officially expected that its total workforce 
during the operations phase would be around 1,000, including both local and non-local people. 
This had engendered significant malaise at the local level, even if the project eventually managed 
to surmount the initial protests and proceed with the exploration and construction phases. I 
believe this is an underemphasized dimension of mine-community conflicts. Certainly, the 
interest of local populations in mining employment varies greatly depending on the particular 
history and dynamics of each region; yet enough of a desire and need for jobs has been generated 
in the country as a whole as to constitute a significant factor in these conflicts.  
 This is a large part of the reason why not only underground but also artisanal, small-scale 
mining (usually of gold) does not generate as much local opposition. In recent years, the 
National Mining Society and its allies have tended to demonize small-scale and informal gold 
mining as environmentally destructive – in 2010, President Alan García called it “savage 
mining” (minería salvaje). The purpose of this campaign has been to deflect criticisms directed 
at large-scale mines and to portray critics of the latter as hypocrites, who claim to care about the 
environmental impacts of large open-pit mines but do not go around opposing artisanal miners, 
who dump mercury into the rivers as part of the process of extracting gold. While artisanal and 
informal gold-mining no doubt contaminates the rivers, and often leads to problematic social 
dynamics, the reason why environmental and social movements have not sought to shut it down 
is that this kind of mining generally arouses little local opposition in Peru (with some exceptions 
to be sure). Small-scale mining generates a lot of employment relative to production volumes 
and values transacted. Without idealizing it, it is a business where people can work and earn their 
livelihood – just like commerce, transportation or petty commodity production – and that 
includes their labor and life activity directly, even if it sometimes also exposes them to 
exploitation, violence and toxic substances such as mercury.  
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A response to the National Mining Society´s arguments would thus need to be built on 
the affirmation of the fact that environmental issues also have a social dimension. More 
specifically, exclusion constitutes a central experience in the world today (Hoogvelt 2001), and 
in Peru this is as much behind the mine-community conflicts as are the issues of local space and 
environment, which are also no doubt crucial. And while in the last few years the large-scale 
mining industry has generated significant financial wealth for the national and also the regional 
and local governments, due to the combined effect of high metal prices and new mechanisms for 
the decentralization of tax revenue arising from the resource sector (i.e. the canon minero), 
people often still see this as something external to themselves, and not something for which they 
will necessarily sacrifice their local space. And although the canon minero does often stimulate 
the local economy in the short run, through the promotion of employment in the construction of 
public works, Arellano (2011) has shown that it has yet to result in any measurable improvement 
in living conditions or social indicators (relative to non-mining areas); rather, it often seems to 
generate more social conflict over the control of the resources and to promote the growth of 
mafias around municipalities.  
 Returning to underground mining, which has been the subject of the majority of this 
dissertation, here the dynamics of exclusion are less intense, but still present in a different way. 
Some Peruvian analysts had been quick to declare that this kind of mining belonged to the past 
and that it had become a relic in the new world of open-pit mines. Yet since 2003, the rise in 
metal prices, as a result of the industrialization of China, has again stimulated production in 
underground metal mines, even in some that had closed in the 1980s.Whether this is a short-term 
or long-term phenomenon, for the time being it is safe to say that the rumors of the demise of 
underground mining have been greatly exaggerated. In any case, open-pit methods are not 
necessarily applicable to all kinds of ore bodies, including some of the silver-lead-zinc veins 
found in much of Pasco Department. Thus, in the last few years, young men from the region 
have been working at the underground mines again. Although there is technological change that 
is ongoing, this is a continuation of the mechanization that began in the 1970s (i.e. trackless 





Figure 12 – Underground mines in Peru, in operation during all or part of the post-2003 
mining boom.  
Yet although there is a demand for workers at the underground mines, this is not nearly 
enough to match the increased supply of labor; this has to do with the long-term emergence of a 
labor surplus discussed in the first chapter. Moreover, dramatic changes in the organization of 
labor took place in the 1990s, even if they had been germinating for a longer period of time. For 
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one thing, the adoption of aspects of the Long-Distance Commuting (LDC) model has meant that 
mining companies and their contractors can now bring more of the best-qualified operators from 
other regions and cities, by car or bus, even if they are not willing to move their families to the 
mine. This “annihilation of space” (Harvey 1991, 205) tends to reduce the access of local people 
to jobs even when these exist at the mine; this occurs particularly with the more high-skilled 
positions.  
For local people who do find jobs at the mines, the most salient changes when compared 
to the past are the proliferation of contracting (as opposed to direct employment by the mines), 
the rise of temporary as opposed to stable contracts, and the shift to the “accumulated time 
systems” or sistemas that entail a certain number of 12-hour work days followed by a period of 
rest. In Peruvian legislation, these were initially called “atypical work days” (jornadas atípicas), 
but in the mines they have become the norm. The introduction of the 12-hour day in the 1990s 
and early 2000s often took place in a chaotic, abusive fashion - as one Human Resources officer 
explained to me, in some mines there were systems like 30x10 (i.e. 30 12-hour days followed by 
10 rest days). By the time of my research, in mines like Huarón and Cerro de Pasco the “atypical 
work day” had stabilized into the 14x7 system, as mandated by national legislation and 
authorities. While certainly less abusive than what occurred in the late 1990s, this sistema still 
entails a higher exaction of labor than under the old 8-hour day.404 By and large, the attitude I 
have encountered regarding the sistemas is a mix of stoicism, resignation and ambivalence. I 
cannot claim that there is no unrest inside the workplace over the increase in labor exaction and 
                                                          
404 One mine official explained to me that the rationale of the 14x7 system is that, although the signs at the mine say 
that the two shifts are 8am-8pm and 8pm-8am, the new work day really includes only 10.4 hours of actual work – if 
lunchtime and changing and transit time are not taken into account. This thus results in 2.4 hours above the 8-hour 
day, which over the course of 14 days translates into a total of 33.6 accumulated hours, i.e. around four 8-hour days. 
When combined with the weekend days the worker has lost over the course of two weeks (two Saturdays, which 
used to be half-days, plus two Sundays), this yields the 7 days of rest to which the worker is then entitled. What this 
does not take into account is the fact that the old 8-hour day did usually include lunchtime and transit time within the 
company grounds and mine. As former workers have told me, the actual working time was not 8 hours but less – and 
labor discipline was lower in those days anyway. Thus, the old 8-hour shift would need to be compared with the full 
shift today, i.e. 12 hours, not with the 10.4 hours of “actual work.” By my calculations, this would then yield 10 rest 
days, not 7, for each 14 days of work (i.e. 7 days of accumulated time plus 3 weekend days). It should also be 
emphasized that, although the 12-hour period includes transit time within the mine and company grounds, it does not 
generally include commuting time from the home in the town to the company. When this is taken into account, it 
can be as much as 14 hours from the time the workers leave home to the time they return.  
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labor discipline in general, but in my interviews and conversations, and in public discourse, these 
issues were not seen as something that people could change or influence.  
By contrast, there is significant and unambiguous bitterness over the contracting system 
and the lack of labor stability, as well as over the barriers to employment. More importantly, 
communities like Huayllay place the switching of workers from contrata to planilla (i.e. a 
mining company’s payroll) among their central demands during negotiations over the use of 
communal lands. In this way, the community’s hold over the land is used in an attempt, however 
limited, to partially overcome one aspect of capital’s dominance in the organization of labor. 
While people generally do not see the comunidad as having the ability to interfere with what 
goes on inside the workplace, they do assert its right to intervene in the hiring process, and to 
demand jobs, especially planilla jobs, for comuneros. Additionally, they seek contracts for the 
communal company, with the latter seen above all as a mechanism to create job opportunities for 
the community’s young people. This intersection of employment and contracting issues with 
those of land is not limited to Huayllay; it has also characterized, most markedly, the conflicts 
between the community of Huaraucaca (even more dependent on mining and on its communal 
company) and the Brocal Company. It is also present in Rancas, although to a lesser degree, 
given that community’s lower degree of dependence on mining employment.  
The ability of communities to affect the hiring practices of mining companies is real but 
very limited. However, as I showed in Chapter 6, there is another aspect that is central to the 
company-community convenios, especially in Huayllay. That is the transfer of the “social 
burden” from the labor relation to the mine-community relation based around land. For the most 
part, company compounds now only house the upper-level staff and the more skilled technicians. 
For the other workers, the camp has fused with the local town and to some degree with the 
comunidad. The kinds of benefits and programs that used to be negotiated through the labor 
relation are now obtained through the agreements over land. This is particularly the case around 
education, where the community obtains scholarships, training programs and support for local 
schools and, in the case of Huayllay, the local technical institute. Some of these education 
programs are meant to help with the access to employment also, since they provide training and 
skills required to obtain work at the mines nowadays. More broadly, the company-community 
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agreements have become a repository for people’s expectations of progress and advancement, 
and for the defense of local dignity and self-respect against a powerful outside entity.  
While the labor convenios have gone from being socially “thick” to being socially “thin,” 
the land convenios have gone from being socially “thin” to being socially “thick.” There has 
been a transfer in the relative strength of politically salient identities, from a community of 
workers and their families to a comunidad of communal landowners (many of whom happen to 
work in the mine). The latter existed before, but it has increased in importance and strength even 
as the former has declined, and it has come to include many of the same people. This 
strengthening of the comunidad campesina as a political actor has come about not only as a 
result of companies’  increased need for land, but also as an outcome both of global processes 
and of the particular history of land recuperation in Peru in the second half of the 20th century. 
The failure of the occasional attempts by the neoliberal state since the 1990s to facilitate the 
alienation of land in highland and Amazonian Peru has also contributed to this process. 
Furthermore, I would argue there is a “surplus” that overflows the forms set by struggles over 
value – struggles in which capital reigned supreme in the last years of the 20th century, as it 
externalized its “frailty” (Kliman 2012, 2) towards workers and towards the poor. This surplus, 
which in a sense is the social itself, then expresses itself through other forms, which have their 
own lines of inclusion and exclusion – as in the case of the comunidad campesina.  
I believe such a perspective may help us to highlight the ways in which identities in 
capitalism shift over time, how some become more salient and others less so. Although these 
identities and positions can sometimes enter into contradiction with one another, there is a 
common underlying social terrain that has its own logic and does not necessarily follow the 
dictates of capital, even if it is influenced by them. The changes described in this dissertation 
may be specific to some mining regions of Peru during particular periods of time, but they point 
to certain wider dynamics in global capitalism, as well as more broadly to the connections and 
continuities underlying social divisions and shifts. In the particular geographic and historical 
setting discussed here, dynamics and relations such as labor, land, community and contests over 
local space appear all together in one place. In other contexts, they may be more separate, 
involving different sets of individuals. Nevertheless, social analysis still needs to find a way to 
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bring them into dialogue with one another, because sooner or later they will come into contact, 
fusion or conflict in the social world, either through their presence or, as in the case of labor in 
open-pit mines, through their absence or scarcity. And, in so far as labor, land and other forms 
are “burdened” by the social, we need to better understand the relation between the social and the 
“economic” sphere that emerges from it but that increasingly asserts its own autonomy and 
“objective” laws, in turn shaping the constraints and partially limiting the options available in the 




















Migration to the Huarón Mine: Long-term Trends 
 
A. Migration to Huayllay District in 1940-42 
The first set of data I present here, in Table 2, comes from one book of actas (minutes) 
from 1940-42. All 102 cases in that set of actas were examined. I have chosen to count each of 
the two parties to a dispute as a unit of analysis, resulting in a total of 204 individuals for whom 
location of origin is taken into account in my analysis.405 The litigants´ places of origin are 
classified into seven categories: first, (1) Huayllay District itself (including both the villages of 
Huayllay and Huaychao as well as the outlying estancias and haciendas), followed by the 
outside locations from which people migrated: (2) the rest of the Pasco/Junín Plateau, on the 
edge of which Huayllay sits; (3) the broad, agricultural valley of the Mantaro River to the south; 
(4) the highlands of Lima Department, in particular the upper basins of the rivers Chancay, 
Huaura and Chillón; (5) the Chaupihuaranga Valley (Daniel Alcides Carrión Province) and other 
narrow mountain valleys (quebradas) in Pasco Department; (6) the department of Huánuco to 
the north; and finally (7) “other” locations which cannot easily be grouped with the others. Thus, 
rather than classify places of origin strictly according to provincial, departmental or other 
political divisions, I have grouped them into categories that combine political, geographical and 
cultural criteria. I believe these categories are more meaningful and useful for the analyst; they 
                                                          
405 In other words, if there were several family members accompanying the main litigant, they are not counted 
separately, even if their place of origin (which is almost always the same as the main litigant´s) is given in the 
transcript. When a case consists of one spouse bringing a complaint against the other, I do count them separately, 
even if they are from the same location. It would have been too difficult and too speculative to attempt to delineate 
exact family or household units in the cases and take them as units of analysis; this would have been further 
complicated by the fact that many of the cases consist precisely of households in the process of dissolution.  
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also come closer to the ways in which people in the area of my research distinguish among 
spatial and geographical areas.406  
Table 2: Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1940-1942 cases, by geographical category 
Region of Origin All parties to 
disputes 
Parties to disputes with a 
stated connection 
(occupation or residence) 
to Huarón mine 
Parties to disputes who 
were from outside 
district (i.e. migration 
only) 
Huayllay District 77    (45%) 30      (28%) ----- 
Pasco/Junín Plateau 33    (19%) 23      (21%) 33    (34%) 
Mantaro Valley 31    (18%) 23      (21%) 31   (32%) 
Lima Highlands 15    (9%) 14      (13%) 15    (16%) 
Chaupihuaranga and 
nearby valleys 
10      (6%) 10        (9%) 10      (10%) 
Huánuco  3      (2%) 3        (3%) 3      (3%) 
Other 4      (2%) 4        (4%) 4      (4%) 
TOTAL STATED 173    (100%) 107    (100%) 96 (100%) 
Unstated/unclear 
place of origin 
31     11 ---- 
TOTAL  204 118 96 
   
The first column of Table 2 includes all 204 parties to disputes. Of those, 173 individuals 
had their place of origin listed, while for 31 individuals it was either unclear or not stated at all. 
The percentages given for each geographical category are proportions of this total of 173 
locations. As we can see, 45% of litigants listed a location within Huayllay district – either the 
villages of Huayllay or Huaychao, one of the local haciendas or an outlying estancia – as their 
place of origin. Often, they were simply recorded as being “native to this locality” (natural de 
este lugar). The next most common locations were the Pasco/Junín plateau and the Mantaro 
Valley, with 19% and 18%, respectively, followed by the rest of the categories. It is possible, 
however, that this data does not accurately reflect the relative proportions between people native 
                                                          
406 Thus, I have included the Pasco/Junín plateau (also known as Bombón Plateau) as one unit that straddles both 
Pasco and Junín departments, while the Mantaro Valley further to the south, though belonging to the political 
jurisdiction of Junín department, stands alone as its own cultural/geographical unit. The non-plateau areas of Pasco 
Department – the narrow mountain valleys or quebradas – are grouped together in one unit that includes the 
Chaupihuaranga Valley (an area with its own regional identity) but also the Tingo River and other tributaries of the 




to Huayllay district versus individuals who had migrated from outside. Rather, it probably 
overestimates the former and underestimates the latter. It seems probable that native-born 
huayllinos would have been more likely than migrants to go to the Juez de Paz, since they would 
have recognized him as a local authority and might know him personally; migrants might have 
elected to resolve their disputes in their own towns, during their trips back home.  
The second column takes a different approach by including only the 118 individuals (out 
of the total 204) who had a connection to the Huarón mining company that was explicitly stated. 
This was either through their occupation (most commonly obrero), their place of current 
residence (one of the Huarón workers´camps), or by being a spouse (married or conviviente) to 
someone who fit those categories.  This information needs to be taken with a grain of salt. Some 
individuals have been excluded from Column 2 because they explicitly stated either an 
occupation not directly related to mining (such as shepherd or cattle-raiser) or a place of 
residence that would indicate a non-mining occupation (such as the estancias or the 
haciendas).407 Although this exclusion is certainly an oversimplification, since people often went 
back and forth between occupations and places of residence, it is of some limited use in 
distinguishing between those with a direct connection to mining at a particular moment in time 
and those without. However, there are also some individuals for whom neither place of residence 
nor occupation was recorded; in their case, they have been left out of Column 2 because of 
uncertainty – they may have worked or lived at the mine, but we do not know for sure. Thus, 
Column 2 likely excludes certain individuals who really should be included. Still, it provides a 
picture that is closer to being an accurate representation of the Huarón mining camps only, rather 
than the district as a whole. In this sense, it makes sense that the number of individuals native to 
Huayllay district would drop dramatically from Column 1 to Column 2 – the former included 
many people who simply lived in the district but were not working at the mine. Migrants from 
outside the district, on the other hand, usually came for the mine, and so for them the difference 
between Column 1 and Column 2 is not as dramatic. Whereas for people from Huayllay the 
number drops by over 60% from Column 1 to Column 2, for people from the Pasco/Junín 
                                                          
407 Or, in the case of 6 individuals, they have been left out of Column 2 because they lived in one of the other, more 
distant mining camps in the area, not in Huarón. Namely, there were 4 individuals in Río Pallanga (outside the 
district´s boundaries, to the west) and 2 in Vanadium Corp. 
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Plateau and from the Mantaro Valley it drops by only1/4, and for the other locations it hardly 
drops at all.408 
 Column 3 takes yet a different approach by excluding not those without a stated direct 
connection to the Huarón mine (as in Column 2) but rather all those who did not explicitly state a 
place of origin other than Huayllay district. The purpose of this is to leave aside the issue of the 
overrepresentation of locals vis-a-vis migrants referred to earlier; Column 3 focuses only on 
those who explicitly stated they were migrants, and gives the relative weights of the different 
locations of origin. It does not distinguish by place of residence or occupation as Column 2 does; 
rather, it simply reproduces the numbers from Column 1, but with the figures for Huayllay 
District and for the “uncertain” category left out, and the percentages for the other categories 
recalculated accordingly. Here we see the Mantaro Valley and the Pasco/Junín Plateau each 
account for almost 1/3 of migrants who came before the Huayllay Juzgado. The Lima Highlands 
follow with 16%, the Chaupihuaranga Valley and nearby quebradas with 10%, and Huánuco 
with only 3%.  
 To complement this analytical picture with a more impressionistic image, Table 3 
provides the specific locations of origin recorded in the Juzgado minutes – i.e., the raw material 
from which the categories in Table 2 were derived. The documents list each location at varying 
degrees of specificity: some give the name of the town, some only the district, others only the 
province or general area, and yet others only the department. The locations given probably do 
                                                          
408 Also, the reasons for the drop are different in each case. Among the 47 individuals from Huayllay who were 
weeded out in the process of moving from Column 1 to Column 2, 29 (62%) were left out because they explicitly 
state an occupation or place of residence that indicates a lack of direct connection to the Huarón company. They are 
thus justifiably excluded from Column 2. Only in 18 individuals (38% of the 47 excluded) is there actual uncertainty 
– no place of residence or occupation is recorded (only place of origin), so their exclusion from Column 2 might not 
be justified. On the other hand, for the Mantaro Valley individuals, out of 8 who are excluded from Column 2, only 
3 appear with occupations or places of residence disconnected from the mine; in 5 of the cases the information is 
simply not recorded, and it is likely that they did actually have a connection to the mine. This makes sense if we 
remember that the Mantaro Valley is distant from Huayllay and people would be unlikely to come for any reason 
other than the mine. Among the Plateau individuals, on the other hand, the picture is more similar to those from 
Huayllay: out of 9 individuals left out of Column 2, most of them (7) explicitly state occupations or places of 
residence not directly connected to the mine, and only 2 are cases of actual uncertainty. Again, this makes sense 
given that the category I have labeled as the “Pasco/Junín Plateau” is the closest to Huayllay district itself; the latter 
is actually part of the former geographically, and the distinction made here between the two is solely to differentiate 
between the strictly local (Huayllay) and close-range migration (the plateau) . People from the plateau towns may 
easily have gone to Huayllay for purposes other than mining, such as trading or because their grazing lands actually 
straddled district boundaries. However, it should be noted that the numbers discussed here are quite small and thus 
these conclusions are partly speculative.  
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not get at all of the complexity of local geographies: someone may give the name of a district 
seat, but they may actually be from an anexo or sub-district jurisdiction, or they may maintain a 
base in more than one district at once. In the rest of the cases, where the specific town or district 
name was given, I have given the corresponding province in which it is located – using 
contemporary provincial divisions rather than those existing at the time (there have been 
significant shifts in provincial boundaries in the years since).  
Table 3 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón 1940-42 cases, specific locations of origin 
(Migrants only) 
Pasco/Junín Plateau (33) Cerro de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 6 
Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 4 
Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 2 
Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Pasco Prov. – 2* 
Ondores (Junín Prov.) – 5 
Pari – (Ondores Dist. - Junín Prov.) - 5  
Junín (Junín Prov.)– 4 
Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 1 
Marcapomacocha (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 
Yauli (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 
La Oroya (Yauli-La Oroya Prov.) – 1 
Mantaro Valley (31) Muquiyauyo (Jauja Prov.) – 4 
Huamalí (Jauja Prov.) – 4 
Masma-Chichhe (Jauja Prov.) -2  
Huancaní (Jauja Prov.) – 2 
Marco (Jauja Prov.) – 2 
Julcán (Jauja Prov.) – 1 
San Lorenzo (Jauja Prov.) – 1 
Parco (Jauja Prov.) – 1 
Masma (Jauja Prov.) - 1 
Jauja Prov. – 5* 
Concepción Prov. – 4 
San Jerónimo (Huancayo Prov.) – 3 
Huancayo Prov.  – 1* 
Lima Highlands (15) Oyón Prov. – 7 
Vichaycocha (Huaral Prov.) - 3 
Pacaraos (Huaral Prov.) – 1 
San Lorenzo de Quinte (Huarochirí Prov.) – 1 
Huarochirí Prov. – 1* 
Canta Prov. – 1 
Yauyos Prov. – 1 
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Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco 
Dept.) (10) 
Tápuc (D.A.C. Prov.409) – 5 
Goyllarisquizga (D.A.C. Prov.) – 2 
Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Prov.) – 1 
Ticlacayán (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Huariaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Huánuco (3) Dos de Mayo Prov.– 2 
Ambo – 1 
Other (4) Palcamayo (Tarma Prov.) – 1 
Puerto Bermúdez (Oxapampa Prov. – eastern 
lowlands) – 1 
San Martín Dept. (eastern lowlands) - 1 
Huancavelica Dept. (south-central Peru) – 1 
*These cases, in which only the province name was given, are in addition to the cases which list 
a more specific location within the same province. 
 
B. Migration to Huayllay District in 1969 
We have already mentioned the limitations of this archive as a source of evidence on 
migration to the Huarón mine. It constitutes an indirect source, having been produced not as part 
of employment procedures but rather in the sorting out of interpersonal disputes within the 
domain of everyday life. However, if we can detect trends over time within the evidence 
provided by the archive – that is, compare sets of cases from different years, all of them 
presumably having more or less the same limitations as sources – then the results might be 
significant. Table 4 presents cases from one book of Juzgado minutes from 1969, about 27 years 
after the data presented earlier. As with the 1940-42 material, all cases in the 1969 book were 






                                                          
409 Daniel Alcides Carrión Province, which more or less corresponds to the Chaupiwaranga Valley. 
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Table 4 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1969 cases, by geographical category 
Region of origin All parties to disputes  All parties to disputes who were 
from outside the district (i.e. 
migration only) 
Huayllay District 50               (50%) --- 
Pasco/Junín Plateau 21               (21%) 21                   (41%) 
Huánuco 13               (13%) 13                   (25%) 
Chaupihuaranga and 
nearby valleys (Pasco 
Dept.) 
8                 (8%)  8                     (16%) 
Mantaro Valley 6                 (6%) 6                     (12%) 
Lima Highlands 1                 (1%)  1                     (2%) 
Other 2                 (2%) 2                     (4%) 
TOTAL STATED 101            (100%) 51                   (100%) 
Unstated 26 ---- 
TOTAL 127 51 
 
The categories for Region of Origin are the same as in Table 2. The data is presented in 
two columns that correspond to Columns 1 and 3 in the previous table. The former Column 2 – 
which isolated the individuals who explicitly stated they worked at and/or lived in the Huarón 
mining complex - does not find an equivalent in the 1969 cases, because for some reason 
residence and occupation were recorded much less consistently that year. Thus, Column 1 
presents all parties to disputes, while Column 2 presents only those who had migrated from 
outside the district, with the percentages recalculated accordingly. 
As we can see, people native to Huayllay District still account for around half of all 
parties to disputes, as in 1940-42. The Pasco/Junín plateau is still an important source of 
migrants, but the Mantaro Valley has decreased from around 1/3 of migrants to only 12%. The 
highlands of Lima have decreased from 16% to 2% of migrants. Huánuco, on the other hand, has 
emerged as an important region of origin, accounting for around ¼ of migrants. The decrease in 
migrants from the Mantaro Valley and the increase in those from Huánuco is thus the most 
important aspect that emerges in comparing the 1969 cases to those from 1940-42. Table 4 
presents the specific locations listed in the 1969 cases. 
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Table 5 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1969 cases, specific locations of origin 
(Migrants only) 
Pasco/Junín Plateau (21) Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 5 
Pari (Ondores Dist., Junín Prov.) – 4 
Ondores (Junín Prov.) – 2 
Villa de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 2 
Cerro de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Colquijirca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Cochamarca (Vicco Dist., Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Carhuacayán (Yauli La Oroya Prov) - 1 
Morococha (Yauli La Oroya Prov.) – 1 
Huánuco (13) Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) – 2 
La Libertad – Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 
Miraflores (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 
Tantamayo (Huamalíes Prov.) – 1 
Sillapata (Dos de Mayo Prov.) – 1 
Dos de Mayo Prov. – 2* 
Cauri (Lauricocha Prov.) – 1 
Baños (Lauricocha Prov.) – 1 
Ambo Prov. – 1  
Huánuco Dept. (unspecified) – 2 
Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco 
Dept.) (8) 
Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Province) – 2 
Goyllarisquizga (D.A.C. Province) – 1 
Cajamarquilla (Yanacancha Dist. – Pasco 
Prov.) – 2 
Quiparacra (Huachón Dist. – Pasco Prov.) – 2 
Vinchos (Pallanchacra Dist. – Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Mantaro Valley (6) Masma (Jauja Prov.) – 2 
Tingo Paccha – Acolla (Jauja Prov.) – 1 
Jauja Prov. – 1* 
San Jerónimo  (Huancayo Prov.) – 1 
Huancayo – 1 
Lima Highlands (1) Santa Catalina – Santa Cruz de Andamarca 
Dist. (Huaral Prov.) – 1 
Others (2) Azángaro Prov. (Puno Dept.) – 1 
Ancash Dept. – 1 
* These cases, in which only the province name was given, are in addition to the cases which list 




C. Migration to Huayllay District in 1975-76 
 It could be argued that the 1969 cases are too few to make conclusions about trends. 
However, in Table 6 we give yet another set of data, close in time to that of Table 4: a book of 
Juzgado de Paz cases from 1975-76. Here every other case from the book has been recorded, 
resulting in a total of 52 cases. Note, however, that here the individuals are labeled as “parties to 
disputes present before judge” rather than simply “parties to disputes” as in the previous two 
tables. This is because the format of the cases is different– rather than both parties to each 
dispute being present and stating their location of origin, the 1975-76 book mostly consists of 
single individuals bringing a complaint against a person not present (often it is a woman bringing 
a complaint against her partner). Thus, here there is one person per case, rather than two as in the 
previous tables. Other than that, the columns in the table are the same as in Table 2: 1) all parties 
present before the judge); 2) people who explicitly mentioned either an occupation or a place of 
residence connected to the mine; 3) all people who were from outside Huayllay District – i.e., 
migrants only. 
Table 6 – migration to Huayllay and Huarón: 1975-1976 cases, by geographical category 
Region of Origin All parties to 
disputes present 
before judge 
All parties to disputes present 
before judge who mentioned a 
direct connection to mining in 
Huayllay 
All parties to disputes 
present before judge 
who were from outside 
district (i.e. migration 
only) 
Huayllay District 25       (48%) 8            (28%) --- 
Huánuco  11      (21%) 9            (31%) 11          (41%) 
Pasco/Junín 
Plateau 




4        (8%) 3            (10%) 4            (15%) 
Mantaro Valley 3        (6%) 3            (10%) 3            (11%) 
Lima Highlands 0 0 0 
Other 1        (2%) 1            (3%) 1            (4%) 
TOTAL 
STATED 
52     (100%) 29          (100%) 27          (100%) 
Unstated 3 0 ---- 




As we can see, the 1975-76 data confirm the trends seen in the 1969 table. The Mantaro 
Valley has decreased in importance as a source of migrants, while Huánuco has grown in 
importance. On the other hand, the Pasco/Junín plateau, as well as Huayllay District itself, have 
more or less stayed at the same level. Table 7 gives the specific locations of origin for the 1975-
76 cases. 
Table 7 – Migration to Huayllay and Huarón - 1975-76 cases, specific locations of origin 
(migrants only) 
Huánuco (11) Baños (Lauricocha Prov.) – 2 
Marías (Dos de Mayo Prov.) – 2 
Dos de Mayo Prov. – 2* 
Margos (Huánuco Prov.) – 1 
Chupán (Yarowilca Prov.) – 1 
Llata (Huamalíes Prov.) - 1  
Marañón (Marañón Province?)– 1 
Huánuco Dept. (unspecified) – 1 
Pasco/Junín Plateau (8) Carhuamayo (Pasco Prov.) – 2 
Ninacaca (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Vicco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Villa de Pasco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Smelter (Tinyahuarco Dist. – Pasco Prov.) - 1 
Racco (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Ulcumayo (Junín Prov.) – 1 
Chaupihuaranga and nearby valleys (Pasco 
Dept.)  (4) 
Yanahuanca (D.A.C. Prov.) – 2 
Páucar  (D.A.C. Prov.) - 1 
Yarusyacán (Pasco Prov.) – 1 
Mantaro Valley (3) Chupaca – 1 
Huancayo – 1 
Jauja Prov. – 1 
Others (1) Puno Dept. – 1 
* This case, in which only the province name was given, is in addition to the cases which list a 
more specific location within the same province. 
 
The Mantaro Valley and Huánuco are both relatively far from the Huarón mine (albeit in 
opposite directions – to the south and north, respectively) while the plateau is relatively close, 
since it includes Huayllay itself. Thus, we can say that there was a shift from one relatively long-
distance source of migrants to another (i.e. from the Mantaro Valley to Huánuco), while the areas 
at close-to-medium distance from the Huarón mine remained important sources of migrants 
throughout the periods examined here. This is the broad arch that the data analyzed in this 
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section presents. Even if the amount of data presented here is too small to draw definite 
arguments, the fact that the 1969 and the 1975-76 data independently reinforce each other serves 
to strengthen these conclusions. 
 Nevertheless, several additional complexities must be taken into account, in addition to 
the ones already mentioned. The type of migration from each place – short-term vs. long-term, or 
individual vs. family - might have made a difference in the degree to which it shows up in the 
documents from the Juzgado. This is not always easy to predict. Short-term migrants would have 
been less likely to have family with them, thus removing one potential source of disputes of the 
kind that could lead to appearing before the Juez. On the other hand, they might be more likely to 
form short-term relationships at the camp, which could easily lead to a type of dispute that 
appears very frequently in the documents: complaints from former convivientes (common-law 
spouses) seeking recognition of children as well as payment of child support. It is thus hard to 
say whether these factors would have led to either overestimating or underestimating the 
importance of particular groups within the population of the mining camps. Similarly, it is 
difficult to predict how the relative socioeconomic status of different groups of migrants, as well 
as their level of integration into the formal education system, would have affected the rate at 
which they appear in the documents examined here. On the one hand, Brandt´s (1990) study of 
the institution of the Juzgado de Paz in Peru argues that it is visited most frequently by rural and 
working-class people rather than by the elite or the middle class, who tend instead to consult 
with professional lawyers and judges. In Huayllay, the near-absence of hacendados and of 
mining company engineers and officials from the Juzgado minutes (when we know they were 
present in the area) seems to confirm this for the local area. On the other hand, within the popular 
sector, differences in access to education and socioeconomic development might have played a 
role in ways we are unaware of. Would a mining worker with at least a few years of high school 
education be less likely to go to the Juzgado than one with only elementary education?410 Would 
                                                          
410 Sulmont and Valcárcel (1993) give data on years of schooling at several mines, including Huarón in 1986. That 
year, 34% of Huarón workers had attended elementary school but not completed it, 28% had complete elementary 
but no secondary education, 18% had started secondary school without finishing it, and another 18% had finished 
high school. It should be emphasized that in the latter half of the 20th century educational level at Huarón was 
strongly associated to generational change; this is evident not just in the history of the founding of the various 
schools in the area, but also in how people talk about the subject. 
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the more skilled workers from the Mantaro Valley have been more or less likely to seek the 
assistance of the Juez de Paz than those from the quebradas in Pasco and Huánuco? 
 Also, the geographical categories utilized here are not the only way that I could have 
chosen to organize the data. In particular, some of the categories could have been combined. 
Namely, as indicated earlier, the individuals from Huayllay district could have been included 
within the category for the Pasco/Junín plateau. Huayllay sits at the edge of this plateau, close to 
where the terrain shifts into a series of mountain peaks that mark the continental divide leading 
into the western slopes of the Andes and the Pacific Ocean. The reason for distinguishing 
between Huayllay District and the plateau is simply to differentiate between a strictly local 
population and one that had migrated even if only a limited distance. Also, the category for the 
Chaupihuaranga and other nearby valleys could have been combined with that for Huánuco, 
since both areas in a sense form a single agrarian region with deep historical interconnections – 
this is how Mayer´s (2002, 147) map presents it. If this was done, then this combined region 
would account for 13% of migrants in the 1940-42 documents, 41% of migrants in 1969, and 
56% of migrants in the 1975-76 documents (i.e. using the data in the rightmost column of Tables 













The 1940-42 Juzgado de Paz documents as sources on the mining population and as 
sources on other sectors of local society 
The discussion here pertains to the archival material from the Huayllay Juzgado de Paz 
for the years 1940-42 that is examined in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. As noted there, these 
documents pertain to Huayllay district as a whole, not just to the Huarón mine. Here I discuss the 
degree to which this material allows us to examine social dynamics at the mine, and the degree to 
which it concerns the rest of the surrounding locality; both are of interest here, but in different 
ways. 
In the 1940-42 actas we have 98 cases411; of these, 62 cases (63.3%) have at least one 
party to the dispute (and usually both parties412) with a direct connection to the Huarón mine – 
either because they stated that they worked there and/or resided in one of the company´s 
camps.413 Specifically, 45 cases (45.9 % of the total 98 cases) had at least one party to the 
                                                          
411 Although most of the cases appear only once in the 1940-42 book of actas, a few (4 cases) stretch out over two or 
more dates, meaning that the parties to the dispute went back to the Juez de Paz because the issue had not been 
settled to their satisfaction. I do not count each appearance separately, but rather count them together as one case. 
412 In a few of the cases, the two parties to the dispute state different places of residence. That is why in the analysis 
in this paragraph I try to say “at least one party to the dispute.” In the great majority of cases, however, both parties 
either state or imply (for example, by being convivientes or cohabitors) that they have the same place of residence. 
Most of the cases are between people living close to each other. 
413 There are a few cases where an individual lists his occupation as obrero but does not say explicitly that he is 
employed at the Huarón company. I do count these cases as “having a direct connection to the Huarón mine,” since 
it seems most likely that that is the case – i.e., it seems highly unlikely that such a person would be a worker in one 
of the other, more remote mines in the district at the time: Vanadium Company of America, which is named in only 
one case, and Río Pallanga, which is named in only two cases (as opposed to Huarón which is named in many if not 
the majority of cases). Hypothetically, this could result in an overestimation of people with a connection to the 
Huarón mine. On the other hand, however, there are a few other cases of individuals who had migrated to Huayllay 
from outside the district, and who most likely were there because of the Huarón mine, but they did not explicitly 
state an employer or place of residence or an occupation like obrero. I do not count them. This partly compensates 
for any overestimation that could result from the previous factor – i.e., from counting all obreros as Huarón workers 
even if they did not explicitly say which mine they worked at.  
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dispute (usually both) who listed one of the Huarón company´s camps as their place of residence. 
By comparison, only 1 case included someone who listed as their place of residence one of the 
camps of the other mining company in the district, the Vanadium Corporation of America; 2 
cases involved individuals living in the Río Pallanga mine from the adjacent district. In 27 cases 
(27.6% of the total 98), at least one party to the dispute (and usually both) gave a village or rural 
location in Huayllay District as their residence – either the villages of Huayllay, Huaychao, an 
estancia or one of the district´s haciendas (Cónoc, El Diezmo, Huáscar), or simply stated that 
they were vecino de este lugar (a resident/citizen of this place). Although they may have lived 
outside the mine compound, a few of these individuals did list occupations related to the mine. 
Only five cases included parties to the dispute who resided outside the district – in places nearby 
like Vichaycocha, Pari or Ondores, or further away like La Oroya and Concepción; these were 
there because the other party to the dispute resided in Huayllay district. Finally, in 23 of the 98 
cases (23.5% of the total) neither of the parties to the dispute listed their place of residence; they 
may have resided in the mine camp, or they may have lived in the villages, estancias or 














Marriage and convivencia according to the Census: 1940 and 2007 
Table 8 provides the figures for the different categories of marital status among 
individuals over 12 years old – single, married, conviviente, separated, divorced, and widowed – 
in Rancas, Huayllay, as well as their respective districts and the departmental and national 
figures, according to the 2007 National Census. 
Given the general prestige attached to civil/church marriage, it´s conceivable that the 
figure for that category might be overstated. Similarly, some of those who appear as “single” 
may simply have been indicating that they had not had a civil or church marriage. Both factors 
would tend to underestimate the number of convivientes. Nevertheless, these figures serve as a 
general illustration of the variation in terms of the relative weight of convivencia, on the one 
hand, and civil/church marriage, on the other, even among proximate locations. As we can see, 
Rancas has a significantly higher rate of marriage than Huayllay, and a similarly higher rate of 





                                                          
414 The potential reasons for this difference are too many to know which to choose; one factor is Huayllay´s status 
today as a place of residence for the Huarón and Animón mines (since the mine camps were demolished in the 
1990s), which would lead to the presence of more people in their 20s and 30s – who tend to be married or 
convivientes – as opposed to individuals who are 12, 13 or 14 years old and who tend to be single. The figures for 
Simón Bolívar district as a whole – which includes, in addition to Rancas, part of the urban area of Cerro de Pasco, 
as well as several villages and rural areas dotted with estancias – are closer to those for Huayllay. The departmental 
and national figures are situated between Rancas and Huayllay – although somewhat closer to the latter. 
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Table 8: Marital Status, individuals ages 12 and over, according to 2007 Census 






























































 (39.7%)  (26.7%)  (26.2%)  (3%)  (0.4%)  (4%) 
Peru (nat´l 
%) 
 (39%) (24.6%)  (28.6%) (3.4%) (0.5%) (3.9%) 
Source: INEI, Censos 2007 de Población y Vivienda  
Returning to the 1940s – the period of our archival material - we can similarly examine 
census data, this time from the 1940 Census. When it comes to marital status, the published 
results for that census are not broken up by nucleated settlement or district, but rather simply by 
province. In Table 9, rather than comparing different towns and districts near Huarón and Cerro 
de Pasco, I have selected several of the provinces from which people migrated to the Huarón 
mine, as discussed in the previous chapter. The category “Pasco Province” in 1940 actually 
corresponded to virtually the same geographical area as Pasco Department today (as used in the 
                                                          
415 I use the term “town” here because, although Rancas and Huayllay are also comunidades campesinas (peasant 
communities), the 2007 Census does not use that as a geographical unit; rather, it gives figures for each nucleated 
settlement (in this case the main towns of Rancas and Huayllay) as a separate location. Since this is a pastoral, rather 
than agricultural region, the countryside is dotted with estancias that belong to a particular comunidad campesina, 
and whose inhabitants move back and forth from the towns, but these areas are not included in the figures for the 
“towns.”  
416 Rancas is part of Simón Bolívar District, just like Huayllay is part of Huayllay district. Simón Bolívar District 
includes not just Rancas but also other comunidades campesinas (both their central towns and the estancias in their 
outlying lands) and part of the urban radius of Cerro de Pasco. Huayllay district includes both Huayllay and 
Huaychao, and some smaller settlements.  
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previous table) – that is, it included the highland plateau region in which Huayllay and Cerro de 
Pasco are located as well as the Chaupiwaranga Valley and the eastern lowlands of 
Oxapampa.417 Also, the 1940 Census publications break down marital status according to gender 
(unlike the data I have from the 2007 census), and that is how it is presented in Table 9. 
For Pasco, the proportion of convivientes in 1940 was roughly equivalent to that in 2007, 
but the percentage of married persons was higher and that of single individuals was lower back 
then. If we leave out “single,” widowed and divorced individuals, and look only at those 
involved in a marital union in Pasco province at the time of the 1940 census, we have that around 
60% are listed as married, and about 40% are convivientes. However, the differences between 
regions are striking – the Mantaro Valley provinces have a very low rate of convivencia and a 
high rate of marriage, as does Canta Province in the Lima Highlands. Cajatambo (Lima 
Highlands) and Dos De Mayo (Huánuco), and to a lesser degree Huamalíes Province (Huánuco), 
have a conviviente/married proportion that looks more similar to that for Pasco. There are also a 
few important differences between genders, for example between the percentages of married 
men and married women in Huancayo Province. Again, though, these figures are meant only as a 
general illustration, and should be read with caution. The 1940 Census was the first attempt at a 
modern scientific census in twentieth-century Peru, and, although it was a serious project, the 
accuracy of its data cannot always be taken for granted. Moreover, as with the more recent 
censuses, the data is based on people´s answer´s to a questionnaire, and thus on their own 
perceptions of the difference between single, conviviente and married status, with the latter often 
carrying greater prestige and thus possibly overreported.418 
 
                                                          
417 In 1940, Pasco was still a province of Junín Department. Soon after, it was made into its own department, with 
the modern provinces of Pasco, Daniel Alcides Carrión, and Oxapampa. 
418 Christiansen makes the same argument regarding the older, less accurate 1876 Census: “I am not convinced that 
all individuals who were reported as formally married had actually married in church. It strikes me as quite probable 
that some priests or hacendados may have reported that their parishioners or tenants were married in an attempt to 
place themselves in a better light as moral supervisors. It is therefore possible that the incidence of marriage was 
actually overreported in the census” (Christiansen 2004, 58). She furthermore cites Susan Lobo´s study of squatter 




Table 9: Marital status, individuals ages 15 and over, according to 1940 Census 
 Single Convivient
e 
Married Divorced Widowed Undeclare
d 
Total 

















































































































































































































































































































Note: For the sake of clarity, I have italicized all the columns that show data for men, and left the columns 
for women in regular font. The percentages indicate proportions out of the total for each gender, which 
appears in the rightmost column. 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Estadística, República del Perú: Censo Nacional de Población, 1940, Vol. 




Measuring contamination in Cerro de Pasco 
 
The contamination of the environment 
Environmental measurements have long been made by companies themselves, both as 
part of their regular operations and safety guidelines and, increasingly, in response to 
environmental inspection and regulation from the government.419 Carlos Alarcón´s 1994 study 
was one of the first to publish environmental measurements obtained from Centromín company 
documents. It focused on two aspects: the contamination of the air in the smelter town of La 
Oroya with lead, sulfur and arsenic,420 and the pollution of Lake Junín, through the San Juan 
River, with mining wastes from Cerro de Pasco. Alarcón´s study published company 
measurements of heavy metals in lake/tailings deposit of Quiulacocha and in the San Juan River. 
Originating in the lands of the community of Rancas, the San Juan is the most important river in 
the immediate vicinity of Cerro de Pasco and is the main tributary of Lake Junín, the second 
largest lake in Peru and the origin of the Mantaro River, which in turn is one of the most 
important rivers in the central highlands and a tributary of the Amazon basin. As a destination 
for the Cerro de Pasco mine´s tailings for decades, Lake Quiulacocha showed abundant levels of 
iron, lead, manganese, as well as sulfur, zinc, copper and cadmium. Some of this filtered into the 
San Juan River, together with excess water from the mine itself, and was carried downstream 
into Lake Junín, where measurements showed extremely high levels of iron as well as elevated 
                                                          
419 Such attention was first prompted by the “smoke damage affair” of La Oroya as well as complaints from 
communities affected by the mineral residue dumped into the San Juan River and Lake Chinchaycocha, though the 
latter were scarcely attended to.  
420 For La Oroya, according to Alarcón, company figures revealed average yearly atmospheric lead levels in the 
neighborhood of Old Oroya for the period 1986-1991 to range from 5.5 ug/m3 (1375 times the World Bank´s 
maximum permissible limit for outdoor exposure at the time of .004 ug/m3) in 1986 to 30.5 ug/m3 (7625 times the 
World Bank limit) in 1988 (Alarcón 1994, 33-34). Sulfur and arsenic levels were also found to be above World 
Bank limits in La Oroya. 
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levels of lead, manganese and nitrogen trioxide and, to a lesser degree, arsenic and copper 
(Alarcón 1994, 53-57). 
 In the 1980s and 90s, the state mining company implemented a number of projects aimed 
in part to reduce contamination: a new water treatment plant, a new, better-constructed tailings 
dam at Occroyoc to replace Quiulacocha, and systems for recirculating mine water and tailings 
runoff back into the concentrator plant (Alarcón 1994, 52-53; Volcan EIA P/S, 10). These 
projects have no doubt reduced the dumping of heavy metals into the San Juan River and other 
nearby bodies of water. However, they have by no means solved the problem entirely. No 
remediation project has been implemented for the Quiulacocha deposit, for which the current 
company, Volcan, takes no responsibility. That is also the case for the waste ore mounds that 
date from the Centromín period, though the currently produced waste ore deposits also lie 
uncovered and exposed, generating acid drainage as will be seen shortly. And some effluents are 
still being deposited into the San Juan River through a drainage canal, which contains waste not 
only from Volcan but also from the small Aurex gold mine as well as some urban sewage - , as is 
common knowledge locally and as Bianchini´s421 2009 study also shows. 
 For the San Juan River, Bianchini took water samples at four points: upstream, near the 
source of part of the city’s drinking water,422 before the river meets the canal from the mine; the 
urban sewage/mine waste drainage canal itself; the San Juan River shortly after meeting with the 
canal, and the river 30 kilometers downstream where it flows into Lake Junín. Measurements 
were taken on 5 different dates and analyzed using UV/VIS spectroscopy to determine the 
presence of the metals aluminum (Al), iron (Fe), bromium (Br), manganese (Mn), copper (Cu) 
                                                          
421 Bianchini, an Italian environmental scientist and chemist active in the environmental movement, took water 
measurements as well as blood samples from Cerro residents in early 2009. Having previously worked on similar 
mining issues in Guatemala and El Salvador, he was hired by a Peruvian organization to look at the case of Cerro de 
Pasco, and spent around four months in the area. His study sought to measure the presence of heavy metals and 
other substances, as well as pH and conductivity, in different bodies of water in Cerro and its surroundings: the San 
Juan, Tingo and Upper Huallaga rivers, the Quiulacocha lake, a mine water canal and the city’s drinking water. In 
addition, as we will see later, he also examined blood levels for several metals in one Cerro neighborhood. I met 
Bianchini at the beginning of his study, since he was housed at a local NGO that I had contact with. I accompanied 
him one time to obtain a water sample, and wrote an introduction to the published version of his report (BIanchini 
2009). In our conversations, he voiced concern that lead was overemphasized when it was probably not the metal 
most present, since it is produced to be sent out whereas other less useful byproducts remain in the area.  
422 The other part of the city´s water comes from Lake Acococha; I describe this in detail in another chapter. 
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and zinc (Zn), as well as hydrogen cyanide (HCN) and sulfate (SO4). The averages are shown 
below: 
Table 10 – Bianchini (2009) measurements – San Juan River – UV/VIS 
 HCN SO4 Al Fe Br Mn Cu Zn 
1. River 
upstream 
5.60 1.26 0.05 0.47 0.05 0.09 3.20 0.02 
2. Canal from 
mines/sewage 
9.00 847.50 1.09 26.66 0.09 46.96 42.38 10.28 
3. River shortly 
after canal 
8.00 539.38 0.67 18.82 0.09 28.82 21.97 6.38 
4. River 30 
kms. down-
stream 
7.00 118.20 0.29 6.00 0.15 1.76 5.01 1.78 
Taken from: Bianchini 2009, 47. Temperature, ph levels and conductivity have been omitted. 
All measurements are in miligrams per liter (mg/L) 
 
 One additional sample was taken on one date and sent to Italy to be analyzed using an 
atomic absorption spectrophotometer (AAS). This allowed other metals to be measured in 
addition to the ones above, such as cadmium (Cd), chromium (Cr), vanadium (V), tin (Sn), 










Table 11 – Bianchini (2009) measurements – San Juan River (AAS) 



















3.004 .0015 .0052 .022 3.623 .275 .085 .01 .175 .17 .037 .0071 
Taken from Bianchini 2009, 69. (Layout has been rearranged and the values for mercury have been 
omitted since said element is not present in significant quantities). 
All values are in mg/L 
 The comparison between the data obtained through multiple analyses through UV/VIS 
spectroscopy with that generated through AAS on one single date shows how widely such 
numbers can vary depending on the day samples are taken (effluents from the mine need not be 
uniform across time) and on the method used. Nevertheless, the pattern is clear: the effluent 
canal (point 2) contains large amounts of sulfate, aluminum, iron, manganese, copper, zinc, 
aluminum, lead, zinc and arsenic. These metals are found in much higher concentrations there 
than in the river as it comes from its source away from the mine (point 1). This contrast 
highlights the relationship between anthropogenic (“man-made”) and non-anthropogenic 
(“natural”) processes of contamination. The metals are indeed the result of long-term geologic 
mechanisms that lead to higher concentrations of certain elements at certain locations rather than 
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at others; it is these processes that create mineral deposits in the first place.423 In its metabolism 
with the environment, however, human activity then produces much higher concentrations of 
these same elements. Rather than being radically opposed to or different from nature, the result 
of human action is in this case both similar to (same elements), and different from (different 
concentrations), the product of non-human activity.424  
Thus, once it is joined by the canal from the mines, the river shows much higher 
concentrations than it did before (point 3). The metals from the canal are diluted somewhat by 
the cleaner water coming in from the river, but only partially.425 It should be noted that almost all 
of the metals noted above are found in point 3 at concentrations well above World Health 
Organization standards for drinking water: iron is between 6 and 7.6 times the maximum of 0.3 
mg/L; manganese is 30 to 72 times the guideline of 0.4 mg/L. Even what might seem like a small 
figure for arsenic – a jump from .044 to .185 mg/L – actually signifies an increase from a level 
some 4 times the WHO standard for drinking water to one some 18 times that standard. The 
difference between 44 and 185 micrograms of arsenic per liter is actually treated in the literature 
on arsenic as very significant in terms of health effects on the human body. Arsenic is unusual 
among the elements discussed here in that non-anthropogenic, “natural” concentrations actually 
can be harmful to people. The level of 44 ug/L found in the San Juan River at point 1 – or, for 
that matter, the level of 43 ug/L found in the city’s drinking water – would seem to correspond to 
such a non-anthropogenic level of contamination that can be considered harmful though not 
                                                          
423 In turn, these deposits then become “reserves” through their interaction with social factors such as prices and 
technology. 
424 Of course, the division between anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic processes is not always clear-cut. For 
example, surface water contaminated with metals concentrated by human activity can find their way into 
groundwater. 
425 Thus, the concentration of iron in the San Juan River itself jumps from 0.47 mg/L at point 1 to 18.82 at point 3, 
according to the UV/VIS data, or from 0.249 to 22.903, according to the AAS data. The amount of manganese 
jumps from .09 to 28.82 (UV/VIS) or from .031 to 11.85 (AAS); copper increases from 3.20 to 21.97 (UV/VIS) or 
from .015 to 2.480425 (AAS); arsenic jumps from .044 to  .185 (AAS); the amount of sulfates increases from 1.26 to 
539.38 (UV/VIS); zinc increases from .02 at point 1 to 6.38 at point 3 (UV/VIS) or from .034 to 5.34 (AAS). 
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extreme.426 The level of 185 ug/L at point 3 corresponds to a higher level caused by human 
activity.427  
By contrast to arsenic, and as mentioned earlier, lead is not usually present in the 
environment at high enough concentrations to be a significant risk to human health; lead 
poisoning has historically been closely associated with human manufacturing activities.428  At 
the San Juan River, according to the data presented above, lead jumps from .037 mg/L before the 
encounter with the mine residue canal to 2.388 mg/L after that encounter; this latter value is over 
238 times the WHO’s guideline for lead levels in drinking water. 
 Of course, point 3 on the San Juan River is not drinking water for people; the urban 
population of Cerro derives its drinking water from point 1 on the river as well as from Lake 
Acococha. The village of Rancas, where I did some of my fieldwork, is situated next to the San 
Juan River, but further upstream, and in any case derives its drinking water from a set of natural 
springs (puquios) using the river mainly to wash clothes. Generally, in communities with some 
mining experience, people know which rivers are contaminated and lifeless and obviously avoid 
drinking water from there. However, the metals are absorbed into the ground and may find their 
way into the grass, plants and the animals that consume them, thus re-circulating in the 
environment.429  
 The San Juan River data also show the spatial dimension of pollution: it decreases 
gradually as one moves down the river and away from the juncture with the mine waste, either 
                                                          
426 The level of arsenic found naturally  in both the San Juan River and the city’s drinking water is slightly above 
four times the WHO guideline level of 10 ug/L (see below).  
427 As Bundschuh et al. write in connection with this relation between human and non-human processes, “Arsenic is 
present in water, mainly groundwater, due to natural processes and also due to many labor activities such as mining 
where As can be found at dangerously high concentrations” (Bundschuch et al. 2009, 4). 
428 As Warren tells in his social history of lead poisoning (2000), in the 1960s geochemist Clair C. Patterson showed 
that the average American’s blood-lead level was 100 times higher than was natural (204). This was during the high 
point of what Warren calls the United States’ twentieth century “saturnine binge,” namely the widespread use of 
lead in gasoline and paint as well as common household items. Also, according to one estimate (Smith and Fleegal 
1992), blood-lead levels in pre-industrial humans were a mere 0.016 ug/dL (CDC 2005, 3).  
429 As Cai et al (2009) write for the case of lead and cadmium, “the food chain is an important source of Cd and Pb 
accumulation, especially for plants grown on polluted soils... Significant amounts of Cd and Pb can be transferred 
from contaminated soil to plants and grass.” (Cai et al. 2009, 3078). For the case of arsenic, the Blacksmith 
Institute’s 2010 World’s Worst Pollution Problems Report states that “arsenic cannot be destroyed, and thus remains 
in surface soil long after the event that released the arsenic has ceased. Because of this, many people do not realize 
that the soil near them contains high concentrations of the element.” (Blacksmith Institute 2010, 45). 
545 
 
because the metals are deposited on the ground or because other, clean streams come into the 
river.430 Thus, at point 4 (where the river enters into Lake Junín, 30 kilometers downstream), 
measurements for the various metals are almost all lower than at point 3.431 These measurements 
might have been significantly higher before the remediation projects undertaken by the state 
mining company in the 1980s and 90s, in particular the water treatment plant432 and systems for 
recirculating mine water and tailings runoff. These projects were the result of new environmental 
regulation as well as years of pressure and complaints from the comunidades surrounding Lake 
Junín, which for decades had received massive amounts of tailings and other mine waste through 
the San Juan River.  
 Another aspect of contamination from mining in Cerro de Pasco is the waste ore deposits 
and stockpiles that ring the city on its northwest and northeast sides. These cause two main 
problems: the spread of mineral particles into the city air and soil, and the generation of acid 
drainage. This latter issue is acknowledged in the company’s 2006 Closure Plan documents.433 
On the one hand, this document claims that only those stockpiles situated to the northwest of the 
open pit show a tendency to generate acid drainage (because of their high pyrite content), 
whereas the Rumiallana deposit, located to the northeast, where the Tingo River434 is born, do 
not (Volcan 2006, Appendix 8, 17). On the other hand, elsewhere in the document (Appendix 9) 
it is affirmed even for the Rumiallana deposit that “the high permeability and porosity of the 
waste ore permits the filtration that appears at the base as acid waters by oxidation of iron sulfide 
(pyrite) contained in the ore” (Volcan 2006, App. 9, 3.4). The document claims that this acid 
                                                          
430 Communication with Flaviano Bianchini. 
431 For some, like copper and arsenic, they decrease almost to their original level (point 1). Others, like iron and total 
sulfate, remain at levels significantly higher than at point 1, though still substantially lower than at point 2. 
432 This plant had a decontaminating effect on the San Juan River but resulted in the contamination of Lake 
Yanamate, where its effluents were sent. 
433 The data contained therein shows these piles of ore to be made up of different types of rock, with widely varying 
amounts of quartz and pyrite, and, to a lesser degree, dolomite, hematite, pyrolusite and others (Volcan 2006, App. 
8, 1-14). In terms of the elements involved, analysis reveals above all iron, and, to a lesser degree, calcium, 
manganese, lead, zinc, copper, cadmium and arsenic (Ibid., 15). 
434 The Tingo River is one of the two most important rivers that pass close to the city (the other being the San Juan). 
Unlike the San Juan, which flows south toward Lake Junín and the Mantaro River, the Tingo flows north towards 
the Huallaga River. Though both form part of the larger Amazon basin, their waters do not meet until much later, 
when the Ucayali and the Marañón Rivers meet to form the Amazon, next to the city of Iquitos in the Peruvian rain 
forest. Cerro de Pasco thus sits on a sort of hydrological divide between the two basins. The Tingo is born in a 
ravine right outside the city, behind the Rumiallana waste ore deposit as well as the city garbage dump.  
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water is now canalized and pumped up to the water treatment plant to avoid contamination of the 
Tingo River´s headwaters. However, it also acknowledges that some of the acid waters “that 
filtrate into the fluvial-glacial deposit that constitutes the bog, follow the direction of the slope of 
the terrain, provoking a negative impact on the environment.” (Ibid., 3.4).  
Indeed, Bianchini (2009) also presents measurements taken at the headwaters of the 
Tingo River, where it is born right next to the Rumiallana waste ore deposit. This water shows a 
very high electrical conductivity as well as high levels of total sulfate (SO4), iron, manganese, 
copper, aluminum and lead (Bianchini 2009, 39, 69). This would be due not only to the waste ore 
but also to the city´s garbage dump, which lies next to it. Measurements taken at two points 
much further downstream in the Tingo’s course show that these levels are gradually diluted as 
the river receives water from other streams. Thus, whereas the San Juan River is borne away 
from the mine and then receives high doses of metals when it passes close to Cerro de Pasco, the 
Tingo River is born contaminated just outside of the city. The pollution then gradually decreases 
as one moves away from the river’s origin in the high plateau and downward towards the 
valleys.435 This is, of course, part of the problem of having a mining center at such high altitude 
as Cerro – gravity makes it hard to keep at least some of the metals and acid drainage from 
reaching the streams and rivers that form at many of the ravines in this region.436 
 The acid drainage problem also affects the waste ore deposits left behind by the old state 
mining company, for which the current company, Volcan, takes no responsibility. This deposit, 
named Excelsior, is located on the western edge of the city, surrounding the neighborhood of 
Champamarca and separating it from the Quiulacocha tailings deposit.437 In 2003, Wade et al. 
(2006) studied how the Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) problem operates on this side of the city. 
                                                          
435 Namely, UV/VIS analysis shows the average of 5 different days at the headwaters of the Tingo River to be 
728.68 mg/L of SO4, 14.03 of iron, 30.7 of manganese, 26.88 of copper and 11.22 of zinc (Bianchini 2009, 39). 
AAS analysis from Feb. 12, 2009 shows 8.376 mg/L of iron, 21.512 of manganese, 0.165 of lead and 2.001 of 
aluminum (Ibid., 69). Compare these figures to the values given in the table above for Point 1 of the San Juan River, 
which gives an idea of what the metal content in a “normal” river in the area might be. Also, while the Tingo River 
“cleans” itself gradually, the measurements taken downstream are still higher than normal. 
436 Although Cerro is still part of the Bombón plateau – a vast expanse situated at 4,300 meters above sea level and 
the second largest altiplano or high plateau in Peru – it is not in the flattest, central part of the plateau but rather at 
its northeastern edge, precisely where it begins to drop down into the valleys and ravines. 
437 The Excelsior waste-rock dump contains 26,400,000 m3 of ore covering 94 hectares and containing 60 wt% of 
pyrite. The Quiulacocha tailings deposit contains 79 Mt of tailings covering 114 hectares (Wade et al. 2006, 2199). 
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The Quiulacocha tailings deposit, situated in a former lake, is composed of two parts: a copper-
rich area where tailings were deposited from the 1920s to the 1940s, and a larger zinc-and-lead-
rich area used to deposit tailings between 1946 and 1992. The latter area, they found, was not 
itself generating significant amounts of AMD438, but the Excelsior waste-rock dump adjacent to 
it was. This AMD then infiltrated into the tailings deposit creating an underground acid plume 
rich in iron, zinc and to a lesser degree lead. Some of the AMD was also channeled on a surface 
canal. Both the underground plume and the surface canal emptied into what remains of Lake 
Quiulacocha – basically an AMD pond on top of the copper-rich section of the tailings, with a 
pH of 2.3 (Ibid., 2204). This acid liquid reacted with the copper-rich tailings to liberate arsenic 
from sulfide minerals such as enargite, arsenopyrite, and tennantite: “the arsenic content in this 
pond remained high (6.54 mg/L) and constituted a major pollutant” (Wade et al. 2006, 2204). 
Indeed, in 2009 Bianchini found a lower but still very high level of arsenic in a sample from 
Lake Quiulacocha: 4.65 mg/L (Bianchini 2009, 69).439 Some of the AMD collected in this pond 
was then pumped into the active tailings deposit at Occroyoc, where it caused further oxidation 
of sulfides there (Wade et al. 2006, 2205).440  
 Lastly, the CDC study (mentioned in the Volcan radio ad) also examined the 
contamination of the urban soil with metal particles, in particular with lead, in the neighborhoods 
of Ayapoto, Paragsha and Chaupimarca (centro). Of the homes examined, 79% had lead levels 
above the level recommended by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency – 400 parts per 
million (ppm) – 60% had levels above 1200 ppm (Conklin et al., 12).441 The study also found a 
strong correlation between lead levels in the soil and dust in the home and blood lead levels, for 
                                                          
438 This, they concluded, was because of a particular geochemical situation: although the sulfidic minerals on top did 
generate AMD through their interaction with the oxygen in the atmosphere, this acidity was neutralized by the 
underlying carbonate minerals (dolomite and siderite). 
439 These figures are somewhere between 100 and 145 times, respectively, the concentration of arsenic that seems to 
be found naturally in at least some of the region’s water, namely the San Juan River (at point 1 in the table above) 
and the city’s drinking water that comes from there. They are also 465 and 654 times the WHO standard for arsenic 
in drinking water. Again, of course, no one would drink water from the AMD pool that is Lake Quiulacocha, but 
still, it should be noted that this concentration of arsenic is located in the open air immediately next to the village of 
Quiulacocha. 
440 For that reason, they advocated separating the hydrological separation of the three waste systems (the Excelsior 
waste ore dump, the inactive Quiulacocha tailings, and the active Occroyoc tailings).  
441 The researchers took 84 samples of soil and 99 samples of dust from 53 homes, as well as 32 soil samples from 
public areas (Conklin et al. 2008, 8). 
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both children and pregnant women (Ibid., 18).442 In the public areas, 84% of the samples were 
above the 400 ppm guideline, and 66% were above 1200 ppm (Ibid., 13). The soccer field in the 
neighborhood of La Esperanza had a lead concentration of 7,700 ppm (Ibid., 17).  Although the 
study found no clear geographical pattern in the degree of lead contamination of the soil, it did 
show a certain clustering of higher levels of lead in homes near the open pit and the waste rock 
deposits. Indeed, it would seem that these deposits are one important source of the spread of 
lead: the sample with the highest lead content – 20,000 ppm (50 times the EPA standard) – came 














                                                          
442 In its 1991 guideline statement, “Preventing lead poisoning in young children,” the CDC notes that “blood lead 
levels generally rise 3-7 ug/dL for every 1,000-ppm increase in soil or dust lead concentrations” (CDC 1991, “Soil 
and Dust”). 
443 Again, the 1991 CDC statement affirms that “since lead does not dissipate, biodegrade, or decay, the lead 




Measurements of metals in blood – Cerro de Pasco 
National and Regional Health Agency Studies 
 Over the last two decades, agencies from the Ministry of Health, such as the National 
Institute of Health (INS) and the Regional Health Office (DIRESA), have drawn and analyzed 
samples of the blood of residents of Cerro de Pasco. Because of lead’s high public profile, these 
studies have focused exclusively on this metal. Furthermore, they concern children, since they 
are known to be more vulnerable to the effects of lead than are adults. Of these Health Ministry 
measurements, the most readily available results are those that were taken in 2005 and have been 
published in Astete et al. (2005). They do not concern all of the city, but rather only the 
neighborhoods of Champamarca and Quiulacocha.444 The study attempted to sample the blood of 
all children between 1 and 10 years old who had been living in these two neighborhoods for at 
least 1 year. All, in all, 236 children were examined. Using the World Health Organization’s 
current guideline of 10 ug/dL (10 micrograms per deciliter of blood) as a “level of concern” for 
lead in blood, the study found that 85.8% of children sampled were above this level. The lowest 
value recorded was 6.17 ug/dL, and the highest was 34.53; the average was 15.79 ± 4.85 ug/dL 
(Astete et al. 2005, 15).445  
 At the time of my research, these results from 2005 had been made available to at least 
some of the families concerned as well as to the local health posts. The same national and 
regional health agencies that produced those results then conducted a similar study again in 
2008, as mentioned in a 2008 planning document from the Regional Health Office (DIRESA-
PASCO, 2008). Although these have not been published, I was able to obtain a copy of the 2008 
                                                          
444 Champamarca is surrounded on three sides by a waste ore deposit, whereas Quiulacocha sits next to the 
abandoned tailings pond of the same name. 
445 Of the children examined, 14.2% had concentrations below10 ug/dL, 36.1% had between 10 and 14.9, 27.5% 
were between 15 and 19.9, and 22.3% had levels above 20 ug/dL (Astete et al. 2005). 
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results distributed to parents, for one of the neighborhoods involved. As I was told by a local 
health post worker, there had been considerable unease among parents because the 2008 results 
were uniformly lower than the 2005 measurements, for each of the children examined, when 
little or no change had been made to the environment of the neighborhood. There was a 
widespread feeling that results like these could be easily manipulated by the mining company. 
These suspicions have to be understood in the context of a city like Cerro, which is populated by 
rumors and assertions that the mining company “buys” or otherwise exerts undue pressure on 
city officials and authorities to get them to do its bidding.446  
Indeed, an examination of the results confirms that for the 88 individuals who are 
featured on both the 2005 and 2008 lists,447 there is an average drop of 5.04 ug/dL. Whereas the 
average for all individuals on the 2005 list is 15.67448 ug/dL, the average for all individuals on 
the 2008 list is 11.12 ug/dL.449 Of the 88 cases featured on both lists, 95% (84 cases) register a 
drop, whereas only 4 cases register an upward variation. We could presume that either there has 
been some change in the environment450 or in the population´s practices, or there could be either 
intentional manipulation at some level – as some people in the neighborhood seemed to feel – or 
a change in measurement techniques and methods.451 These variations in the numbers highlight 
                                                          
446 I could cite many examples of these assertions as I encountered them in my fieldwork. It is widely assumed that 
the company has journalists on its payroll; one former employee of the company told me of how he had been in 
charge of these payments, in the time of the old state-owned company. The company is widely assumed to exert a 
powerful presence on all aspects of city life, as part of a broader system of corruption that also involves such 
institutions as the local government and the university. 
447 The 2005 list contains 117 individuals; the 2008 list, 145 individuals. Some are featured only on one list or on 
the other, whereas 88 individuals are featured on both. 
448 That is, for one of the two neighborhoods in the study, for which I have the results. For both neighborhoods 
together, the average was 15.79, as cited above and as listed in Astete et al. (2005). 
449 The range also varies between both lists, though it actually becomes wider in the 2008 results. Whereas in 2005 it 
went from 6.17 to 34.53, on the 2008 list the range is from less than 3.3 to 47.18. 
450 It is conceivable that there could indeed have been some environmental change unrelated to the mine. As will be 
seen shortly, the phasing out of leaded gasoline in the United States in the 1970s and 80s caused a dramatic decrease 
in average blood lead levels in the United States. While the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) states 
that the phase-out in Peru was completed as early as December 2004 (See 
http://www.unep.org/pcfv/PDF/MatrixLACLeadjul06.pdf), I do not know whether this actually took longer in the 
interior of Peru and whether the process extended into the 2005-2008 period. In any case, due to the much lower use 
of auto transportation, leaded gasoline was never as great a source of contamination in highland Peru as it was in the 
U.S.  
451 On the one hand, the average for the 2008 list is closer to the averages obtained in the other two significant 
sources we have for blood lead levels in other neighborhoods of Cerro – namely, the CDC study and Bianchini 
(2009). On the other hand, the 2005 results have been published in a Peruvian medical journal, whereas the 2008 
results have not. We must therefore grant greater legitimacy to the 2005 results for the time being, while at the same 
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the importance of exercising caution when quoting figures such as blood lead levels, no matter 
the social prestige that their numerical form carries. 
There are also other measurements which have not been published but which are 
referenced either in the above-mentioned publications or in information I was able to obtain from 
the local health authorities. Astete et al. (2005) mention a 1999 study by the National Health 
Office (DIGESA) that found an average blood lead level in children of 14.9 ug/dL, with the 
range being from 1.9 to 45.5. One document from the local health authorities mentions a 2006 
study in the district of Yanacancha, which supposedly found 14 children with levels above 40 
ug/dL and 6 children above 70 ug/dL (DIRESA-PASCO, 2008, 8); another document says that 
the same study found only 1 child (out of 340) with a level above 70 ug/dL, 10 children between 
45 adn 69.9, and 32 between 20 and 44.9 (DIRESA-PASCO, “Resumen Estudios Plomo”). There 
are also references to two studies in the neighborhood of Miraflores which show levels 
significantly higher than all the other the studies for the rest of the city. 452 This difference could 
be due to a number of factors: a distortion in sampling methods in these earlier studies, the fact 
that Environmental Remediation Plans (PAMAs) had not yet been put into effect, or a possible 
higher level of contamination in the particular neighborhood it examined. Miraflores, an area that 
once sat next to the open pit, no longer exists, as it was destroyed in mine expansion of the late 
1990s.  
The 2007 CDC Study  
 As mentioned earlier, in 2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, 
in collaboration with national health agencies and the Pan-American Health Organization, 
conducted a study of the degree of exposure to heavy metals in three areas of Cerro de Pasco 
(Conklin et al., 2008). The sample included 357 individuals from parts of the city that were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
time acknowledging that such rumors and discrepancies highlight the ways in which these data are human 
constructions – which, again, does not mean that some may not be more accurate than others. 
 
452 According to DIRESA-PASCO (2008) a 1990 study in the Miraflores neighborhood supposedly found an 
average blood lead level of 45 ug/dL, with levels ranging from 28 to 60. According to information I obtained from 
DIRESA-PASCO (“Resumen Estudios Plomo”), a 1996 study in the same neighborhood had found an average level 
of 36.95 ug/dL, with levels ranging from 11 to 71. It could even be that these two studies are really one, and that one 
of my two sources has recorded the information erroneously. 
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different from those examined by the 2005 National Institute of Health study cited above 
whereas the latter had taken place in Quiulacocha and Champamarca, the CDC measurements 
sampled the neighborhoods of Ayapoto and Paragsha – both next to the open pit – and the larger 
area of Chaupimarca (the center of the city). Whereas the previous measurements had examined 
only children, this study also looked at women of fertile age (defined as 15 to 45 years), since 
fetuses are known to be at risk from lead ingested by their mothers. The CDC report found an 
average blood lead level for the 163 children of 10.5 ug/dL, ranging from a minimum of 1.8 to a 
maximum of 64 ug/dL. The percentage of children with levels above the WHO 10ug/dL “level of 
concern” was 53%. It was this result that the company’s Operations Manager was referring to 
when he spoke of the “low level” (under 10 ug) enjoyed by 47% of children (see above) – the 
fact that the majority was above 10 ug was not explicitly mentioned in his speech. For the 194 
women in fertile age, the blood lead levels were found to be lower, as is common for adults.453  
Unlike the studies from the national health authorities cited previously, the CDC did not 
limit itself to lead, but also tested the blood and urine samples for other metals, using mass 
spectrometry: blood was examined for cadmium and mercury, while urine samples were 
analyzed for antimony, arsenic (both organic and inorganic), barium, beryllium, cesium, cobalt, 
molybdenum, platinum, thallium, tungsten and uranium. Of these heavy metals, the two that 
were found to be present in significant quantities, besides lead, were cesium and thallium. Here, 
unlike with lead, the level of contamination in adults was similar to that for children.454 
Compared to lead, the literature on the effects of cesium and thallium is much more limited, and 
there is no established standard of concern for these two metals. The CDC study determined 
                                                          
453 The average was 5.8 ug/dL, with the low and high extremes being 1.8 and 51 ug, respectively. The percentage 
with a blood lead level above 10 ug/dL was 9.4%. 
454 Among children, the average level of cesium was 19.0 ug/L, ranging from a minimum of 2.56 to a high of 382 
ug/L; 63.1% were considered to have an “elevated level” of this metal. For women of fertile age, the average level 
of cesium was 19.4, ranging from a minimum of 2.0 to a maximum of 489.0; 69.6% were judged to have an elevated 
level of the metal. In the case of thallium, the average for children was 0.65 ug/L, with a minimum of 0.015 and a 
maximum of 23.6, while 70.5% had elevated levels. For the women, the average thallium level was 0.77 ug/L, 




whether values were “elevated” based on whether they were above the 95th percentile for the 
U.S. population.455  
 2009 measurements 
 Bianchini’s 2009 study, cited above for its measurements of water contamination, also 
included one set of blood measurements, taken on February 16 2009 and shipped to Italy to be 
analyzed using atomic absorption spectrometry. The blood was taken from 41 individuals – 24 
children between the ages of 6 and 12, and 17 individuals over the age of 12 – from the 
neighborhood of Paragsha. Paragsha is where the mine’s offices and two concentrator plants are 
located, and was also one of the three neighborhoods examined by the CDC study. Bianchini’s 
analysis examined three of the same metals as the CDC report: lead, cadmium and arsenic. In 
addition to these, however, he also measured the presence of copper, aluminum, selenium, 
manganese, chromium, nickel and cadmium.456  In terms of lead, the study found a mean level of 
8.257 ug/dL in the children examined and 6.194 ug/dL in the adults (Bianchini 2009, 79-81). The 
level for children is lower than that found by the CDC study for the same neighborhood (10.0 
ug/dL); this variation could be due to a difference in the sample chosen or to other factors. The 
lowest level for children found by Bianchini was 2.61 ug/dL, and the highest was 23.25. The 
percentage of children with levels above 10 ug/dL was 25%. 
 As mentioned above, Bianchini was more interested in highlighting the presence of 
metals other than lead, since they are rarely talked about in Cerro. Among these other metals, the 
ones he found to be of greatest concern were arsenic, chromium, nickel and aluminum. 
According to the results, the average level of arsenic in blood was 15.73 ug/L, with individual 
levels ranging from a low of 9.00 to a high of 28.93 ug/L. Chromium levels ranged from a low of 
0.32 ug/L to a high of 1.17 ug/L, the average being 0.56, which according to Bianchini is more 
than three times the allowed limit (Bianchini 2009, 82) – all cases except one were over twice the 
                                                          
455 In other words, in the U.S., less than 5% of the general population have levels of cesium and thallium as high as 
those considered “elevated” in this study. Thus, unlike the lead measurements, the classification of a level as 
“elevated” here is based on a comparison with the U.S. population rather than necessarily on a risk to health, even if 
peripheral neuropathy is a well-documented effect of both chronic and acute exposure to thallium (the effects of 
cesium are less well-known). 
456 Whereas the CDC study used blood samples for lead, cadmium and mercury and urine samples for all the other 
metals it measured, Bianchini used only blood samples for all metals. 
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limit. For nickel, the average level was 6.00 ug/L, with a range from a low of 4.05 ug/L to a high 
of 9.90 ug/L. According to the study, the limit level for nickel is 1.00 ug/L, which means that the 
average in Cerro de Pasco is six times the allowed limit. All cases present blood nickel levels 
that are four times the allowed limit. Other metals that were found at high levels were aluminum, 
and to a lesser degree manganese and selenium.457  
Final note – arsenic thresholds 
 In the text of Chapter 7 I discuss the changing construction of threshold levels for lead in 
blood. Similarly, for the case of arsenic, Smith et al.’s 1992 review argues that the available 
evidence does not support the idea of a threshold for inorganic arsenic carcinogenicity, below 
which no harm would occur (264-264). Like lead, the harmful effects of arsenic have been 
known since antiquity; unlike lead, it was explicitly used as a poison. This “king of poisons” 
(Nriagu 2002, 1) later also found other uses, as an ingredient in medicine, poison gas and 
pesticides, as well as being a by-product emitted by copper smelters, leading to what Nriagu calls 
the “golden age of arsenic poisoning” between 1850 and 1950 (Ibid., 10). In recent years, 
concern over arsenic poisoning has centered on its presence in groundwater; unlike in the case of 
lead, public health agencies tend to focus most on numbers related not to blood levels but rather 
to concentrations in drinking water.458 In 1942, the U.S. Public Health Service set an interim 
standard of 50 ug of arsenic per liter of drinking water; 10 years later, it set a goal of reducing 
arsenic in drinking water to 10 ug/L (Smith and Smith 2004, 39). This latter value became the 
WHO’s  guideline for drinking water in 1992 (Ibid., 39).   
While countries like the U.S., Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the European Union have 
adopted the 10 ug/L standard, Peru, like many developing nations, has maintained the former 
guideline of 50 ug/L (Castro de Esparza 2009, 21). As mentioned above, Bianchini (2009) found 
a level of arsenic in Cerro de Pasco’s drinking water of 43 ug/L, and a similar measure of 44 
                                                          
457 Copper and cadmium, on the other hand, were found to be at much lower levels. 
458 Again, the difference between lead and arsenic must be emphasized: while poisoning by the former is almost 
always due to anthropogenic sources, harmful concentrations of the latter can be due to either anthropogenic or 
“natural” factors. The greatest number of people affected by groundwater contaminated with arsenic appears to be in 
India, Nepal and Bangladesh (Blacksmith 2010, 44) as well as Taiwan and northern China; in the Americas, 
Argentina, northern Chile and Mexico have also been affected (Bundschuh et al 2009). 
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ug/L at the source of that drinking water, namely point 1 of the San Juan River,459 before the 
river receives the polluted stream from the mines and the city. If these measures are correct, it 
means that the city’s drinking water is over four times the WHO guideline but just under the 
national limit. There would seem to be little doubt based on the evidence available in the 
literature that a level of 43 to 44 ug/L460 produces at least some serious health effects. While 
chronic exposure to arsenic has long been known to cause skin lesions and in particular skin 
cancer, in recent years it has been shown to cause more fatal internal cancers as well – 
particularly of the liver, lung, kidney and bladder – as well circulatory and peripheral nervous 
disorders (Smith and Smith 2004, ATSDR 2007, WHO 2008, Henke 2009). The health effects 
are obviously worse in a population with acutely contaminated water – according to Smith and 
Smith (2004), if the level of arsenic is 500 ug/L, 1 in 10 people drinking that water over many 
years may expect to die from internal cancers attributable to arsenic, with lung cancer the leading 
cause (39). At 50 ug/L, Smith et al. (1992) calculate the death rate from cancer caused by arsenic 
to be about 13.4 in a 1,000 (264), whereas the U.S. National Research Council, Subcommittee on 
Drinking Water, estimates a lifetime excess cancer risk at that arsenic level of between 1 in a 100 
and 1 in a 1,000 (Hlavay et al. 2003, 492).461 At the same time, although Smith and Smith (2004) 
argue that “reducing water concentrations from 50 [the Peruvian maximum limit and 7 points 
above Cerro’s drinking water] to 10 ug/L might reduce long-term cancer risk from one in 100 to 
one in 500,” (43) they believe that 50 ug/L might be a more realistic short-term goal for 
                                                          
459 Cerro’s drinking water used to come from Lake Yanamate, immediately to the south of the city. When the new 
Mine Water Treatment Plant was inaugurated in 1981, with the objective of reducing the amount of contaminants 
released into the San Juan River, the effluents from that plant began to be sent to Lake Yanamate – this arrangement 
lasted until 2003 and effectively destroyed the lake. Thereafter, the city’s drinking water supply shifted to the San 
Juan River (upstream from where it receives pollution from the mine) and toa canal from the Quicay River and Lake 
Acococha to the west. (Information from Volcan Environmental Impact Assessment for Paragsha Expansion, and 
from Centromín Archive – Box 1263, Folder 21).  
460 By comparison with this level in Cerro, estimates for the average level of arsenic in drinking water in the U.S. 
range from 2.0 to 2.5 ug/L (Smith et al., 1992, 264), though it is also estimated that 350,000 people in the U.S. drink 
water above 50 ug/L (Ibid., 259). In 2002 Smith and Smith calculated that in Bangladesh, West Bengal and parts of 
China, “millions of people have arsenic concentrations in their drinking water above 50 ug/L, with some exceeding 
1000 ug/L” (Smith and Smith 2002, 42). The Blacksmith Institute (2010) has identified a population of 3.7 million 
people worldwide “at risk” of severe arsenic contamination, and estimates that its actual size is 5-9 million people 
(Blacksmith 2010, 44). In one community near a mine smelter in Mexico, people consumed arsenic-rich water (190-
650 ug/L, with an average of 380 ug/L) over a span of 12 years (Bundschuh et al, 2009, 11). In the Chilean city of 
Antofagasta in 1958, arsenic levels rose sharply to around 800 ug/L when a new water supply began to be used; after 
an arsenic removal plant was built in the 1970s, concentrations decreased to 40 ug/L (Ibid., 6).  
461 Castro de Esparza (2009), on the other hand, argues that “exposure to 50 ug/L can cause 31.33 cases of skin 
cancer per 1000 inhabitants” (20).  
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developing countries with widespread arsenic pollution above this level, since “setting stringent 
drinking water standards will impair short term solutions” that are urgently needed in highly 
contaminated places (39). In any case, they argue, “even when the concentration in drinking 
water is reduced to 10 ug/L as the World Health Organization recommendation, potential cancer 
risks remain high” (Smith and Smith 2004, 39).  
While the level of arsenic in drinking-water detected by Bianchini (2009) would seem to 
probably be due to non-anthropogenic contamination, his study also measured blood arsenic 
levels in the sample of 41 individuals from the neighborhood of Paragsha and found the average 
concentration to be 15.73 ug/L, with individuals ranging from 9.00 to 28.93 ug/L. Granted, this 
information comes from one single sample on a single date in one neighborhood, and the 
reliability of blood arsenic levels as an indicator of arsenic contamination seems to be disputed 
(more so than in the case of lead).462 Nevertheless, and although the data on blood arsenic levels 
in the literature is very limited (unlike for blood lead concentrations), the levels found by 
Bianchini in Paragsha seem rather high463 if the only source is the 43 ug/L of arsenic found in the 
drinking water; places with higher water arsenic concentrations than Cerro seem to have lower 
blood arsenic concentrations than those found in Bianchini’s sample.464 If this is true, one 
                                                          
462  Wu et al. (2001) argue that “Once digested as a water solution, arsenic is rapidly transported by the blood to 
such organs as the liver, kidneys, lungs, intestines and the skin within 24 hours. Although 90% of the bloodborne 
arsenic is rapidly cleared, blood arsenic level is still a useful indicator of continuous arsenic exposure. In contrast, 
urine arsenic is the best indicator of recent exposure of several days” (1012). While Wu et al. thus see blood and 
urine levels as useful indicators of different things, Castro de Esparza argues that “Studies have shown that urine is 
the best biomarker for measuring absorbed inorganic As, as blood, hair and nails are less sensitive to exposure.” (20) 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Toxicological Profile for Arsenic (2007) states that 
“measurements of blood arsenic reflect exposures only within the very recent past” but also that “blood levels do not 
appear to be reliable indicators of chronic exposure to low levels of arsenic... measurement of blood arsenic is not 
generally considered to be a reliable means of monitoring human populations for arsenic exposure... measurement of 
urinary arsenic levels is generally accepted  as the most reliable indicator of recent arsenic exposure.” (258-259). On 
the whole, it would seem that blood arsenic levels can indicate continuous or very recent (1 to 24 hours) exposure to 
arsenic, but that it may also significantly underestimate such exposure. Urine arsenic levels, on the other hand, may 
be more useful at gauging exposure from the previous few days.  
463 According to Le (2002) blood concentrations of arsenic in people with no excess exposure range between 0.3 and 
2 ug/L.  On the other hand, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service’s Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry states that “a high blood arsenic level (normal being less than 7 ug/100 mL) might confirm a 
diagnosis of poisoning.” But, again “arsenic moves quickly out of the bloodstream (its initial half life in blood is 1 to 
2 hours) and a normal value does not exclude poisoning.” (ATSDR, “Arsenic Trioxide,” 19). 
464 I make this observation based on a comparison with the limited data on blood arsenic measurements available for 
other sites. Wu et al. (2001), in their study of a region of Taiwan (a country where arsenic contamination of well 
water is a significant public health problem), found an average blood arsenic concentration of 9.60 ug/L, and a range 
of 0 to 46.50 ug/L. For those who had levels of 10 to 50 ug/L in their drinking water, the blood concentration was 
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tentative explanation could be that arsenic contaminates city residents not only through drinking 
water but also through the soil and through the concentration of arsenic in the meat of animals 
that eat and drink in fields near sources of arsenic pollution. After all, as shown earlier, there are 
significant concentrations of arsenic in Lake Quiulacocha – liberated through the interaction 
between the copper-rich tailings and the AMD drainage from the waste ore deposits – and in the 
San Juan River after it receives the canal from the Volcan and Aurex mines (and from city 
sewage). Even if this arsenic does not make it into the drinking water system, it is still present in 













                                                                                                                                                                                           
8.1. Only those who had over 300 ug/L in their water (a very high level) had blood concentrations approaching the 
average in Bianchini’s sample from Cerro, namely 11.4 (against 15.73 in Bianchini’s sample) (Wu et al. 2001, 
1012). Le (2002) compiles some of the data on blood arsenic levels. Women in Argentina exposed to high levels of 
arsenic in drinking water (200 ug/L) had an average of 8 ug/L. In areas of California and Nevada with water arsenic 
between 100 and 400 ug/L, the arsenic blood level for the population sample was 3-4. On the other hand, in a very 
arsenic-rich area of Taiwan, the average blood level was 22 ug/L, and individuals who had developed Blackfoot 
disease (a serious peripheral vascular disease caused by arsenic exposure in Taiwan) and their families had blood 
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